**Search** for
**Common Ground**

2019

# PUBLIC PERCEPTION ON
# **RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND TOLERANCE**

# Table of Contents

# List of Figures

# Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| FoRB | Freedom of Religion and Beliefs |
| FPI | Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender's Front) |
| GMKI | *Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia* (Indonesian Christian Student Movement) |
| HKBP | *Huria Kristen Batak Protestan* (Batak Christian Protestant Church) |
| HMI | *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (Islamic Student Council) |
| HTI | Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia |
| IDI | In-depth Interview |
| MUI | *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (Indonesian Ulema Council) |
| NU | Nahdlatul Ulama |
| SES | Socio-Economic Status |
| Search | Search for Common Ground |
| TOM | Top of Mind |

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

# Executive Summary

Although Indonesia is a pluralist nation based on ideals of the Pancasila, recent years have seen significant increases in restrictions on freedom of religion and belief (FoRB), as well as inter-faith conflict and violence – particularly towards the nation's religious minorities. Overall, a nation that historically prides itself on harmony and tolerance amongst its diverse religious and ethnic groups has – in many locations – begun to experience an erosion in such freedom of religion and belief, materialized through increasing intolerance.

Search for Common Ground is an international non-profit organization implementing projects across Indonesia aimed to restore tolerance and harmony amongst Indonesia's religious groups. In 2018, as part of these efforts, the organization undertook a research project that surveyed public perceptions on a range of elements related to freedom of religion and belief, with the aim to further understand the levels of understanding and implementation of tolerance across the country. This perception survey used both quantitative and qualitative methods, with a focus on seven specific target cities (Jakarta, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi, Bandung, Kupang and Yogyakarta), with the following objectives:

⇒ To assess the level of public knowledge and understanding on religious freedom;
⇒ To assess the public perspective on how state actors preserve the religious freedom;
⇒ To measure public attitude towards religious freedom;
⇒ To measure public attitude towards other religious groups; and
⇒ To assess the influence of social media in shaping public attitude towards religious freedom.

Overall, analysis of the findings evidenced that while theoretical understanding of FoRB and tolerance remains significantly high, the understanding and application of practical FoRB/tolerance is on the decline. There was an average of between 10-40% of respondents – depending on location – whose practical implementation of tolerance somewhat contradicts their theoretical perceptions. Overall, examples of such practical implementation provided in the survey could be considered as **'minimum standard'** tolerance, requiring little sacrifice and with almost no impact on the lives of others. Such a shift in responses between theoretical and practical perceptions forms a worrying sign for the ongoing state of FoRB and tolerance in Indonesia.

Kupang's inclusion as a survey location had an impact on overall figures, as the minority/majority city bucked the trend on tolerant practices. Kupang was found to be well ahead in most areas of practical tolerance application, and while this may have embellished overall FoRB/tolerance figures in the study, it also provided a strong benchmark or example for other cities regarding the realization of tolerance and FoRB. On the other hand, Bandung was consistently at the lower end of the FoRB/tolerance scale, displaying specific traits related to, amongst others, lack of willingness to engage with other religious groups. Bandung (alongside other Islamic-majority cities) also portrayed increasing signs of majoritarianism – a mentality that can further impinge on a range of minority rights.

Public perception on the role of the State in FoRB/tolerance displayed similar signs to overall FoRB/tolerance theory and application. While high rates of respondents believed that the government's role was integral in handling FoRB/tolerance matters, the application of such a role has been below optimal to this point. Public perception on the State's protection of their rights and activities also varied, with contradictions displayed between religious groups and locations. Awareness of religious organizations was also surveyed, with the largest traditional Islamic institutions heading the figures – particularly in the majority cities. Of interest is the high initial awareness rates of hardline Islamic groups in a number of cities, which is potentially due to the high amount of press received by said groups in the Indonesian media.

Finally, media sources and use were also studied, with almost all respondents citing television as a source of media they turn to. Social media also forms a key information source, with preferred platforms often dependent upon location. Most respondents tend to steer clear of using social media for spreading negative information about other religions, however engagement in such activities was notably higher in Bandung and Jakarta.

Key recommendations developed from this study are as follows:

1. Engaging the 'vulnerable to intolerance' demographic – Identifying, understanding and engaging the demographic who displayed decreased willingness to apply tolerance – regardless of their agreeance with the theory. This forms the group that may determine FoRB/tolerance in the future of Indonesia.
2. Challenge Intolerant Voices – Through inclusive and appealing modes that further distance the small but loud intolerant voices from the majority of society.

3. Religious Leaders as Information Sources – To support the spreading of 'truth' and positive/tolerant messaging in a climate of increased social media use and false news.
4. Promoting Positive Stories – To evidence the 'real' Indonesia and the application of FoRB/tolerance through methods that engage and invite the audience to participate.
5. Comprehension of Majority Status – Within this, comprehension of human rights in theory as well as practice, and the majority's role in supporting its application.

CHAPTER 1
# INTRODUCTION

# 1. Introduction

Indonesia is home to over 1,000 ethnic and religious groups across a chain of over 17,000 islands. It forms the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, but is also home to other religious groups – including Christians, Catholics, Buddhists, Hindus and Confucians – as well as a range of traditional beliefs that are still practiced in some form. However, despite cultural and religious pluralism, violations of religious freedoms – particularly towards minority religions – are not uncommon. Such violations have not only experienced a spike in numbers over the last few years[1], but the increase in access to online media has also seen their occurrence thrust heavily into the public sphere[2]. A vast majority of such violations are committed by proponents of the majority religion (Islam) towards minority religions, as well as sects within Islam itself[3], ensuring that freedom of religion remains a sensitive topic across the island archipelago. On the positive side, organizations that measure tolerance and freedom of religion – such as the Setara Institute – report significant changes in some cities across the nation[4]. These cities stand as examples that tolerance and freedom of religion can be improved – particularly through real actions by both society and those who govern it.

Another recent factor that has added to the overall context is the increasing politicization of religion, as the nation's political elite become increasingly aware of the value that religion holds within a population also becoming increasingly focused on religious identity – compared to traditional national and cultural identities. Whether identity is a trigger or a result of religious politicization is open to further investigation, however it is clear that religion is an important tool of power within one of the world's largest democracies.

Search for Common Ground (Search), as an international non-profit organization, is implementing projects across Indonesia, which engage a range of local stakeholders including a range of organizations, local communities and the media. These diverse groups will contribute in working towards an overall goal that aims to reinstate the values and norms of pluralism required for strengthening religious freedom in Indonesia.

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[1] Setara Institute: Mid-Year Report on Religious Freedom and Religious Minorities, 2018
[2] Search for Common Ground: Media Content Analysis on Freedom of Religion and Tolerance in Indonesia, 2018
[3] One particular example is treatment of the Ahmadiyya sect – Farsight: Security & Protection of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, 2016
[4] Setara Institute: City Tolerance Index, 2019

CHAPTER 2
# CONTEXT ANALYSIS OVERVIEW

# 2. Context Analysis Overview

## 2.1. Research Objectives and Implementation

A survey was conducted to gain better insight into the public perceptions on religious freedom and tolerance in Indonesia. This survey was conducted May and July 2018, across 7 'target' cities made up of Greater Jakarta (Jakarta, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi – for the purposes of this report will be referred to as Jakarta), Bandung, Yogyakarta and Kupang.

The overall objectives of the survey were as follows:

- To assess the level of public knowledge and understanding on religious freedom;
- To assess the public perspective on how state actors preserve the religious freedom;
- To measure public attitude towards religious freedom;
- To measure public attitude towards other religious groups; and
- To assess the influence of social media in shaping public attitude towards religious freedom.

## 2.2. Methodology

The research was undertaken through a mixed methods approach, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative methods.

The quantitative approach was implemented through face-to-face interviews based on a structured questionnaire (the survey), with the sample of respondents determined based on a stratified random sampling technique across the seven cities. Questioned used both the 'Likert Scale', as well as some open-ended questions designed for further probing perceptions

Surveys were undertaken with 711 respondents, disaggregated as follows:

| Methodology | Quantitative (Face to Face Interviews) |
|---|---|
| Respondent Criteria | <ul><li>Gender: Male and Female;</li><li>Education: Minimum graduated Junior High School;</li><li>Age: 20 – 30 y/o, 31 – 40 y/o, 51 – 55 y/o;</li></ul> |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | • Working, non-working; <br><br> • Social economy class: ABC (To determine socio-economic status, Nielsen social economic status classification was used). | | | |
| Interview Length | Maximum 45 – 60 minutes | | | |
| Sample Size (Based on city size) | Jakarta | Bandung | Kupang | Yogyakarta | Total |
| | 303 | 153 | 104 | 151 | 711 |

Sampling in each city (using stratified random method) purposively selected certain areas (villages) known for their mixed demographical design (varying ethnicities, religions, and race). For example, the sampling avoided certain areas known to be primarily made-up of single sub-groups, whether religious or otherwise. In developing the sampling frame, these mixed-demographic sub-districts were then randomly selected for survey implementation. In order to ensure even geographical distribution of respondents throughout each city, it was decided to limit respondent numbers to a maximum of ten per sub-district. Furthermore, the survey would be undertaken in intervals of five houses in each selected area. If the interviewer was unable to find an eligible respondent in the designated house, they would then move to the next house.

*Figure 1: Survey Sample Diagram*

The overall response rate was full – with no rejection of interviews experienced. A number of respondents were reluctant in the beginning of the interview; however, this was eventually overcome. Some respondents felt the survey was being implemented for certain religious interests, however after being explained that the survey implementation was through an independent marketing research company, the respondents welcomed and willingly participated in the interview.

Qualitative information was gathered through in-depth interviews (IDIs), with interviewees identified by Search due to their strong engagement in the related field, and therefore capacity to establish contact with respondents. The IDI were undertaken under the following structure:

- Search provided details of IDI respondents and made an appointment (time and venue) for interviews.
- IDIs were conducted with Key Opinion Leaders (KOL) and influencers who hold background knowledge related to religious freedom elements, and could provide perspectives based on their own local knowledge and the national scope. Respondents included:

    - Academics (lecturer, dean, etc.);

    - Religious community members;

    - Key influencers (local public figures);

    - Religious organization members (formal/informal);

    - Journalists/editors from AJI (Independent Journalists Alliance).

The IDI was conducted with 11 sources as follows:

*Figure 2: In-Depth Interview Respondent Breakdown*

| City | Amount | Criteria (combination of majority and minority) |
|---|---|---|
| Jakarta | 3 | Majority religion (Ustãd, MUI ) |
| | | Majority religion (Journalist, Freelance ) |
| | | Minority religion (Reverend) |
| Bandung | 3 | Majority religion (Buzzer - social media influencer) |
| | | Majority religion (Dean, Islamic University of Indonesia) |

| | | Majority religion (Alliance of Independent Journalist, Art Community + Activist, Author) |
|---|---|---|
| Yogyakarta | 2 | Majority religion (Cultural Observer, Director of a Cultural Arts Foundation) |
| | | Minority religion (Reverend, Lecturer from a Catholic University) |
| Kupang | 3 | Majority religion (Reverend) |
| | | Majority religion (Newspaper Editor in Chief) |
| | | Minority religion (Ustãd) |
| TOTAL | 11 | |

The IDIs were implemented one after the other in each city, thus enabling a process of learning from one in-depth interview to the next. No issues were encountered in interviewing the sources, who were very welcoming in providing their opinions and insights. The interviews were conducted at a location determined by the source themselves to increase their personal comfort, with each IDI taking between 1.5 – 2.5 hours.

For the In-Depth Interviews (IDI), the survey implementer developed a discussion guide consisting of questions to be asked during IDI sessions, as well as providing the questionnaire used for the quantitative survey. Both the questionnaire and discussion guide used in this survey were checked and approved by SFCG before the fieldwork was conducted.

## 2.3. Scope and Limitations

The survey was conducted across 7 cities, which means that generalization of results across the entire Indonesian population is difficult. However, the choice of cities and population demographics do allow for a strong insight into general perceptions across the nation. During the fieldwork in Yogyakarta (the last city to surveyed), there were two major incidents related to survey content that may have affected answers – namely a riot, and bombings in Surabaya. There is no direct understanding of whether there were impacts on respondent answers, or what these impacts may have been.

Findings also may not be truly representative, as Kupang – a minority city – accounts for 15% of total respondents, and overall demographics incorporated 65% of Muslim respondents

(whereas the over 87% of Indonesian's nationally identify as following the Islamic faith[5]). This weighting may also be a positive element, as it allows the report to gain further insight into the minority experience.

It is also important to highlight the engagement of the qualitative elements of the survey (IDIs), which were undertaken selectively with a small number of respondents who hold specific roles, backgrounds and knowledge regarding the subject. While this is beneficial for a more in-depth understanding of the overall context within the Indonesian public, it must be remembered that information is primarily based on the opinion (however well-informed) of respondents – and therefore not necessarily reflective of general public perceptions. Qualitative insights from these interviews do, however, provide relevant context and support to findings from the overall quantitative survey – as well as at times reflecting or evidencing some of the perceptions and findings that arose.

## 2.4.Demographics

From the 711 respondents surveyed, a majority were of Muslim faith (65%), followed by Protestant (18%), and a small number of Catholics (7%), Hindus (4%), Buddhists (4%) and Confucianists (2%). The distribution of respondent gender was almost equal, with a slightly higher number of female respondents (51%) compared to male (49%). A majority of respondents were aged 30-39 years (33%), followed by 41-49 years (28%), 20-29 years (27%), and a small number of respondents (13%) in the 50-54-year-old age group.

*Figure 3: Respondent Religion*

*Figure 4: Respondent Gender*

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
[5] Indonesian Census, 2010

The educational background of respondents included 50% senior high school/equivalent graduates, 36% higher education graduates, as well as 14% of respondents who had not graduated to a level of senior high school or equivalent. This study classified the socio-economic status (SES) of the respondents based on their monthly household expenditure and the ownership of durable goods (such as electronics, vehicles, other household facilities, etc.), then dividing them into three categories:

**SES A:** Highest socio-economic status (25% for this survey);

**SES B:** Middle socio-economic status (54%);

**SES C:** Lower socio-economic status (21%).

This survey shows that out of 711 respondents, almost half had monthly expenditures of IDR 2,500,000 - 4,000,000 (47%), with 22% falling within a range of IDR 4,000,001 - 5,000,000. The remaining figures can be seen in graph xx.

*Figure 5: Respondent Age Group*

50-54 12%
20-29 27%
40-49 28%
30-39 33%

Respondent Age

*Figure 6: Respondent Education Level*

Postgraduate 2%
Below Senior High School 15%
Undergraduate 22%
Diploma 11%
Senior High School 50%

Respondent Education Levels

*Figure 7: Respondent Socio-Economic Status*

SES C 21%
SES A 25%
SES B 54%

Respondent Socio-Economic Status (SES)

*Figure 8: Respondent Household Spending*

$351+ 10%
$125-$175 21%
$281-$350 22%
$176-$280 47%

Monthly Household Spending (USD)

CHAPTER 3
# FINDINGS

# 3. Findings

The findings contained within this report are based on overall data obtained through the implemented survey, and supported, evidenced and highlighted by insights from qualitative interview respondents with specific backgrounds and/or insights on the research topic.

## 3.1. Findings Overview

The survey undertaken is based on public perception/attitude related to freedom of religion and belief (FoRB) and tolerance across the target areas, with findings intended to reflect such perceptions and attitudes within the overall community.

Initial findings from all target locations paint a relatively strong picture of FoRB/tolerance across Indonesia. Most respondents show very strong levels of agreeance with FoRB/tolerant values, and also strong agreeance/willingness to implement such values. However, there are areas of concern related to the difference between theoretical and practical FoRB/tolerance that arose consistently through data analysis (see Figure 10). There were also certain trends that arose within each city, as well as trends related to a respondent's religion. As intolerant (or even extremist) religious values and behavior are often found within only small percentages of populations worldwide[6], the initial findings of similar nature in Indonesia should be of little surprise. However, as mentioned, the difference between theoretical and practical FoRB/tolerance responses is somewhat unique – and points to potential misunderstandings regarding the actual requirements for FoRB/tolerance to exist in Indonesian society. The following figure rates all target cities based on combined theoretical and practical tolerance – with the theory/practice concept explored later in the findings.

The city of Kupang stood out clearly for its higher levels of FoRB/tolerance (both theoretical and practical), however its inclusion as a target city for the survey has both positive and negative impacts for the findings. On the positive side, it provides an example on which to compare other target locations, as well as the qualitative data providing insights into the reasons for such high FoRB/tolerance levels. On the negative side, its inclusion results in some contradictory influences within overall findings related to demographics, as it forms a minority/majority city (majority of citizens follow the Catholic or Christian faith in a majority

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[6] Pew Research: Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world, 2017

Islamic country), meaning its respondent base is not truly representative of the national context.

*Figure 9: Overall Tolerance Levels per City*



Data collators were instructed to use the word majority/minority in relation to the city (in most cases), however its acceptance, understanding and application by the respondents in Kupang cannot be guaranteed, which may have had an influence on the findings. This report at times attempts to overcome the challenge by providing the overall findings, as well as exploring potential influence or changes in findings by adding analysis of data based on religion (as opposed to location), or by removing/splitting Kupang's data completely. Any such changes are clearly stated within the displayed data. Yogyakarta also registered relatively high levels of FoRB/tolerance, however due to its majority religion also mirroring the nation's, data from the city had little contradicting influence on overall findings. At best, Yogyakarta can still be highlighted as a strong example of FoRB/tolerance within a number of elements surveyed.

*Figure 10: Theoretical vs. Practical Tolerance – All Cities*



Bandung was overall the most 'intolerant' city, with figures (particularly related to tolerance in practice) rating considerably lower than the other target locations. Bandung respondents showed less engagement with other religious groups and people, as well as high interaction and sharing of religious messages through media. Jakarta also displayed relatively high levels of practical tolerance at times, yet also is a unique example due to its context as the modern, capital city of Indonesia. Jakarta, as the center of most religious and political issues and also the most modernized and connected region, seemed at times to brush-off circulation and influence of intolerant messages, perhaps due to 'over-saturation' of issues during recent times, or even due to focus on economy and work as a priority in life.

## 3.2.  Community Awareness and Application of Religious Freedom and Tolerance

Freedom of religion and belief (FoRB) is guaranteed under Indonesian Law, and forms a key part of Indonesia's identity under the Pancasila ideal. To support this, religious tolerance is a notion that is promoted and fostered across the nation, with the aim of maintaining a diverse and colorful community – made up of numerous religions – living together in peace and harmony. To explore just how the ideas of FoRB and tolerance are perceived, as well as

accepted and practiced in the target locations, respondents were asked questions relating to their understanding, awareness, perception and practice of these ideals in everyday life.

### 3.2.1. Understanding of Religious Freedom

*"Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching."* – Article 18 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights[7].

80% of all respondents aligned FoRB with the statement that *"everyone is free to follow a religion without compulsion"*, with another 9% aligning to a statement of *"appreciation and respect for each other's religion"*. When compared to standard definitions of FoRB (see above), this result shows that populations in target locations hold a strong understanding of such a meaning. When prompted to identify a practical example of FoRB, as undertaken by themselves or someone they know, a majority of respondents highlighted worship without compulsion or interference, and appreciation between religions. Such answers cover perhaps the most basic principles in practice, and while more practical options were provided to respondents, it is understandable that such core principles were chosen as examples.

*Figure 11: Explanations of Freedom of Religion and Belief*

| Freedom of Religion and Belief is…… | Overall | Jakarta | Bandung | Kupang | Yogyakarta |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anyone is free to follow a religion without compulsion | 80% | 77% | 88% | 87% | 75% |
| Mutual appreciation and respect amongst religious people | 9% | 11% | 6% | 5% | 13% |
| Can udnertake worship without impact on/by other religions | 3% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 7% |
| Others below 2% | | | | | |

### 3.2.2. Religious Freedom in Practice

Understanding of what religious freedom means in practice was surveyed by engaging respondents to consider a range of statements, and determine whether they agreed or disagreed (or neither) with each statement. Almost all (99%) of respondents from all locations

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[7] United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 18

believed freedom of religion and worship are human rights, as well as respect for others' freedom to follow and practice their own beliefs. 95% also agreed that diversity in religion is a part of the normal social fabric. While this overall acceptance of religious freedoms continued on a core level from most respondents, answers began to diversify as more 'practical' statements were provided. Around 20% of respondents did not agree that the State accepts other (minority) religions, or that it guarantees freedom of worship for all citizens, with almost 50% of respondents from Kupang (minority religion) disagreeing on State acceptance. More insight into the State's role in FoRB/tolerance can be found in section 3.3.

*Figure 12: Responses Regarding FoRB*



| Statement | Agree | NAND | Disagree |
|---|---|---|---|
| Religious freedom is a part of human rights | 99% | | 1% |
| Worship in accordance with respective religions is human right | 99% | | 1% |
| Everyone should respect the freedom of others to follow religion according to their belief | 99% | | 1% |
| Everyone should respect the freedom of others to worship according to their belief | 97% | 2% | 1% |
| I can influence others to follow a particular religion | 9% | 12% | 79% |
| Diversity in religion is normal in social life | 95% | | 5% |
| I try to keep away from polemics against other faiths | 81% | 15% | 4% |
| I disagree with groups that justify violence in the name of religion | 88% | 6% | 6% |
| I reject the "prayer with other religions (join prayer) for the nation's salvation" | 24% | 19% | 57% |
| I do not force followers of other religions to follow my religion | 87% | 6% | 7% |
| Not interfering in the religious activities of others is a form of respect for religious freedom | 97% | 2% | 1% |
| Religious activities of all religions should be regulated by the government to avoid inter-religious conflicts | 81% | 14% | 5% |
| Religious freedom means not trying to influence others who already have a religion to embrace another religion | 89% | 6% | 5% |
| The State accepts and allows other religions, including minority religions | 82% | 14% | 4% |
| The State guarantees the freedom of worship for all citizens. | 80% | 17% | 3% |

> *The minority seems to lack tolerance towards the majority. They don't accept the majority religion, and are never thankful for the tolerance provided to them by the majority*
>
> – IDI Respondent, Jakarta, Islam

Of particular note was that only 57% of respondents agreed with the idea of 'joint prayer' (praying alongside other religions) for the nation's salvation. 24% of respondents did not agree with the idea, while 19% neither agreed or disagreed. These figures were even higher in Bandung, with almost 50% of respondents rejecting the notion of joint prayer for the nation. This may point to a preference of religion over State (Pancasila) for a number of respondents, and specifically highlights an issue of religious freedom in practice compared to in theory.

Notably, Bandung also displayed much higher rates of agreeance to the statement that they can influence others to follow a particular religion (25%), which highly contradicts the idea

that *"not interfering the religious activities of others is a form of respect for religious freedom"* – of which 98% of respondents from Bandung agreed with. Adding to this contradiction, 98% of Bandung respondents agreed that "everyone should respect the freedom of others to follow religion according to their belief", which further displays a gap between the awareness of religious freedom and its application in 'daily life'.

To touch on understanding of religious freedom's legality in Indonesia, respondents were asked about their awareness of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution's Article 29 regarding religious freedom. Only 48% of respondents recognized the law – with a majority of these respondents (89%) noting that the law allowed each person to freely choose and follow their own religion. A reason for such low awareness levels could be explained through the use of direct questioning regarding the Constitution's section – rather than opening such questioning with something 'broader' (e.g. do you know that the Constitution provides freedom of religion to Indonesian citizens?).

### 3.2.3. Understanding of Tolerance

Almost 70% of respondents understood tolerance to mean appreciating/respecting each other's religion, with other answers touching on respect of worshippers, supporting harmony and other similar answers. A range of examples of their tolerance were provided by respondents, of which many were focused towards allowing other religions to worship without interference or issues. Almost all of the answers provided could be construed to be **'minimum standard'** in relation to tolerance, with little pro-active action required, aside from allowing other citizens to fulfil their basic right to freedom of worship. The basic level of tolerance in these answers is exampled by Bandung's highest response (24%), which was *not disrupting or disallowing worship*. 99% of respondents believed it was very important (51%) or important (48%) to respect the religion of others.

*Figure 13: Explanations of Tolerance*

| Tolerance means....... | Overall | Jakarta | Bandung | Kupang | Yogyakarta |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mutually appreciate/respect each other's religion | 68% | 59% | 66% | 84% | 75% |
| Respect others who are worshipping despite their religion | 11% | 15% | 12% | 7% | 5% |
| Free to worship regardless of beliefs | 8% | 8% | 5% | 5% | 16% |
| Mutually protect inter-religious harmony | 5% | 4% | 9% | 3% | 4% |
| Others below 5% | | | | | |

### 3.2.4. Tolerance in Practice

With the overall importance and theory of tolerance globally agreed upon by almost all respondents, the survey then probed this idea of tolerance, including how, and how far, it would be applied in the different locations. To begin, all respondents agreed they would let others pray without intervention. More personally, 94% of respondents stated they would be happy to be friends with people of another religion, and 86% didn't mind if their neighbors celebrate their events or hold prayers in their own house. This specific number is interesting, as it leaves 14% of respondents who would mind (8%), or weren't sure if they would mind (6%) their neighbors holding religious events at home. It could be said that aside from attending a place of worship, there is no more private place to worship a religion than one's home.

*Figure 14: Responses Regarding Tolerance*



Therefore, through this answer we can see 14% of respondents beginning to shift away from the general consensus on freedom of religion and tolerance. This figure begins a slide in the overall statistics – which is visualized in Figure 15. In this graph we have ranked the application of tolerance from more theoretical ideas to practical application, with the figures showing the change in attitude as the examples increase in practicality. Figures also slip further if Kupang data is removed from the statistics.

> *Previously, tolerance was more like religious freedom, with people more confident to freely exercise their own convictions. Now tolerance is more like minority groups should tolerate the majority as the largest authority in the country*
>
> *– IDI Respondent, Jakarta, Christian*

*Figure 15: The Tolerance Slide*

Figures such as this point to the possibility that while tolerance may be agreed-upon in theory, its application in practice is less apparent. Notable is the significant difference in figures for Bandung, that register well below all other locations related to a majority of examples posed to respondents.

> *Tolerance means I have to open myself to the idea that there might be another possibility – and I have to do this because I feel pressured and compelled*
>
> – IDI Respondent, Yogyakarta, Islam

Respondents in Bandung were twice as likely to feel uncomfortable with other religious activities in their neighborhood, and more than twice as likely to feel disturbed by worship on closed public streets. Only 33% of respondents in Bandung were likely to join an organization with other religious group members (average 69%) and much more uncomfortable (32%) if their neighbors were celebrating a religious day (overall average 15%).

Figure 16: Bandung Tolerance in Practice

There were significantly large differences in FoRB/tolerance levels in the city of Kupang when compared to other locations. A distinct defining factor that cannot be overlooked is the city's demographics as a minority-majority within the city (and surrounding regions). Whether such a difference is related to the religious beliefs or practices themselves, ties to culture and activities that outdate modern religious institutions, or more towards the people's awareness of their minority status within the nation is open to discussion. However, both quantitative and qualitative information displays a concerted effort by all stakeholders to ensure harmony within the region, and integrated efforts to oppose any advancement of intolerant behavior or ideals. Such efforts are not only applied in theory, but also in practice by the organizations, government and everyday citizens, and link strongly with historical culture and a shared ownership of inter-religious harmony within the far-eastern city.

On this aspect, the influence of each religion on FoRB/tolerance cannot be ignored. Overall, and often more so once Kupang's data was removed, there were clearly higher levels of intolerance, or unwillingness to engage in tolerant activities, found within respondents of the Islamic faith. This is not a new finding, and simply supports the array of research and events that have made-up the overall context of religious issues in Indonesia during recent times. An area that did appear, related to this factor, were the signs of *majoritarianism* that are infiltrating the nation – in particular its religious characteristics. Majoritarianism is

unsurprising within this context, as it is also found within many related situations and power struggles globally (gender, race and other socio-economic factors).

*Figure 17: Active Tolerance Majority/Minority Comparison*



The following graph shows all cities in comparison to each other and the average response, through which we see that Bandung, followed by Jakarta as lower applicators of tolerance, with Yogyakarta registering considerably high, and Kupang at the top end (as previously highlighted).

*Figure 18: Practical Tolerance Rating per City*

Of note are the high levels of angst registered for other religions distributing pamphlets in the neighborhood (see Figure 19). Depending on the nature of the content, this may begin toeing the line on imposing one's religion on others (of which most respondents did not want to do), and was previously closely linked to the ideals of tolerance and freedom of religion.

*Figure 19: Reaction to Leaflets Distributed in Neighborhood (Majority/Minority)*



While this is for pamphlets in the neighborhood, it may be also interesting to determine responses regarding the spread of messages through other modes – be it through billboards, television and other media channels (a common occurrence in Indonesia).

A number of interview respondents noted the idea of religions implementing 'conversion' practices – whether this can be evidenced is another point. Of added interest is figures in the following graph that show this data split between the Indonesian majority and minority religions. This could support the existence of majoritarianism (see section 3.7), or conversely point to efforts of minority religions to strengthen their presence in Indonesia.

> *Minorities are not disturbed by the majority. Conversely, the majority disturbed by the minority in a lot of cases, such as Christians distributing leaflets in public, or offering money to poor people to convert*
>
> – IDI Respondent, Jakarta, Islam

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Tolerance

*"The ability or willingness to tolerate the existence of opinions or behavior that one dislikes or disagrees with"* – Oxford Dictionary[8].

*"The meaning of tolerance to me seems like saying, 'I do not like you, but I have to live with the fact that you exist. I may agree to be tolerant of you, but I don't have to be your friend—I don't even have to speak*

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[8] Oxford Dictionary Online

Tolerance, similar to the definition of the word in general, seems to focus more on 'if I can't see it, that means it's not there' for many respondents, however should diversity and difference of belief appear in their direct surroundings they become more uncomfortable. Somewhat in-line with the definition of tolerance overall, this is perhaps even less surprising for a nation in which religious identity is becoming increasingly important in everyday life. However, while rates still overly favor both the theory and practical application (less favorable but still overall positive) of FoRB/tolerance, the increasing inter-religious disengagement should be a cause for concern. It is this lack of knowledge, understanding, acceptance and sometimes fear of the 'other' that is the ideal breeding ground for intolerance and radicalism. It is easier to reject and attack something or someone you do not know or understand, as their existence is somewhat 'de-humanized'.

Supported by qualitative findings obtained from significant stakeholders within this field is the conclusion that religion is becoming increasingly 'exclusive' in some regions.

> *Now there are many private schools that are developing monocultures. Students are from the same social class, their parents' educations are the same, their lifestyles are the same, and of course all of their beliefs are the same. This is causing youth to see things using 'horse blinkers'*
>
> – IDI Respondent, Bandung, Islam

> *"Religious teachers are invited to state-owned companies with a considerable fee. This phenomenon is based on market demand, such as increased existence of hijabers, hajj and umroh"*
>
> – IDI Respondent, Yogyakarta, Islam

This exclusiveness, or lack of willingness to engage with others outside of one's own religion, once-more closes avenues for engagement with the 'others', which again begins the cycle explained above. Exclusivity also increases opportunity for the engagement of parties with ulterior and intolerant motives, with little avenue to question or counter information that is provided.

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[9] Tutu: Moving Beyond Tolerance to Understanding (2012)

## 3.3. State Role in Religion and Tolerance

As the designers and implementers of national policy and the rule of law, as well as being the protectors of citizen freedoms, the role of government and its related institutions (the State) is pivotal in the development, application and ongoing protection of matters related to religious freedoms and tolerance. Through its guiding ideology – the Pancasila – Indonesia is a primarily a secular State, however it does compel its citizens to subscribe to one of six State-recognized religions (Islam, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhist and Confucianist). The development and existence of the Pancasila aims to unite a diverse island nation, and stands to promote the best interests of Indonesia above any one religion. However, with a changing and evolving social landscape, influenced by politics, power and distribution of wealth, in recent times the role of religion has moved closer within the overall matters of the State. This often-non-formal integration tends to raise issues and pertinent questions related to the role of the State and its capacity to undertake the range of important functions mentioned above to promote, and strengthen tolerance and freedom of religion for all of Indonesia's citizens.

### 3.3.1. The State and Religious Freedom

Almost all respondents (99%) agreed that the Pancasila was the best fit for Indonesia, and that the values depicted within the ideology matched the diversity of Indonesia's ethnic, cultural and religious societies. While agreeance figures dropped a little, 91% of respondents were grateful that the nation was based on the Pancasila model. All findings related to the Pancasila displayed similar results when disaggregated based on religion.

*Figure 20: Perspectives on Pancasila Ideology*

81% of respondents agreed that religious activities should be regulated and controlled by government, in order to avoid inter-religious conflict. 82% of respondents agreed that the nation accepts and allows for other/minority religions, which may be said is not particularly high for a country based on the Pancasila. Of the remaining 18% however, 14% chose neither agree or disagree.

### 3.3.2. The Government's Role in Religious Freedom and Tolerance

Almost all (97%) of respondents see the government's role in religious freedom as important/very important, with similar numbers agreeing that the government protects the freedom of worship for all (96%), as well as promoting tolerance through dialogue between religious leaders (93%). As seen earlier within public perception on FoRB/tolerance, figures begin to fluctuate when respondents were questioned regarding practical application of the values – in this case the application of the government's role in these matters. Respondents tended to agree (or not disagree) with the statement that the government has adequate laws for regulating religious activities, however opinions differed on the ease of applying such regulations for implementing religious activities and building places of worship.

*Figure 21: Responses Regarding Role of State in FoRB/Tolerance*



Overall, 72% of respondents agreed it was easy to obtain government permission to undertake a religious activity, however when further investigated based on religion, only 60% of minority religion respondents agreed, with 78% agreeance from followers of the majority religion. Interestingly Kupang only agreed 50% for this question, which may point to stronger

application of regulations in a city of which the majority religion is Christian/Catholic, regardless of the majority/minority community situation.

*Figure 22: Easy to Obtain Government Approval for Religious Activities (Majority/Minority)*



Obtaining permission to establish places of worship was considered even more difficult by respondents, with only 52% agreeing this was an easy process, and Bandung rating even lower in agreement levels to this statement at 38%. Of note is the 32% of respondents who didn't agree or disagree, which may reflect a lack of knowledge on the establishment processes for a place of worship, as this is perhaps not an everyday activity for most citizens.

The role of government and law enforcement in handling religious issues or conflict was also questioned by many respondents. While over 90% of respondents agreed – or didn't disagree – that issues of violence and persecution could be overcome by government, it can be said that – based on responses to related statements – action to overcome such issues to this point in time has been somewhat lacking. Only 58% of respondents believed police have been able to overcome interfaith conflict, with 29% choosing not to agree or disagree with the statement. Only 59% of respondents agreed that the government does not take sides when handling cases of violence against minority religions in their city, with 30% more choosing to neither agree or disagree. Based on these figures, we might say that 41% of respondents do not agree that the government does not take sides, however, the question does not state specifically whose side the government takes (majority or minority).

*Figure 23: Government Perceived Role vs. Actual Implementation of Role*



*\* based on agree/strongly agree*

Other questions related to majority and minority also raise interest, in particular responses to the statement that *'law enforcement tends to favor the majority in inter-religious conflict to avoid a larger issue'*. Only 23% of respondents agreed that this happens, which is perhaps in contrast to a number of prominent inter-religious conflicts that have made news headlines and are reflected through a variety of research reports on the subject[10].

> *All religions accept the State's rules. However, they are aware that the rules are made by those who hold the majority religion. This trend also happens in any other country*
>
> *– IDI Respondent, Bandung, Islam*

Unfortunately, due to Kupang's position as a minority city, and therefore their answers based on the city context (not national), as well as detailed data analysis constraints, it is difficult to further explore these outcomes based on majority/minority perceptions. However, the existence of majoritarianism could be considered in this finding.

Of further interest is the perception that government regulations are not in favor of the majority religion. Across the board only 24% of respondents believed that the majority is favored by government regulations, with 47% believing this is not the case. Furthermore, Kupang respondents registered only a 4% agreeance rate, which if inverted (due to Kupang's

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[10] See Farsight 2016, and HRW: In Religion's Name, 2013

majority being a national minority), found that almost all respondents believed, or were neither in agreement or disagreement, that regulations are in favor of the majority religion in Indonesia. Such perceptions highlight a significant contrast between religious followers, with both parties believing that the other is in a better position under government regulations. Without recognition of the reality from one side (whatever that may be), the opportunity for misunderstanding and conflict increases.

*Figure 24: Agree that Government Regulations Favor Majority Religion*



## 3.4. Religious Organizations, Religion and Tolerance

Religious organizations play an important role in Indonesian society, with their reach spreading throughout all societal elements and into political and media institutions. Large organizations play a significant role in shaping the moral fabric and design of the nation's citizens, often providing public guidance related to current trends and events taking place across the country. Such guidance and input are heavily reported (yet perhaps with limited scrutiny) by media outlets, and often used as a platform within political movements. Smaller hardline organizations have also become increasingly prominent in recent years, with a number of groups and individuals gaining a large amount of exposure due to their controversial comments and actions. While often this exposure may be classified almost as 'infotainment', there is ongoing concern about the impact of such increased awareness within the wider FoRB/tolerance situation.

### 3.4.1. Awareness of Religious Organizations

Overall, almost half of respondents (46.1%) do not participate in a religious organization. In Bandung however, only 29% were not part of a religious organization, while 48% were members of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), and small numbers for a range of other organizations. Kupang also registered similar numbers, with 55% of respondents participating in either one of two key Christian groups, and 31.7% not participating. On the contrary, Jakarta registered significantly high numbers of non-participation (60%).

*Figure 25: Religious Organization Participation – per City*



Respondents were also asked about their awareness of religious organizations across Indonesia. The questioning was done through three stages – with the initial reaction or Top of Mind (group that first comes to mind - TOM), secondary reaction (next group that comes to mind), and prompting (mentioning specific groups and registering knowledge) all used to determine awareness See appendix B). Islamic hardline group, The Islamic Defender's Front (Front Pembela Islam – FPI), registered the highest result for the 'top of mind' awareness (22%), followed by large Islamic institutions such as the Indonesian Ulama's Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia – MUI), NU and Muhammadiyah (all between 13% – 17%). When including all levels of awareness, these groups still figured at the top, with respondents most aware of Muhammadiyah (86%), MUI (84%), NU (81%) and FPI (80%). Muhammadiyah was formed in 1912, and with the second largest membership base in Indonesia, its top position in overall survey awareness rankings is not surprising. MUI and NU also have similar histories and large membership numbers, therefore also justifying their high awareness ratings.

Such high awareness of a relatively small hardline group such as FPI may not be surprising due to the coverage the group receives in the media, as well as the controversial messages and engagement the group undertakes. This should not however be overlooked – as such coverage and messaging, as well as high awareness, has the potential to facilitate wider engagement in the group's movement, particularly in areas home to lower levels of tolerance.

Jakarta registered the highest initial awareness of the FPI (33% TOM), which is perhaps due to the groups central and most controversial activities taking place in the capital city. Yogyakarta also registered high levels of awareness on the FPI, however still behind Muhammadiyah as the TOM for respondents. In Bandung, it was also the large traditional institutions (MUI and NU), alongside the FPI that were most recognized, however the FPI rated quite low (7%) in TOM for Bandung respondents.

Awareness of the Indonesian Christian Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia – GMKI) was far ahead of any other organization in Kupang, most likely due to a majority of its

> *Mass religious organizations like Islamic Defender Front are not allowed in Kupang. MUI Kupang stated that this is to maintain social harmony in the city. The existing Forum for Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama – FKUB) in Kupang is strong, and helps in creating harmony and religious tolerance*
>
> *– IDI Respondent, Kupang, Islam*

population being followers of either the

Christian or Catholic faith.

Interestingly, the second and third organizations for 'first-to-mind' or TOM in Kupang were hardline Islamic groups – with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) registering 19%, and FPI 11%. HTI have featured in Indonesian media throughout 2018 (alongside the previously-mentioned FPI), and perhaps gain specific attention from minority cities such as Kupang.

*In Kupang, the role of religious and youth leaders is very important and influential, especially in the implementation of religious activities. Religious organizations in Kupang promote inter-religious communication and overcome negative propaganda and potential conflicts*

– IDI Respondent, Kupang, Catholic

Another interesting finding was the awareness of the Islamic Student Council appearing at number four in Kupang's TOM awareness ratings – above the traditional and large Islamic institutions. This may point to the engagement of HMI with groups such as GMKI in the city's inter-religious affairs, further evidencing the importance of inter-faith engagement – particularly within youth groups.

Alongside this, Kupang registered by far the highest rates of media forming their information source for awareness (regular media registered 75% and social media 71%), compared to overall survey figures of 64% for regular media and 45% for social media. This finding is also worthy of attention, as the potential for such high media sharing (particularly negative news) about another religion within this minority city may create an environment for increased intolerance – even within a city that registered significantly high rates of tolerance such as Kupang. However, to counter this, Kupang has an array of inter-faith groups and actions aimed at ensuring negative narratives are countered within communities.

*Figure 27: Organization Awareness Top 4 per City*

| City | Organization | Awareness |
|------|-------------|-----------|
| JAKARTA | MUHAMMADIYAH | 91% |
| JAKARTA | NU | 86% |
| JAKARTA | MUI | 84% |
| JAKARTA | FPI | 84% |
| BANDUNG | NU | 89% |
| BANDUNG | FPI | 89% |
| BANDUNG | MUI | 88% |
| BANDUNG | MUHAMMADIYAH | 79% |
| KUPANG | GMKI | 84% |
| KUPANG | MUI | 73% |
| KUPANG | PGKP | 68% |
| KUPANG | MUHAMMADIYAH | 64% |
| YOGYAKARTA | MUHAMMADIYAH | 100% |
| YOGYAKARTA | NU | 100% |
| YOGYAKARTA | FPI | 98% |
| YOGYAKARTA | MUI | 90% |

On the topic of information sources for the awareness of religious organizations, traditional media (television, newspaper etc.) remained the highest source overall with 64%. Of specific interest, however, was the 61% of respondents who acknowledged friends and family as sources related to awareness, with the highest rates in Yogyakarta (87%) and Bandung (60%). Kupang aside, all other cities registered higher information sources as friends or family rather than social media, with Jakarta registering significantly low rates of social media awareness (25%) in comparison to others.

> *Religious forums in Yogyakarta existed even before the FKUB, but many are no longer active*
>
> – IDI Respondent, Yogyakarta, Catholic

*Figure 28: Source of Organization Awareness – City Comparison*



Two key points or assumptions may be taken from this finding. The first is that Jakarta, Bandung and Yogyakarta are majority-Islamic cities, and the organizations with the highest awareness rating are Islamic-based. This means that there is a much greater chance friends and family members of the people in these cities are engaged in, or witness activities of these groups, that are then shared (raising awareness) with their family/friendship groups. As we will see in section 3.5.1, messaging applications such as Watsapp are also in high use within these cities, allowing for real-time, direct sharing of information, perhaps before news has been circulated through other social media forms. As a minority city, friends and family of Kupang respondents are much less likely to be engaged in the groups that were designated highest awareness.

The second point of note is the geographic location of a city such as Kupang, which is at the eastern end of the Indonesian island chain, a long way from the other target cities based on Java. Many of the activities undertaken by these primarily Islamic groups take place on Java, even more specifically within Jakarta (as well as other key cities), and therefore news takes time to filter through to Indonesia's far-flung populations – even more so if such populations (minority religions) are not particularly engaged within said groups. Therefore, the role of social media takes on more significance, as news is perhaps first accessed through these information-sharing platforms. Without further research it is difficult to ascertain whether

this is true of other Indonesian cities outside of central regions (whether majority or minority religious populations), however it should remain a significant point to highlight due to the type and sources of media shared, and their potential to increase (or perhaps decrease) intolerance within communities across the country.

*Figure 29: Location of Survey Cities – Distance Comparison*



## 3.4.2. Role of Religious Organizations

78% of all respondents believed that religious organizations in Indonesia are useful or very useful, while 18% did not rate them as either useful or not useful. A higher number of respondents in Jakarta (24%) took the middle ground (neither useful or not useful), while respondents in Bandung were much more inclined to rate them 'very useful' (44%, and 42% as useful) – which was over twice as many as the next highest 'very useful' rating in Kupang of 18%. Bandung and Kupang found a common ground once-more, forming the two highest cities to believe in the usefulness of religious organizations (86% and 89% respectively).

> *Communication amongst younger generations of many religions is important, as there are so many groups*
>
> – IDI Respondent, Yogyakarta, Catholic

Across the board, most respondents found organizations useful as a tool for maintaining relationships between religious people, as well as for increasing their faith. For not useful or 'neither' responses, the key reason was related to the irrelevance/unimportance of certain organizations/forums.

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*Figure 30: Agreement Rates on Usefulness of Religious Organizations – per City*



A majority with respondents had no problem with peaceful demonstrations by religious groups, yet if groups weren't respectful and peaceful (the word anarchic was used), 94% of respondents agreed that the government should close them down. Of note is the fact that only 75% of Yogyakarta respondents agreed with organizations undertaking peaceful protest, which could potentially be linked to specific cultural or experiential elements. A majority (86%) of all respondents also agreed that certain religious groups had no right to stop the activities of other religious groups, however it is also interesting that 14% chose not to agree with this statement, meaning that these respondents feel that such actions are or may be permissible. Without further investigation it is hard to ascertain under what circumstances respondents believe this to be permissible – as it may be closing down freedom of speech, but also may be supporting the roles of more tolerant organizations acting against those who seek to promote intolerance within their own religion.

*Figure 31: Responses Regarding Religious Organizations*



Across all locations, 69% of respondents agreed that religious groups should not be able to take the law into their own hands when police are slow to act, which leaves 31% who either chose not to agree/disagree, or believe religious groups should have this right. Again, circumstances and context of such beliefs remain an unknown, however Kupang notably registered only 46% of respondents agreeing with this statement. This could represent overall distrust in law enforcement to act (within a minority city), or may be based on experience of past events. Further investigation would be required to understand this anomaly. Only 16% of all respondents believed that religious groups were required to take action on 'moral-based' issues – however there were 26% of respondents who chose not to either agree or disagree. Overall, 71% felt that all religious groups should be treated equally and provided equal opportunity to develop, meaning that 29% did not explicitly agree that equality should be afforded to all groups in this case.

*Figure 32: "Organizations should be able to take the Law into their own hands"*

Only 54% of respondents explicitly disagreed with the statement that *'the existence religious groups are not necessary and they should all just be dissolved'*. While 28% of respondents chose not to agree or disagree with this statement, if included in the total of not specifically disagreeing (including 18% agreeing with the statement), this displays a large number of respondents who question the overall need of religious organizations across the target cities. Agreement levels in Kupang (44% agreed) were significantly high, and perhaps point to a preference for a nation based further on Pancasila than influenced by specific religious groups. Interestingly, when disaggregated by religious affiliation, there is no significant change in figures of disagreement with the statement, which signifies a similar sentiment across the religious sphere.

*Figure 33: Agreement with Dissolving All Religious Groups*



## 3.5.   Media, Freedom of Religion and Tolerance

Media plays a significant role in the distribution, and sometimes development, of FoRB/tolerance issues across the country. Indonesia remains one of the highest users of digital media across the world[11], and the public's engagement only increases as the nation continues to develop. While in many cases this may be a positive advancement, more recently such access has been utilized by a range of parties to spread messages of intolerance and hatred. The issue of hoax (fake) news has also been in the spotlight of late, as unfettered

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[11] Open Society Foundations: Mapping Digital Media – Indonesia, 2014

internet access, alongside weak existence and application of related laws, has seen a significant increase in misinformation being shared across the nation. The situation is perhaps made worse by limited education and awareness of citizens regarding the difference between factual and fictional (or opinion-based) news, adding to the confusion and misinformation under which intolerance can thrive.

### 3.5.1. Media Utilization

Television still remains the primary media source for all respondents (97% use), with social/online media ranking second with 87% of respondents accessing online. Only in Kupang does online/social media outrank television, with figures of 92% and 90% respectively. Interestingly, almost double the amount of Yogyakarta respondents use newspapers (34%) and radio (21%) as news sources. As previously mentioned, social media has had an influence on a number of key findings. Across all respondents, Watsapp messaging service (95%) and Facebook (91%) were by far the most utilized social media platforms, far ahead of Instagram (59%), YouTube (54%) and other mentioned platforms. People generally used social media to provide comments (76%) and browse (73%), while creating original content (57%) and, perhaps surprisingly, sharing other people's content (51%) came in with lower responses. 64% of respondents used social media for between one to four hours per day, and 27% between 5 to 8 hours. This in itself shows significant log-on time for social media users in this survey.

*Figure 34: Social Media Platform Use – City Comparison*



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As touched on earlier, Kupang registered high levels of social media use for receiving information about religious organization activities, and accordingly showed a 100% respondent usage of the Facebook platform. On the contrary, Jakarta showed the lowest rate of Facebook use (84%), which although significant, could display a trend away from the service, which is a trend reflected globally – particularly amongst youth[12]. This again supports the theory of distance from central locations, as cities such as Kupang may take some time to 'keep up' with trending use of applications in the central areas of Indonesia, as well as the wider global population. This should be considered in future location-based activities regarding information sharing.

*"In Kupang there is an unspoken agreement amongst the media they will not publish any news that will lead to potential conflict. For example, the media will not describe a perpetrator of crime with physical characteristics describing that reflect a certain tribe or race."*

*– IDI Respondent, Kupang, Christian*

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[12] Pew Research Center: Teens, Social Media and Technology, 2018

One other notable finding was significantly higher rates of Twitter platform use in Bandung (27% compared to average 10% across other cities), as Twitter is a platform centered on sharing specific and succinct messages to 'followers'. Parallels could be drawn, or at least investigated, into the higher levels of intolerance and use of Twitter in the target location of Bandung.

> *NU has been left behind in the virtual world compared to fundamentalist groups, however, they are now starting to engage further in social media to balance the conversations*
>
> – IDI Respondent, Bandung, Islam

Bandung respondents also registered significantly higher rates of browsing/commenting on social media (98% and 96%), and 91% of respondents spent over 3 hours per day on social media platforms (compared to 58% in Jakarta, 40% in Kupang, and 64% in Yogyakarta).

## 3.5.2. Religious Content on Social Media

According to respondents, 50% of them have never received religious content via social media. Due to the daily saturation of religion in the social media sphere, this result is confusing somewhat questionable due to commonly experienced situation on the ground, and perhaps displays an error in question design or misunderstanding by respondents.

While there tended to be a small percentage (under 10%) who disagreed/chose not to agree or disagree with questions/statements related to promotion of religious harmony on social media, a majority of respondents showed positive opinions on such areas as awareness of impact of hate speech and on inter-religious violence through social media, avoiding spreading negative religious content, and even avoiding sharing negative racial/religious content from overseas.

Figure 38: Responses Regarding Religious Content on Social Media

Numbers increased a little related to those who share their beliefs on social media (70% said they did not), as well as those who share information regardless of whether they understand it or not (73% don't – however the perception of 'understanding' for the remaining 27% could also be questioned here). Bandung (22% compared to other 3 areas average of 9%) were more highly engaged in this sharing of content.

Figure 39: Likelihood to Share Information Regardless of Understanding



75% of respondents specifically agreed that harmony/inter-religious relationships could be influenced by social media, with a significantly large number also remaining neutral to the statement (20%). It was not clear whether respondents perceived this as meaning positive or negative influence. Notably, Jakarta registered significantly lower agreeance with this, posting a total of 62% in comparison to 84% average from the remaining three areas. Jakarta

respondents also tended to rate approximately 10% differences on a number of topics, including that they were more likely to share negative content, more likely to engage in negative religious content, and showed less agreement that distributing negative content is not a good practice. Jakarta respondents also more highly disagreed that hate speech online could affect or provoke religious sentiment. Is this apathy or ignorance, or is there another factor for this small but significant percentage?

Overall, Yogyakarta displayed very low rates of actively sharing religious content on social media, which may be influenced by locational culture or recent experiences.

> *"Just let hoax media continue, because it will be clarified anyway. People will search for the information, so just let the market work."*
>
> – IDI Respondent, Bandung, Islam

*Figure 40: Agree That Social Media Can Influence Harmony/Inter-Religious Relations*



Almost all respondents reacted similarly when reading about negative (polemic) religious issues on social media, with no more than 7% of respondents (regardless of city) contributing comments or distributing the content to their own groups.

The study did not investigate the sharing of positive FoRB/tolerance content, which forms a completely different (but not necessarily less-valuable) element of the social media

landscape. What is apparent is that many radical groups have strong social media presence, and leave some of the larger, moderate organizations in their wake.

## 3.6.    A Tale of Two Cities

While Kupang and Bandung may have been at the opposite ends of many of the FoRB/tolerance scales throughout the findings, there are a number of intriguing similarities that are worthwhile highlighting. Primarily, both locations showed the highest value and engagement in religious organizations, which perhaps points to the influence of such organizations on FoRB/tolerance issues. The role and leadership of religious organizations may be used to promote and develop FoRB/tolerance – but also may form a hinderance or negative influence, depending on the messaging, activities and ideas that such organizations undertake.

On one hand, numbers of Bandung respondents likely to join an organization with people of another religion were significantly low. Kupang, however, not only registered high numbers in this category, but also provided a range of evidence of existing inter-religious engagement through organizations (particularly in qualitative interviews).

*"Youth organizations in Kupang are active together with other groups of young people, participating in various joint activities"*

– IDI Respondent, Kupang, Catholic

These two specific elements (and differences from the cities) cover both personal inter-religious engagement using organizations as the medium, as well as more formalized efforts at the organizational level itself. Alongside this, both cities also recognized the importance of government in overcoming religious issues – however, there is potential for varying contexts and opinions due to demographic design should this area be investigated more thoroughly.

## 3.7.    Majoritarianism

Majoritarianism is a context in which a majority (may be categorized by religion, social class, race or other characteristic) holds a degree of primacy in their related society, and holds a 'higher level' of rights to make decisions that impact – and sometimes impinge – on other

rights-holding members of said society. This context can have a negative impact on pluralism, and majoritarianism-based democracies are often found to be the least 'formally inclusive' systems[13].

While majority is central to the overall democratic ideal, many parties point out the danger of moving towards the 'tyranny of majority', which is defined as "a situation in which a group of people are treated unfairly because their situation is different from the situation of most of the people in a democratic country"[14].

*Mainstream media still favours non-Muslims. For example, Metro TV was unfair by calling Movement 212\* intolerant, and that the 212 Reunion was "celebrating intolerance".*

*– IDI Respondent, Jakarta, Islam*

While the concept of majoritarianism is complex and open to strong debate, the survey findings – both quantitative and qualitative – showed elements of majoritarianism from respondents related to a range of topics. In this case, the majority is related to religion, and Indonesia's religious majority follow the Islamic faith. Findings related to governance and State support of minority religions often showed signs of this ideology (as highlighted during the preceding analysis), and numerous comments from qualitative respondents also portrayed strong elements of majoritarianism.

*FALSE EQUIVALENCE EXAMPLE*

*For example, what is happening in Papua, where the church forbids the establishment of mosques, they can't be higher than a church, and they can't have any events on a Sunday. In Islam that doesn't happen – other religions are free to do as they please*

*– IDI Respondent, Jakarta, Islam*

Alongside this was the use of 'cherry-picking' or false equivalence, which added to the perceptions and ideas promoted by respondents. While these elements are not unusual across a range of majority contexts, and can be found also (both in Indonesia and internationally) related to gender, race, class and other perspectives, they can result in the materialization of, and support (explicit and implicit) for actions that attack the human rights of minority and/or vulnerable groups. Such potential outcomes ensure that the concept and existence of majoritarianism within the

[13] Cohen: Proportional versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies, 1997
[14] Merriam Webster Dictionary Online
\* 212 movement was an action by Muslim groups to 'stand up for Islam', which took place around the blasphemy trial of Ahok, then-Governor of Jakarta – an individual of Christian faith.

religious majority in Indonesia is an area that must be considered in efforts to overcome such issues.

## 3.8.   Influence of *Neither Agree or Disagree* Answers

Of note throughout the data was the relatively large amount of responses that 'neither agree nor disagree' (NAND) for a range of statements. There is a variety of literature that explore the meaning of NAND, with the following all potential outcomes of NAND responses:

<div style="border:1px solid">

Reasons for Choosing NAND

"A key concern with "neither agree nor disagree" (NAND) is that people will satisfice, which means that respondents just answer something that will satisfy the interviewer while minimizing cognitive effort."[15]

"'Neither agree nor disagree' can either be a 'hidden don't know' (i.e., the respondent has no opinion) or it can mean a neutral opinion (i.e., the respondent is somewhere between agreeing and disagreeing)."[16]

Key Reasons for Choosing NAND:

- Respondent doesn't understand the question/is confused;
- Respondent isn't engaging/lost interest;
- Respondent genuinely does not have an opinion on the matter;
- Respondent is protecting or watering down their real opinion.

</div>

To highlight this phenomenon within the survey, we have taken a range of questions concerning both the theoretical and practical application of FoRB/tolerance, and calculated the total amount of people who neither agree nor disagree with actions that would be anti-freedom of religion or anti-tolerance. The difference between the two elements is again significant, and shows some strong underlying factors in committing to FoRB/tolerance application – which the real reason is only known to the respondents themselves.

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[15] Norman: Likert Scales, Levels of Measurement and the 'Laws' of Statistics, 2010
[16] Baka, Figgou and Triga: Neither agree or disagree – A critical analysis of the middle answer category, 2012

*Figure 41: NAND Answers – Theoretical vs. Practical Tolerance*



On sensitive matters, there is potential that respondents may understand the aim or underlying goals of a survey, and proceed with caution on providing answers to certain clearly-inferred contexts. The NAND option provides respondents with an opportunity to not explicitly state their agreeance/non-agreeance on questions may specifically add to evidence that challenges their cause/beliefs, but also ensures they do not have to provide false answer (choose the opposing view). In face-to-face surveys, respondents may also choose this answer to appear less 'controversial' in the eyes of the person interviewing them. There are potential cultural influences that arise in this situation.

Another reason for NAND responses may be context-based, meaning the answer depends upon the context within which the statement/question is applied. For example, the statement *"I would allow other religions to build a place of worship in my neighborhood"* received 26% of NAND responses. Such an 'activity' receiving agreeance or non-agreeance from many respondents may rely on numerous influencing factors, including the size of the building, the location, its intended use, and even which religion is developing the place. Some of these influencing factors may have no relation to tolerance/freedom of religion, yet others may be directly linked. Either way, tolerance cannot be measured specifically due to the choice of NAND response.

All of the above potential factors aside, the reality is there remains a considerable gap between the figures of those willing to provide an explicit response regarding concepts of

freedom of religion/tolerance, and willing to provide explicit pro-freedom of religion/tolerance responses for simple application of such ideals. For the 19% of respondents who chose NAND when presented with the statement *"I reject engaging in joint prayer for the nation's salvation"*, for example, such a figure choosing an unclear answer for a relatively straightforward statement deserves consideration. It may be argued, based on the simplicity of the question, that a majority of the 19% chose specifically not to support the 'joint prayer' idea. This would in turn question their application of the ideals of Pancasila, an ideology that was supported by over 95% of respondents.

CHAPTER 4
# CONCLUSION

# 4. Conclusions

While the range of data and responses from the survey is broad, and primarily representative of populations in the target cities, there are a number of strong conclusions that can be drawn related to each specific area explored in the findings above.

## 4.1. Public Perception and Engagement in Freedom of Religion and Tolerance

Overall, both freedom of religion and tolerance showed similar trends across the survey respondents. It can be concluded that while a vast majority of Indonesian's understand what freedom of religion/tolerance means, and overall agree with the notions in theory, there remains a significant portion of the population (ranging between 10 – 40%) who are more hesitant when it comes to the application of such ideals in everyday life – and within this sub-group is where most attention is required. Situations provided through the survey were, on the whole, quite straightforward and simple to apply, and without the element of religious difference, one could expect almost universal agreeance to such activities. However, in comparison to agreeance on theoretical statements, figures for practical engagement in the ideals were notably lower. It must be noted, however, that the high amount of NAND responses to many statements has a considerable influence on such figures (as explored above).

*Figure 42: Active Tolerance Rating per City – Including Differential Bar*

Throughout this study, both quantitative and qualitative data arose that contradicted the overall context when triangulated with findings from other research activities on the subject of human and minority rights in Indonesia. This study found contradictions related to understanding of FoRB/tolerance that point to majoritarianism opinions – for example that "minorities should be happy that the majority allows them to have their rights". Such opinions can then have an impact on situational interpretations – such as the large percentage of people who believe that government tend to 'side with minorities' in disputes. In reality, this can often mean the government 'sides' with the basic rights of minorities over the wishes of the majority – although there are also multiple current examples of government 'siding' with the majority's wishes over the rights of minorities. Regardless of the context within this complex concept, the growing existence of majoritarianism within the national psyche is a cause for concern.

## 4.2.  State Role in Freedom of Religion and Tolerance

In general, respondents believe that the government (and its relevant institutions) have a strong and specific role to play in the protection and promotion of FoRB/tolerance in Indonesia. There were a number of results that displayed forms of contradiction (similar questions with contradicting results), which possibly displays a misunderstanding of the questions/statement itself, or a misunderstanding of the different roles and responsibilities for government institutions. While perceptions on what the State's role should be were relatively united, perceptions on how this has been, or should be implemented provoked some differing opinions.

Once again, figures displayed a significant shift between the underlying beliefs of respondents compared to actual application of freedom of religion and tolerance (in this case regarding the government's role). High rates of agreeance on the importance of the government's role in protecting and acting on religious freedom are not completely reflected in perceptions on the ideal's application. There was also varying agreement regarding the government's perceived and expected role, the concept of protecting the rights of all versus the perceived rights (or wishes) of the majority, and perhaps the core understanding (aside from conceptual) of what such rights and roles mean in 'reality'. Of added interest is the

relative similarity in higher levels of confidence regarding government capacity to overcome religious issues in both Bandung and Kupang. While throughout the findings these cities have often been at opposing ends of the scale, questions related to specific government roles (such as the 'peacemaker') saw both cities displaying a similar mindset.

## 4.3. Role of Religious Organizations

While approximately ¾ of all respondents valued the role of religious organizations in Indonesia, more than half do not participate within such religious organizations. Respondents tend to be aware of the largest organizations, as well as there being strong recognition of a number of hardline organizations across the country (particularly prominent in TOM responses). This can be confidently linked to the coverage received by the organizations in nation-wide media, as well as the controversial nature of their actions. A large number of respondents (particularly outside of Kupang) attributed their awareness to family and friends, with media also forming a key awareness mode. Of particular interest was the comparison between Jakarta and Kupang related to awareness through social media – with figures suggesting a link between relevance of social media in comparison to distance from the center of religious groups' activities.

There still remained a concerning percentage of respondents who felt the role of religious groups must, or could, include 'policing' activities of other religious groups and/or behavior of society in general (moral policing). There has been an ongoing trend of this across Indonesia in recent times, and based on survey responses, there is still a considerable percentage who do not disagree with such activities. The data does not provide for clarity on context within these responses, related to what type of organizations may be self-policed and exactly what behaviors/morals require engagement of religious organizations. What such responses do display, however, is a similar pattern compared to the previous section's percentage of responses regarding distrust/displeasure in capacity of government/police to play their role in the overall context. As an extension to this, we may also draw inference to the ideal versus application of rights (including FoRB), as well as links to lack of understanding on the difference between what is the law and what is moral preference, and where the line between religion and State is drawn within Indonesian communities.

## 4.4.  The Role of Social Media

Figures relating to media (including social media use) as sources of information were high across all target locations. While traditional media (television, and to a lesser extent newspapers and radio) still form the primary information source, social media is a clearly increasing as a source of news and information. There was an overall tendency to engage with religious content through reading information only, with limited willingness to engage in debate or share contentious material (however just what is considered contentious may be open to further investigation). While a considerable percentage of respondents agreed that sharing content could affect religious harmony, there was a large enough NAND or disagreeing amount of responses to question the public's awareness of the real impact that social media can have.

While it is clear that social media awareness is high within respondent groups, and a vast majority tend to avoid engaging in sharing of negative content based on religion, in reality only small numbers are required to spread such content. Any anti-religious sharing of this sort in reality signifies a notable contradiction with the almost universal agreeance on freedom of religion and right to worship. Of significant note is the use of more 'traditional' platforms (Facebook) in more outer-lying areas, and the reliance of these locations on social media for current information. Alongside this, platforms such as Twitter may be worthy of specific attention, as they provide little forum for in-depth discussion/information sharing, and focus more to the delivery of short, sharp messaging. Such messaging may perhaps be more ideal for promotion of intolerance, as it somewhat closes the door on discussion and further investigation. Bandung's relatively higher levels of social media use (including much higher rates of Twitter use) when compared to its overall lower levels of positive FoRB/tolerance application may be a sign of the link between social media use and intolerance in general.

## 4.5.  Overall

It can be concluded that attention must be provided to the 20-30% of respondents who displayed significant contrast between ideal and application, as it is within these mindsets that intolerance can grow and prosper. A key element of this was lack of engagement with

'others' – those who are 'different'. This lack of engagement leads to lack of understanding, with the potential that information about the 'others' is more likely to come from inside their own circle. When the information source is limited and/or biased, and received through mediums that are exclusive, the potential for misinformation increases significantly. From misinformation results misunderstanding, and misunderstanding (or lack of understanding), no matter the context, is the breeding ground for intolerant beliefs and actions.

Within this is perhaps a lack of real interaction between religious groups (not just individuals), resulting in further distance and lack of understanding as highlighted above. In the example of practical tolerance in Kupang, this encompasses the engagement of not only religious organizations, but that of government and their institutions as well. The study's findings, alongside a range of other related research, show that the role of the State is less than optimal, and displays signs of weakness or inaction on protecting the values of all citizens regarding religion and tolerance. Any changes within society must be mirrored and supported within governance structures, particularly to overcome the small percentage of citizens who engage in and promote intolerant behavior.

For Indonesia in its current climate, influenced by a range of clear and hidden factors, it is these 20-30% of respondents who may influence the advancement (or retreat) of FoRB/tolerance in the coming years. Based on similar socio-economic contexts, this groups may be listed as vulnerable to intolerance – or borderline intolerant. As much as people focus on the situation of the lowest percentile (in this case the clearly intolerant), in reality it is those who are vulnerable to intolerance that could shape the overall future of the nation in relation to religious freedom and the practice of tolerance. It is they who decide the community harmony in the years to come.

CHAPTER 5
# RECOMMENDATIONS

# 5. Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on both the authors of this report as well as input from the range of interview respondents engaged throughout the survey. It is by no means an exhaustive list, and relatively broad in details, however may provide guidance for programmatic interventions within the FoRB/tolerance sphere.

## 5.1. Engaging the 'vulnerable to intolerance' demographic

As stated throughout the findings, there are a group of citizens who comprehend and agree with FoRB/tolerance in theory yet lack understanding, find it more difficult, or are unwilling to implement such theories through relatively simple actions in daily life. While people are not compelled to engage in such practical application, as mentioned, this lack of application forms a potential breeding ground for intolerant behaviors and activities. Therefore, there is considerable scope for engaging, or re-engaging, this demographic within a wider tolerance movement. Key steps to undertake this include:

1. Understanding who the demographic is, what they respond to, and what their fears and attractions are. This may require further in-depth research.

2. Design interventions that 'speak to this demographic, whose values or driving factors may be different from the tolerant majority.

3. Promote similarities – don't highlight differences. This demographic needs to be further engaged not pushed further away. Similarities such as specific interests, points of agreement, ideologies (such as Pancasila) are all options for consideration.

4. May be undertaken individually, through organizations, using culture and art as mediums for communication.

## 5.2. Challenging the Intolerant Voice

While radical/intolerant voices and actions – while loud and visible – may come from a small sub-section of the community, there remains a need to ensure they are balanced (or even defeated) by the voice/actions of the tolerant majority. A lack of a strong, inclusive and definitive counter-voice opens the door dangerously for the unopposed spread of anti-

tolerant messages. Key within efforts such as this is the term 'inclusive' – which as opposed to 'exclusive' – ensures a wider range of proponents are engaged in a movement. Options for overcoming this include:

1. Ensuring 'vulnerable to intolerance' demographic is included, not excluded, from anti-intolerance movement, thereby decreasing the spread of intolerant voice.
2. Positive messaging from more conservative (but still pro-tolerance) voices could be effective.
3. Opportunity for public and community campaigns, based on broad or specific issues (flexible to evolving situations), that aim to unite a diverse range of groups, institutions and stakeholders.
4. Inter-religious engagement through formal organizations, student groups, with potential to use 'real' examples on which to base movements/ideas.

## 5.3.  Religious Leaders as Information Sources

Hoax news, bias media, the increase of access to information through social media and many other elements from this study all serve to muddy the waters for community understanding on what is real/true and what is sensationalist or just outright misinformation. When combined with the awareness levels of respondents about, and overall engagement with religious organizations, the role of religious leaders (and their groups) once again becomes key. Within this context, there is a significant role for religious leaders and organizations to present the true voice and representation of current events to their followers. A fact-based and united clarification of events that are distorted, misinformed and overblown through the everyday news cycle may help to calm the waters during times of significant unrest. Potential opportunities include:

1. Engaging leaders and organizations within news/media cycles, through traditional and digital modes, to be aware and understand potential problematic events.
2. Developing methods for responses to current contexts, that promote harmony and counter false or misleading news.
3. Including leaders at both the top and community levels of organizations, to ensure united and balanced voice.

4. Development of 'monitoring' system for large organizations to ensure a unified message is being portrayed throughout all levels of engagement.

5. Ensure methods are modern and responsive, yet remain accessible and user-friendly to all potential user groups in-line with their individual contexts.

## 5.4. Promoting Positive Stories

Nothing is more valuable to ideas, concepts and movements than real, engaging and positive evidence of what such concepts and movements are aiming to develop. There are clearly a wide range of positive and interesting stories and situations related to active tolerance and religious freedom, and efforts should be undertaken to promote these situations from the voices of those involved. Often ideas and concepts become much easier to envisage when they are evidenced and portrayed by those who have already experienced them, with case studies and other knowledge management projects forming a realistic source of inspiration and evidence for other parties hoping to promote similar ideals and actions. Options include:

1. Tolerance/FoRB in Kupang (or similar cities/locations) highlighted, but not necessarily from the city' majority religion's perspective. Portray voices from Kupang's Muslim population (for example), youth groups and government leaders.

2. Delivery of stories is key – including relevant stakeholders joining larger movements/events across the country, or presentation through digital media platforms.

3. Film and other arts are important and valuable, particularly with high rates of social media engagement, even more so in cities with higher rates of intolerance.

4. Partnering with large institutions that can reach alternative audiences to portray films and other media, to cast a wider net across target audiences.

5. Television should not be forgotten, as it remained the largest source of relevant information across all surveyed cities. Potential partnerships with national broadcasters should be considered.

## 5.5. Comprehension of Majority

While the idea of majoritarianism is a difficult one to counter, there remains potential for increased understanding of what it means to be a majority – and conversely what it means to be a minority in Indonesia. Similar efforts have been undertaken related to other issues across the world, such as race and refugees, that push individuals with strong opinions against minorities or issues to 'walk a mile' in the other group's shoes. Options include:

1. Social experiments for awareness raising, although may not directly change mindsets, can highlight ideological inconsistencies for external viewers.
2. Engage majority on deeper understanding of FoRB and human rights, and their role in ensuring these apply for all citizens.
3. While related ideas may be complex, always keep the door open to innovative ideas that push boundaries for social change.

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# Appendix

## Definition of measurements

### Likert Scale

One of the techniques used for measuring respondents' opinions was the top two boxes technique, which is the highest two categories on a rating scale (the "top" refers to the highest scale points in the questionnaire). Respondents were asked to express their opinion towards a particular statement and answers were recorded on a scale of 1 – 5 (strongly disagree – strongly agree). We then classified those who answered 4 and 5 as the top two boxes.

### Awareness

**Top of Mind (TOM):** TOM is the first brand (in this study, religious organization) mentioned by a respondent when they are asked a question. Almost always, TOM is a brand that respondents use personally or a brand that someone knows very well. That is why it first comes to their mind.

**Spontaneous awareness:** When respondents respond to the question on "awareness of some brands", apart from a brand they mention first (TOM), all other brands are said to have 'spontaneous memory', i.e. they come spontaneously to their mind.

**Aided awareness:** the percentage of respondents who claim to have seen /heard /known something, after having been shown some form of stimulus. So it is a stimulated response.

**Total awareness is the sum of all awareness: TOM + Spontaneous + Aided awareness**

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