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Outcome Mapping Report “Supporting Post-Election Dialogue and Reconciliation in Zanzibar” Project

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**AGENCY FOR
PEACEBUILDING**

I. Introduction

This report presents and discusses the main findings emerged during the outcome mapping exercise of the project “Uchaguzi Bila Zogo – Supporting Post-Election Dialogue and Reconciliation in Zanzibar”. The workshop was held in Zanzibar on November 3, 2022 and was facilitated by Richard Sambaiga, Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Dar es Salaam, with the support of Hashim Pondeza, Senior Advisor, Agency for Peacebuilding (AP). This report was co-authored by Richard Sambaiga and Bernardo Venturi, AP’s Director.

The workshop brought together a total of 23 participants from a wide range of stakeholders namely leaders of political parties (6), representatives of CSOs (6), religious leaders (2), representatives from media (1), representatives from the US Embassy (2), and staff from Search (6). A full list of participants is available as Annex 1 at the end of the report.

According to the definition provided by *Better Evaluation*, an “*Outcome mapping (OM) is a methodology for planning, monitoring and evaluating development initiatives in order to bring about sustainable social change. As the name suggests, its niche is understanding outcomes; the so-called ‘missing-middle’ or ‘black box’ of results that emerge downstream from the initiative’s activities but upstream from longer-term economic, environmental, political or demographic changes.*”¹

This Outcome mapping exercise was planned in the form of a discussion of what participants considered the outcomes of implementing the project activities. The outcome mapping task was conducted focusing on five major project activities out of which several outcomes were mapped in line with the theory of change of the project.²

II. Context background

In Zanzibar, every election year has become a flashpoint for tensions and violence between community members, and sometimes between citizens and security forces. The 2020 general election was specifically challenging as for the first time it was held on two consecutive days³. Many people in Zanzibar and other political actors outside the islands were reluctant about this decision, but the Zanzibar Elections Commission (ZEC) insisted that it followed the law as stated in the 2018 Zanzibar Election Act.

¹ <https://www.betterevaluation.org/methods-approaches/approaches/outcome-mapping>

² Cover photo: A group photo of participants at the outcome mapping workshop - November 3, 2022.

³ "Security personnel in Zanzibar to vote a day earlier", *The Citizen*, September 29, 2020, <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/security-personnel-in-zanzibar-to-vote-a-day-earlier-2717052>

That decision led to clashes between the supporters of the main opposition party and Zanzibar and Tanzanian security forces⁴. This said, after the general elections and the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU), in December 2020, with the swearing in of the late Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad as First Vice President of Zanzibar, the security and political environment in the archipelago continued to stabilise. Besides that, on January 12, 2022, during the 58th anniversary of the Zanzibar Revolution event at the Amaan Stadium in Unguja, supporters of both CCM, the ruling party, and ACT Wazalendo, the main opposition party on the island, matched together to show solidarity under the GNU spirit.

Despite ongoing peaceful conditions, Zanzibar's peace is in fact a situation that needs constant special care from peace and security stakeholders, due to its volatile condition. For instance, on July 18, 2021, Zanzibar witnessed a very contested by-election in the Konde constituency in Pemba Island. The election campaign was peacefully held by all participating political parties, although the more active campaigns were between CCM and ACT Wazalendo. The National Elections Commission (NEC) then announced Mr. Sheha Mpemba Faki, the CCM's party candidate, the winner in the by-election, after reportedly garnering a total of 1,796 votes against his closest opponent Mr. Mohammed Said Issa from the opposition ACT-Wazalendo, who earned a total of 1,373 votes (the total valid votes were 5,020⁵).

ACT Wazalendo rejected the official results claiming there was vote-rigging. Later, they made a threat to remove themselves from the GNU. There were different high-level political analyses and suggestions on urgent actions to save the GNU, especially between July 18 and August 3, 2021⁶. Though it was publicly announced that family reasons led to the resignation of CCM party's newly elected MP, political analysts viewed that decision as the result of concrete actions to save the GNU from collapsing and to prevent an escalation to political violence. Since the resignation announcement was publicly made and a fresh election was called, which witnessed ACT Wazalendo strongly winning the by-election, the social and political relations among citizens and other political actors in Zanzibar have continuously improved⁷.

On October 4, 2022, President Hussein Mwinyi of Zanzibar, while presenting official opening remarks to the special stakeholders' forum on multi-party democracy in Zanzibar, appreciated the participation of all

⁴ "Tanzania: Clashes reported as early voting begins in Zanzibar", Crisis24, October 27, 2020, <https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/393576/tanzania-clashes-reported-as-early-voting-begins-in-zanzibar-october-27>

⁵ The Chanzo Morning Briefing – August 4, 2021, <https://thechanzo.com/2021/08/04/the-chanzo-morning-briefing-august-4-2021/>

⁶ Rehema Ibrahim, "Serikali ya Umoja wa Kitaifa Zanzibar hatihati kumeguka", *Sauti Kubwa*, 20 July 2021, <https://sautikubwa.org/serikali-ya-umoja-wa-kitaifa-zanzibar-hatihati-kumeguka/>

⁷ "ACT –Wazalendo defeat CCM in Konde by-election", Africa Press, 10 October 2021, <https://www.africa-press.net/tanzania/all-news/act-wazalendo-defeat-ccm-in-konde-by-election>

19 political parties in the workshop. He mentioned that their presence indicated continuous positive relations and support that political parties experience in Zanzibar under the current GNU⁸.

On November 10, 2022 President of Zanzibar, Hussein Mwinyi announced seven appointments to his government, including Mr. Thabit Idarous Faina as ZEC Director⁹. Mr. Faina was holding the same position during the most recent general election, in 2020, when the opposition claimed foul play by the ZEC. Due to this announcement, Zanzibar's First Vice President boycotted attending the swearing-in ceremony and his political party, ACT Wazalendo, issued a press release on the same day denying Mr. Faina's appointment and urging President Mwinyi not to swear him in¹⁰. This incident started once again to escalate political tensions in Zanzibar¹¹. ACT Wazalendo has now made a public announcement that it will hold a special meeting to discuss political matters in Zanzibar particularly focusing on their party's relevance to the GNU¹². Due to this political turbulence, Zanzibar's political stability and sustainable peace are currently at risk.

III. Project background

The overall goal of the project "Uchaguzi Bila Zogo – Supporting Post-Election Dialogue and Reconciliation in Zanzibar" (October 2021 - April 2023) is to strengthen inclusive post-election dialogue and reconciliation efforts in Zanzibar. This goal is supported by the project's objective to improve the integration of high-level political actors into community-level post-election dialogue and reconciliation efforts as well as three expected results.

The project targeted Zanzibar (both Unguja and Pemba), recognizing the need to increase collaboration and inclusivity in addressing post-election tensions on each island, as well as to improve relationships between the two islands.

⁸ "Mwinyi to grace stakeholders' forum on multiparty democracy in Zanzibar", *Daily New*, 4 October 2022, <https://dailynews.co.tz/mwinyi-to-grace-stakeholders-forum-on-multiparty-democracy-in-zanzibar/>

⁹ "Mwinyi reshuffles PS, appoints ZEC Director", *Daily New*, 10 November 2022, <https://dailynews.co.tz/mwinyi-reshuffles-ps-appoints-zec-director/>

¹⁰ <https://twitter.com/IsmailJussa/status/1590760848255234053/photo/1>

¹¹ "ZEC Boss Appointment Leads ACT-Wazalendo to Question Mwinyi's Reconciliation Rhetorics", *The Chanzo Reporter*, 11 November 2022,

<https://thechanzo.com/2022/11/11/zec-boss-appointment-leads-act-wazalendo-to-question-mwinyis-reconciliation-rhetorics/>

¹² <https://twitter.com/salimbimani2/status/1591037072885833728/photo/1>

This project has one objective and three expected results, as outlined in the table below.

Objective 1: Improve integration of high-level political actors into community-level post-election dialogue and reconciliation efforts		
Expected Results		
1.1. High-level political actors and local civil society are better equipped to constructively engage among and with each other on post-election-related issues	1.2. Horizontal coordination among local civil society and religious actors to identify election conflict drivers and inclusive approaches to address them is improved	1.3 Opportunities for vertical dialogue and collaborative action to address election grievances are increased

The project is also informed by the following theory of change:

IF political and civil society actors have increased capacity and tools to constructively engage among and between them, and *IF* opportunities are created for collaboration and positive interaction between the national government and Zanzibari communities on election grievances and conflicts, *THEN* there will be more effective reconciliation and reforms to address election grievances *because* there will be more inclusive avenues for dialogue and increased trust at all levels.



Richard Sambaiga facilitates the first session of the outcome mapping workshop

IV. Main outcomes

Part I: Outcome Identification Exercise

After introducing the outcome mapping exercise, the facilitator asked the participants to highlight the main outcomes of the project. The participants mentioned and elaborated on several project outcomes, as listed below:

1. Enhanced skills in how to peacefully address political tensions and conflicts;
2. Opened space for stakeholders from different political parties to convene for dialogue leading to reduced political tensions in Zanzibar;
3. Improved ability to engage with political opponents through dialogue despite the past experience of lack of tolerance;
4. Improved relationship between peacebuilding CSOs and the government;
5. Opened spaces for dialogue between members from different political parties and election management bodies (such as ZEC and Police Force);
6. Sense of political tolerance toward stakeholders with different political positions;
7. Improved capacity for high-level advocacy on conflict transformation and sustainable peace.;
8. Influence of policy-making through the Presidential Task Force in Zanzibar;
9. Ideas within the Stakeholders Recommendations' papers were reflected in the report of the Presidential Task force for reconciliation;
10. Appointing of some members of the Technical Working Groups in the Presidential Task Force for Reconciliation in Zanzibar;
11. Questioning from some government institutions about the legitimacy of the selected Task Force Team and the stakeholders' recommendations' paper process;
12. Increased awareness of the security actors on how to prevent abuse of human rights during elections.

After collecting and discussing these intended and unintended outcomes, the participants summarized and clustered them into three main categories:

1. Improved capacity to constructively engage in high-level advocacy related to electoral grievances;
2. New spaces for peace dialogue to reduce electoral tensions among different stakeholders;
3. Improved relationship between peacebuilding CSOs, political parties, religious leaders and the government.

These three categories are overall in line with the three intended results outlined by the project mentioned below.

- Result 1.1: High-level political actors and local civil society are better equipped to constructively engage among and with each other on post-election-related issues;
- Result 1.2: Horizontal coordination among local civil society and religious actors to identify election conflict drivers and inclusive approaches to address them is improved;
- Result 1.3: Opportunities for vertical dialogue and collaborative action to address election grievances are increased.

The coherence between the outcomes emerged during the exercise and the project's intended results show that the activities were oriented and developed in the expected direction. More information on intended and unintended results is discussed in the following section.

Part II: Outcome Description Exercise

During this second part of the Outcome Mapping, the facilitator guided the workshop participants to describe the emerged outcomes. Then, the participants' associated project activities with the emerging outcomes. The outcome descriptions are presented clustered in the three main categories, supported by direct quotes from participants and complemented with secondary sources.

Result 1: Improved capacity to constructively engage in high-level advocacy related to electoral grievances

Among the outcomes mentioned during the first part of the outcome mapping, the following four outcomes can be reported to this result and can be considered as intended outcomes:

1. Enhanced skills of political actors together with CSO and religious representatives on how to peacefully address political tensions and conflicts;
2. Increased awareness of the security actors on how to prevent abuse of human rights during elections;

3. Improved capacity for high-level advocacy on conflict transformation and sustainable peace;
4. Sense of political tolerance toward stakeholders with different political positions.

Participants of the outcome mapping workshop attested to having gained competence to engage with high-level political actors on sensitive issues and concerns such as election-related grievances. In particular, there was a consensus among participants from Unguja and Pemba that they were equipped with skills and competencies to conduct effective, non-adversarial advocacy, build consensus among diverse groups, and represent community concerns and needs to high-level government representatives.

Likewise, it was unanimously agreed by the workshop participants that, as part of the high-level political actors, they feel empowered with essential knowledge and skills in conflict resolution, which has enabled them to peacefully discuss electoral-related concerns among themselves and with diverse community stakeholders.

Workshop participants attributed the above outcomes mainly to the two conflict transformation trainings for high-level political actors conducted in Unguja and Pemba one week after the high-level advocacy training. A review of project monitoring reports indicates that trainings aimed at preparing high-level political actors to discuss election concerns among themselves and with diverse community stakeholders.

Overall, there was a feeling among project beneficiaries that the project has empowered them to better engage in conflict transformation. Through the project interventions, high-level political actors, religious leaders and local civil society were better equipped to constructively engage each other on electoral issues. This point was confirmed by different participants, such as these two from local CSOs: *“In the past it was almost impossible for leaders from rival political parties to seat together and deliberate on election-related matters but the trainings on conflict resolution have been changed the situation”*; and *“I have benefited from the project trainings on conflict resolution, which I have used in addressing family conflicts at the community level in a successful way such that I would not imagine having done it without the training”*.

Furthermore, from the mapping exercise emerged that some participants applied the acquired skills, as mentioned in this quote: *“After the training I utilized the skills because we had a conflict in our political parties [...] I engaged with my top leaders in the party and advised them on how to address intraparty conflicts through dialogues.”*

Further review of the project's quarterly reports confirms that the content of the training was relevant in



Participants engaged in a discussion during the outcome mapping workshop

terms of equipping participants with knowledge and skills moving from the main concepts of peace and conflict and power dynamics to planning for peace and cooperation in Zanzibar.¹³ According to the project quarterly reports, the Ugunja training came up with 14 key issues of common concern framed around four thematic areas (policy, procedures, laws, practices and institutions). The project's quarterly reports further underline the fact that the trainings conducted in Pemba were an opportunity for high-level political leaders,

CSO and religious representatives to engage one another and agree on a joint advocacy agenda.

Result 2: New spaces for peace dialogue to reduce electoral tensions among different stakeholders

Among the outcomes mentioned during the first part of the outcome mapping, the following three outcomes can be reported to this result and can be considered primarily as intended outcomes:

1. Improved ability to engage with political opponents through dialogue despite the past experience of lack of tolerance;
2. Opened space for stakeholders from different political parties to convene for dialogue leading to reduced political tensions in Zanzibar;
3. Opened spaces for dialogue between members from different political parties and election management bodies (such as ZEC and Police Force).

Effective mechanisms to prevent and/or manage post-electoral conflicts in societies characterized by polarized politics like Zanzibar require inclusive approaches to identify conflict drivers and address them. The project has managed to open up spaces for local CSOs, religious actors and political stakeholders

¹³ Thirdly and Quarterly Report to the US Department of State – US Embassy, Tanzania, July and October, 2022.

to collectively engage in peacebuilding conversations. The spaces took multiple forms including technical working groups and round table meetings

Throughout the outcome mapping workshop, participants acknowledged that the project succeeded in bringing together actors with different ideological backgrounds to engage in dialogue, which allowed them to identify the drivers of conflicts and the best ways to address them. According to the workshop participants, platforms for dialogue were instrumental in raising awareness among actors and empowering them to be tolerant of opposing views. In particular, CSOs, religious actors, and political parties' leaders attested the capacity to promote peaceful dialogue and engage in advocacy. This aspect was further illustrated by a participant: *"Let's look at what the project has brought about. First of all, the gathering of people from different political parties. You all remember that in the past it was not possible for members from different political parties to meet and discuss [...] but now through the trainings we can engage constructively. Then, the project reduced conflicts between political stakeholders. [They] were not greeting each other but through the project, they were forced to sit together and deliberate on peace"*.

It's relevant to underline that the project's results involved both Pemba and Unguja. Increased positive relations between antagonistic parties – in particular ruling and opposition political parties and between community members themselves – were reported in both islands. As mentioned by a participant, *"In Pemba the outcome of the project includes awareness on how to solve their conflicts without threatening peace, to build a sense of tolerance, because we were brought from different political parties [...] The Stakeholders Recommendations in Pemba was able to gather different voices into one on the need to transform the political landscape [...] we were able to sensitize people on the laws, some politicians were not knowledgeable about their own constitutions."*

The participants also showed satisfaction with the senior level of institutional stakeholders taking part in the dialogues. As a participant pointed out: *"We were given access to high-level leaders. We have not reached out to the President but have reached out to the first Vice President. Some of the members who were trained on high-level advocacy training were appointed to the Presidential Task Force for reconciliation in Zanzibar. On the whitepaper, the achievement is still limited, we have submitted to one high level and at the lower level [...] some things that have surfaced in the just released Presidential Task Force report were also in our white paper [...] we are looking forward to more achievement"*.

Participants of the outcome mapping workshop also attributed positive results to the Technical Working Groups (TWGs), which included the development of the Stakeholders Recommendations' development and convening of peace roundtables in Unguja



and Pemba. The TWGs have engaged in and promoted dialogues as a means of addressing electoral grievances. In addition, they were able to gather views and develop white papers, which would serve as advocacy tools, as mentioned by different participants during the exercise: *“The Stakeholders Recommendations have only landed at the First Vice President while lower-level offices are likely to shelve it. Nonetheless, listening to the resolutions made by the Presidential Task Force it’s not hard to see how some of the ideas from the Stakeholders Recommendations were taken on board”*.

Furthermore, participants agreed that the Peace Roundtable served as a platform to foster dialogue in order to ensure that the process of developing the white papers was inclusive. It was also underlined by participants from both Unguja and Pemba that the Roundtable brought together representatives from the government, law enforcement agencies, election management bodies, political parties, religious leaders, media and CSOs. The discussions served to review the draft Stakeholders Recommendations, and agree on resolutions and recommendations in conducting high-level advocacy visits.

Equally important, some participants related the above outcome with a series of trainings conducted within the framework of the *Uchaguzi Bila Zogo* project: *“It must be underlined that the training also served as safe spaces for high-level political actors to air out election-related frustrations in a carefully facilitated environment, leading to brainstorming on peaceful ways to address them”* noted one of the participants during the workshop. The diversity of participants in the high-level advocacy training and conflict transformation training for political actors both in Unguja and Pemba demonstrates the extent to which political, religious and CSOs actors positively responded to the project.

The above findings on the project outcomes are supported by secondary sources whereby a review of quarterly reports indicates that both in Unguja and Pemba the TWG was empowered to deliberate on peaceful elections. Insights from the discussion informed the recommendations for Unguja and Pemba stakeholders. The Stakeholder Recommendations have indeed been used as an advocacy tool during high-level visits and at the peace roundtable meetings.

Result 3: Improved relationship between peacebuilding CSOs, political parties, religious leaders and the government

Among the outcomes mentioned during the first part of the outcome mapping, the following two intended and three unintended outcomes can be reported:

Intended outcomes:

1. Improved relationship between peacebuilding CSOs and the government;
2. Influence of policy-making through the Presidential Task Force in Zanzibar;
3. Unintended outcomes:
4. Ideas within the Stakeholder Recommendations' papers were reflected in the report of the Presidential Task force for reconciliation (unintended outcome);
5. Appointment of some members of the Technical Working Groups in the Presidential Task Force for Reconciliation in Zanzibar (unintended outcome);
6. Questioning from some government institutions about the legitimacy of the selected Task Force Team and about the white paper process (unintended outcome).

This cluster shows, more than the previous two, relevant unintended results besides the intended one. In fact, while an “improved relationship between peacebuilding CSOs and the government” and some achievements related to the white paper were expected, the results related to the Presidential Task force were not foreseen. More specifically on the development of Stakeholders Recommendations' papers, it was a positive outcome that it was reported to the First Vice President of Zanzibar, and he accepted and mentioned that it's a good ground to start improving election-related challenges based on people's voices. However, other government institutions did not show excitement either about the process or its results. Also, there were questions about the legitimacy of the selected Task Force Team as well as the objective selection of constituencies they visited. Overall, the project engaged high-level politicians who had other key political issues apart from the project objectives. This missed alignment generated subjective satisfaction with the results.

Overall, participants of the outcome mapping workshop confirmed that the relationship between stakeholders in Zanzibar such as political parties, religious leaders, CSOs and state actors has improved significantly as a result of the project interventions. The majority of the participants confirmed to have experienced some degree of improvement in the relationship between key stakeholders in the electoral politics of Zanzibar. For example, a participant explained that “*The project has enabled us to engage*



constructively because before the project intervention it was difficult for political actors to come together for dialogue [...] whenever it happened, we ended up fighting each other but now we can argue and engage”.

Yet others felt that the project has cultivated a culture of dialogue and tolerance amongst stakeholders,

which was evident through debates without violence. Overall, participants felt that the project has had notable outcomes but risks related to electoral violence remain in place. Hence the need to build on the achievement to sustain peace in Zanzibar. Much as *The Registrar of NGOs in Zanzibar speaking during the outcome mapping workshop* the participants echoed the desire to sustain the project outcomes. They demonstrated genuine concerns about whether the sense of tolerance will persist in the next elections.

Building on the good relationship between key stakeholders in peacebuilding, the TWGs succeeded in submitting their Stakeholder Recommendations papers to the First Vice President of Zanzibar and the Election Management Bodies. A participant illustrated that *“The technical working groups included representatives from religious leaders, CSOs, Media, Political Parties and governmental officials. This served not only as a space to engage different actors but also as an opportunity to foster good relationships and networks between state and non-state actors. When the submission of the white paper by the TWG in Unguja had issues we did capitalize on these networks to address the challenge”*. Finally, from the participants emerged the idea that the formation of TWGs should consider collective action between Unguja and Pemba.

V. Conclusion

Overall, the project provided an alternative platform for key political players to discuss challenges and find common solutions. After the 2020 general election, there were fewer avenues for peace dialogue and the Uchaguzi Bila Logo project provided this space.

The outcomes emerged from this exercise result fully in line with the objectives and intended results of the project. At the same time, the activities have also reached relevant unintended results, in particular in terms of advocacy and concrete policy documents on peace-related issues. The eleven outcomes were also clustered into three main categories in line with the intended project results: improved capacity to constructively engage in high-level advocacy related to electoral grievances; new spaces for peace dialogue to reduce electoral tensions among different stakeholders; improved relationship between peacebuilding CSOs, political parties, religious leaders and the government. Overall, capacity-building remains a paramount activity while dialogue was effective after the first training phase: participants felt empowered with practical knowledge and skills in conflict resolution, which has enabled them to peacefully discuss electoral-related concerns among themselves and with diverse community stakeholders. This outcome mapping exercise also showed relevant results in terms of advocacy. This final dimension certainly deserves attention and continuity in future programming in Zanzibar, especially moving toward the next electoral period. In fact, achieving results in terms of policy-making is often one of the most complex and long-term objectives of peacebuilding programmes. Advocacy also needs significant continuity in relations and activities. At the same time, policy-makers and high-level stakeholders need to be involved in the project development, otherwise part of them could derail and delegitimise the achieved results. To make the results sustainable, Search and partners should continue to invest in this direction in the coming months maintaining open channels even beyond activities supported by specific projects.