

# BASELINE AND CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

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## Jenga Amani Yetu

Anthony Sarota, Lead Consultant

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## Disclaimer

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and should not be viewed as representing the official position of Search for Common Ground or its donor.



*Female focus group, Lead Consultant.*

## Abbreviations

ACT Wazalendo	Alliance for Change and Transparency- Wazalendo
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CHADEMA	Chama Cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia
CGA	Common Ground Approach
CSO	Civil society organization
CUF	Civic United Front
COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease 19
DC	District Commissioner
DED	District Executive Director
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNU	Government of National Unity
ILPI	International Law and Policy Institute
KII	Key Informant Interview
LHRC	Legal Human Right Centre
NCCR-Mageuzi	National Convention for Construction and Reform- Mageuzi
SUZA	State University of Zanzibar
ToC	Theory of Change
ZLSC	Zanzibar Legal Service Centre
ZEC	Zanzibar Electoral Commission

## Executive Summary

Tanzania, regarded as relatively stable compared its neighbors, has continued to experience an increase of violent conflict over the past few decades. After the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Tanzania in the 1990s, elections became a primary driver of tensions and political violence in Tanzania. Since the return of the multiparty system, politicians and some political parties have used religion for political gain, dividing communities in Tanzania. Political, religious, and economic grievances such as competition over natural resources, combined with ethnic/clan disagreements in some parts of Tanzania have also contributed to a significant increase of violent conflict in Tanzania. The current decline in civic space in Tanzania has undermined the relationship between government and other stakeholders stifling legitimate political activity, which pushes individuals or groups to violence as a means of achieving their social, economic, political, or religious goals, as platforms to openly talk about their concerns or air their opinions are non-existent.

Recognizing this challenge, Search for Common Ground (Search) in partnership with Legal Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and a partner organization from Zanzibar have designed the Jenga Amani Yetu project (Building Peaceful Communities) aiming to support peaceful conflict resolution, open dialogue, and inclusive democracy in Tanzania. The project is funded by the European Union and will train diverse CSOs in non-adversarial engagement, conflict sensitivity, and leadership, as well as provide them with a platform to improve their relationship and work together with the government at the local level. The project is funded by the European Union and will be implemented over a 30-month period in five districts: Tarime-North Mara in Mara, Mtwara town and Tandahimba in Mtwara, Kibiti and Rufiji-Ikwiriri in Coastal region, and Unguja and Pemba in Zanzibar.

Search commissioned this baseline and conflict assessment study to thoroughly understand community perceptions on conflict dynamics that will be used to inform Search and partners to enhance their strategy and approach during project implementation. In line with this, the baseline acts as a framework for the project, providing initial data to enable measurement of project indicators and validate the project's theory of change, as well as provide a risk assessment to ensure conflict sensitivity of project activities.

The baseline and conflict assessment report covers findings from quantitative data collected through a survey and qualitative data collected through focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs) from April to June 2020 in all target communities. Although overall the data collection process was successful, there were challenges in reaching some targets due to COVID-19, which restricted the ability to travel to some target areas. Contributing to the inability to reach some respondents due to lifestyle changes in communities, like social distancing and quarantining. Adjustments to the data collection plan were made, including moving to phone interviews, which allowed the baseline to collect enough data to ensure there was no negative impact on overall findings.

Findings from the baseline and conflict assessment suggest that violent conflict is continuing to increase in the target communities. Community members identified economic, political, and religious conflicts as the primary flash points in their communities. Data also suggests that while at the national level, social, political, economic, and religious grievances are drivers of conflicts. At the community level, economic grievances around natural resources, such as land, are the primary driver of violent conflict. As the country heads towards the October 2020 general election, many surveyed did not show concern over violent conflict as a result of elections. Interestingly, community members were more worried about banning of political activities and rallies, which they anticipate will lead to violence in their community. Despite positive feelings about the potential absence of violence during the upcoming election, communities are feeling the decline in the civil space and there is fear that this will contribute to violence. Lastly, misunderstandings and lack of trust between CSOs, media and government contribute to ineffectiveness of conflict resolution efforts at the community level.

## Key findings

- There was a significant difference in perceptions of the biggest violent conflict by location. Respondents in Kibiti (88%), Ikwiriri (70%), and Mtwara (67%) showed more concern about land violent conflicts, compared to Tarime where a majority of respondents (53%) viewed ethnicity as the main conflict, and Tandahimba, where a majority of respondents (41%) viewed religious conflicts as the biggest conflict in their communities.
- There are two primary drivers of land conflict: First, as a result of disagreements between community members or between villages due to lack of understanding of land laws and; Second, between community members and the government, park authorities or investors, which are a result of poor communication between communities and these stakeholders, or community land being taken without appropriate compensation.
- Political hate speech has polarized communities based on their political and religious ideological differences, hindering collaboration between community members.
- Evidence suggests that violent conflict changes during election years. Many common conflicts such as farmer vs. herders, communities vs. park authorities, or communities vs. government or investors, decline during elections. However, election violence emerges during election years, due to factors such as boycotting election results.
- Surveyed community members in all target areas have little knowledge on CSO initiatives addressing violent conflicts in their communities. In fact, CSO and media performance were viewed negatively by respondents.
- Unsurprisingly given the current climate in Tanzania, relationships between CSOs and media and government are poor and trust between them is low.
- Findings show that communities still trust in media, but messages distributed through media are not contributing to community trust and cohesion.
- The majority of respondents have shown concern about the crackdown on civic space in Tanzania, which they claim has compromised the performance of CSOs and media in addressing violence conflict.
- There are conflict mechanisms in place already, such as Village or Ward land committees, police desks, and actors such as local authorities and elders at the community level who deal with conflict as it occurs. However, a majority of respondents suggested that more trainings and conflict mitigation skills are needed for these actors to effectively address violent conflicts in their communities.
- In all surveyed communities, women and men have significant differences on violent conflict dynamics in their communities. For instance, women were more concerned by political and electoral conflict compared to men.

## Conclusion and recommendations

Understanding community perceptions on conflicts, the drivers of conflicts, actors who exacerbate and mitigate conflict as well as the available conflict mechanisms at the community level empowers Search engage effectively on key issues. Additionally, baseline indicators around the effectiveness of CSOs in conflict resolution, government awareness of CSO roles in conflict resolution, citizen perceptions of the media, stakeholder collaboration, and citizen perceptions of those who may differ from themselves, will enable Search to support peaceful conflict resolution, open dialogue, and inclusive democracy. The following recommendations will help Search and partners while implementing Jenga Amani Yetu, improving activities and increasing impact:

- Focus on strengthening relationships and trust among stakeholders using “*single and multi-stakeholder community dialogues*” before engaging in building platforms where stakeholders will engage to address violent conflicts.
- Build connections and relationships with champions within the government who can act as entry points for the project to bring institutional change around the importance of CSOs and media in addressing conflict.
- Design tailored capacity building trainings that empower actors responsible for mitigating conflict in communities.
- Ensure implementation of a gender strategy which will ensure equal representation and participation during project implementation. Additionally, strengthen women’s organizations to effectively participate in the coalition to address violent conflicts in Tanzania.
- Conduct an in-depth assessment of the media landscape, including understanding the impact different types of media can have in the context of the crackdown on civil space in Tanzania, as well as understanding what types of media and media representatives can have the greatest impact on conflict resolution.
- Design activities to align with existing structures, including local mechanisms such as land committees, in addressing violent conflict in the communities. In order to gain buy-in from stakeholders, including government.
- Conduct rigorous monitoring and evaluation of project activities to allow the program to be iterative; learning and adapting based on fluidity of conflict dynamics in Tanzania.

## 1. Introduction

This report covers the findings from the baseline and conflict assessment for the “Jenga Amani Yetu” project. The project aims to support peaceful conflict resolution, open dialogue, and inclusive democracy in Tanzania, funded by the European Union and implemented by Search for Common Ground (Search) in partnership with the Legal Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and a partner organization from Zanzibar.

Search commissioned this baseline and conflict assessment to a team of consultants. The consultants conducted the baseline and conflict assessment to inform Search on conflict dynamics and provide recommendations on the theory of change (ToC) and indicators of the project. Additionally, the baseline and conflict assessment assisted in validating the assumptions underpinning the ToC ensuring they are applicable in each target area, while also helping to identify possible areas of collaboration within and between stakeholders.

### 1.1. Objectives of the Baseline and Conflict Assessment

The objectives of the baseline and conflict assessment, based on the TOR, aimed to:

1. Assess the current context, with regards to existing conflict dynamics: particularly focusing on the type of conflicts, the actors involved and their level of influence, communication channels and narratives, and existing response mechanism and level of collaboration among different stakeholders;
2. Collect baseline values and assess whether the project's Theory of Change (TOC) resonate with targeted communities and their needs and is relevant to the current context;
3. Conduct a risk assessment and draw recommendations for programming to ensure conflict sensitivity is respected in the project.

The consultant answered the following questions in each target community:

<p><b>OB1. Conflict Assessment</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What types of conflicts are becoming or likely to become violent in the targeted areas? Among the conflicts identified, which are the main conflicts between CSOs, government, media around elections? Which of those conflicts are likely to be exacerbated in the lead up to the elections and how?</li> <li>2. What are the factors of attraction and repulsion to these violent conflicts?</li> <li>3. Who are the key players involved in those conflicts? What is their role and their level of influence and/or collaboration?</li> <li>4. How do communities react to these conflicts? What are the attitudes and perceptions of communities and other key actors towards these violent conflicts?</li> <li>5. More specifically, what is the role of CSOs and the media in violent conflicts?</li> <li>6. What are the existing communication channels and networks used to trigger and to manage/transform/prevent conflicts?</li> </ol>
<p><b>OB2. Baseline values and Theory of change</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Considering the current theory of change, does it resonate with targeted communities and their needs? Is the ToC relevant to the current VE context?</li> <li>2. What are the baseline values of the project indicators?</li> <li>3. Are there recommendations for adaptations of the current project logic and results chain to improve the potential impact of the project?</li> </ol>
<p><b>OB3. Risk Assessment and “Do No Harm”</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Which are the contextual and project-related risks that require monitoring?</li> <li>2. What can the project do to ensure it stays conflict sensitive and respects “Do No Harm” principles?</li> </ol>

### 1.2. Description of Project Intervention

The project relies on the following theory of change, which is discussed and validated in Section 5. **Baseline Indicators and Theory of Change:**

*If a diverse coalition of civil society groups has the skills and space to collaborate in a no adversarial manner around key sensitive issues and has opportunities to engage with government champions to constructively address them and if Tanzanian citizens have access to balanced and credible information that promotes peaceful approaches and collaboration among different actors and across various divides then a variety of key stakeholders, including civil society, will work together to promote a culture of peace, conflict prevention, and inclusive democracy because civil society, government actors, and citizens will understand the advantages brought by working together to solve shared problems.*

The TOC directly informs the project’s overall objective, activities, and results, as expressed below:

The overall objective of the project is to increase civil society organizations’ (CSOs’) contribution toward a culture of peace, conflict prevention and inclusive democracy in Tanzania. This objective is supported by two specific objectives and results, which are to:

<p><b>Specific Objective 1:</b> Increase collaboration among and between CSOs, media and government stakeholders to advance peaceful conflict resolution</p>	<p><b>Specific Objective 2:</b> Promote narratives of peace at the local, regional, and national levels</p>
<p><b>Results 1.1:</b> Platforms to share information and dialogue on critical issues are created or strengthened</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Results 1.2:</b> CSOs, media, and government work together to identify and implement constructive solutions that directly address sensitive issues</li> <li>● A1.1 CGA Training for CSOs</li> <li>● A1.2 CGA Training for Government</li> <li>● A1.3 Coalition building forum</li> <li>● A1.4 Civil society - Government forums</li> <li>● A1.5 Support to Joint initiatives</li> </ul>	<p><b>Results 2.1:</b> Increased access to stories of collaboration across divides, challenging prevailing stereotypes and transforming mutual negative perceptions;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● A2.1 CGA Training for media</li> <li>● A2.2 Peace Media Campaign</li> </ul>

The main target group of the project activities includes the diverse CSOs with a variety of missions, backgrounds, and constituencies in the focus communities.

## 2. Methodology

Fundamental to the methodological framework, the consultants used an action-research approach<sup>1</sup> focusing on assessing conflict dynamics. The baseline and conflict assessment developed a rich set of data collected from a variety of sources: quantitative data collected through surveys, qualitative information gathered through interviews and focus group discussions, as well as a literature and current news review.

In parallel, the methodology focused on the project's Theory of Change (ToC) and indicators to determine if they reflect the current social political context of the target communities. We assessed various aspects covered by the impact indicators and ensured the background variables are properly linked together; determined what external factors might affect the performance of the project and whether they are related to the performance indicators; and described the links between the outputs and the short- and long-term outcomes of the project. In short, we laid a foundation to test that the theory of change is expressed in the form of a series of cause-and-effect relationships which would allow, throughout the project life cycle and end-line, to assess what has worked, what has not, and for which reasons – whether internal or external<sup>2</sup>.

### 2.1 Literature review

The consultants reviewed and analyzed project documents which Search shared. In addition to standard project documents, the consultants reviewed current literature from ongoing violent conflicts, democratic and electoral trends in Tanzania, including formal policies, communications, and academic reports and articles through open-source searches targeting online materials from governmental and non-governmental sources. These sources were triangulated with data from the field to identify differences and similarities of the data in an effort to understand community perceptions on violence, the social political context, and ToC and indicators of the project in the context.

### 2.2 Data Collection

Data collection included qualitative – Key Informant Interviews-KIIs, and Focus Group Discussions-FGDs, and quantitative – an individual survey. Activities took place from April 20 to May 15.

**Qualitative:** The consultants conducted interviews and focus groups with a number of stakeholders as agreed in the inception meeting with Search. Stakeholders included partners, community members and other relevant actors that will be engaged during implementation. The approach during interviews and focus groups was semi-structured, allowing the interviewees and participants during the discussion to flow freely and discuss new issues and ideas.

**Key Informant Interviews.** The interviews were conducted face to face in those areas where the team was able to travel for data collection. Because of the risk of the COVID-19 pandemic, for those areas where the team was

<sup>1</sup> *Action Research* is an approach in which the researcher and researched work collaboratively to come up with findings based on self-reflection and a desire to improve. In this case, the approach aims to improve or change Search's understanding and practices before the project implementation. This approach can be used, for example, on adaptation of ToC and assumption behind project indicators by involving people who will be affected by the project.

<sup>2</sup> See for instance CARE International (2012), *Defining Theories of Change*. London, CARE; USAID (2010), *Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation*.

unable to travel, the consultants conducted phone interviews. A total of 25 interviews (at least five in each target community) were held, per the table below.

Informant type	Gender	
	Male	Female
Key Informant		
LHRC	1	2
ZLSC		1
Representatives from targeted CSOs	9	3
Representatives from media	4	1
Government officials (At local level)	2	1
Community influencers (incl. religious leaders)	3	
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>8</b>

*Focus Group Discussions.* As mentioned above, the COVID-19 pandemic affected the ability of the consultants to travel, impacting the number of focus groups conducted. FGDs were held in only two target communities, Mtwara town and Tandahimba, per the table below. In areas where the team was unable to travel, no focus group discussions were conducted. Male and female focus groups were conducted separately.

Informant type	Gender	
	Male	Female
Focus group participants		
Community members - Mtwara town	1 (7 participants)	1 (8 participants)
Community members - Tandahimba	1 (7 participants)	1 (8 participants)
<b>Total Participants</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>

**Quantitative:** Finally, quantitative data was collected using an individual household survey. The survey was designed to capture community perceptions and feelings of various baseline and conflict assessment variables aiming to assess: the general community feeling and perception of violence, drivers of violence, and the primary actors who exacerbate or mitigate conflicts in communities. Furthermore, the survey helped the consultant to validate the ToC and indicators of the project and testing how the ToC and indicators reflect the current context of the target communities and Tanzania more broadly.

*Survey.* A total of **324 people** (163 females and 161 males) were interviewed during the survey in all target communities except for Zanzibar, as per demographic information as reflected below:

**Table 2: Respondents' gender distribution**

Sample	Mtwara Town	Tandahimba	Kibiti	Ikwiriri	N/Mara
Male	32	32	33	32	32
Female	32	31	35	33	32
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>64</b>

**Table 3: Respondents' age Distribution**

Age	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-35	36-40	41-49	50-59	60+
Number	4	33	65	66	49	55	34	18
Percentage	1%	10%	20%	20%	15%	17%	11%	6%




Figure 1 and 2: Respondents level of education and economic status in all survey areas

### 2.3. Limitations

There were some challenges and limitations throughout the baseline and conflict assessment activities:

- **Limitations to data collection** – Due to risk of COVID-19, we were unable to travel to all target locations, namely Zanzibar and Tarime. To adapt to this environment, the consultants conducted phone interviews to complete key informant interviews. Additionally, in Kibiti, the authorities did not allow us to interview government officials because of COVID-19. In Zanzibar, the baseline did not plan to collect quantitative data because of political sensitivity. Instead, we compared data collected through interviews with the rich data already available for Zanzibar for analysis and triangulation.
- **Bias** – Due to the nature of this study, bias among sources was also experienced. To counter this problem the consultant triangulated information gathered from sources to validate before use. During the KII and FGDs, the consultant encouraged participants to answer and engage honestly by ensuring that confidentiality will be maintained. Enumerators were also trained on maintaining impartiality and presenting themselves as unbiased to gain the trust of the interviewees and ensure data collected is accurate and truthful.
- **Time and Access Constraints** – The data collection portion of the baseline was delayed, impacting the ability to travel and access respondents due to COVID-19. Because of the virus, people had already started to make lifestyle adjustments, including social distancing and quarantining, hindering the ability to gather all information in person.

Although these limitations contributed to some drawbacks in data collection activities, their impacts were insignificant on the findings. The available data, except for indicator 2 which covers direct engagement with government officials, were sufficient to inform the project on the context, and to assess the TOC and project indicators.

## 3. Contextual Analysis

**Drivers of conflict in Tanzania:** The historical narrative that Tanzania is a peaceful, stable, and secure country among neighbors and other sub-Saharan African countries faces challenges from the increase in violent incidents in the past decade.<sup>3</sup> Since the neo-liberal reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, following the unsuccessful economic development approach of socialism and self-reliance (ujamaa na kujitegemea) policy in Tanzania, there has been a slow but steady increase in societal tensions across the country. The plethora of ethnicities and tribes in Tanzania does not readily provide for the tribalism that has dominated in neighboring Kenya, rather large religious blocks and social political differences have become dividing lines. Tanzania is facing growing violent conflict activities associated with the religious and social-political grievances and marginalization among groups in its societies.<sup>4</sup>

**Religious Marginalization and Interfaith Tension:** Religious grievances and marginalization have continued to threaten the country's peace and tranquility. There are inter-religious tensions between the two main religions in Tanzania, namely Christianity and Islam, some of which have resulted in violent conflict. Arguably, new more assertive and expressive forms of Christianity and long-held views by many Muslims of marginalization<sup>5</sup> have led to an increase in religiously motivated conflict in communities across Tanzania. For decades, there have been a number of worrying and sometimes violent incidents that have resulted from conflicts between Muslims groups and the government. For example, the protests and burning of churches in Dar es Salaam following allegations of a Christian youth urinating on a Quran.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, in Zanzibar the UAMSHO protests and riots driven by Salafi based nationalism and anti-Union sentiment highlight how long-standing religious grievances mixed with political agendas can lead to violent conflict. For instance, UAMSHO sentimentalists set to fire two churches and clashed with the police during the protest in Zanzibar after the arrest of their leaders<sup>7</sup> showing that religious tensions mixed with long standing political grievances about Zanzibar's position in the United Republic of Tanzania, can quickly turn violent. Likewise, events such as the killing of Muslims in a place of worship in Mwanza in 2016<sup>8</sup> signifies that extremism is growing and those seeking to divide in Tanzania are increasingly targeting religious divisions of all faiths.

<sup>3</sup> Social Conflict in Africa Database

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> Wijnsen, F. Mfumbusa, B. (2002). Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation: Multifaith Ideals and Realities

<sup>6</sup> BBC News. (October 2012). Tanzania arrests after Dar es Salaam churches attacks. BBCnews.com. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19950941>

<sup>7</sup> Reuters (May 27, 2012). Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/zanzibar-protest-idUSL5E8GR1HB20120527>

<sup>8</sup> AllAfrica.com, (26 June 2016 ) Tanzania: Muslim Community Lives in Fear After Attack



*Landscape, Lead Consultant.*

**Economic Marginalization, Tension and Violent Conflict:** Economically, Tanzania is regarded as a low-income country. Tanzania faces a myriad of challenges in reaching middle income status by 2025, as its national development plan envisions. Although the economy has been one of the fastest growing in East Africa at around 7% annual GDP growth as the government focuses on industrialization and infrastructure development, maintaining macroeconomic stability, and strengthening internal revenue collection; the impact of economic gains has yet to be seen at the individual level. The country is still facing a high level of economic inequality, which also has resulted in tension and conflict between the haves and the have nots. Reflecting the general unequal sharing of the national cake: 20% of the population accounts for 42% of total consumption, and the lowest 20% consume only 7%.<sup>9</sup> Tanzania has experienced a number of economically related violent conflicts in recent years. The Mtwara gas pipeline protests and the heavy-handed government response in 2012 demonstrates clearly that if communities and citizens feel marginalized and left out of social and economic development plans, violence can result.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, there have been several demonstrations and disputes between authorities and the informal economic sector around the country, including with people who have businesses on the streets in towns, commonly known as “machinga.” These demonstrations at times have turned into violence and unrest, including incidents in 2014 and 2017 in Mwanza.<sup>11</sup> The ongoing global pandemic is likely to hit emerging economies and those reliant on extractive industries like Tanzania’s hard and could lead to further economic tension and potential violence.

**Political Marginalization, Tension and Violent Conflict:** After the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Tanzania in the 1990s, elections became a primary driver of tensions and political violence. Politicians and some political parties have also used religion for political gain.<sup>12</sup> The continued dominance of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), who has ruled Tanzania and Zanzibar since independence and electoral irregularities in Zanzibar in particular, have led to feelings that elections have not reflected the will of the voters and that the system is skewed in favor of the ruling party.<sup>13</sup> Since the current 5<sup>th</sup> phase government came to power it has cracked down on opposition politicians and civil society.<sup>14</sup> The result being underlying tensions and political frustration have been exacerbated. This produces dissatisfaction and the potential for individuals and groups to use other means including violence to achieve political goals. Other political and religious leaders on the Tanzanian mainland have also harnessed

<sup>9</sup> Current and Future Challenges and opportunities in Tanzania. Report by Danish Embassy. <http://um.dk/en/danida-en/strategies%20and%20priorities/country-policies/tanzania/current-and-future-challenges-and-opportunities-in-tanzania>

<sup>10</sup> Thobias, Kseniia. (June 2017). Mtwara Gas Project Conflict: Causes of Arising and Ways of Stabilization (Part 2).

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/-Mwanza-authorities-and-hawkers--A-catch-22-situation/1840340-3829120-u1os6c/index.html>

<sup>12</sup> Gahnstrom, L.S. (2012, p. 132). Ethnicity, Religious and Politics in Tanzania: The 2010 General Election and Mwanza. *University of Helsinki*. Retrieved from <https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/34058/Gahnstrm%20final.pdf?sequence=2>

<sup>13</sup> Roop, S. and Sarota, A. (April 2017) Baseline Evaluation Report: Katika Usalama Tunategemeana and Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience in Tanzania and Zanzibar. Search For Common Ground

<sup>14</sup> The Citizen (9.11.2018). Retrieved from <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/World-Bank-stance-on-loan-release-to-Tanzania/18403404858282-r1mhb1/index.html>

dissatisfaction to promote resistance to the government using both peaceful and violent means.<sup>15</sup> The low capacity and quick resort to force by security services and police can exacerbate rather than de-escalate tensions.

The current government's efforts to further restrict civic space can also lead to increased violence, instead of peaceful political means by frustrated citizens and groups. Several laws passed by the government in recent years have been criticized by both local and international stakeholders including CSOs and development partners.<sup>16</sup> Laws such as The Media Service Act of 2016, and the Cyber Crime Act and Statistics Act and Amendment of 2017 have resulted in shrinking political, media, and civic space in Tanzania. The restriction of civic space for citizens and other actors has led longtime development partners of Tanzania to react, including by withholding development funds which can hinder government development plans and initiatives.<sup>17</sup> This situation has resulted in a lack of trust in government from stakeholders including development partners, CSOs, and media. In this electoral year, tension has continued to rise between the government and civil society as well as political parties. As the 2020 general election nears, this mistrust and tension makes it difficult for the government and stakeholders to collaborate and address challenges including violent conflict among communities in Tanzania. Tensions in Zanzibar are also high for contemporary and historical reasons. The peace and stability brought to Zanzibar by the 'Maridhiano' process that culminated in a 2010-2015 Unity Government has completely vanished after the annulment of the October 2015 election and the second election being boycotted by the major opposition party in Zanzibar, Civic United Front (CUF). Public opinion polls indicate 85% of Zanzibaris attribute weakened unity to the 2015 election outcome.<sup>18</sup> Zanzibar is historically prone to political violence and conflict because the stakes of winning elections are high. There is an assumption by the ruling party that an opposition victory in Zanzibar would result in the beginning of the end of the Union of Tanzania.<sup>19</sup>




Figure 3: Violent Conflict in Tanzania 1990-2018<sup>20</sup>

Overall, there are many drivers of violent conflict in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar: religious, economic, and social and political tensions, exacerbated during elections, have become major drivers of violent conflict in Tanzania. As figure 3 highlights, conflict events in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar have increased over decades, with election years seeing spikes of conflict events. Significantly, elections in Zanzibar have been the historical peaks of conflict, with a notable exception of 2010, when the reconciliation process led to an unprecedented drop in electoral violence in Zanzibar. This drop-in conflict during the 2010 reconciliation, which led to "Maridhiano," also signals the importance of having programs and projects aiming to bring Tanzanians together to address their differences and to reach consensus and durable solutions.

<sup>15</sup>Schwikowski, M. (September 2017). Tanzania: Political climate worsens amid crackdown on opposition. DW. Com. <https://www.dw.com/en/tanzania-political-climate-worsens-amid-crackdown-on-opposition/a-40422844>

<sup>16</sup>The Citizen (9.11.2018). Retrieved from <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/World-Bank-stance-on-loan-release-to-Tanzania/18403404858282-r1mhb1/index.html>

<sup>17</sup>Ibid

<sup>18</sup>From data collected in *Wasemavyo Wazanzibari*, a nationally representative panel survey of Zanzibaris carried out 2013-2016.

<sup>19</sup>This has been an assumption of many political analysts, and also was echoed by some respondents

<sup>20</sup>Social Conflict in Africa Database

## 4. Conflict Assessment in Target Locations

Data from the baseline and conflict assessment confirms that political, socioeconomic, and religious drivers of conflicts at the national level have trickled down to local communities. Socioeconomic reasons have been a main driver of conflict at the community level. Stemming from the general assessment of conflict at the national level discussed in the previous section, this section therefore, will go into detail to assess conflict in each location looking at four aspects of conflict: the **conflicts themselves**;<sup>21</sup> the **drivers of conflict**;<sup>22</sup> the **actors involved in conflict**, including those who exacerbate conflict and those who mitigate conflict; and **mechanisms for resolving conflict**.

### 4.1. Mtwara Town Conflict Assessment

**District Overview:** Mtwara Urban (Mikindani) is one district within the Mtwara region. According to the National Statistical Bureau (NSB), the council estimated that in 2019 it had a population of 136,857 (Males - 65,620; Females - 71,237).<sup>23</sup> While agriculture (farming and pastoralism) employed 90 percent of the population, the recent discovery and production of natural gas has continued to grow the economy of the district, and the region in general. The Mtwara port, which is the deepest natural port in East and Central Africa, continues to create promise for future economic development of the region. With a large investment from Dangote Cement Company, which should help to boost internal revenue and available tourism attractions such as Mikindani historical old town and monuments,<sup>24</sup> providing attractive sightseeing in the southern coast of Tanzania.

**Conflict Context:** Despite social and economic growth, the town is also facing security challenges including violent conflicts. Land and ideological differences are the main conflicts (see table 4 below).

*Table 4: Community perception on the biggest violent conflicts in the community in Mtwara Town by sex*

		Ethnic/clan conflict	Land conflict	Religious Conflict	Political conflict	Domestic/family conflict	Weak/ ineffective local gov't
<b>Mtwara Town</b>	Male	25%	59%	25%	28%	28%	13%
	Female	9%	75%	53%	34%	3%	16%
	Total	17%	67%	39%	31%	16%	14%

**bold: statistically significant at p<0.05**

The data shows that a majority of surveyed respondents (about 67%) perceived land allocation and use, including conflict between farmers and pastoralists, as the main conflicts in Mtwara, followed by religious conflict 39% and political tension 31% of respondents. The findings from the survey were also supported by data collected through KII and FGDs. Respondents from KII and FGDs also mentioned that unequal distribution of other resources caused violent conflict in Mtwara. The gas crisis emerged in a number of interviews and focus group meetings and it was explained in two ways: First, it is directly associated with the community feeling that the government is discriminating against community members by transporting the gas from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salaam. Dashing hopes that the gas would more directly benefit Mtwara; Second, according to some respondents, politicians used the gas crisis to their advantage, arguing for or against transporting gas based on their own political goals.<sup>25</sup>

*The reasons Mtwara people reacted against the government's decision of transporting the gas from Mtwara to Dar through the pipe was that the communities were told before that everything related to gas will be done in Mtwara, and they will be the main beneficiaries. The government's action of changing the plan without informing or educating people made them feel that this is a continuation of discrimination against Mtwara people economically by the government. That is why violent conflict emerged.*

- Personal communication, KII Mtwara, April 2020

Ethnic/clan and domestic/family conflicts were reported as less prevalent, representing 17% and 19% of the total respectively. This suggests that while domestic violence is still prevalent in Tanzania, women surveyed in Mtwara have experienced less violence, or do not see domestic violence as the biggest type of conflict. Indeed, different from other target locations, Mtwara respondents in KII and FGD did not mention domestic or ethnic tension as a reason for violent conflict in their community.

<sup>21</sup> Respondents were asked to choose the top two biggest conflicts facing their community. Each data point reflects the total percentage of respondents who identified that conflict as a major conflict in their community.

<sup>22</sup> Respondents were also asked to choose two main drivers of conflicts in their communities.

<sup>23</sup> Mtwara Regional Investment guide (2019). <http://www.esrf.or.tz/docs/MtwaraRegionInvestementGuide.pdf>

<sup>24</sup> Mtwara Regional Investment guide (2019). <http://www.esrf.or.tz/docs/MtwaraRegionInvestementGuide.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> Author Personal Communication with (KI), Mtwara town, 21.04.2020




Figure 6: Community perception of the drivers of violent conflicts in Mtwara Town

**Community Perceptions on Drivers of Conflicts:** There is also a broad agreement between the survey (see figure 6 above) and qualitative data on the drivers of violent conflict in Mtwara. Data shows that 43% of all respondents suggested that competition over natural resources, such as land, is a top driver of conflict in Mtwara, 37% suggested that political competition is a driver of conflicts, followed by other drivers such as ethnic/family disagreement 25% and elections from 17% of respondents. Quantitative findings were backed up by the qualitative data where KII from the government, CSOs, media, and community influencers. These stakeholders also believed that competition over natural resources such as land, gas, and politics are the main violent conflicts in their communities.

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*Grievances due to unequal distribution of national economic wealth. People in Mtwara feel that the government does not pay any attention to their development, that is why when the government decided to transport the gas through pipeline to Dar, many citizens joined the opposition's cause.*  
 - Personal Communication (KI), Mtwara town, April 2020

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From a gender perspective, there is a difference between the way women and men responded about elections as a driver of conflict in their communities. 34% of women perceived elections as a driver of violent conflict in their community, while no surveyed men suggested that elections are drivers of conflict. This could be a sign of men's involvement in conflicts around elections as perpetrators rather than victims of electoral violence. On the other hand, women were more concerned because they have been negatively impacted during election years. As research shows, women typically suffer more than men from electoral conflict.<sup>26</sup> Women interviewed also signaled that when violence erupts, most of the time they are victims of this violence.

**Conflict Actors:** Actors who exacerbate conflict in Mtwara town identified by KII and FGD respondents include: politicians, youth groups such as bodaboda drivers, and witch doctors. Politicians have also triggered conflict in the community as a way to gain popularity or win elections. Respondents also suggested that government officials responsible for overseeing land management at the local level, have also been contributors to conflict in their communities. These leaders sometimes engage in corruption by allowing certain transactions to occur although they are illegal. For instance, by allowing landowners to sell their land to two buyers, which often results in conflict and sometimes violence. Youth bodaboda drivers in particular have also been identified as contributors of violent conflicts because of their involvement in many political and social altercations with the government, such as conflicts with police around road rules and safety.

**Conflict Management:** There are several initiatives and actors involved in mitigating conflict identified by respondents. On one hand, initiatives by CSOs, community leaders, and government have been responsible for

<sup>26</sup> [https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/EXAMPLE\\_What%20is%20VAW-E%20on%20Election%20Day\\_Tanzania-English.pdf](https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/EXAMPLE_What%20is%20VAW-E%20on%20Election%20Day_Tanzania-English.pdf)

addressing violent conflicts when these arise. For instance, when the gas crisis reached its peak and resulted in violent conflict in 2012, CSOs and the government were active in addressing this violent conflict.

However, despite the good intentions of the parties who have been responsible for addressing violent conflict in Mtwara, interviewed community members feel that more is needed to achieve sustainable peace. Some members feel that the government needs to provide social services for its community fairly and equally because this will reduce tension between community members themselves and with their government. More significantly, other respondents suggested that training in addressing violent conflict is required since a majority of CSOs responsible for addressing violent conflict in Mtwara are not CSOs specialized in conflict resolution. Most of these CSOs focus on other fields such as education, health, and agriculture.

*Politicians, who on many occasions have been dragging people, youth in particular, into violence, are the main people who contribute to conflict. Politicians sometimes feed wrong information to the community to achieve their political goals. During the gas crisis, for instance, many politicians were feeding wrong information to the community, including the narrative that the government is economically discriminating against people from Mtwara, etc. This information triggered communities to demonstrate and challenge the government's decision to transport gas from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salaam.*

-Personal Communication (KI), Mtwara town, April 2020

## 4.2. Tandahimba Conflict Assessment

**District Overview:** Tandahimba is one of the major districts in Mtwara region with a population of 257,357 people (120,079 male and 137,260 female).<sup>27</sup> The district borders a part of northern Mozambique, which is known for violent extremist incidents over the past few years.<sup>28</sup> With an annual average of 53,540.9 hectares (36.7%) of cashew nuts produced in Mtwara region,<sup>29</sup> Tandahimba is the number one cashew nut producer in the region. In addition to cashew nuts, people of Tandahimba are also involved in livestock keeping. A recent report shows 15.8% of all indigenous cattle are in Tandahimba, making them the second most cattle populated district in Mtwara.<sup>30</sup>

**Conflict Context:** The main conflicts reported and identified in Tandahimba are land conflicts, family conflicts, political conflicts, and conflicts between farmers and the government or the primary cooperative society<sup>31</sup> (see table 5 below).

**Table 5: Community perception on the biggest violent conflicts in the community in Tandahimba by sex**

		Ethnic/clan conflict	Land conflict	Religious Conflict	Political conflict	Domestic/family conflict	Weak/ ineffective local gov't
Tandahimba	Male	19%	44%	53%	56%	13%	9%
	Female	39%	39%	42%	26%	19%	3%
	Total	29%	41%	48%	41%	16%	6%

**bold: statistically significant at p<0.05**

The data suggests that competition over natural resources, such as land, and politics are the most common conflicts in this community. A majority of respondents suggested common land conflicts are between community members, and most of the time are due to ignorance of land laws. Conflicts are common on the demarcation and boundaries of plots or farmland, as well as during the inheritance process, especially when women are involved. According to respondents, political conflict in Tandahimba seems to be caused in part by economic grievances. There has been a long-standing narrative that leaders of cooperative societies for cashew nuts are exploiting farmers in Tandahimba. This narrative is fueled by the fact that the government, which is under the ruling party, always protects association leaders. Because of this, farmers often support the opposition because of opposition promises to address the issue if elected. Tensions rise when the opposition fails to capture power in these elections. Several instances of violence have resulted because of this political power competition between the ruling party and opposition.

<sup>27</sup> Mtwara Regional Investment guide (2019). <http://www.esrf.or.tz/docs/MtwaraRegionInvestementGuide.pdf>

<sup>28</sup> Pirio G, Pittelli R, R, &Adam, Y. (March 2018). The Emergence of Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique. Africa Central for Strategic Studies. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-emergence-of-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/>

<sup>29</sup> Ibid

<sup>30</sup> Mtwara Regional Investment guide (2019). <http://www.esrf.or.tz/docs/MtwaraRegionInvestementGuide.pdf>

<sup>31</sup> Primary cooperative society is a local association or organization that is formed to safeguard farmers' welfare and protect them from any exploitation from middlemen




Figure 7: Community perception of the drivers of violent conflicts in Tandahimba

**Community Perceptions on Drivers of Conflicts:** Tandahimba has also been affected by its proximity with neighboring Mozambique, which has emerged as a hub of violent extremism in southern Africa.<sup>32</sup> Data from the baseline (see figure 7 above) suggests that competition for resources such as land at 47% and grievances (religious and political) at 35% are considered the top drivers of conflicts. When paired with the proximity between Tandahimba and Mozambique, these grievances are alarming and could pose a serious threat to peace and security of both Tandahimba and Tanzania in general. As violent extremist groups often take advantage of grievances to recruit vulnerable community members.<sup>33</sup> **Violent conflicts driven by cashew nut crops were also observed.** Many KII and FDGs suggested that farmers do not agree with the approach of selling their cashew nuts through “Stakabadhi Ghalani” (warehouse receipt system (WRS)<sup>34</sup> in Swahili), a system which according to farmers, leaves them with more debt than profit from their cashews.<sup>35</sup> Respondents cited serious violent conflict between farmers and police which resulted in lives being lost and destruction of private and public property as a result of farmers boycotting the system. Claiming it benefits leaders of cooperative society instead of them.

Interestingly, a significant gender gap on the family drivers of conflict was observed in Tandahimba. More women, about 32% compared to 15% of males, were concerned that family disagreement has been a driver of violent conflict in their communities. Traditionally, Tandahimba communities have given less value to the importance of women in economic production. As such in many cases women are not recognized or given a voice in important community issues. Women do not typically own land or inherit properties, for instance. As a result, inheritance matters have been driving family tensions and conflict when a woman is supposed to inherit property. Respondents suggested that this is common in Tandahimba when a father or husband passes away and family members want to take inheritance away from the women family members. These conflicts often also contribute to GBV.

*Women have been discriminated against in the community. Many community members' perceptions, especially men's, is that women are not entitled to own land or inheritance from their fathers or husbands. This perception has been causing violence toward many women when their loved one (father or husband) passes away and they ask for their portion or right.*

- Personal communication, female KII, Tandahimba, April 2020

**Conflict Actors:** The main actors in violent conflicts in Tandahimba are politicians, leaders of cooperative societies, elders, youth, and the police. Many respondents from both KII and FDGs suggested that conflicts have been exacerbated by one of these groups, or a combination of these groups. For conflicts which are caused by cashew farming, the main actors are leaders from cooperative societies. For decades, farmers have complained that the majority of these leaders have been misusing their position to benefit themselves and exploit them. If these

<sup>32</sup> Pirio G, Pittelli R, R, & Adam, Y. (March 2018). The Emergence of Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique. Africa Central for Strategic Studies. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-emergence-of-violent-extremism-in-northern-mozambique/>

<sup>33</sup> Botha, A. (2014). Radicalisation in Kenya. Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council." Institute for Security Studies Papers.

<sup>34</sup> Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) was introduced in 2007 as a mechanism to protect farmers from exploitation by allowing them to send cashew nuts to nearby cooperatives and receive a warehouse receipt which certifies the value of their deposited cashew nuts before they are sold in an auction conducted at the warehouse under the supervision of the Cashew Board of Tanzania (CBT) and regional cooperative society.

<sup>35</sup> Thangata, P. (2016). Smallholder Cashew Business Model in Tanzania: Lessons from the Tandahimba Newala Cooperative Union (TANECU) Ltd. [https://brusselsbriefings.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/tanecu\\_fo\\_business\\_model\\_final.pdf](https://brusselsbriefings.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/tanecu_fo_business_model_final.pdf)

complaints are left without being addressed and reach a peak, then conflict occurs. In 2012 or 2013, many people lost their lives, families, and were displaced because of the violent conflict as a result of the cashew nuts conflict.<sup>36</sup>

**Conflict Management:** It appears from the respondents that communities in Tandahimba already have mechanisms to address conflict when it arises. Respondents from KII and FGD mentioned some actors who have been involved in addressing conflict, including land committees, elders, and government officials. Although they act in different capacities, these actors have been responsible for addressing violent conflict in Tandahimba.

*During elections youth become the center of every conflict in society. It is obvious that youth are looking for changes, so they have been pushing for the people who they believe are the change makers, and when they are not successful, they become violent either through boycotting the results or sending the message that they did not like the chosen leaders*

- Personal communication, male KII, Tandahimba, April 2020

Nevertheless, challenges remain, as many respondents still think that those responsible for addressing conflict in Tandahimba require more coordination, skills and techniques on how to address conflicts effectively. Many CSOs responsible for addressing conflict in Mtwara are not specialized in conflict, rather focused on issues around education and health.

### 4.3. Kibiti Conflict Assessment

**District Overview:** Kibiti is a district in the Coastal Region (Pwani) of Tanzania. Before it became a region, Kibiti was a ward under Rufiji district, but later became a district as the government attempted to extend social services closer to community members at the grassroots. The main economic activities of Kibiti are agriculture, fishing, and trade. In terms of security, Kibiti district experienced violence from an unknown militia who killed civilians and government officials in 2017.<sup>37</sup> This security challenge has caused many government officials to flee their post for fear of being the next target of this unknown militia.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, since operations by security forces and declaring the district as a special police zone, the killing has stopped.

**Conflict Context:** When asked what is the biggest conflict in their community, the study found that land allocation and use is the biggest conflict in Kibiti, with 88% of respondents identifying this as an issue (see table 6 below), followed with ethnicity/clan conflict which was identified by 31% of respondents, and political tension identified by 29% of respondents. This finding was also confirmed by findings from qualitative data. All stakeholders interviewed also suggested that land conflict is the biggest conflict in their community. They separated land conflict into conflicts which are triggered by tension between farmers and herders, community members against community members fighting for the demarcation of their plots, and conflict as a result of land ownership.

Table 6: Community perception on the biggest violent conflicts in the community in Kibiti by sex

		Ethnic/clan conflict	Land conflict	Religious Conflict	Political conflict	Domestic/family conflict	Weak/ ineffective local gov't
Kibiti	Male	3%	97%	9%	28%	41%	22%
	Female	56%	81%	11%	31%	8%	8%
	Total	31%	88%	10%	29%	24%	15%

**bold: statistically significant at p<0.05**

While family and domestic problems together are also viewed by some respondents as among the biggest conflicts in their community, contrary to the survey, respondents from interviews all agreed that politics are the second biggest violent conflict in Kibiti. This suggests that although there is divergence between qualitative and quantitative sources on the second biggest driver of conflict in Kibiti, natural resources such as land, charcoal, and fish, in addition to politics creates grievances and feelings of injustice in community members. Land conflict can also be caused by domestic problems such as divorce, involving division of wealth between the couples. However, the culture and tradition of coastal people, which tends to not recognize the rights of females to own land,<sup>39</sup> has also triggered land conflict in Kibiti. The same is true in terms of grievances and feelings of injustice

<sup>36</sup> During interviews and focus groups, several respondents claimed that their family members lost their lives during the unrest.

<sup>37</sup> LHRC. Annual Report. (2017). <http://humanrights.or.tz/assets/attachments/1531899298.pdf>

<sup>38</sup>Taylor, B. (September 2017). Tanzania Affairs: Violence in Kibiti. <https://www.tzaffairs.org/2017/09/violence-in-kibiti/>

<sup>39</sup>Rule 27 LCL Order states that "a widow has no share of the inheritance if the deceased left relatives of his own clan; her share is to be cared for by her children just as she cared for them." Also see Rules 48 and 49 LCL Order which state that "Any daughters have no or limited rights in inheriting their father's land or house."

around land. Some community members in Kibiti have been involved in conflict as a result of feeling that their rights have been violated, and conflict is their only remedy.




Figure 8: Community perception of the drivers of violent conflicts in Kibiti

**Community Perception on Drivers of Conflicts:** Based on disaggregated data on community perceptions on drivers of conflict in their community, 76% of respondents perceived competition over natural resources, such as land, as a driver of violent conflict in Kibiti (see figure 8 above). Ethnicity/ family disagreement or hatred was identified by 51% of respondents, and political competition by 35% of respondents. Respondents from interviews also viewed natural resource competition as the main driver of conflict in Kibiti.

Interestingly, from a gender lens, the findings showed no significant statistical difference on the perceptions of men and women on drivers of conflict in their community, except for political competition. 44% of women viewed political competition as a driver of violent conflict in their community compared to only 21% of men. This could be because violence associated with politics, including those which occurred in the mid-2010s left many people dead, men and youth in particular. This in turn has had a negative impact on women who lost their sons and husbands and were likely left with the significant burden of taking care of the entire families and becoming the only breadwinners.

**Conflict Actors:** When asked who the main actors are who exacerbate conflict and the role they play in conflict, respondents from interviews identified government authorities dealing with land who have not acted on time when complaints reach them. Respondents also mentioned farmers and herders as main actors of violent conflict in Kibiti. Like many other locations, the conflict between farmers and herders are usually triggered by herders feeding their animals with farmers' crops. Conflict associated with family matters (inheritance and divorce), respondents suggested that men, through the patriarchal system, have been the main actors of conflict in the community. One respondent suggested that men in their community believe that women have no right to inherit property, including land. So, when there is divorce, or a father or husband passes away, conflict ensues in an attempt to block female inheritance.

*Usage of natural resources has been a driving factor for conflict between communities and their government. The Government has denied the community from using certain resources such as wood charcoal and going fishing without giving them alternatives. This has been causing a lot of misunderstanding between government and the community. If you remember, the killing of government and political leaders started with this sort misunderstanding."*

- Personal communication, male KII, Kibiti, April 2020

**Conflict Management:** Land committees from the village to the district level, religious councils, and desks responsible for conflict at the police, as well as CSOs dealing with legal issues (paralegals) were the main conflict management actors identified by respondents. Land committees from the village to the district level are legally responsible for addressing conflict associated with land, and many times, they operate under different jurisdictions. This is deployed by the community as a first step to address land disputes before reaching the court. Religious councils formed by religious leaders from both Christian and Muslim faiths have been resolving conflict involving interfaith issues. They have been directly involved in bringing peace or preaching peace and

insist on religious tolerance. The police force desk responsible for dealing with conflict brings people in conflict together to discuss and reach solutions before any legal action is taken. This has given an opportunity for parties to look back and try to right their wrongdoing before the matters become legal issues.

#### 4.4. Rufiji-Ikwiriri Conflict Assessment

**District Overview:** Ikwiriri is a town in Rufiji District in the Coastal region. The town has 3 wards and 9 villages with a population of 49,492 (22,150 male and 27,347 female). Most indigenous people from Ikwiriri are farmers and fishermen. Recently, there has also been an increase in livestock keeping activities as a result of the migration of herders from other parts of Tanzania settling in the Rufiji valley.

**Conflict Context:** When data was disaggregated, about 71% of respondents perceived land as the biggest conflict in their community, 37% perceived politics as the second biggest conflict, followed by domestic/family conflicts 35% and religious conflict at 20% (see table 7 above). Land conflict has been triggered mostly by competition for land between local communities, who are farmers, against herders, who often migrate within Tanzania. Herders from areas such as Iringa and Morogoro pushed by drought have been moving to the coastal area in the Rufiji valley, including the farmland of Ikwiriri, searching for food and water for their animals.<sup>40</sup> This competition over land for farming and grazing has escalated into conflict between farmers and herders, often resulting in violence in Ikwiriri.

Table 7: Community perception on the biggest violent conflicts in the community in Ikwiriri-Rufiji by sex

		Ethnic/clan conflict	Land conflict	Religious Conflict	Political conflict	Domestic/family conflict	Weak/ ineffective local gov't
Ikwiriri-Rufiji	Male	3%	79%	18%	21%	27%	0%
	Female	16%	63%	22%	53%	44%	3%
	Total	9%	71%	20%	37%	35%	2%

**bold: statistically significant at p<0.05**

Together, religious and political conflicts were identified the primary conflicts by 57% of respondents. This number is generally high, and when paired with the data recorded from interviews, points to a strong feeling about the threat of religious and political conflict in their community. For instance, respondents from CSOs suggested that politicization of religion threatens peace and security, citing the 2017 killings of government officials and burning of a police post by an unknown militia.<sup>41</sup>

Another interesting finding in Ikwiriri is the difference in the perception between women and men on political conflicts and clan/family or domestic conflicts. As Table 7 above shows more women, 53%, identified political conflict as the most relevant ones, compared to men at 21%. In terms of domestic conflict, also more women, 44%, show more concern compared to men, 17%. The difference between female and male perceptions on these two types of conflicts identified in Ikwiriri shows that women are more impacted with this conflict and their aftermath. The findings from qualitative in this regard supported the quantitative, where a majority of respondents mentioned family conflicts which are mainly associated with divorce, childcare, and inheritance after the death of a father or husband, and political conflict, which sometimes reaches a point where siblings do not talk or engage together in social activities because of ideological differences.

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*Religious conflict which most of the time has a political face. In the last few years, there has been serious violent conflicts happening as a result of religious issues. A number of government officials, including law enforcement and members from one political party were assassinated as a result. This conflict was triggered by religious teachings and practices which were very discriminatory and violent. After some time, the followers started to act wild and discriminate against other community members, who later were believed to have started those violent activities.*

- Personal communication, male KII, Kibiti, April 2020

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<sup>40</sup> Makoye. K. (June 2012). Tanzania: Drought Drives Tanzanian Herders into Conflict With Farmers. AllAfrica.com. <https://allafrica.com/stories/201206121085.html>

<sup>41</sup> Personal communication, male KII, Kibiti, April 2020




Figure 9: Community perceptions on the drivers of violent conflicts in Ikwiriri

**Community Perceptions on Drivers of Conflicts:** Again, competition over land, political competition, domestic/family disagreements, were the drivers of conflict identified by most respondents in Ikwiriri. Findings from the survey show that 79% of respondents perceived that land competition is the biggest driver of conflict in their community, followed by political competition was identified by 35% of respondents, and ethnicity/family disagreement by 28% of respondents (see figure 9 above). The views from several CSO representatives responsible for addressing conflict in Ikwiriri, representatives from local government officials, and community influencers also supplement this finding from the survey. Competition for scarce resources and access to land have been driving conflicts among communities in Ikwiriri; in particular, the competition between farmers and herders which has yet to be permanently resolved has contributed to violent conflict for many years in Ikwiriri.<sup>42</sup>

Politicization of religion was also identified by many respondents as a driver of conflict in Ikwiriri. When respondents were asked about the drivers of conflict, a majority suggested that religious leaders use religious platforms to feed the community with misinterpretations of holy scripts and history to drive resistance to the governance system and people from other religions. Respondents also suggested that the past year's killing by supposed Al-shabaab supporters began with these religious leaders who were going around and preaching such false claims.

**Conflict Actors:** The main players who have been identified as actors who exacerbate conflicts in Ikwiriri include herders, local officials responsible for land, religious leaders, and politicians. Respondents suggested that herders have directly triggered conflict by refusing to cooperate and pay compensation to farmers in cases when their livestock feed on the farmers' crops. Also, all interviewed stakeholders suggested that some government officials who are involved in corrupt activities have escalated violent conflict associated with land and family conflicts.

*For instance, conflict between farmers and herders has been exacerbated by long lasting grievances from farmers who accused some government officials of favoring herders. It looks like because herders were bribing government officials after feeding their livestock on the farms, the responsible government officials did not take the case seriously. This forced farmers to take action into their own hands, that is why few years ago we had very serious violent conflict between the two.*

- Personal communication, male KII, Kibiti, April 2020

Stakeholders from CSOs, government, and community influencers also mentioned politicians and religious leaders as some instigators of political and religious conflicts in Ikwiriri. For instance, religious leaders who have indoctrinated their followers with extremist ideas including discrimination of people who do not believe in their faith, have been a driver of violent extremist activities in Ikwiriri.

<sup>42</sup> Many respondents suggested that conflict between farmers and herders has been exacerbated by long lasting grievances from farmers who accused some government officials of favoring herders. It looks like because herders were bribing government officials after feeding their livestock on the farms, the responsible government officials did not take the case seriously. This forced farmers to take action into their own hands, that is why few years ago we had very serious violent conflict between the two.

**Conflict Management:** Respondents suggested that nongovernmental organizations have been helping to mitigate conflicts by providing education, and direct involvement in addressing conflict in the communities. Indeed, they also mentioned religious leaders who believe in coexistence have been champions in addressing conflict in their community. These leaders have come out and insisted on religious tolerance from their followers. Finally, all respondents mentioned the role of land committees. These have been created to resolve any conflict related to land in the community. These committees are at different levels, village, ward, district, and region. Nevertheless, the baseline observed two flaws in the conflict management approach in Ikwiriri. First, the skills of those responsible for addressing conflicts need to be improved. One respondent who also is a main stakeholder in addressing violent conflict in the community suggested that they do not have sufficient skills to address conflict. So far, they have been relying on past experience and available laws and policies, rather than specific conflict resolution techniques to address conflict. The mechanism or platform of engagement, the baseline observed other than feedback meetings and ad hoc meetings between stakeholders, there is no specific mechanism to communicate while addressing conflict within and across the resolution bodies in their community.

#### 4.5. North Mara Conflict Assessment

**District Overview:** North Mara is where Barrick's mineral site is located. The North Mara mines cover wards of Nyamongo, Matongo, Nyamweya, and Naykunguru in Tarime District in Mara region. The district borders neighboring Kenya in the north, and Serengeti in the west. With the population of 339,693,<sup>43</sup> the main economic activities are agriculture, livestock keeping, mining, fishing and trade.<sup>44</sup> Tarime is known to be a major livestock keeping district in Mara region.

**Conflict Context:** When respondents from the survey were asked about the two biggest conflict in their community, 53% of respondents felt that ethnic/clan conflict was the biggest conflict, 48% of respondents named political tensions, followed by 38% of respondents who felt that land allocation and use was a major issue in their community (see Table 8 below).

Table 8: Community perception on the biggest violent conflicts in the community in Tarime-North Mara by sex

		Ethnic/clan conflict	Land conflict	Religious Conflict	Political conflict	Domestic/family conflict	Weak/ ineffective local gov't
Tarime-North Mara	Male	53%	38%	19%	38%	38%	9%
	Female	53%	38%	25%	59%	19%	3%
	Total	53%	38%	22%	48%	28%	6%

**bold: statistically significant at p<0.05**

This quantitative data is also supplemented by information from key informants interviewed who suggested that ethnicity/family and political conflict, followed by land conflicts, are the challenges for people in Tarime. Ethnicity/clan violent conflict was stressed by many respondents during interviews. Important to note here is that villages in Tarime are broken down into clans. Normally, one village is occupied by one clan. Conflict between villages are mainly around land or livestock. For instance, when there is a land conflict between one village and another village, it is indirectly a conflict between one clan/family and another clan/family. The same is true for livestock. The assessment discovered that the reason Tarime has more clan/family conflict is that land is also involved and tied to clan. Meanwhile, political conflict is also sparked by clan/family divisions in Tarime. Some respondents pointed out that politicians have been using a strategy of dividing clans as a way to win elections. These divisions are usually sewn through issues related to borders of villages between one clan and the other clan.

In terms of land conflicts, respondents identified three types of land conflicts in Tarime:

1. Land conflict caused by mining activities. These conflicts are usually associated with the mining company taking community land and failing to pay compensation as required by law, or paying less than the value of the land;
2. Land conflict between villages, involving disputes over borders; and

<sup>43</sup> Census 2012". National Bureau of Statistics

<sup>44</sup>Tarime district website. <http://tarimedc.go.tz/>

3. Land conflict between villagers and park authorities,<sup>45</sup> usually because of communities using or engaging in activities on land owned by park authorities.




Figure 10: Community perceptions on the drivers of violent conflicts in Tarime

**Community Perceptions on Drivers of Conflicts:** Although ethnic conflict is uncommon in Tanzania, areas such as Mara have suffered from violent conflict caused by clan or tribal clashes.<sup>46</sup> When disaggregated, data suggests 58% and 53% of respondents suggested that competition over natural resources (i.e. land) and ethnic/family disagreement respectively are the main drivers. Political competition was also a top driver of conflict in Tarime (see figure 10 above). In addition, political propaganda has driven land ethnic/clan conflicts where politicians with the intention of gaining more political power in the region have triggered border conflicts between one village and another.

A number of key informants, as well as FGD participants, suggested that the failure to have proper land management and use in Tarime is one of the factors which drives land conflict between villages, or between villages and park authorities. Unlawful eviction from their land by mining companies or park authorities, unfair compensation after evictions, and environmental pollution done by the mining company to the land over time has angered the community. The result of which has erupted in conflict between either communities and park authorities, or between communities and the mining companies.

**Conflict Actors:** Respondents identified politicians, mining companies, some clan elders, youth groups, and government officials as the main actors who exacerbate conflict in Tarime. Politicians were identified by stakeholders during the interviews as people who strategically divide clans as a way to win elections. Likewise, interviews suggested that through taking community land without paying compensation, as well as their activities which sometimes result into environmental pollution, mines have contributed and triggered community anger which can erupt into conflict. Community elders who have been given significant power to make decisions on behalf of their community have also contributed to violent conflict. Respondents suggested that sometimes, these elders have convinced their community that miners are there to exploit them instead of bring development. These kinds of statements have triggered violent conflict between communities and mines. Local government officials, such as village executive officers, who oversee land management have allowed people to sell land to more than one buyer or let the mining company expand and take peoples' land without properly compensating them.

**Conflict Management:** Although conflict is still a challenge in Tarime, there are some efforts which have been taken by the government in collaboration with other stakeholders to address these conflicts. For instance, the conflict between villages and park authorities have continued to decline as the government improves its land use and planning. Currently, the conflict between villages and Serengeti National Park have declined after the

<sup>45</sup> The Tanganyika National Parks Ordinance CAP [412] of 1959 and National Parks Act Chapter 282 of the 2002 established and govern Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA). The Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974 allows the government to establish protected areas and outlines how they are organized and managed.

<sup>46</sup> Kwach. (December 2015). Prolonging Conflict and Service Delivery in Tarime.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290473064\\_Prolonging\\_Conflict\\_and\\_Service\\_Delivery\\_in\\_Tarime](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290473064_Prolonging_Conflict_and_Service_Delivery_in_Tarime)

government defined the land and put demarcations to define the border of each village and the national park. Respondents believe this move greatly helped to resolve the conflicts which have been occurring because of the disputes between villages and park authorities. Also, CSOs such as Search, LHRC, and local paralegal organizations have been engaging in addressing conflict between communities and the mining company. This engagement to an extent has helped to resolve some of the conflicts in North Mara.

#### 4.6. Zanzibar Conflict Assessment

**Zanzibar Overview:** Zanzibar is different than other target communities in the project. Although, it is part of the Union of Tanzania like other communities, Zanzibar remains semi-autonomous in its governance under the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar which has mandates on all non Union matters.<sup>47</sup> Secondly, the January 1964 revolution to overthrow the Sultan by members of the Afro-Shirazi Party, the party which represented a majority of Africans in Zanzibar, also marked the beginning of violent conflict in the archipelago.

**Conflict Context:** The revolution and later the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania resulted in deep political grievances and religious polarization among Zanzibaris. While the revolution has continued to shape contemporary politics in Zanzibar, Union matters are also decisively polarizing Zanzibaris, especially during elections. Arguably, the 1992 multiparty system, instead of providing opportunities for Zanzibaris to have a wider political platform to express their grievances and exercise their freedom of expression through political parties, has increased political hostility and has been a main contributor to the violent conflicts in Zanzibar.<sup>48</sup> Specifically, there was a significant increase of violent conflict during the 2000 and 2005 elections (see Figure 11 below) which also resulted in the killing of several Zanzibaris by the government.<sup>49</sup>




Figure 11: Conflict Events During Election Years<sup>50</sup>

Equally, Union matters have been the center of conflicts in Zanzibar. While all Zanzibaris arguably enjoy the benefits of the Union, a majority prefer a more autonomous Zanzibar within the Union. At the beginning, the issue was discussed and challenged within CCM, which forced a number of leaders to resign or leave the party.<sup>51</sup> Thereafter, a registered non-governmental organization with a strong Muslim base, UAMSHO, marked the beginning of violent conflict associated with union matters. For instance, in 2012, the leaders of UAMSHO mobilized demonstrations to challenge the Union of Tanzania and call for an independent Zanzibar, which resulted in violent conflict, death and destruction of public and private property.<sup>52</sup>

Natural resources, specifically land conflict is another silent but very serious conflict in the archipelago. This conflict mainly occurs between communities and their authorities. During interviews respondents suggested this

<sup>47</sup> The Constitution of the united Republic of Tanzania of 1970.

[https://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov\\_uploads/documents/Katiba%20ya%20Jamhuri%20ya%20Muungano%20wa%20Tanzania%20\\_English%20Version\\_%202009.pdf](https://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/Katiba%20ya%20Jamhuri%20ya%20Muungano%20wa%20Tanzania%20_English%20Version_%202009.pdf)

<sup>48</sup> Mohammed, B. (2000). The Democratization Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition. Humburg-Africa Studies. Umburg University.

<sup>49</sup> Mpangara. G. (2016). The Zanzibar Conflict: A Search for Durable Solutions. Institute for Security Studies.

<sup>50</sup> Social Conflict in Africa Database

<sup>51</sup> IPP Media (2016). Aboud Jembe: Zanzibar's forgotten father of democracy' laid to rest. <https://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/aboud-jembe-zanzibars-forgotten-father-democracy-laid-rest>

<sup>52</sup> Roop, S. and Sarota, A. (April 2017) Baseline Evaluation Report: Katika Usalama Tunategemeana and Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience in Tanzania and Zanzibar. Search For Common Ground

type of conflict is triggered by current land laws which give the right of ownership of land to the government,<sup>53</sup> and lack of knowledge of laws governing ownership among community members. Land laws allow the government to take land from the current owner and give it to someone else, including investors from Tanzania mainland and abroad.<sup>54</sup> The law also allows the government to retake pieces of land which have already been developed. Conflict always emerges when the government fails to compensate communities or consult them to reach a consensus on the process and other necessary reallocation plans.<sup>55</sup> With limited knowledge regarding the laws, communities have been retaliating to actions taken by the government in return, and these retaliations have often resulted in violent conflict.

**Community Perception on Drivers of Conflicts:** Politics and perceptions of ethnicity or belonging have been historically intertwined in Zanzibar, which complicates the issues of violent conflicts on the islands. In recent years feelings of belonging have taken an increasingly religious and political turn. Violent conflicts in Zanzibar have had significant political motives, with elections at the center of most conflicts. In May 2015, during the Wasemavyo Wazanzibari (WWz) mobile phone-based panel survey conducted by International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) and The State University of Zanzibar (SUZA), more than 70% of Zanzibaris who responded to the survey suggested politicization of religion generates tension and conflict between Zanzibaris of different faiths (See Figure 12).

*As a result of increased need and demand for land on the islands, the community now understands its value. They often get into conflict because of fighting about the rights to certain land. This conflict between land owners and investors or government are common on the islands.*

- Personal communication, male KII, Zanzibar, May 2020




Figure 12: Increase Politicization of Religion is creating tension between faith<sup>56</sup>

Today, the situation appears to be the same, if not worse. A majority of interviewees suggested that politics and religion are inseparable in Zanzibar, and politicization of religion is continuing to increase. The perception of Tanzanian mainlanders who work in much of the hospitality industry as Christians who support CCM is one that has combined economic, religious and political tensions into a truly toxic mix. Among concerns of interviewees were that UAMSHO leaders are still behind bars without trial and the GNU was put to rest<sup>57</sup> after a nullification of the 2015 election results, which was later boycotted by the opposition in March 2016. Significantly, respondents also expressed concern about the coming 2020 elections, as they anticipate the tension between two parties, now CCM and ACT-Wazalendo will exacerbate the simmering conflict in Zanzibar.

*I am worried about 2020 elections. There are number of signs that violent conflict will be inevitable this coming election. Political tension which is caused by the defection of politicians from one party to another, and the end of GNU and rise of ACT-Wazalendo in Zanzibar, signals that the likelihood of another tense election and conflict is high.*

- Personal communication, male KII, Zanzibar, May 2020

<sup>53</sup> The Land Tenure Act 1992

<sup>54</sup> Section 2 of The Land Tenure Act 1992 in principle describes the 'government' as the one responsible for terminating a right of occupancy. The right of occupancy is akin to ownership which results in proprietary rights. These include, for instance, the right to use, control and transfer either by sale, inheritance or gift. Also see Section 19 of Zanzibar Investment Promotion and Protection 2004

<sup>55</sup> Ibid

<sup>56</sup> Roop, S., ILPI Policy Paper Round 21 WWz, May 2015

<sup>57</sup> While the GNU is still constitutionally mandated it was effectively ended in practice for at least the last five years, after the opposition boycotted the rerun election, which followed the nullification of the 2015 elections.

Unemployment has also driven violent conflict in Zanzibar. Research shows that unemployed youth can be a threat to the economy and national security if unemployment is not addressed. Specifically, in Zanzibar, research shows that youth have been joining extremist groups for material reasons rather than ideology.<sup>58</sup> This finding also reflects the survey conducted by ILPI in 2015, when approximately 75% of people who responded to the survey suggested that unemployment and economic hardship are drivers of violent conflict.<sup>59</sup> Many youth who are part of the opposition or are from the less populated island of Pemba repeatedly complain that there is systemic discrimination in the employment system.<sup>60</sup> One respondent went further, mentioning that the Zanzibar Resident Identification Authority, Shehas, and people responsible for vetting government employees are the main actors who cause grievances toward their government.

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*Unemployment has also become a driver for conflict in Zanzibar. Some Zanzibari youth have started to complain that they are not given employment just because of being opposition or suspected to be opposition. This has been a complaint from many youth, some of whom claim that they decided to join the ruling party so they can get employment, but who knows which party they are supporting.*

- Personal communication, male KII, Zanzibar, May 2020

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**Conflict Actors:** Participants identified several actors who exacerbate violent conflicts, including those responsible for election supervision, officials responsible for land management and use, as well as politicians and religious leaders. Since the introduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania, many reports and conflict analysis suggest that Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) have rigged election results to favor the ruling party, always declaring their candidate as a winner of the presidential election despite evidence which shows otherwise.<sup>61</sup> <sup>62</sup> During the 2000 elections, people were killed while others were left injured by government law enforcement agencies<sup>63</sup> after CUF boycotted the election result announced by ZEC. Indeed, the 2015 election nullification from ZEC and the boycott of the opposition in the rerun of March 2016 were among the concerns of many experts during interviews. This signals that ZEC has not only been central to past electoral violence in Zanzibar, but also represents future challenges.

Authorities responsible for land have also contributed to conflict associated with land. The Land Tenure Act gives power to government through ZIPA, regional commissioners, and Ministry of Land to acquire private land for investment or any public interest.<sup>64</sup> However, the government's approach has sometimes caused conflict. There is evidence that the government uses force or coercion to take community land. For instance, in the famous case of Mpongwe Juma Simba and 8 Others v. Dadi Faki Dadi and Head of Department of Land and Registration, the tribunal proved that the acquisition of shambas (farms) to an Israeli investor in Pemba were surrounded by coercion and undue influence by the government of Zanzibar.<sup>65</sup> As community members who lost their land are often unable to act against the government directly, they reported that they often attack the investors who were given the land by the government.

Indeed, religious leaders who also have influence in politics play a significant role in conflicts in Zanzibar. On one hand these leaders can exacerbate conflicts through hate speech that their followers hear from them. In 2012 during the constitutional review, the leaders from UAMSHO who have both political and religious influence in their communities held rallies to support the agenda of a more independent Zanzibar in the Union which turned to unrest.<sup>66</sup>

**Conflict Management and Available Mechanisms:** To understand mechanisms responsible for addressing violent conflict in Zanzibar, we should first note that the major conflicts in Zanzibar, political conflict and land conflict, occur at different levels. While political conflicts are common at the national level, land conflicts and disputes tend to be at the local level. Therefore, mechanisms which have been used to resolve conflicts in Zanzibar are also at two levels. At the national level, conflicts in Zanzibar have been addressed in collaboration with the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (SMZ), local and national CSOs, and development partners. At the local level, local government, religious leaders, and CSOs have been involved in addressing conflict. While

<sup>58</sup> IGAD. (2016). Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat

<sup>59</sup> Roop, S. and Sarota, A. (April 2017) Baseline Evaluation Report: Katika Usalama Tunategemeana and Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience in Tanzania and Zanzibar. Search For Common Ground

<sup>60</sup> Mohammed, B. (2000). The Democratization Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition. Humburg-Africa Studies. Umburg University. pg. 154-15

<sup>61</sup> Mpangara. G. (2016). The Zanzibar Conflict: A Search for Durable Solutions. Institute for Security Studies.

<sup>62</sup> As election results came out in 2000 for instance, the main local electoral observer, the Tanzania Electoral Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), declared that the election was futile, called for cancellations, and to start the election process again. They went further and claimed the instrument responsible for managing elections in Zanzibar had let down the people and multi-party democracy.

<sup>63</sup> Throup. D.(2016). The Political Crisis in Zanzibar. Center for Strategic International Studies. Retrieved from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/political-crisis-zanzibar>

<sup>64</sup> Hikmany, A & Syed Abdul Kader, S & Othman, A. (2015). Legal

<sup>65</sup> Ibid

<sup>66</sup> Tanzania International Religious Freedom Report. (2018). <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/TANZANIA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf>

on some occasions government and political parties have exacerbated conflicts in Zanzibar, they also play a role in addressing political differences which have resulted in violent conflicts since the first election in 1995. Maridhiano, round table negotiations, between the ruling party CCM and the then main opposition CUF, which led to the establishment of Zanzibar new constitution of 2010 and GNU for instance, were the efforts among political elites, local and international CSOs, and other activists.<sup>67</sup>

CSOs and media have also worked hand-in-hand to support peace in Zanzibar. During the Maridhiano, for instance, while political parties engaged to address their differences, CSOs and media played a role by educating and sensitizing Zanzibaris on conflict issues and the importance of peace. However, challenges remained, the skills and knowledge of a majority of representatives and important people in addressing violent conflict in Zanzibar remains low. During the Maridhiano a number of CSOs, media, and experts were accused of favoring one side of the negotiation table.<sup>68</sup> Whether it was a result of wrong perceptions from some government officials or CSO and media representatives, this flaw indicates that without a vigorous approach in addressing violent conflict, there is risk of further exacerbating conflict as opposed to mitigating it. Resolving conflict in Zanzibar should be accompanied by training to build capacity of the parties involved in conflicts, as well as engagement, which will build trust between stakeholders before starting to engage on serious matters which have driven conflict.

At the local level, where main conflicts have been around land issues, and mostly between community members and their government or investors, conflict has been addressed by local government authorities in collaboration with CSOs and religious leaders or community elders. Yet the collaboration between stakeholders has been poor. There is no mechanism used by stakeholders to engage in addressing violent conflict associated with land, rather the approaches have been ad hoc. Stakeholders have often been engaged separately with no defined structure. This finding was echoed by respondents during interviews who suggested that collaboration between stakeholders, especially government on one hand and CSOs and media on the other is very low.

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*To a large extent, we from CSOs are communicating well during violent conflict. The only challenge is communicating with the government. To some extent the communication is limited, especially if the conflict involves the government themselves. And on many occasions, being involved in this kind of conflict might be interpreted as being part of the opposition or the CSOs is being used by the oppositions, so there will be little to no communication and collaboration.*

- Personal communication, male KII, Zanzibar, May 2020

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#### 4.7. Key Takeaways – Conflict Assessment

Overall, all target communities perceived that competition for natural resources (i.e. land, water, charcoal) is the main driver of conflicts in their communities, followed by ethnic/family disagreements, and political competition. Economically, agriculture continues to be a backbone of the Tanzanian economy contributing 27% to the country's GDP.<sup>69</sup> Land also continues to be an important commodity for community members including in the target areas of Mtwara, Tandahimba, Kibiti, Ikwiriri, Tarime (North Mara), Unguja and Pemba. Communities have found themselves in violent conflicts because of land disputes, because of an increase in demand for land. Land disputes in all target communities suggested that despite the government's effort in managing land, by enacting laws such as the National Land Policies Act,<sup>70</sup> land ownership, community awareness on land issues, and land planning and use are still a concern. For instance, the assessment observed that conflicts between farmers and herders which were reported in many communities, especially the coastal regions, are mainly caused by poor land planning, poor communication from authorities when they take land from community members for public use or investment purposes, and lack of a clear demarcation between agricultural land and pastoral land in Rufiji valley. Likewise, the conflicts between communities and their governments, which were reported mainly in Tarime (North Mara) and Zanzibar, are largely caused by the tendency of the government to take land from the community and give it to investors without consulting the communities, or paying them appropriate compensation for their land.<sup>71</sup> Lastly, land conflict between community members themselves is mainly because of the lack of understanding about policies and laws around land ownership and some community members who own large pieces of land without following proper procedures.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Archie Matheson (2012) *Maridhiano: Zanzibar's remarkable reconciliation and Government of National Unity*, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 6:4, 591-612.

<sup>69</sup> FAO in Tanzania. <http://www.fao.org/tanzania/fao-in-tanzania/tanzania-at-a-glance/en/>

<sup>70</sup> GoT, (1999). "The Land Act (cap 113)." Dar es salaam

<sup>71</sup> African Press, (May 2020). Nyamongo villagers to be compensated- PS. <https://www.africa-press.com/tanzania/community/nyamongo-villagers-to-be-compensated-ps> , Also see Hikmany, Abdul-Nasser & Syed Abdul Kader, Sharifah & Othman, Ahmad. (2015). Legal Issues of Land Acquisition in Zanzibar.



Male focus group, Lead Consultant

While political conflict was among the main drivers of conflict identified by respondents in almost all target communities, elections were not mentioned as a key driver of conflict, except in Zanzibar. This is likely because participants indicated that all drivers of conflict become political during elections, and politicians have been using them to their advantage to recruit more voters and support for their side. This observation reflects the agreement of almost all respondents from interviews and focus groups, who agreed that conflicts and drivers of conflict change during election years. Conflicts which have been experienced by communities in the years before elections all start to be viewed with a political lens and escalation of conflicts tend to decline. For example, respondents claimed that land conflicts between farmers and herders are typically ignored by the responsible authorities; however, during election years the authorities intervene to help settle these conflicts. Politicians also use these conflicts to advance their agendas, claiming they are solving problems for constituents. This makes communities promise to vote for those politicians who sound like they will be a solution to their problems. The challenge begins if those politicians are from the opposition. Some respondents claim that communities do not have trust in the electoral system, so no matter the outcome of the election, communities will boycott the results. This can lead to unrest and violence, especially when their preferred candidate does not win. Still, when community members were asked if they feel that the coming 2020 elections would increase violent conflict in their community, about 40% of respondents were not worried at all, compared to 22% who were very worried (see figure 5 below). This indicates that in general, most communities are not very worried about the upcoming election.

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*During elections, it's no surprise that these conflicts, especially those associated with farmers and herders, or government and the communities, always stop for a moment. This is because during election years the government has been trying to address them to make sure communities are happy, so they vote for them. However, this approach has been proven to be temporary because after elections these conflicts always erupt again. For instance, from 2016 to 2018 we documented a lot of conflicts in communities, but in 2019 during local government elections and this year for the 2020 general election, less conflicts have been documented or reported. Our experience shows that after election, from 2021 conflict will erupt again.*

- Personal communication, female KII, DSM, May 2020




Figure 5: Community perception of increase of violence among members in 2020 election in target communities

In conclusion, it is important to note that findings under this section suggest that at the local level, **economic issues are more concerning for community members and have been the drivers of many violent conflicts compared to other issues.** Nevertheless, other drivers should not be ignored, and it is important to address them during implementation of initiatives because perceptions of conflicts and their underlying drivers vary in each location. Indeed, the dynamics of the upcoming election need to be closely monitored because political pressure around this year's election has been exacerbated by the defection of politicians from one opposition party to another, in particular the shifting of higher-ranking party members and their support from CUF to ACT-Wazalendo in Zanzibar, and from CHADEMA to CCM and NCCR Mageuzi in Tanzania mainland. Respondents who expressed concern about the coming 2020 elections mentioned that they anticipate party defection will contribute to tension between CCM and ACT-Wazalendo in Zanzibar, and CCM on one hand and ACT-Wazalendo and CHADEMA on the other hand in Tanzania mainland.

## 5. Baseline Indicators and Theory of Change

In order to build a solid and empirically based measurement of the program, track its impacts and ensure the ToC is iterative; baseline, midline and end line analysis of the program is required. Establishing baseline indicators around the key focus areas of the project include – CSO effectiveness in conflict resolution, government awareness of CSO roles in conflict resolution, citizen perceptions of the media, stakeholder collaboration, citizen perceptions of those who may differ from themselves.<sup>72</sup>

*Baseline Indicator 1: Percent of community members surveyed who report that the activities organized by the CSO are highly effective in addressing local conflict and promoting peace.*

The citizen survey aimed to capture awareness of CSO on conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities, as well as the perception of the effectiveness of these activities. The goal of these questions was first to establish a baseline of both an understanding of CSO activities and whether or not these are viewed as effective by the communities they have been targeting. As figure 13 shows, less than half of respondents (38%) across all of the surveyed communities knew of any initiatives run by CSOs to address conflict in their communities. Interestingly, there was little difference between male and female respondents, suggesting access to this information was not impacted by gender.

<sup>72</sup> See indicator table in Section 8 for more detail on the breakdown of percentages of each measured indicator and remarks




Figure 13: Community members who know any initiatives by CSOs to addressing violent conflict in their communities by gender

Due to the low levels of awareness of CSOs activities in the peacebuilding space, it doesn't come as a surprise that many when asked about effectiveness of CSOs efforts to address conflict many were unsure (33%). For those who did know about the activities of CSOs and NGOs working to address conflicts, both at the local and national levels, the majority of respondents, 49% had a positive view of the effectiveness compared to only 18% who viewed otherwise (see figure 14 below). However, only in Tarime did a plurality of respondents strongly agree that interventions were highly effective. This is likely because there have been a number of successful initiatives addressing violent conflict in Tarime, including by Search, LHRC and local paralegal organizations.




Figure 14: Community perception on effectiveness of CSOs and NGOs in addressing violent conflict in their communities

Information received from interviews and focus group discussions in all target communities somewhat contradicts data from the survey. Most respondents agreed that CSOs and media are working to address conflict but are not that effective. According to CSO experts, media tend to report basic updates on conflicts, but rarely produce deeper investigative reports on drivers of these conflicts and implications they have on communities. Indeed, respondents suggested that CSOs are also facing a resource challenge in terms of reaching the wider community, as well as challenges presented by the nature of the conflicts which in general takes time to address. So, when the project has reached its end, the conflict is likely to reemerge. In addition to these challenges, respondents also signaled the current crackdown on civic space by the government as an obstacle which has slowed down the ability of the media and CSOs to effectively address violent conflict in communities.

In general, data from qualitative and quantitative leads us to conclude that currently the efforts at both national and local levels by CSOs are not viewed as highly effective and there is significant room for improvement both in terms of awareness, operationalization of programming, capacity building, and communication and coordination between CSOs and other stakeholders.

*Baseline Indicator 2: Percent of government officials interviewed who understand and acknowledge the important role played by CSOs and media in promoting peace and harmony in Tanzanian society.*

Due to the limitations of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic only a small number (4) of government officials were interviewed. However, all of those interviewed stated that they either had seen or understood the importance of CSOs and media to promote peace and resolve conflict in their communities. There was a basic understanding of the role of CSOs and media, yet all of those interviewed were critical of the media to an extent, claiming they only focus on negative issues, and hoped to see more collaboration by CSOs with communities and more importantly government officials such as District Commissioners. Yet government officials understood to an extent the challenges that CSOs and media faced in addressing conflict saying that the perception from government around conflict issues tends to be viewed through a political lens on both Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. As such, CSOs can be written off as political, when addressing conflict. CSOs interviewed acknowledged this challenge in addressing conflicts and underlined that the government often is an actor in these conflicts and focusing too much on addressing conflicts might cause the CSO to be labeled as government critics. Therefore, there is a real need to work with government officials to help them better understand the role of CSOs and media. How they can complement government efforts to support peace and stability, and that not all criticism is political or directed to undercut, rather to bring attention to issues that they all need to work together to solve.

*In recent years, CSOs and media performance in addressing violent conflict have been less effective. Speaking on the media side, because of the new laws and practices, the space for media and freedom of speech have shrunk. So, we have been very cautious when we engage in any activities such as conflict which might touch on a nerve of the government. We have been, for instance, reporting less on issues related to the delayed compensation from the mining company to the community after taking their land, etc.*

- Personal communication, male KII, Tarime, May 2020

In general, the challenges presented by COVID-19 made it difficult to draw conclusions on this indicator. However, this can be explored by Search and its partners over the course of the project by setting up a solid monitoring system during activities implementation to determine government officials' perceptions on the importance of CSOs in addressing violent extremism in their communities.

*CSOs are doing their best to address conflict in the community. However, the challenge is that since main conflicts involve the government, focusing too much on addressing conflict might cause the CSO to be labeled as someone who opposes and criticizes the government*

- Personal communication, male KII, Zanzibar, May 2020

*Baseline Indicator 3: Percent of Tanzanian citizens surveyed who demonstrate positive attitude towards others from across the divide as a result for the positive narratives disseminated through media.*

Media plays a key role in citizens' understanding of their communities, their government and the world around them. Narratives and information disseminated through the media shapes the world view of the consumer. Exploring how the target communities view others in their communities and country based on media consumption is an important indicator for not only this project, but also building a cohesive and tolerant society. Fortunately, 61% of respondents had a favorable view (mostly yes/yes) of media reporting of violent conflict, figure 15. Conversely, 19% of respondents had a predominately negative view of the media coverage of conflict. Particularly in Rufiji-Ikwiriri and Kibiti where a quarter of respondents viewed media coverage as lacking, suggesting these communities could be initial focus areas for tailored media interventions.




Figure 15: Community perception on media such as radio on proper and fairly reporting on violent conflict

Surprisingly, while the community trusts the media, the trust towards others from across the divide despite positive narratives disseminated through media is very low. Over half of all respondents, 51% (definitely not and mostly not) suggested that people in their communities do not interact with other groups outside of their ethnicity, religion, or political beliefs to solve local problems or discuss important issues, compared to only 37% (yes, and mostly yes) who suggested otherwise (see figure 16 below). The information received from interviews and focus groups also suggests that politics and religion have been a driver of divisions in the community and shows that social and economic activities are impacted because of ideological differences or disagreements on election results. This polarization was echoed by many respondents in almost all target communities. This finding suggests that the polarization among communities in Tanzania is continuing to increase, compounded by lack of effective media messaging, and action needs to be taken to address this challenge. Engagement should be done with caution, involving stages to build trust among community members, addressing their grievances in dialogues to reach a durable solution as a whole community.




Figure 16: Community perception on interaction with another member outside their group

**Baseline Indicator 4: Percent of participating CSO, Media and Government stakeholders who have collaborated with other stakeholders in designing and implementing activities contributing to peaceful resolution of conflict.**

The KII interviews with CSO, media and governmental stakeholders yielded no concrete examples of formal collaboration in the design and implementation of activities to peacefully address conflict. However, there were several examples of informal or ad hoc collaborations in resolving conflict.

For instance, evidence from qualitative data suggests that CSOs have been collaborating with the media in addressing violent conflict in Tanzania. Because CSOs depend on the media to reach the wider community, they have been providing training and capacity building workshops and courses making sure media representatives are well equipped with skills to support CSOs peacebuilding efforts. However, the evidence suggested that the level of collaboration between CSOs and media on one hand, and the government on the other hand is not satisfactory. The government collaborates with CSOs on those angles which they view as not controversial to them. Additionally, there are structures in formal and informal governance mechanisms that can be leveraged and tapped into. In other words, the scaffolding is there to build the trust, coordination, collaboration and mechanisms that are required for stakeholders to come together to design and implement peacebuilding activities together. Moreover, 55% of citizens (see table 17) believe that there is trust between these actors to be able to work together, data that could help to propel stakeholders towards greater collaboration. Lastly, there was also evidence from KII and FGD discussions of a real desire to build more collaborative relationships to address not just surface level conflicts, but the deeper drivers of conflict.

Nevertheless, the challenge remains on the conflicts between CSOs, government, and media around elections, which are mainly caused by the lack of communication between these stakeholders. While it is true that CSOs always work to complement government activities, they often have interests. When these interests are perceived as political, then conflict with the government emerges. In Tanzania, on many occasions, CSOs and media have been accused of forgetting their responsibilities and overstepping during elections by engaging in

activities which are not in their jurisdiction. Such accusations include, but are not limited to, CSOs and media engaging in political activities rather than civic activities during elections, and/or supporting the opposition, or being involved in election activities. Also, there are genuine complaints which arise by CSOs trying to identify some challenges during the election process which tends to be received negatively by the government. This in turn has resulted in action taken against them by the government, including banning them from participating in election activities.<sup>73</sup> Although this is a challenge, Search and partners should use it as an opportunity, including to start to engage with the government in a manner that criticism is delivered respectfully and in a constructive way.




Figure 17: Community perception on CSOs and government authorities trust one another to work to address violent conflict

*Baseline Indicator 5: Percent of civil society groups and government members interviewed who can report at least 2 examples of collaboration on positive solutions with the other group.*

Throughout the KII interviews with CSOs and government officials, none of the respondents were able to provide clear examples of collaboration on positive solutions with the other group. Moreover, both sides spoke of mistrust, lack of communication, and misunderstanding. However, interviewees from both groups did acknowledge the importance of improving the relationships by addressing the lack of the aforementioned issues. Suggesting that while there is no current reporting of collaboration in the data, there is a desire to put in the work to develop solutions and to collaborate in the future. This offers a significant entry point for the intervention and should be capitalized upon, established and importantly sustained.

### 5.1. Review of Theory of Change

As mentioned above, Jenga Amani Yetu project's theory of change as per original project proposal, is as follows:


*"If a diverse coalition of civil society groups has the skills and space to collaborate in a non-adversarial manner around key sensitive issues and has opportunities to engage with government champions to constructively address them; and if Tanzanian citizens have access to balanced and credible information that promotes peaceful approaches and collaboration among different actors and across various divides; then a variety of key stakeholders, including civil society, will work together to promote a culture of peace, conflict prevention and inclusive democracy because civil society, government actors, and citizens will understand the advantages brought by working together to solve shared problems."*

The theory features six key elements—skills, space for collaboration, opportunities for engagement, joint action and greater understanding of the advantages brought by working together to solve shared problems—which, taken together, should trigger impact. These elements are closely aligned with the project's estimated results, and their achievement should follow what the project proposal refers to as two activity streams. These are, in all but name, the initiative's main implementation strategies: the first one focuses on increasing skills, space, engagement opportunities and joint action between CSOs and key government representatives, using a single to multi-stakeholder approach; the second strategy focuses exclusively on increased understanding, relying on a mass media-based approach.

<sup>73</sup> The Citizen. (November 2019). CSOs claim been locked out of polls. <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/news/1840340-5351934-9ubqyj/index.html>

The project's theory of change, as stated above, has all the standard elements, starting from the actions that fall under the responsibility of Search and its partners, to the outcomes that these are supposed to achieve, and to the assumptions that need to hold true for change to occur as expected. A more granular understanding of how change happens can, however, be reached if we use causal mechanisms.<sup>74</sup> Using this framework, it is possible to identify at least two mechanisms within the theory of change underpinning the Jenga Amani Yetu project.

The following diagram provides a visual snapshot of the theory of change, where results (from the project's logical framework and the theory of change) have been arranged according to their logical level (the vertical axis) and the relevant domain of change (the horizontal axis):<sup>75</sup>




Based on the diagram, the **first causal mechanism** has three components. First, CSOs increase their capacity for collaborative problem-solving; secondly, identified government actors also increase their capacity for, as well as their commitment to, collaborative problem solving; and thirdly, communities (or groups) in conflict with each other accept solutions that were developed and presented jointly by CSOs and government actors.

<sup>74</sup> Causal mechanisms, in theory-based evaluations, are statements that define the links between cause and effect that are necessary and sufficient to explain a causal relation. In concrete terms, a causal mechanism is made up of several components, each including an entity engaging in an action, which, taken together, leads to an outcome.


<sup>75</sup> Domains are the spheres in which a desired change is expected to take place. For the purposes of this assessment, three broad domains of change have been identified in the "Jenga Amani Yetu" project: individual/ organizational (referring to outcomes related to the participation of individuals and the organizations that they represent); relational/ systemic (referring to changes in how different individuals and entities collaborate); and social (referring to changes that affect entire communities and/ or society at large).

### Causal Mechanism 1



The **second causal mechanism** also has three components. First, identified media actors collaborate on the definition and implementation of a joint peace media campaign; secondly, the campaign reaches a wide audience in target locations; and thirdly, citizens exposed to the campaign shift away from negative perceptions and stereotypes of different backgrounds.

### Causal Mechanism 2



Moving from the theory of change as defined by the ‘if-then-because’ statement to one that features the aforementioned causal mechanisms gives a more granular and nuanced understanding of how change is supposed to happen from the activities that Search and its partners are planning to the decisions and actions that other project participants and stakeholders will need to effectively take for the project to claim impact. All of the components included in the mechanisms will, in other words, help to clarify the theory’s **relevance** and **validity** in order for the project to be able to prove its contribution to achieving its stated goal.

**Relevance:** The theory derives much of its relevance from the macro-analysis of conflict dynamics in Tanzania, as presented in section 3. Here the analysis shows how different factors (religious, economic and political) drive the tensions that exist between different communities and groups and the government—tensions that regularly lead to violence. In this regard, the conflict is certainly exacerbated by the fraught relationship that exists between civil society, including religious leaders, the media and the government. In particular, the latter’s attempts to impose greater control on the operations of the former, including the adoption of laws that curtail individual freedoms, are seen as a departure from the recent past and an escalation of the conflict between the groups. The immediate results of this escalation are a decrease in collaboration and an increase in mistrust for the government, which has the potential to lead to even greater levels of violence. By aiming to counter this trend, the theory of change is thus extremely relevant and appropriate to the context in which the Jenga Amani Yetu project will take place.

To ensure that the project remains relevant, however, Search and partners should make sure that the theory of change articulates changes in ways that also reflect the conflict dynamics that emerge from the micro-level analysis, as presented in sub-section 4.1 to 4.7. This might entail re-articulating the theory of change on the basis of the specific issues that the project will decide to work on in each location. For example, the analysis in sub-section 4.7 points to competition over natural resources as a key driver of violence. In Kibiti, Ikwiriri and Mtwara in particular, informants interviewed and reached through the survey indicated that, for them, the biggest cause of violence in their community was land conflicts between herders and farmers. In this case, civil society, media and the government might continue to be the main stakeholders, but their relationship might be different from the one described in the macro-level analysis. To begin with, in a devolved political system, such as Tanzania’s, responsibilities over land are divided between national and local authorities; also, village land committees already exist, which have a specific conflict management mandate. Making the intervention relevant to communities embroiled in land conflicts will, as such, require a more in-depth analysis of the role currently played by the project’s main target groups, but also others such as legislature bodies.

Linked to the above, the relevance of theory of change could be improved by applying a gender filter. As it is, the theory is, in fact, gender blind, as it does not differentiate between the effects that the project will have on

different groups—not just men and women, but also younger and older generations. It is also, likely, as previous evaluations commissioned by Search in Tanzania, that there are additional assumptions tied to the participation of specific gender groups: women, for example, might be discouraged from becoming engaged in activities if no provisions are made for needs relating to safety, childcare and negative social stereotypes. The conflict assessment has indeed already shown how perceptions around peace and security can vary between women and men: the theory of change should also reflect the fact that pathways to change will also differ.

**Validity:** The strongest evidence for the theory’s validity relates to the first causal mechanism. The experience Search has acquired in Tanzania (and also Kenya) strongly suggests that the approach of working with single stakeholder groups first, only moving to multi-stakeholder engagement once key competencies for collaborative problem solving have been strengthened, is effective: it builds confidence, leads to increased trust between CSO representatives and government actors, which in turn creates the basis for joint action. Overall, data collected suggests that the theory of change is valid, but also that its validity could be improved. The theory of change is based on several assumptions, for instance. Some of these are explicitly stated, for example in relation to the operating space, which the national government has tended to curtail in recent years, escalating in some political tensions. Some are implicit, yet no less important. Among these is the assumption that working with individual government actors can contribute to institutional change. This assumption, however, has not been validated: it could be true, but it could also not be. To navigate through around this assumption therefore, Search and partners should engage with this champions as the Notably, it may apply only to some government representatives (like security forces), and political appointees (like DC and DED) rather than all of them; and it might undervalue the role of institutional constraints, such as regular re-assignments and risk aversion, which tend to be felt by senior to junior level officials. Search and partners should therefore engage these individuals as entry points and champions for internal conversations about larger institutional changes, rather than completely relying on them for changes.

In relation to the second causal mechanism, there are some concerns. Examples of mass-media campaigns that have been successful at changing attitudes exist, making an investment in such activity justifiable—more so in Tanzania, where tensions exist between media outlets and the government which have also contributed to the perception that media’s work around violent conflict are ineffective. Yet, past work by Search has had limited effect in reaching and engaging audiences in the country. The validity of this mechanism might be due to resonance and scale: media programming, to be effective, needs to be trusted and topical, and to reach a high number of people. On both aspects, the theory of change features an implicit assumption: that media representatives and outlets are interchangeable (i.e. that they enjoy similar levels of audience trust—in other words media representatives which include blog owners, reporters, anchors, editors, and outlets such as radio and TV—enjoy the same level of trust, resonance or roles). Yet, this assumption has also not yet been proven valid.

Overall, Jenga Amani Yetu’s theory of change as stated above, has all the standard elements, starting from the actions that fall under the responsibility of Search for Common Ground and its partners, to the outcomes that these are supposed to achieve, and to the assumptions that need to hold true for change to occur as expected. Despite this, the assessment observed flaws in some of the assumptions. Search and partners therefore should adopt the recommendations discussed to strengthen the intervention which can increase its effectiveness and lead to greater impact.

## 7. Risk assessment

<i>Risk Category</i>	<i>Description of Risk</i>	<i>Likelihood</i>	<i>Consequence</i>	<i>Risk before mitigation</i>	<i>Mitigating actions</i>	<i>Risk after mitigation</i>
<i>Risk affecting realization of overall objective</i>	<b>Political:</b> Violence before, during and after elections makes it difficult to continue with building trust between CSOs, media, and government	Medium	High	High	Search should closely monitor conflict dynamics in each target area during the lead up to the 2020 elections, during, and after the election. Search should immediately engage government and other stakeholders to build trust in the early stages of the project.	Low
	<b>Economic:</b> COVID-19 could trigger challenges including inflation, resource scarcity, and travel restrictions, etc.	High	High	High	Search and partners plan ahead for activities considering these challenges, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Budget for project should consider inflation rates and reserve a pool of funds to cover costs should inflation rise rapidly</li> <li>Effective deployment of online tools to communicate remotely with project beneficiaries in all targeted communities</li> <li>Relying on local networks for information gathering and sharing during the project life cycle</li> </ul>	Medium
<i>Risks affecting realization of specific objectives</i>	<b>Political:</b> Local partners perceived as having a political agenda	Medium	High	Medium	Capacity building of local partners should include training to address conflicts through mediation and the common ground approach. Search should also vet potential partners to ensure they are reputable and credible before engaging.	Low
<i>Risks associated with project activities (outputs/inputs) which might harm the target community ("Do No Harm"/Conflict sensitivity)</i>	<b>Social:</b> Fighting for resources among CSOs and media	Low	Medium	Medium	Search should engage with CSOs and media through their associations present in the target communities to ensure collaboration and coordination. In Mtwara, for instance, Search could engage directly with Mtwara Regional Press, which represents the interest of all media in Mtwara. In North Mara, Search could engage with the Association of CSOs in Tarime, which represents the interests of all CSOs present in Tarime.	Low
	<b>Political:</b> Government champions may not be willing openly to express their views and push Search and partner agendas	Medium	High	Medium	Search should adopt a strategy which will incentivize/attract the government, such as involving officials in designing interventions, to ensure they feel that they are part and parcel of the project.	Low
	<b>Social:</b> Targeted CSOs and media who advocate for vulnerable populations are perceived as being in opposition with the government, presenting a risk of difficulties in coalition building	Medium	High	Medium	Search should use its "single and multi-stakeholder community dialogues" approach, where government champions and CSOs/media are engaged separately, then together, with the idea that the first engagement prepares stakeholders by building their capacity to understand issues and challenges facing one another and ensures they interact in a constructive way.	Low

## 8. Indicator Table

Indicator	Project Target	Baseline	Remarks
# of conflict issues resolved by CSO initiatives during the life of the project.	10	N/A	This indicator cannot be verified at the baseline, as it requires an assessment of activities occurring during the life of the project. However, this indicator could have been evaluated by asking community members their knowledge of CSO initiatives addressing conflict in their community (see discussion under Baseline Indicator 1).
% of government officials interviewed who understand and acknowledge the important role played by CSOs and media in promoting peace and harmony in Tanzanian society.	75%	100%	This indicator should be reviewed since it was not appropriately measured and could not be verified through the baseline. Restrictions due to COVID-19 prevented the baseline from interviewing all planned officials.
% of community members surveyed who report that the activities organised by the CSO are highly effective in addressing local conflict and promoting peace	70%	49%	The baseline is lower than the project's target.
% of participating CSO, Media and Government stakeholders who have collaborated with other stakeholders in designing and implementing activities contributing peaceful resolution of conflict.	70%	N/A	This indicator cannot be verified at the baseline, as it requires an assessment of CSOs, media, and government who participate in project activities. However, this indicator could have been measured by assessing the percentage of community members who report that civil society and government actors peacefully collaborate on important issues that affect them.
% government and civil society participants who report trust in one another to work together	80%	55%	The baseline is lower than the project's target.
% of civil society groups and government members interviewed who can report at least 2 examples of collaboration on positive solutions with the other group	80%	0%	No civil society groups or government officials interviewed provided any concrete examples of collaboration on positive solutions to conflict. This indicator should be measured at the end of the project.
# of media products produced and disseminated by participating media stakeholders that promote peaceful narratives during the life of the project	48 radio programs; 12 radio PSAs	N/A	This indicator cannot be verified at the baseline, as it requires an assessment of activities occurring during the life of the project. However, this indicator could have been measured by asking community members whether media promotes peaceful narratives (see discussion under Baseline Indicator 3).
% of Tanzanian citizens surveyed who demonstrate positive attitude towards others from across the divide as a result of the positive narratives disseminated through media	80%	37%	The baseline is lower than the project's target.

## 6. Conclusion and Recommendations

Violent conflict is continuing to threaten Tanzanian peace and tranquility. Data suggests there are two levels in which violent conflict occurs, at the national level, which is usually driven by continuing social-economic, political, and/or religious grievances; and the local level, which is also driven by social-economic, political, and religious drivers, but has been triggered and exacerbated locally by issues such as competition for resources such as land, ethnic/family disagreements, and political competition, particularly during elections. At the local level, all drivers are combined with economic concerns, such as conflicts over natural resources, making it also a major driver of violent conflict identified in all target communities.

In all target communities land conflict dominated the discussion and communities identified several types of land conflicts in their communities – between community members, between villages, and between community members and the government, park authorities, or investors – mostly caused by poor land management and planning by the government of Tanzania and lack of understanding of laws that govern land ownership and use among communities.

Political and religious violence, as well as ethnic/clan/family conflicts were also mentioned as issues in their communities. Interestingly, the assessment found that violent conflict tends to change during election years. Common conflicts experienced by communities in non-election years tend to decline as politicians and government make extra efforts to resolve them to gain the support of their constituents. Despite the decline in these types of conflicts, conflicts driven by elections, such as political hate speech and boycotting of results, naturally tend to emerge during election years. However, elections were not echoed as a main driver of conflict at the community level. Although this is a good sign, the challenge around elections remains between key stakeholders, namely the government on one hand and CSOs and media on the other. Mistrust and lack of communication between these stakeholders impacts efforts to address violent conflict in communities, as to sustainably address conflict at the community level, government and CSOs must work together collaboratively.

Stemming from the findings of the assessment, the following recommendations are offered to Search and its partners to improve effectiveness of its program and improve CSOs' contributions toward a culture of peace, conflict prevention and inclusive democracy in Tanzania.

- **Focus on improving the relationship between advocacy CSOs and media on one hand and the government on the other hand.** Before engaging in building the platform for stakeholders to communicate and address violent conflicts, the first step should be to strengthen the relationship between stakeholders and improve trust between them. To do this, Search could leverage its *“single and multi-stakeholder community dialogues”* approach, where CSOs, media and the government will be engaged separately, then together, with the idea that the first engagement prepares stakeholders by building their capacity to understand the importance of one another in addressing violent conflicts in the communities, as well as preparing them by ensuring they interact in a constructive way. The second engagement will ensure that stakeholders are engaged in a dialogue to improve their trust by focusing on areas they have in common. In the context of Tanzania where advocacy CSOs and media have a tense relationship with the government, this engagement will help to ensure better communication and collaboration between them during project implementation.
- **Build connections and relationships with government champions as an entry point towards institutional change.** To effectively and sustainably address violent conflict at the community level, the project must engage with the government as the custodian of security in the country. Because the relationship between CSOs and government is more adversarial in the current context, Search should identify champions within the government, such as DCs and DEDs, who have wide authority and can delegate downwards to ensure a large number of civil servants are involved, creating an internal tipping point for institutional change.
- **Design more tailored capacity-building training for local CSOs, local leaders, media, business leaders, and government officials.** Search and partners should consider organizing conflict resolution trainings to empower these actors with the proper skills and tools to address conflict in a holistic and collaborative manner through the common ground approach (CGA). A mutual understanding of each stakeholder's role will ensure higher levels of collaboration and coordination in the establishment of a platform to address conflict and promote peace.
- **Develop a strong gender strategy for project implementation.** Data from the baseline suggests that female

respondents in targeted communities are more impacted by violent conflict, and research shows that females have an important role to play in mitigating and addressing conflict. Search should develop a gender strategy to ensure the project not only reaches gender balance in terms of participation and engagement, but also addresses conflicts that disproportionately affect women, such as domestic violence. In addition, Search should ensure female representation for the platform both within the government and CSOs.

- **Conduct an in-depth assessment of the media landscape, including social media.** Before launching the mass-media campaign, Search and partners should conduct an in-depth analysis on traditional and social media to understand how the project should engage and leverage both. Although there is some evidence which suggests that communities still trust media, there is no evidence that positive narratives disseminated through media contribute to community cohesion or trust. Secondly, the current crackdown on media by the government has caused some degree of self-censorship, compromising the ability of media to work effectively. A media landscape assessment will provide Search and its partners an opportunity to understand types of media and media representatives, their resonance and scale, as well as their role and influence on communities in terms of conflict resolution, enabling the project to tailor interventions to maximize impact.
- **Design activities around already existing structures.** During project implementation, Search and partners should design their activities to leverage already existing structures or activities by authorities from the community to the national level. Despite flaws in addressing violent conflict from the government's side, there are already existing mechanisms and structures in place to address violent conflicts at every level. For instance, land committees from the village to the national level are directly responsible for addressing land conflicts. Engaging with already existing structures will allow Search to ensure government buy-in and support, but also contribute to the project's ability to affect institutional change and sustainability – allowing these structures to continue to address violent conflict in their respective jurisdictions after the project ends, based on skills and knowledge gained during the project.
- **Conduct rigorous monitoring and evaluation of progress on an ongoing basis to ensure learning can be incorporated in activities.** Search should consider:
  - Use pre- and post-test evaluation tools during project activities, such as trainings and dialogues, to measure changes in understanding on the role of CSOs and media in addressing violent conflict at the individual level within government, as well as progress towards institutional change.
  - Search should continue to monitor and evaluate conflicts in all targeted areas, especially during the upcoming general election, to ensure project activities stay relevant with the changing dynamics.