



## FINAL EVALUATION

# Preventing electoral violence through early warning and rapid response in Guinea

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## Acronyms

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CBO	Community Based Organization
CC	Code of Conduct
CENI	Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante
CEPI	Commission Electorale Préfectorale Indépendante
CESPI	Commission Electorale Sous-Préfectorale Indépendante
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EWER	Early Warning Early Response
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
IDDD	Institut de Droit pour le Développement Durable
KII	Key Informant Interview
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ROSE	Réseau des Organisation de la société civile pour l'Observation et le Suivi des élections
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding

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## Executive summary

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Since the Constitution was changed and multiparty democracy was instituted in the Republic of Guinea, every local and national election in that country has been marked by violence with deadly consequences. The reoccurring violence during elections is widely believed to be caused by the divisive rhetoric from the political elite which too often relies on ethnocentrism in order to win votes. These practices have been threatening the sociopolitical stability of the country and causing unnecessary fracture on national cohesion. One of the consequences of these contentious practices of the political leaders has been the deep-seated hatred between people from different ethnic and religious groups throughout the country.

Moreover, the Republic of Guinea is also facing serious problems related to land tenure that are also contributing to fuel anger and violence among the communities. In Guinea, there is a conflict between the legal right to land and the traditional land tenure which cause a lot of conflicts, above all in the rural areas, where the farmers and the cattle herders are competing for land to produce their crops and for pastures.

Youth unemployment is also another source of violence as the young people have few outlets for engagement in positive and productive activities and are therefore easily manipulated by groups with divisive and violent agendas.

It is in this context that the project *"Prevent electoral and community violence through a system of early warnings and rapid responses in Guinea"* was initiated by Search for Common Ground Guinea in several prefectures of Guinea. The activities supporting the project were carried out thanks to the financial support from the US State Department through the Office for the Stabilization of Conflict Operations.

### Objectives of the project

The objectives of the project are to mitigate the risk of election and community violence in Guinea. Specifically, the project has the following two complementary objectives:

- **Objective 1:** *Increase community stakeholders' capacity to collect and analyze emergent risks of election and community violence; and*
- **Objective 2:** *Strengthen rapid response of local, national, or regional stakeholders in order to prevent or mitigate electoral and community violence*

The project has come to an end and Search for Common Ground Guinea has commissioned the present final evaluation to assess its achievements.

### Objectives of the evaluation

The evaluation seeks to:

- Measure the project's **relevance** in the Guinean context;
- Measure the **effectiveness** of the project;
- Identify and measure the **proven effects** on Guinea's electoral process; notably the 2018 communal elections, and the potential impact of the project actions;
- Construct project **close-out indicators**;
- Measure the **viability and sustainability** of the project;
- Collect **two success stories** relaying the effects of project;
- **Draw lessons learnt** to date to inform the strategy of the next phase.

## Methodology

The methodology was based on the collection and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data which were collected in Conakry, Kankan, N'zérékoré, Labé and Guéckédou where the project was implemented. A desk review based on the projects' documents such as the logical frameworks, the narrative report, the monthly bulletins and the projects' proposals preceded the field data collection. Overall 150 respondents were targeted for the quantitative data collection while the following respondents participated to the qualitative data collection.

Table 1: Respondents to the qualitative data collection

Respondents	One-on-one	SWOT Analysis
SFCG Guinea assistant M&E	1	
SFCG Project coordinator	1	
SFCG EWER data base manager	1	
Field Officer/Moyenne Guinée	1	
Platform coordinators	5	
Platform members		5 SWOT Analyses of 35 participants
Community leaders	5	
Representatives of political parties	10	
Field agents	4	
President of the local NGO ROSE	1	
Director of IDDD	1	
Coordinator of WANEP	1	

## Key findings

### Relevance of the project

#### *Relevance with regards to the socio-political context*

According to the participants to the group discussion in Labé, in the months leading up to the organization of any local elections since 1993, the electoral processes has always remained

unfinished and there has always been a lot of turmoil among the political parties and in the communities. The people's reactions to the "local elections" issue leave a lot of potential for political violence in the country.

The sentiment about the fact that the multiparty system has placed ethnic identity at the core of the political process and therefore became the source of violence during every election has been expressed by the participants to all the SWOT Analysis sessions in all the prefectures visited.

The rural parts of Guinea and more particularly the Forest Region are seriously affected by conflicts over land ownership which are turning into ethnic violence. As a matter of fact, with the scarcity of land for grazing, the cattle herders are finding themselves in conflict with the farmers. The farmers accuse the cattle herders of destroying their crops by taking their cattle into their farms. Because the Peuls are traditionally farmers, when even one cattle herder is in conflict with one farmer, people tend to transform the conflict into a fight between the Peuls and members of the other ethnic groups.

#### *Relevance with regards to building capacity for CSOs*

Several of the CSOs in Guinea have been engaged in sensitization and conflict resolution both at local and national levels. However, given the widespread prevalence of violence and risks of violence in the country, these CSOs need to be very skillful in their approaches in order to be effective at fighting violence and this requires a great deal of capacity building and funding.

With the project Preventing Electoral Violence through Early Warning and Rapid Response in Guinea, SFCG has contributed to build capacities in the local CSOs, IDDD, WANEP and ROSE through the training provided and through practical application. IDDD and ROSE were able to reinforce their presence in the project's implementation areas and conduct practical observation and data collection. While WANEP was already acquainted with the mechanism and has applied it with the ECOWAS, ROSE and IDDD had never been trained on it.

In addition to the capacity building that the project provided to the local CSOs in terms of EWER, it also trained their members on SFCG's approach on peaceful conflict resolution. Tools such as participatory theater and participatory dialog were used during the project's implementation to sensitize the public on risks of violence during elections.

The project has proved to be relevant because it helped fill a void left by the absence of leadership engagement in the different communities living in Guinea and the CSOs engaged in peace building are unable to effectively conduct sensitization about peaceful conflict prevention and conflict resolution due to their limited resources. The violence between communities prevailing in Guinea is to a certain extent explained by poor leadership and bad governance which led to suspicions and animosity towards each other and to the politicians' meddling and the divisions that they create between people from different ethnic groups.



The goal of the project is to prevent electoral and community violence in Guinea through prevention by setting up of an Early Warning and Early Response systems (EWER) and through capacity building in CSOs and the creation of platforms gathering relevant political and traditional stakeholders whereas the relevance of the project within the current political context.

## **Effectiveness of the project**

### *Election and community stakeholders' knowledge of early warning signs of election violence*

The participants to the SWOT analyses with the platforms' members have all praised the quality of the activities in which the civil society organizations and members of the platforms participated; according to them, these activities were conducted at the most critical moments and brought the different parties together and fostered peaceful coexistence during this electoral process.

The CSOs also conducted community dialogue sessions with youth and women from political parties, which contributed to reduce the chances for the political activists to participate in electoral violence. Finally, the participants spoke about the monthly meetings that they felt facilitated the process of revitalizing the platforms throughout the project implementation period; these meetings made it possible to regularly assess the socio-political context of the regions and the country in general.

### *The Creation of early warning network*

Aside from the platforms' members, the observers who work for ROSE and IDDD were also trained on how to identify signs of violence. The training was done in the framework of seminars where the participants identified signs of violence which were then used later to improve or update the early warning signs during the training of observers.

The monitors were thus trained in early warning techniques and reporting in the data management system aimed at ensuring the successful data collection by monitors and the data analysis.

### *Election stakeholders collaborate to create real-time strategies*

Overall, the Ushahidi database which compiles the alerts showed that 966 early warning reports were issued through the SMS based system. These reports were collected, analyzed, and verified by the SFCG team, the alerts were then sent to the relevant platforms that had the responsibility to provide the appropriate responses.

On the basis of the alerts, SFCG compiled monthly bulletins distributed to platforms' members as well as partners, government ministries, and international organizations. The alerts and the bulletins primarily centered on irregularities, violence, and concerns related to the local elections as well as the teacher's strike. Additionally, the issues which were raised in the alerts included increasing criminality across the country and ongoing land conflict concerns.

Table 2: Project indicators

Project indicators	Achievements
Number of conflict/fragility early warning systems, conflict assessments, or response mechanisms supported by USG assistance	30
Number of consultation meetings	323
Number of stakeholders participating in meetings	221
Number of observers trained in early warning signs of election violence	55
# of stakeholders participating in local or national platforms	221
# of national or local platforms created	10
# of action points generated in response to early warning information	50
# of responses mobilized by CSO actors to respond to action points identified by local or national platforms to respond to early warning signs of violence	105

### Sustainability of the project's results

The sustainability of the project's achievements was analyzed during the SWOT Analyses with the platforms' members. Overall, despite the strength of the EWER design and the skills gained through the capacity building provided by the project, its effectiveness was limited by several factors among which, the slowness in gathering information by the observers has been decried to be amongst the main hindrances.

#### *Sustainability of the platforms*

The diversity of the composition of the various platforms, the mitigation of communal electoral violence and the training activities of the members of the Platforms and observers have been considered as strong achievements of the project.

The platforms are likely to continue operating after the project is completed since every one of them is in the process of seeking a legal status which will enable them to be legally recognized by the government as not for profit associations. With such a legal status, they will be able to find sources of income that will enable them to operate.

#### *Sustainability of the CSOs' contributions*

While WANEP already had a great deal of experience and expertise in the field of EWER in Guinea, ROSE and IDDD have started acquiring knowledge in that area through the capacity building provided by the project. WANEP is likely to carry on expanding on its activities of implementing the EWER approach with the support of donors and it is already collaborating with the government on the definition of a National Policy on Violence Risk Reduction.

## Recommendations

### Towards SFCG

- Support the CSOs in their advocacy campaign for the elaboration of a National Policy for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence
- Before completely phasing out the project, engage the CSOs and the Platforms to collaborate more effectively. Involve the CSOs and the platforms into collaborating on income generating activities so that they can take initiatives together
- Search for Common Ground could leverage its position in order to help the Platforms obtain their legal status since there is a financial cost attached to the procedures for legalizing the associations.
- The Guinean Government is currently working on defining a National Strategy for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence. Search for Common Ground Guinea, because of the nature of its mission should be at the forefront in supporting the national Government through technical advice base on its experience from the present project. Search should leverage its position and experience to assist in the definition of the National Strategy.

### Towards the platforms

- Create Committees for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence at all administrative levels with a hierarchical reporting mechanism. We would thus have a national observatory for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence which rests on the Village Committees for Reduction of the Risks of Violence at the lowest level, then the Communal Committees for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence, then the Prefecture Committees for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence. This will go all the way to the national level. The public authorities must be involved in the monitoring of the committees' activities.
- The coordination between all the Platforms at all levels requires the creation of an information system for the management of the activities as well as the housing of the data gathered from the communities. Therefore, Search can accompany the platforms in that regards because it already has a platform which can be improved so that it can be shared by all the platforms.
- The next step for SFCG Guinea should be to initiate a new project aimed at the networking of the existing platforms and the creation of regional platforms which will manage the data coming from the local communities and which will have the responsibility to create more local platforms throughout the areas in the country which are faced with risks of violence. The gains from the present project can serve as a basis for strengthening and spreading the alert mechanisms throughout the country.

## **Towards the CSOs**

They must be empowered so that they can carry on supporting the platforms both in terms of capacity building and in terms of monitoring the sources of violence in the communities. To empower them, more capacity building should be provided so that they can work more directly with the Platforms at community level. Given that their role will not be the same the one that they played during the project's implementation, they will need more technical support so that they can continue the monitoring of the risks of violence within the communities with the support of the Platforms. They will need periodic assessments of the situation and the prevailing risks of violence throughout the country. The assessments will have to be published in order to help the policy makers better measure the risks of violence and their causes so that they can allocate resources where needed.

## **Towards the donors**

Another project should be initiated to consolidate the achievements of the present one. The donors can participate in assisting SFCG contribute to the governments' National Strategy for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence. The next project should consist into mobilizing resources in order to:

- Improve the data management on the risks of violence;
- consolidate the existing platforms in terms of their capabilities to gather information pertaining to risks of violence and quickly act upon them;
- the replication of the best practices in other communities;
- the networking of the platforms at community levels;
- the creation of regional platforms;
- the creation of a national platform which will operated independently and serve as a source of information on risks of violence for policy makers as well as an awareness raising organization for all the stakeholders involved in peace building;
- better leverage the media to raise awareness on risks of violence throughout the country.

# 1. Introduction

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## 1.1. Context of the evaluation

The republic of Guinea has recently experienced democratic advances, illustrated in particular by the adoption of a new constitution and two presidential elections. But several years of instability have eroded the national capacities in the management of many key sectors of development. There is a certain atomicity in the centers of decision, which leads to a lack of legibility of coordination mechanisms. The presidential elections have revealed deep fractures within the Guinean society, requiring a real program of national reconciliation in order to avoid a total loss of confidence between communities and a more serious situation of instability which would erode the social cohesion and the foundations of the Guinean nation.

This fragility of the socio-political climate, the persistence of insecurity and the deep differences between the political actors can have serious consequences on social cohesion and stability in the country. One of the manifestations of the fragility of the socio-political climate in Guinea continues to be the persistent ethnic divisions, the strong propensity of some politicians to want to use their ethnicity as a tool for power conquest, which often leads to more ethnic fragmentation. One of the weaknesses of the Guinean political elite is the too often overt leaning on their respective ethnic groups when they seek to gain political positions. This situation has led to ethnic and local loyalties, becoming a restraint to the creation of national unity.

The Republic of Guinea is a multicultural and multiethnic nation with the four major geographic regions corresponding to the areas inhabited by the major linguistic groups. In Lower Guinea the major language of the Susu is a lingua franca for most of the coastal population, in the Fouta Djallon the major language is Pulaar, while in Upper Guinea the Malinke (Maninkakan) language is the most widespread. The Forest Region is home to several ethnic groups, from east to west, of Kpelle (Guézés), Loma (Toma), and Kisi. Aside from these major ethnic groups, there are more than 20 other smaller groups throughout the country. In addition to the diversity in its ethnic composition, the population is also divided on religious basis with more than four-fifths of the population being Muslim, predominantly Sunni. Less than one-tenth of Guineans are Christian, mostly Roman Catholic and a minority still following local traditional religious practices.

The sources of tension have multiplied in the region in recent years. The Forest Region of Guinea, located at the border of the Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia, has been faced for several decades with political instability coming from its neighboring countries. It regularly hosts displaced populations fleeing the fighting from these countries, and the region often represents a rear base for mercenaries. Over the years, the social fabric has been weakened.

There had not been any major violence outbreak between the different communities living in the Forest Region of Guinea until 1993 during first local elections organized in the country. The

situation has never stopped worsening since then due to the weakness of the administrators in conflict management and especially the political elite and intellectuals who are from the region and who tend to ignite ethnic identities during elections. The situation has worsened to such an extent that deep-seated hatred and suspicion has settled in between neighboring communities so much so that a conflict between two individuals can lead to extreme violence outbreak between communities from different ethnic groups as it happened in 2013 between the Guerze and Konianké communities. The Konianké people are primarily Muslims, and the Guézzés are people who come from the surrounding forests and are generally Christians or animists. News of the fighting which started in Koulé between two individuals spread quickly to nearby Nzérékoré, Guinea's second largest city. Gangs from both the Konianké and Guézzé communities came out onto the streets. They were armed with machetes, sticks, knives and some with weapons. Petrol stations were burnt down; churches and mosques were set on fire. People from both ethnic groups were savagely hacked to death, some were beheaded, and others were shot dead. According to the government, at least 100 people were killed.

Access to land has also become confrontational, the country's population is impoverished, and the environment is degrading. This context promotes the development of conflicts within and between communities: between farmers and cattle herders and inside the families around issues of inheritance and of marriages. The political context of Guinea, which tends to play on the community divisions, aggravates this already tense situation. Each electoral consultation is mired into clashes between political parties and rapidly transforms into clashes between ethnic groups. From year to year, the political climate continues to deteriorate because of the "*ethnicization*" of power. Ethnocentrism has been pushed to the extreme and the magnitude of the inequalities in the distribution of government positions is such that it threatens the social cohesion and causes a risk of a real socio-political crisis.

Whereas the need for a greater awareness of citizens in general and constituents in particular on their civic duties for peaceful elections in order to prevent and mitigate electoral violence.

It is in this context that Search for Common Ground Guinea with the funding support from the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) initiated the project "*Preventing electoral violence through early warning and rapid response in Guinea*" which was an 18 months project aimed at mitigating the risk of election violence in Guinea.

## 1.2 Objectives of the project

The objectives of the project were to mitigate the risk of election and community violence in Guinea. Specifically, the project had the following two complementary objectives:

**Objective 1:** *Increase community stakeholders' capacity to collect and analyze emergent risks of election and community violence; and*

**Objective 2:** *Strengthen rapid response of local, national, or regional stakeholders in order to prevent or mitigate electoral and community violence*

The project has come to an end and SFCG Guinea commissioned the present final evaluation to assess its achievements.

### 1.2.1 Project implementation process

In order to reach these expected results, the following activities were initiated among others:

- **High level consultation meetings** with key stakeholders at both the national and subnational levels with political party leaders, security and justice actors, the media, and civil society actors to introduce the goals of the project, reinforce the importance of early warning in preventing violence and to outline the process by which SFCG will work with the various stakeholders. The meetings aimed to harmonize the expectation from all the stakeholders and agree on how the project was to be implemented.
- After the consultations, an **Election Violence Scenario Seminar** was organized with the same stakeholders in order to identify scenarios on where election violence may occur, as well as identified geographic areas and demographic groups that were most at risk and examine what early warning signs may be present to predict violence and which actors were best placed to respond to these early warning signs. This was followed up by an additional reflection meeting in the second phase of the project.
- Based on the gathered information and the agreed upon processes defined during the seminar, the project team decided to produce **regular analysis of early warning reports** analyzing the trends in early warning signs of election violence including highlighting geographic areas where tensions may be escalating.
- In order to make information quickly available and shareable, the project team **developed an ICT-based early warning reporting system** which collected and visualized early warning reports. The system was configured to use the Ushahidi platform.
- The project entered into partnership agreements with two Civil Society Organizations (CSO), namely ROSE (*Réseau des Organisation de la société civile pour l'Observation et le Suivi des élections*) and IDDD (*Institut de Droit pour le Développement Durable*) Civil Society Organizations. These two CSOs had the responsibility to provide the observers who would collect information regarding signs of risks of violence from the communities where they operate. Another CSO called WANEP which already had experience implementing EWER partnered with the project in order to provide training for the observers on the deployment of the EWER.
- Developing local, national and regional platforms for analyzing early warning information.
- Building and training a network of early responders
- Providing support to localized and national violence prevention efforts – responses

From the assessments previously done by SFCG Guinea, it was determined that the following areas were more particularly vulnerable to violence and they were consequently targeted for the project's implementation.

Conakry; Kankan; Labé; Nzérékoré; Beyla; Lola; Kouroussa; Mandiana; Siguiiri et Guéckédou

Within each of these communities, the project identified actors with mobilization capacities for rapid response to prevent and mitigate violence and it organized them into platforms. These platforms are composed of key electoral stakeholders, including election officials, media representatives, CSOs, representatives of political parties and religious, ethnic, and community leaders.

Therefore, after the observers from IDDD and ROSE collected information about the risks of violence in their communities, the information was then processed through the **ICT-based early warning reporting system** and then the local platforms were made aware of the risks and invited to verify the information before taking the appropriate actions in order to address the problems in a peaceful manner. The monitors were not necessarily members of the platforms and for the sake of protecting their safety their identities were protected from even the members of the platforms who were the project's active implementing partners.

In addition to the ICT-based early warning reporting system, a monthly bulletin updating of the risks of violence was published. The bulletin summarized all the alerts that had been received and the responses taken by the platforms to address them.

### 1.3 Objectives of the evaluation

The evaluation sought to:

- Measure the project's **relevance** in the Guinean context;
- Measure the **effectiveness** of the project;
- Identify and measure the **proven effects** on Guinea's electoral process; notably the 2018 communal elections, and the potential impact of the project actions;
- Construct project **close-out indicators**;
- Measure the **viability and sustainability** of the project;
- Collect **two success stories** relaying the effects of project;
- **Draw lessons learnt** to date to inform the strategy of the next phase.



## 2. Methodology

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The methodology adopted consisted of a documentary review and a field study combining quantitative and qualitative data collection in all the regions targeted for the project's implementation. For the qualitative data collection, KII and FGD guides were used and questionnaires were used for the quantitative data collection. A desk review preceded the field data collection.

### 2.1 Desk review

The literature review consisted of the project documents, more specifically the projects' proposals and logical frameworks, the monitoring reports, the monthly monitoring bulletins and quarterly narrative reports.

The logical framework served as a guide during the elaboration of the data collection tools and it helped assess the project's expectations and analyze the indicators included in it in order to better gauge the project's achievements. The indicators in the logical framework served as a yard stick for the comparison between the expectations from the project and what was actually achieved.

The study of the narrative reports has helped identify all the activities which were conducted by the different local platforms which were created in the project's implementation areas while the Early Warning Bulletins showed how the political situation evolved from month to month during the project's implementation period through the warnings that were received. The projects' narrative reports were also studied to help in assessing the effectiveness with which the project was conducted.

In addition to those documents, other documents related to the state of intercommunity violence prevailing in the Forest Region of Guinea as well as the reoccurring violence outbreak during national and local elections throughout the country. Documents related to the political history of the country and reports from sociological work done about it were also exploited to better contextualize the project<sup>1</sup>.

### 2.2 Field study

The field data collection was conducted in the following regions:

- Haute Guinée: Kankan
- Guinée Forestière: N'zérékoré and Guéckédou
- Moyenne Guinée: Labé

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<sup>1</sup> See the list of consulted documents in the Annexes part of the report

- Conakry: Kaloum

Figure 1: Geographic map of the Republic of Guinea



### 2.2.1 Quantitative data collection

The quantitative data collection was conducted based on one questionnaire administered to the members of the communities where the project was implemented in Kaloum, Kankan, Nzérékoré, Guékédou and Labé. Only adult men and women were randomly selected to respond to the quantitative questionnaires.

The questionnaires sought to assess the perception, attitudinal and knowledge changes that occurred as a result of the project implementation. In all for 150 respondents were targeted. The sampling approach was non-probabilistic and 30 respondents were targeted from each Prefecture.

Table 3: Respondents to the survey

Prefectures	Respondents
Kankan	30
Guékédou	30
Nzérékoré	30

Labé	30
Kaloum	30
Total	150

### 2.2.2 Qualitative data collection

Qualitative data collection was conducted through one-on-one interviews which were organized with key respondents who were the project's beneficiaries in addition to the SFCG Guinea staff involved in the project, the implementing partners and local NGOs, as well as local authorities in the target areas. Such a process enabled a better triangulation of the information collected from the field. Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat analyses were organized in the five Prefectures with the Platform members. Focus Group Discussions and key Informant Interviews were organized for the targeted categories mentioned below and they were conducted on the basis of interview and FGD guides<sup>2</sup>.

Table 4: Respondents to the qualitative data collection

Respondents	One-on-one	SWOT Analysis
SFCG Guinea assistant M&E	1	
SFCG Project coordinator	1	
SFCG EWER data base manager	1	
Field Officer/Moyenne Guinée	1	
Platform coordinators	5	
Platform members		5 SWOT Analyses of 35 participants
Community leaders	5	
Representatives of political parties	10	
Field agents	4	
President of the local NGO ROSE	1	
Director of IDDD	1	
Coordinator of WANEP	1	

## 2.3 Data analysis

The data analysis was conducted in three stages: First of all, SWOT analyses were organized with the platforms' members in each one of the visited Prefectures.

<sup>2</sup> See the guides in the Annexes of the report

When used in a project's evaluation, the SWOT analysis helps identify the factors that made the project reach its objectives, the constraints related to its design or the ways in which the activities were conducted that were faced during its implementation. It also identifies the opportunities offered outside of the project that are still favorable to its sustainability as well as the external threats that could hinder it.

The second stage of the data analysis was conducted during the daily meetings with the enumerators who helped collect quantitative data. At the end of every day, the team gathered to give feedback about how the data were collected and the first impressions about the respondents and the responses that they got, based on that, a triangulation was done with the qualitative data collected by consultant and a Daily Field Journal was elaborated with the input from all the data collection team members. The Daily Field Journals were written in such a way that every evaluation criteria was analyzed in order to triangulate the quantitative and qualitative data. The last stage of the analysis was the data analysis is the present reporting which organizes and triangulates all the data contained in the Daily Field Journals and along with the secondary data collected during the Desk Review.

## 2.4 Ethical considerations

During the data collection, the enumerators were instructed to abide by the following rules:

**Fair selection of interviewees:** the interviewees were randomly selected, the enumerators were instructed to meet the respondents in their homes and once they finish with one interview, they had to skip the next house and go to the following one.

**Informed consent:** The respondents were informed that they were to make their own choices as to whether they wanted to participate in the evaluation or not, and to do this, the team provided them with adequate information on the evaluation and they understood its purpose and to what end results will be used. They were informed that they could withdraw from the research at any time and that the confidentiality will be guaranteed. None of the project documents will contain information that will enable anyone to know that they are the ones who provided the information.

### 3. Analysis of the findings


The findings are generated from the analysis and triangulation of the qualitative and quantitative data with the secondary data. They focus on assessing the evaluation criteria which were indicated by the Terms of Reference: effectiveness, measure of outcome and output indicators and adaptability of the project, however, during the data analysis, the sustainability of the gains remains critical for the recommendations to be made for the project, therefore a subsection dedicated to it was added.

#### 3.1 Sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents

The analysis of the respondents' socio-demographics in the target areas is critical for the understanding of their attitudes, knowledge and learning in relation to community cohabitation and violence between neighbors from different ethnic groups and also their attitudes towards politicians leveraging the ethnic groups to which they belong to win elections. The people's openness to dialog is to a certain extent explained by their levels of knowledge and education.

Overall, 55% of the respondents were women and the average age of the male respondent is 27 years while that of the female is 35.

Figure 2: Respondents' distribution according to gender




Sources: Quantitative data

The education level has an impact on the responses that are given by the respondents about their opinions on the intercommunity violence and the extent to which ethnicity should play a role in politics, their ability to defend their rights, as well as their perceptions and attitudes towards the project implemented by SFCG in their communities. Figure 3 shows the average

education level for all the respondents in each prefecture. Only 2.5% of the respondents from Kaloum hold a university degree, in all the other Prefectures, none of the respondents has attended college.


Figure 3: Education levels of respondents



Sources: Collected quantitative data

Figure 4 shows the averages of the education levels for the respondents from each Prefecture. It shows that more than 57% of the respondents have an elementary school education level at the most only 3% have attended college and that only 1% has a university degree.

Figure 4: Education levels' average for all Prefectures



**Sources: Collected quantitative data**

## **3.2 Relevance of the project**

The project's relevance measures the extent to which it responded to the needs of the communities where it was being implemented; how it adapted to conflicts and to the priorities of the targets Prefectures and the beneficiaries. The analysis of the socio-political situation encompassed several aspects. It related first of all to factors that are the main sources of pre and post-election violence in the country. Secondly, it sought to analyze the opinions of the various target groups on roles of the political leadership in leveraging their influence to appease or ignite violence.

### **3.2.1 Relevance with regards to the socio-political context**

The project was implemented at a time when the Republic of Guinea was going through a difficult moment in its political life marked by the delay in the implementation of certain aspects included in the political agreement of October 12<sup>th</sup>, 2016, the non-acceptance of the results of the local elections by the opposition and the perspective for the establishment of future district leaders, communal councils and regional councils. In addition, after the publication of the results by the Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI), controversies over these results have occurred throughout the country. It was only after nearly eight months after the elections that there had been agreements between the various parties and these agreements were disputed by some activists from the opposition political parties. Also, the political opposition parties' interpellation of the CENI to review the final results that it published had paralyzed activities in many prefectures and especially in the capital Conakry and Labé, the stronghold opposition throughout that period.

Since the multiparty democratic process has started in Guinea, there has never been any national election conducted in the country at any level that has not been contested by those who have been declared losers. The CENI itself whose members are chosen by the executive powers has always been a contentious body in the country's political configuration. This has created doubts among the political elite on the opposition side and the opposition leaders use the situation to incite their followers into often violent protests to contest the legitimacy of the CENI. Consequently, before and after every electoral consultation, violent riots are observed throughout the country.

According to the participants in the group discussion in Labé, in the months leading up to the organization of any local elections since 1993, the electoral processes has always remained unfinished and there has always been a lot of turmoil among the political parties and in the communities. The people's reactions to the "local elections" issue leave a lot of potentials for political violence in the region. According to the participants, even though the awareness-raising

activities on the culture of non-violence are carried out by Civil Society Organizations, as long as the process is not completed and the risks of political protests are not addressed, it would be impossible to carry out peaceful elections. The difference between the post-election and the pre-electoral situation is the simple fact that the elections were organized, but the people's desire to see this process come to an end remains the same.

The same transparency concerns were perceived by all the participants to the group discussions throughout the visited Prefectures to be the main sources of pre and post political violence. However, the tendency for the political leaders to heavily rely on the ethnic groups to which they belong has been decried as the most dangerous problem in Guinea's political process.


“The end of military dictatorship and the opening of the country to multiparty democracy have led to real disappointment with our political leadership and steered the country towards mutual suspicion and ethnic hatred. Until the year 1993 when we first organized what was supposed to be our first multi-party democratic elections, ethnicity was not a major factor in the political process. The two biggest ethnic groups in Guinea are the Peuls and the Malinkés. Before the multiparty political system started, there was not any problem between them. Although there are lots of minority groups in the country, people were not judged according to their ethnicity and they were not awarded jobs based on that. However, with the multiparty system, everything changed because the political elite poisoned the system by always identifying with their ethnic groups to the detriment of the others. I sometimes regret why I fought against military dictatorship”.

A participants to the SWOT Analysis in Nzérékoré

The sentiment about the fact that the multiparty system has placed ethnic identity at the core of the political process and therefore became the source of violence during election has been expressed by the participants to all the SWOT Analysis sessions in all the visited prefectures. The quantitative data also showed the same perceptions as indicated by Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: Sources of violence during elections






Sources: Quantitative data

The figure shows that the influence of the political leaders on their followers is the main source of violence during elections. Figure 6 below shows the main factors that guide the electors' decisions during elections.

Figure 6: Main factors guiding the voters' choices



Sources: Quantitative data

The combination of the information gathered from Figures 5 and 6 shows that the citizens follow their leaders and vote on the basis of their ethnicity and also that if there is violence during elections it is the result of political leaders fanning the flames of ethnicity.

Moreover, the rural parts of Guinea and more particularly in the Forest Region are seriously affected by conflicts over land ownership which are turning into ethnic violence. As a matter of

fact, with the scarcity of land for grazing, the cattle herders are finding themselves in conflict with the farmers. The farmers accuse the cattle herders of destroying their crops by taking their cattle into their farms. Because the Peuls are traditionally farmers, when even one cattle herder is in conflict with one farmer, people tend to transform the conflict into a fight between the Peuls and the members of the other ethnic groups.

Another type of conflict which is caused by confusion over land ownership is related to the production of cashew nuts. With the increase in the price of cashew nuts, more and more farmers are turning to the production of that crop. Cashew nut farming requires a lot of land for it to be profitable. The scarcity of land has caused on several occasions inhabitants from neighboring villages to dispute the ownership of the land that separates them often causing violence. These land related intercommunity conflicts have resulted in, among other things: the erosion of the social fabric and secular links in localities; the destruction of agricultural fields and cashew plantations and the arrest and imprisonment of some farmers. The resolution of these conflicts is addressed by local authorities, administrative and community leaders as well as the platforms and civil society organizations.

#### **How the reliance on ethnic identities lead to violence, resentment and bad governance**

*It is unfortunate to say it but we all have to admit that the dislocation of our nation, Guinea is likely to come from the overarching opportunism of our political leaders who keep igniting hatred among our people by pitting one ethnic group against another and causing members of the minority groups to believe that they are second class citizens. As a Christian Toma, I am absolutely sure that it is impossible for me or for my children to occupy any political leadership position in our country just because we come from a minority group. No matter how educated and how competent we are, it is impossible for us to thrive, we will always have a less capable person above us if we decide to work for the government. This is due to the fact that we live in a vicious circle in which the politicians have put us and from which it is almost impossible to come out. This is the source of all our problems including the bad governance that is hindering our development and causing so much anger among our youth.*

*Our political leaders lean on their ethnic groups to get into power to the extent that all the political parties are now nothing but pressure groups for ethnic interest used to foster ethnic based concern. If you know that you were elected to public office by the members of your ethnic group and they did it only because you are one of them, you would know that you owe them something in return and if you want to be reelected, then you have to make sure that you have to show them recognition. So you will make sure everyone working in your office is from your ethnic group and all the public resources are garnered and solely invested in the region where you come from, since the resources are limited, there won't be much left for the rest of the country and the people from the other regions get upset and show resentment against you which forces you to focus even more on helping your community and accusing the members of the other ethnic*

*groups of tribalism when in fact you are the one who started it all.*

*If you go to the city council, you will see that the most competent people with the most degrees work under people who are illiterate and incompetent. The most incompetent people are the ones leading only because they belong to certain ethnic groups and have been given these positions by their peers. That is why we face a problem of bad governance because, if the person who is above you and giving you orders is clearly less qualified than you, and you know that he is occupying the position only because of his ethnicity, you would be frustrated and you would not do your job the way you should have knowing that an incompetent individual would take credit for your merits.*

*A political leaders participating to the SWOT Analysis in Gueckedou*

### 3.2.2 Relevance with regards to building capacity for CSOs

The socio-political context of the Republic of Guinea which is characterized by the constant fear of violence eruption has generated responses from CSOs which seek to abate the risks mayhem throughout the country. Several of those CSOs have been engaged in sensitization and conflict resolution both at local and national levels. However, given the widespread prevalence of violence and risks of violence in the country, these CSOs need to be very skillful in their approaches in order to be effective at fighting violence and this requires a great deal of capacity building and funding.

According to the WANEP representative who participated to the qualitative data collection, his organization was already engaged in developing an Early Warning and Early Response systems (EWER) in Guinea well before the project “*Preventing Election Violence through Early Warning and Early Response in Guinea*” and it had collaborated with several institutions for the implementation of that approach for violence prevention. However, in the absence of reliable and stable sources of funding, it has been difficult to implement the mechanisms effectively because its implementation necessarily required a great deal of networking with stakeholders from the smallest communities to the national level. The idea of having a mechanism for early warning alerts is not new, it is rather that its setting up requires financial and technical means which are not always available to the CSOs.

With the project Preventing Electoral Violence through Early Warning and Rapid Response in Guinea, SFCG has contributed to build capacities in the local CSOs, IDDD, WANEP and ROSE through the training provided and through practical application. IDDD and ROSE were able to reinforce their presence in the project’s implementations areas and conduct practical observation and data collection. While WANEP was already acquainted with the mechanism and has applied it with the ECOWAS, ROSE and IDDD had never been trained on it.

In addition to the capacity building that the project provided to the local CSOs in terms of EWER, it also trained their members on SFCG’s approach on peaceful conflict resolution. Tools such as participative theater and participative dialogue were used during the project’s implementation to sensitize the public on risks of violence during elections.

Table 5: Capacity building

	Participants
High level consultation meetings	323
Participants trained in election violence prevention	29
Observers trained in early warning signs of election violence	55

Moreover, the project also created platforms which gathered community stakeholders who did not previously know each other including political leaders who often were at odds. The fact that political party members who are on opposite sides and have been violently battling each other were gathered in order to peacefully work together to find local solutions to their problems has been seen and praised as a great achievement of the project. These platforms have also been strengthened by the project in order to operate independently once the project is completed.

According to the participants to the SWOT Analysis in Nzérékoré, the region in general and Guinea as a nation have reached a level of unpreparedness to face violence that is such that a small argument between two individuals can turn into a violent conflict between communities. The lack of preparedness to face this situation on the part of the authorities at all levels has been blamed for atrocities committed above all in small towns and for leading to fractured families and communities along ethnic and sometimes religious lines.

*“The level of hatred, suspicion and deep seated resentment between the different ethnic groups in this country and more particularly in the Forest Region has reached a level where in the year 2013 a fight between two individuals, a Guézzé and a Konianké at a petrol station over the theft of a few liters of gasoline translated into a major outburst between all the Koniankés and all the Guézzés in the region and it resulted into the death of several individuals. The Guézzés were attacking Konianké villages and the Koniankés attacking Guézzé villages. It just shows that resentment and hatred were dormant among the people from these ethnic groups waiting to be ignited to cause that horrible mayhem. The sources of that violence are still around with us between all the different tribes living in Guinea waiting for a misguided politician to cause uncontrollable damages. If we are not prepared to foresee these situations, anything can happen”.*

One of the participants to the SWOT Analysis in Nzérékoré

### **Partial Conclusion**

The political leadership in Guinea has generated a lot of frustration, mistrust and misgivings among the population and conflicts between people from different ethnic and religions. The conflicts have been worsening the coexistence between people who are bound to live together side by side to the extent that it is impossible to foresee where the next conflicts will come from. Moreover, there has not been any agreed upon mechanisms that enable the public authorities to anticipate or foresee potential sources of problems and act upon them.

Leadership at community level, whether it is traditional, political or religious has generally not played a positive role in preventing violence and there has not been much cooperation between the community actors who can influence their peers into finding peaceful resolution to conflicts.

The CSOs which operate in the field of peace building and conflict resolution are well intended but do not have the financial or the technical capacities to effectively embark on programs aimed at preventing violence through early warning and rapid response.

The project has proved to be relevant because it has filled a void left by the absence of leadership engagement in the different communities living in Guinea and the CSOs engaged in peace building are unable to effectively conduct sensitization about peaceful conflict prevention and conflict resolution due to their limited resources. The violence between communities prevailing in Guinea is to a certain extent explained by poor leadership and bad governance which lead to suspicions and animosity towards each other and to the politicians' meddling and the divisions that they create between people from different ethnic groups.

The goal of the project was to prevent electoral violence in Guinea through prevention through the setting up of an Early Warning and Early Response systems (EWER) through capacity building in CSOs and the creation of platforms gathering relevant political and traditional stakeholders, whereas its relevance within the current political context.

### **3.3 Effectiveness of the project**

The effectiveness of the project relates to how the set objectives and expected results were achieved, namely how it created and strengthened the platforms created in the framework of the project with the aim to mobilize and prevent election violence, at national, political and community-levels. The effectiveness also assesses how the project increased election stakeholders' capacity to collect and analyze emergent risks of election violence and how it strengthened the rapid response of local and national election stakeholders in order to prevent or mitigate electoral violence.

### 3.3.1 Election stakeholders' knowledge of EW signs of election violence

The project involved the main election and community stakeholders both at national and local levels in its activities. At the incept of the implementation, SFCG convened high-level consultation meetings with key election stakeholders at both the national and subnational levels, political party leaders, security and justice actors, the media, and civil society actors to introduce the goals of the project, and detail the ways in which it was going to be implemented. The goal of the gatherings at national level was also to garner information from the stakeholders about the political processes and their perceptions about what needs to be done to address violence during the political consultations throughout the country. At local level, the project identified the main political stakeholders and involved them in the platforms dedicated to providing responses to the early warning signals. Capacity building was provided to the platforms so that their members could effectively address the sources of conflicts in a peaceful manner.

The participants to the SWOT analysis with the platforms' members have all praised the quality of the activities in which the civil society organizations, members of the platform, participated; according to them, these activities were conducted at the most critical moments and brought the different parties together and fostered peaceful coexistence during the electoral process. These are for example the advocacy activities for social cohesion organized by SFCG in political parties Headquarters. Because of the event's venues, members of those parties who happen to often be the main instigators of the riots were present and actively participated to the discussions.

Through their participation in the implementation of the project, platforms' members and CSO partners benefited from several training sessions on early warning and rapid response. They also benefited from several capacity building sessions focused on the peaceful management of conflicts, the Common Ground approach and techniques for promoting the culture of non-violence in their localities. Local partners have acquired knowledge on the mobilization techniques of civil society actors for mass activities related to the promotion of social cohesion (Forum, advocacy ...). Throughout the implementation of the project, observers have learned to collect information related to the context of their localities; they also had notions of transmissions of alerts collected at the base in order to insist on quick answers. As for the local authorities, their involvement in the implementation of rapid response actions has allowed them to understand their role in the promotion of peace in their communities, just like the leaders of the political parties. They have also understood at their level through the project's activities that they have a primary role to play in maintaining social cohesion.

According to the platforms' members, the forums on the technical and legal aspects related to the local elections and the progress on the October 12<sup>th</sup> agreements have allowed a peaceful run of elections in the project's targeted administrative prefectures. The CSOs also conducted community dialogue sessions with youth and women from political parties, which contributed to reduce the chances for political activists participating in electoral violence. Finally, participants

spoke about the monthly meetings that they felt facilitated the process of revitalizing the platforms throughout the project implementation period; these meetings made it possible to regularly assess the socio-political context of the region and the country in general. The meetings that the platforms held were also opportunities for the members to discuss the responses to initiate in order to address the warning signals which were sent by the monitors to the Database in Conakry.

According to one of the political party members who was also a platform member in Labé:

*“The training that we received from the project has made us more aware of the consequences of deviant activities during the elections and more observant of our environment to identify sources of violence and act upon them before it is too late.”*

### 3.3.2 Creation of an early warning network

All the platforms which were involved in the project were created by the project. The goal of setting up the local platforms was to enable SFCG and its partners to bring together actors with mobilization capacity for rapid response to prevent and mitigate violence, by organizing the platforms at the local, regional and national level. The platforms are composed of media representatives, CSOs, representatives of political parties and religious, ethnic, and community leaders. They contribute to identifying signs of violence within their communities and they also receive information gathered by monitors through the SFCG in Conakry.

Aside from the platform members, the observers who work for ROSE and IDDD were also trained on how to identify signs of violence. The training was done in the framework of seminars where the participants identified signs of violence which were then used later to improve or update the early warning signs during the training of observers.

The monitors were thus trained in early warning techniques and reporting in the data management system aimed at ensuring the successful data collection by monitors and the data analysis. Based on the information gathered through the early warning system, SFCG produced regular reports analyzing the trends in early warning signs of election violence including highlighting geographic areas where tensions may be escalating, but also providing the information to the EWER platforms in order for them to think of early response actions or mechanisms.

#### **Success story: Guéckédou women sanitation workers' strike**

The city of Guéckédou is known in Guinea for being among the most restless cities in the country. Since multiparty democracy has been restored, there has not been any election year without violent riots in the city. It is also the city where the Ebola outbreak started and the disease spread out because of the populations' violent rejection of the quarantines at the beginning of the outbreak.

When the Guéckédou platform was created, it coincided with a violent strike by the union of the city's women sanitation workers who had not been paid for several months. The situation was

made worse by the fact that during the strike, a split along ethnic lines occurred within the union itself causing the workers to fight between themselves and to march on the streets of Guéckédou burning tires and cars. Because the violence was about to turn into ethnic division, no one could predict its consequences.

The platform members got together and decided to mediate between the union members and the city council. Thanks to their intervention, they successfully calmed the situation and got the city council to pay the salaries and union members were reconciled and two of them are now members of the platform and participate to all its activities. Since then, there has not been any conflict between the city council and its workers.

According to a participant to the SWOT analysis in Nzérékoré, *“the training workshops on peaceful conflict management, the Common Ground approach and early warning and rapid response techniques are channels through which the project has enabled the capacity building for the platforms’ members in the framework of the project. The prevention of electoral violence, the involvement of platforms’ members in community-based violence prevention activities has been beneficial to them in building their personal capacities.”*

The setting up of the platforms has contributed to developing methodologies that are adapted to local communities and the platforms have been trained on those methodologies. According to one of the community leaders who is a member of the platform in Kankan: *“The sharing of methodologies for the implementation of activities, the organization of training activities and the teamwork in the workflow have led to a clear improvement in the efficiency and dynamism of local partners, platforms and observers on early warning and rapid response in their respective communities.”*

### **Testimony about the EWER**

*Before we started the activities of the platform in the city of Labé, there were not any preventive actions to thwart or limit violence during elections. We often saw violent political demonstrations with young people who came out with tires to put fire on the roads causing mayhem throughout the city. All that used to occur under the eyes of the security forces because no one is respectful or scared of the representatives of the State anymore. With the project’s implementation, we have sensitized the populations on peaceful conflict resolution and the need to refrain from violence. Now, in all the communities where we have conducted sensitization we notice that the level of violence is going down during demonstrations and that some of the young people considered to be the most violent have begun to change their behavior in favor of peace and now these young people are motivated to accompany us in any activity for the promotion of Peace in their districts. This positive behavioral change is now a pride for us as a member of Labé’s Early Warning and Rapid Response platform. This is also due to the fact that in Labé’s platform, the activists of the opposition parties and those of the party in power speak the same language, it is the language of peace and non-violent elections.*



## A participant to the SWOT Analysis in Labé

### 3.3.3 Election stakeholders collaborate to create real-time strategies

For the reporting and response mechanism to operate effectively, at least three conditions had to be met:

- Relevant actors who have been well trained had to be in both the monitoring teams and the platforms teams
- A technology system which gathers the collected information had to be operational and accessible to all the stakeholders
- And most importantly, the actors in the platforms had to collaborate effectively in order to develop fast and adequate responses.

The stakeholders participating to the activities can be regrouped into three categories:

- The members of the platforms who are at community level in the Prefectures. They were all involved in some forms of activities in their communities either as professionals working in the city council, political party members, in local CSOs, as religious or traditional leaders or youth associations' leaders, media professionals and members of the security forces. However, despite being from the same communities, most of the platforms' members did not know each other before they were invited to work together in the framework of the project. Their role in the project had been to contribute to the collection of information pertaining to risks of violence in their communities, sensitizing their peers about all types of violence and also about providing responses to the alerts sent by the monitors. IDDD and ROSE provided 55 early warning observers who were operating throughout the areas targeted by the project.
- The CSOs responsible for providing the monitors. There were three CSOs actively involved in the project. These were IDDD, ROSE and WANEP. They were all involved in the fight against the prevailing widespread violent atmosphere throughout the country. ROSE and IDDD provided the monitors in all the Prefectures targeted in the project while WANEP provided the training on the setting up of the data collection and processing of the alerts.
- At SFCG office, the project team was responsible for the management of the project as a whole and also the setting up and management of the alerts data base, the production of the monthly bulletin and the training and monitoring of all the participants to the project's implementation.

The collaboration between these three was made easy by the fact that all the participants' desire to see the conflicts in the country resolved through peaceful means.


*“Except for the few difficulties related to the availability of funds and the mobilization of platform members for some rural activities, the relationship with SFCG and the project did not*

*have many shortfalls. This was partly due to the fact that the members of the platform perceived the project as an opportunity for them to learn from each other and also from SFCG’s experience on fighting violence through peaceful means and its experience in the prevention and management of pre- and post-election conflicts in Guinea. The services involved in the platform also have notoriety for conflict management in their areas; this is the case for religious, security services, CSOs, the media and political parties, for example. The presence of all these services in the platform has stabilized the relationship with SFCG and the project.”*

**A participants at the SWOT analysis in Kankan**

The process designed to manage the EWER follows a full circle which involves all the stakeholders involved in the project.

**Figure 7: EWER information flow**



Overall, the Ushahidi database which compiled the alerts showed that 966 early warning reports were issued through the SMS based system. These reports were collected, analyzed, and verified

by the SFCG team, the alerts were then sent to the relevant platforms that had the responsibility to provide the appropriate responses.

On the basis of the alerts, SFCG compiled monthly bulletins distributed to platform members as well as partners, government ministries, and international organizations. The alerts and the bulletins primarily centered on irregularities, violence, and concerns related to the local elections as well as the teacher's strike. Additionally, the issues which were raised in the alerts included increasing criminality across the country, a large market fire, and ongoing land conflict concerns.

However, despite the good design of the report mechanisms, the platforms' members who participated to the SWOT analysis did complain about the slowness of the process and the fact that some of the alerts that they received could not be verified. Moreover, some of the issues reported by the monitors were problems that had already been resolved by the platforms. Therefore, according to them they received more credible information from the community members and from their own observations than from the monitors who provide the Early Warnings.

**Success story: Gono women's attempt to walk naked on the streets of Nzérékoré**

Gono is a district in the Nzérékoré region. It was led by a young District chief who was accused by the population of swindling large amounts of money and of never being in his office when he was needed. In fact, he had run away from the district and refused to resign so that another person could be elected to manage the district's affairs. Gono had received financial support from an NGO in order to build a school and the district chief stole the money. After having swindled the money, he went to stay in Nzérékoré city and left the management of the district's affairs to his father who did not know anything about how to administer.

The Gono inhabitants, under the leadership of a women's association decided to meet with the préfet at three occasions to discuss the matter, but every time that they tried, they were told that the préfet was not available to meet them. So the women decided to organize a protest and walk naked from Gono to Nzérékoré city in order to display their anger.

Knowing that such a protest, with hundreds of naked women walking the streets of Nzérékoré could degenerate into violence, the platform members got together very quickly and organized themselves in order to intervene. They sent a delegation to Gono to meet with the women and the local traditional leaders in order to calm the situation. They also met with the district chief and convinced him to resign and accept to go with them to Gono in order to own up to his deeds and apologize for his mistakes. He went with them to Gono to pay back all the money that he had stolen and he publicly apologized and resigned before organizing new elections for his succession.

A woman was elected district chief and the platform organized a meeting between the community's leaders and the préfet in order for him to acknowledge his mistake for refusing to meet with the women. Since then, there has not been any violence in Gono and the Nzérékoré platform has been used by the populations to mediate between them and the local administration.

A platform member who participated to the SWOT Analysis in Guékédou gave the example of the conflict that arose between the Peul and the Kissy communities in Guékédou. One Peul

herdsman had bought a cow that he wanted to fatten before selling it, he went to tie the cow to a tree next to a farm belonging to a Kissy, and the cow broke the cord and went into the Kissy's farm and destroyed his plants. Instead of saying that a cow has destroyed the plants, the members of the Kissy's community started screaming that the Peuls have invaded their farms and have started attacking them. This caused the kissy communities' members to take their weapons and seek revenge and start attacking the Peuls. When the platform members heard about it, they quickly gathered and went to investigate the problem and found out that it was only a minor conflict between two individuals. They went to the communities and appease their members. It was only after the problem was resolved that they received the alert from the monitors.

However, despite that fact that some of the alerts came late, the monitors did provide valuable information that was very useful in helping prevent mayhem. The platforms collaborated with the monitors only indirectly because for the sake of ensuring their safety, the monitors never identified themselves to anyone. This also was deemed to slow the responses, because it took time to identify a problem, send an SMS to the database manager and then investigate the problem before informing the platform members who also had to convene before conducting their own investigations before taking actions. According to one of the participants to the SWOT analysis in Labé, it would have been better if each platform had a terminal where it receives the SMSs simultaneously with the database manager so that they can act quickly, because as she stated: *"here in Guinea, a very insignificant conflict between two individuals can quickly degenerate into a major uncontrollable problem between communities."*

### **Partial Conclusion**

Through their participation in the implementation of this project, the platforms' members and CSO partners benefited from several training sessions on early warning and rapid response. They also benefited from several training sessions focused on peaceful management of conflicts, the Common Ground approach and techniques for promoting the culture of non-violence in their localities. Local partners have acquired knowledge on the mobilization techniques of civil society actors for mass activities related to the promotion of social cohesion (Forum, advocacy ...). Throughout the project's implementation, observers have learned to collect information related to their localities' contexts; they also had notions of transmissions of alerts collected at the base in order to insist on quick answers. As for the local authorities, their involvement in the implementation of rapid response actions has allowed them to understand their role in the promotion of peace in their communities, just like the leaders of the political parties have also understood at their level through the activities of this project that they have a primary role to play in maintaining social cohesion.

### 3.4 Sustainability of the project’s results

The sustainability of the project refers to the durability of its gains and to how long they will last and the possibility for the platforms to carry on with their activities without any external support. It also refers to how the capacities built into the CSOs will empower them to operate more effectively and in a collaborative manner after the project has been completed.

In other words, the analysis of the sustainability of the project sought to determine how the project allowed for greater collaboration and the creation of synergies in the long term between different platforms, the CSOs and other actors active in promoting peaceful conflict resolution through dialogue and if the project enabled to sustainably transform target beneficiaries’ attitudes towards an increased support for peace between the communities.

The sustainability of the project’s achievements was analyzed during the SWOT Analysis with the platforms’ members. The following table summarizes the main findings that came out during the discussions with the representatives of the different platforms.

Table 6: Summary of SWOT analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Gathering people of opposing sides of the political spectrum made the platforms more relevant and credible</li> <li>● The capacity building provided to the CSOs and the platforms’ members enabled them to work</li> <li>● The alerts were effective in limiting violence within the communities</li> <li>● The existence of the platforms and the publication of the alerts through bulletins helped measure and expose the extent of the continuous risks of violence in the country</li> <li>● Thanks to the EWER, a lot of violence has been thwarted in the areas where the project was being implemented</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Lack of financial means limited the responses. Often the platforms’ members had to take money out of their pockets to respond to the alerts because the project did not provide money for activities such as transportation in case of needed responses.</li> <li>● The platforms worked as standalones instead of being organized into a large network of platforms. The platforms were communicating between themselves in order to exchange on expertise and knowledge.</li> <li>● Slow procedures at SFCG that slow access to funds</li> <li>● It was not easy to mobilize some members of the platforms</li> <li>● The monitors were slow to inform about cases</li> <li>● The platforms were implemented in just a few Prefectures which limits their impact</li> <li>● The information on the database was not</li> </ul>

	directly accessible to the Platforms' members, therefore, the platforms' members could not directly input information into them
<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The experience gained by the platforms through collaborative work makes them able to carry on with their work without external technical support</li> <li>• The platforms are about to seek a legal status in order to become recognized associations</li> <li>• Through the work that they have been doing in their communities, the platforms are well regarded by the communities' members and the political leadership alike</li> <li>• The government is working on the adoption of a National Policy for Violence Risk Reduction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The lack of funding may reduce the platforms ability to operate as it was doing during the project's implementation</li> <li>• Once the project is over, it will not be easy for the CSOs to keep providing monitors to the platforms so that they can carry one providing alerts</li> <li>• There will not be any organization playing the role that SFCG was playing during the project's implementation</li> <li>• The lack of networking between the existing platforms hinders information and expertise exchange them</li> </ul>

Overall, therefore despite the strength of the EWER design and the skills gained through the capacity building provided by the project, the effectiveness of the project was limited by several factors among which, the slowness in gathering information by the observers has been decried to be the main hindrances. According to the participants to the SWOT analyses, the slowness in the information collection about the risks of violence or the fact that the information was sent after the problems had already been resolved made a lot of the information contained in the database less relevant because that information was not at the basis of response actions. That is why the participants to the discussions in Guéckédou suggested that the data base would have been more accurate and relevant if the members of the platforms could send information to feed the database with the preventive actions that they themselves actually took to settle risks of violence. According to them, the periodic bulletins and the EWER database underestimate the accomplishments of the project because a lot of the undertakings of the Platforms had gone unreported.

Moreover, the absence of horizontal coordination between the Platforms which would enable them to communicate and exchange experience also had limited their ability to fully take advantage to each other's experiences.

### **3.4.1 Sustainability of the platforms**

All the platforms were created by the project and they regroup members who came from different backgrounds and often only knew each other during the project's implementation and in every platform there are representatives of political parties who are on opposite sides: However, the project activities have created bounds between them that made it easy for them to work together for the good of their communities.

Working with people at community level, political actors and youth and women activists of political parties was perceived as some of the strengths that made the project's activities effective. It is also the dynamism of the platforms and the fact that their members have benefited from full training on early warning techniques and rapid responses. The services that make up the platforms have demonstrated the members' availability and their commitment to peace in their localities. The diversity in the composition of the various platforms, the mitigation of communal electoral violence and the training activities of the members of the Platforms and observers are also strong points.

The platforms are likely to continue operating after the project is completed since every one of them is in the process of seeking a legal status which will enable them to be legally recognized by the government as not for profit associations. With such a legal status, they will be able to find sources of income that will enable them to operate. SFCG has already allocated funds to the platforms that are in the Forest region to set up Income Generating Activities so that that they can start working independently. However, all the participants to the SWOT analyses with platforms' members complained that the amounts of money received from SFCG are too small to start any form of Income Generating Activity.

However, the forms in which they will be operating is likely to be altered because the relationship between them and the CSOs supporting the project such as ROSE and IDDD and WANEP will not be the same. There has not been any understanding between the platforms and the CSOs so far. Moreover, the ways in which alerts are being collected and organized in a database will not be possible in the future because of a lack of funding.

### **3.4.2 Sustainability of the CSOs' contributions**

While WANEP already had a great deal of experience and expertise in the field of EWER in Guinea, ROSE and IDDD have started acquiring knowledge in that area through the capacity building provided by the project. WANEP is likely to carry on expanding on its activities of implementing the EWER approach with the support of donors and it is already collaborating with the government on the definition of a National Policy on Violence Risk Reduction.

ROSE and IDDD representatives stated their willingness to leverage the expertise that they have acquired to carry on supporting the existing platforms and working on expanding the creation of

platforms in other areas. However, the lack of funding remains the main obstacle to their desire to sustain the project’s achievements.

### Partial conclusion

The data collected from the prefectures targeted by the project have shown that in general the project has had a positive impact upon the beneficiaries, whether they are the platforms or the CSOs who have been involved in conflict resolution between communities. The strategy used to implement the project has been effective because the activities were conducted simultaneously combining sensitization through the media, participatory theatre, capacity building for the CSOs and the platforms. The capacity building provided to the platforms and to IDDD and ROSE is likely to enable them to carry on with their activities under other forms given that the way in which the project was structured is not sustainable because SFCG will not be available to keep on coordinating the activities, managing a data base and providing financial support.

However, with the changing of their status, the platforms are likely to continue working on sensitizing the communities’ members on the risks that violent behaviors pose on the peaceful cohabitation between people from different ethnic and religious background and the stability of the country as a nation.

## 3.5 Synthesis of the project’s indicators

The following table summarizes the achievements of the project based on the indicators on the logical framework.

Project logic	Indicator	Achieved	Remaining
Project logic	Indicator		
ER1.1: Community stakeholders have an increased knowledge of early warning signs of election and community violence.	Indicator 1: # of positive responses taken by responders in EWER process	1	0
	Indicator 2: 1.6.3-7 # of conflict/fragility early warning systems, conflict assessments, or response mechanisms supported by USG	30	0



	assistance		
Activity 1.1.1 High level consultation meetings	Indicator 1: # of consultation meetings	323	0
	Indicator 2: # of stakeholders participating in meetings	221	
Activity 1.1.2 Election violence scenario forum	Indicator 1: # of stakeholders participating in scenario planning	39	0
	Indicator 2: # of indicators of election violence identified	88	0
	Indicator 3: % change of forum participants with increase knowledge of potential scenarios for election violence	90%	0
Activity 1.1.3 Regular analysis of early warning reports	Indicator 1: # of bulletins produced	17	0
ER 1.2 Creation of early warning network, made up of key local, national and regional stakeholders, which utilizes technology- system to identify emergent violent risks.	Indicator 1: # of reports received of early warning signs of election violence	427	0
Activity 1.2.1 Developing or supporting an ICT- based early warning and reporting system	Indicator 1: #1.6.3-7 Number of conflict/fragility early warning systems, conflict assessments or response mechanisms support by USG assistance.	1	0

Activity 1.2.2 Training and deployment of early warning observers	Indicator 1: # of observers trained in early warning signs of election violence	55	45  This was due to SFGC engagement with the US Embassy. Due to a series of activities with them SFGC never had the opportunity to complete the EW trainings. The EW observers were not that effective so this was deemed to be less of a priority.
	Indicator 2: % of observers increased early warning	79	0
<b>Project logic</b>	<b>Indicator</b>		
Activity 2.1.1 Developing local, national and regional platforms for analyzing early warning information	Indicator 1: # of stakeholders participating in local or national platforms	221	0
	Indicator 2: # of national or local platforms	10	0
	Indicator 3: # of action points generated in response to early warning information	50	0
ER 2.2 Key election and community stakeholders take local or national rapid action to prevent or mitigate violence based on information provided through early warning system.	Indicator 1: # of responses mobilized by CSO actors to respond to action points identified by local or national platforms to respond to early warning signs of violence	180	0

	Indicator 2: % of targeted stakeholders who feel better able to respond to prevent election violence than 1 year ago	180	0
Activity 2.2.1 Building and training a network of early responders	Indicator 1: # of participants trained in election violence prevention	29	1
	Indicator 2: % of workshop participants who cite example of specifically applying workshop skills six months after first training	60%	
Activity 2.2.2 Support to localized and national violence prevention efforts	Indicator 1: % of targeted stakeholders who feel better able to respond to prevent election violence than 1 year ago	100% of the platforms' members who participate to the SWOT analyses stated that they feel better able to respond to prevent election violence than 1 year ago	0

## 5. Conclusion

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The situation within Guinea at the time of the project's implementation was characterized by pre and post-electoral violence throughout the country. The political elite is not in general promoting reconciliation but rather often almost openly advocating for ethnocentrism in a volatile context. The CSOs all throughout the country did not have the capacities to effectively counter the vitriolic political discourse and do not have the capacities to provide accurate and unbiased information to better inform the public about the electoral process.

The absence of well trained and capacitated CSOs capable of conducting effective sensitization and advocacy campaigns throughout the country has left a void among the populations in need of dialogue and communication in order to avoid facing a situation of widespread intercommunity violence and mayhem. The project relied on both the platforms that it created and the CSOs and direct intervention within the communities in order to identify sources of risks for violence and then providing adequate responses through the opening up of dialogue spaces about reconciliation and the need for peaceful cohabitation and peaceful elections. The organization of the community leaders in the framework of the platforms created by the project and the capacity building provided to them have contributed to provide collaborative work to reduce the risks of violence in the country.

The project has strengthened the rapid response capacity of local, national and regional electoral actors with the goal of preventing or mitigating electoral and communal violence through the platforms in which they were organized.

Through the platforms, the project has also increased the key elections stakeholders' capacity to identify and analyze the emerging risks of communal and electoral violence. These stakeholders have actively not only sensitized their communities' members on the risks of violence during elections but they also have responded to risks of violence beyond election periods. Every time an alert was sent, they have taken the initiative to engage dialog in order to avert violent incidents.

## 6. Recommendations

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### 6.1 Towards SFCG

- Support the CSOs in their advocacy campaign for the elaboration of a National Policy for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence
- Before completely phasing out the project, engage the CSOs and the Platforms to collaborate more effectively. Involve the CSOs and the platforms into collaborating in the Income generating activities so that they can take initiatives together
- Search for Common Ground could leverage its position in order to help the Platforms obtain their legal status since. There is a financial cost attached to the procedures for legalizing the associations.
- The Guinea Government is currently working on defining a National Strategy for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence. Search for Common Ground Guinea, because of the nature of its mission should be at the fore front in supporting the national Government through technical advice base on its experience from the present project. Search should leverage its position and experience to assist in the definition of the National Strategy.

### 6.2 Towards the platforms

- Create Committees for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence at all administrative levels with a hierarchical reporting mechanism. We would thus have a national observatory for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence which rests on the Village Committees for Reduction of the Risks of Violence at the lowest level, then the Communal Committees for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence, then the Prefecture Committees for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence. This will go all the way to the national level. The public authorities must be involved in the monitoring of the committees' activities.
- The coordination between all the Platforms at all levels requires the creation of an information system platforms for the management of the activities as well as the housing of the data gathered from the communities. Therefore Search can accompany the platforms in that regards because it already has a platform which can be improved so that it can be shared by all the platforms.
- The next step for SFCG Guinea should be to initiate a new project aimed at the networking of the existing platforms and the creation of regional platforms which will manage the data coming from the local communities and which will have the responsibility to create more local platforms throughout the areas in the country which are faced with risks of violence. The gains from the present project can serve as a basis for strengthening and spreading the alert mechanisms throughout the country.

## 6.3 Towards the CSOs

- They must be empowered so that they can carry on supporting the platforms both in terms of capacity building and in terms of monitoring the sources of violence in the communities. To empower them, more capacity building should be provided so that they can work more directly with the Platforms at community level. Given that their role will not be the same the one that they played during the project's implementation, they will need more technical support so that they can continue the monitoring of the risks of violence within the communities with the support of the Platforms. They will need periodic assessments of the situation and the prevailing risks of violence throughout the country. The assessments will have to be published in order to help the policy makers better measure the risks of violence and their causes so that they can allocate resources where needed.

## 6.4 Towards the donors

- Another project should be initiated to consolidate the achievements of the present one. The donors can participate in assisting SFCG contribute to the governments' National Strategy for the Reduction of the Risks of Violence. The next project should consist into mobilizing resources in order to:
  - Improve the data management on the risks of violence;
  - Consolidate the existing platforms in terms of their capabilities to gather information pertaining to risks of violence and quickly act upon them;
  - The replication of the best practices in other communities;
  - The networking of the platforms at community levels;
  - The creation of regional platforms;
  - The creation of a national platform which will operated independently and serve as a source of information on risks of violence for policy makers as well as an awareness raising organization for all the stakeholders involved in peace building;
  - And a better leverage the media to raise awareness on risks of violence throughout the country.

## 7. Annexes

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### 7.1 Terms of references

#### Consultancy: Final Project Evaluation - Guinea Project Summary

Since Guinea's return to multiparty democracy in 2010, the country's elections cycle has experienced numerous irregularities. This has in turn increased electoral tensions concerning elections schedules, and further increased the potential of ethnic and regional antagonisms that have also been on the rise since 2010. The conflicts of these identity-based electoral politics have caused violence in various degrees during every post junta electoral period, such as the isolated instances of "tit-for-tat" violence between the Malinké and Pulaar peoples during the 2010 electoral period. There are particular regions of the country where social unrest and outbreaks of conflict is particularly acute during elections. Highly contentious local-electoral campaigns in the Maritime Guinea and Forest Guinea regions often lead to recurrent spikes of violence and protest. It is also a notable feature in communities where.

Pulaar and Malinké groups live in close proximity such as urban Conakry, N'Zérékoré, Labé and Kankan. Recurrent features in elections such as delays, contestation and the lack of inclusive political dialogue, which spans ethnic boundaries leads to continued tensions and mistrust among the population.

To date the project has been running for a year, and most of the above mentioned issues have worsened. The 2015 presidential elections were lauded in Guinea and internationally for being relatively free and fair, without any significant violence. The local elections however, were contested and caused major problems across the country. Contestation resulted in the elections being postponed continually, with each date announcement raising doubt as to whether or not the elections would take place. After the elections were announced for 18th December 2016, the opposition refused the date because they had not been included in selecting the date. Together with existing political antagonisms, the elections date issue began to divide the electorate along ethnic lines, especially in N'Zérékoré, where each ethnic group had chosen their candidate more or less exclusively by ethnic affinity. There is concern that the situation will worsen, especially if the elections are postponed to the following year and ethnic antagonisms further intensify. This could have adverse long-term consequences for the currently fragile social fabric in the country.

The series of early warning and response alerts during this first year of the project implementation paint a very complex picture of violence potential in the region. The critical reports show a deterioration of the social fabric due to electoral issues, issues with deeper roots in longstanding ethnic division, regional economic stagnation and high youth unemployment. The reports also showed evidence of religious tensions and church vandalism by unemployed youth, as well as drug related violence.

Looking forward, the project has identified key communities to focus its future efforts, and three critical violence precursors have been identified in these communities:

Land conflicts between traditional system of land allocation and inheritance, particularly in the six new mining site communities, and the regime of legally codified mining rights which have gained international mining companies access to the ancestral and inheritance lands and overridden the customary ownership of these lands.

Unemployed youth who have no opportunities to engage in productive and positive activities are prone to being conduits of violence and violent agendas ordered by various politically driven groups.

Border town communities are challenged by ethno-political issues in their efforts to satisfy the needs of their multi-ethnic populations. The revised project aims to use the elections as a departure point and the Early Warning Early Response system as a complement to address the complex and varied nature of violence in Guinea.

#### **Key Responsibilities**

Project Objectives: To prevent electoral violence in Guinea.

Specifically, the project aims to:

**Objective 1:** Increase the capacity of key elections stakeholders to identify and analyze the emerging risks of communal and electoral violence.

**Objective 2:** Strengthen the rapid response capacity of local, national and regional electoral actors with the goal of preventing or mitigating electoral and communal violence.

#### Evaluation Objectives

After a year's span of project implementation, SFCG seeks to carry out a final evaluation against the standards of the effective implementation of a peace consolidation action. In line with the project's base agreements, SFCG will have this evaluation carried out by a consultant with the help of SFCG Guinea's DME department.

This evaluation will:

- Measure the project's pertinence of the context to the Guinean context;

- Measure the effectiveness of the project;

- Identify and measure the proven effects on Guinea's electoral process; notably the 2018 communal elections, and the potential impact of the project actions;

- Construct project close-out indicators;

- Measure the viability and sustainability of the project;

- Collect two success stories relaying the effects of project;

- Draw lessons learnt to date to inform the strategy of the next phase.

Please click here for the full terms of reference

As job descriptions cannot be exhaustive, the position holder may be required to undertake other duties that are broadly in line with the above key responsibilities.

#### Qualifications

You meet the following qualifications:

Experience

Required

Minimum 3 years' experience in the domain of research and qualitative and quantitative evaluation, including methodology design, research tools and data analysis;

Preferable

Experience in peacebuilding/media projects is preferable;

Experience in evaluating projects financed by USAID and or CSO is preferable

Skills and Competencies

The consultant must have a high analytical capacity, have irreproachable moral integrity, be independent and impartial in the interpreting the results of the evaluation.

The consultant is required to respect the following Ethical Principles:

**Comprehensive and systematic inquiry:** Consultant should make the most of the existing information and full range of stakeholders available at the time of the review. Consultant should conduct systematic, data-based inquiries. He or she should communicate his or her methods and approaches accurately and in sufficient detail to allow others to understand, interpret and critique his or her work. He or she should make clear the limitations of the review and its results.

**Competence:** Consultant should possess the abilities and skills and experience appropriate to undertake the tasks proposed and should practice within the limits of his or her professional training and competence.

**Honesty and integrity:** Consultant should be transparent with the contractor/constituent about: any conflict of interest, any change made in the negotiated project plan and the reasons why those changes were made, any risk that certain procedures or activities produce misleading review information.

**Respect for people:** Consultant respect the security, dignity and self-worth of respondents, program participants. Consultant has the responsibility to be sensitive to and respect differences amongst participants in culture, religion, gender, disability, age and ethnicity.

Fluency in English and French. The evaluation report will be in English and the consultant will provide all documents in English.

Our evaluation and research directives are available on the following webpage:



<http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilt/Directives%20SFCG%20pour%20l'evaluation%20externe%20FINAL.pdf>

We recommend all candidates to familiarize themselves with these directives.

## 7.2 Documents consulted

- All the monthly Bulletins
- The narrative reports
- The logical framework
- The project proposal
- Activity Report Tracker
- Monitoring and Evaluation Tracker

## 7.3 Data collection questionnaire

### Formulaire de consentement

Bonjour et merci de m'avoir donné l'occasion de vous parler. Mon nom est..... Je travaille sur une étude conduite par Talking Drum Studio, une organisation à but non lucratif qui œuvre pour le règlement pacifique des conflits. Talking Drum Studios a mis en œuvre un projet en vue de contribuer à atténuer les tensions pré-électorales dans le pays. Le projet est terminé et l'organisation cherche à mener son évaluation. L'objectif est de voir comment le projet a été mis en œuvre et de mesurer les résultats.

L'entrevue prendra environ 30 minutes, et votre participation est complètement volontaire. Vous pouvez refuser de participer ou même suspendre votre participation à tout moment. L'identité des répondants et leurs différentes réponses seront maintenues confidentielles. Toute information à partir de laquelle on pourrait établir une quelconque identité sera supprimée.

Si vous avez une quelconque question au sujet de l'étude, vous pouvez contacter le point focal et le point focal de Talking Drum Studio, son numéro de téléphone est le:

**Souhaitez-vous participer à cette étude ?**

**Pouvons-nous commencer maintenant ?**

<b><u>Enquêteur ayant rempli le questionnaire</u></b>
<b><u>Date de l'enquête :</u></b>
Nom/Prénom :



	Entourer la réponse correspondante		
103	Votre profession	.....	Ecrire la profession
104	Quel est votre niveau d'éducation ?	Je n'ai jamais été à l'école..... 1 Niveau primaire..... 2 Niveau secondaire..... 3 Niveau universitaire.....4 Autre (préciser) .....99	
105	Quelles langues parlez-vous généralement à la maison ?	.....	Ecrire la langue
106	Quelles autres langues parlez-vous ?	.....	Ecrire les langues
107	Quelle est selon vous la source des violences pendant les élections ?	Les élections sont truquées.....1 Les leaders politiques incitent leurs partisans à la violence..2 Les media donnent de fausses informations qui causent la violence.....3 Le chômage des jeunes cause la violence.....4 Autres (à préciser).....99	
108	Quels sont selon vous les principaux critères qui guident le choix des électeurs lors des élections en Guinée ?	La compétence des candidats.....1 L'argent que les candidats distribuent aux électeurs.....2 Le discours des candidats.....3 Les gens votent selon l'ethnie du candidat.....4 Autres (a préciser).....99	
109	Pensez-vous que tous les membres de toutes les ethnies doivent avoir le même droit de devenir président en Guinée ?	Oui.....1 Non.....2	
110	Avez-vous toujours pensé de cette manière	Oui.....1 Non.....2	Si « oui » allez à la question 112 Si « non » allez à la question suivante
111	Depuis quand pensez-vous comme ça ?	Il y a plus de 4 ans .....1 Il y a 3 ans.....2 Il y a deux ans.....3 Il y a moins de deux ans.....4	

112	Si vous avez changé vous manière d'apprécier les membres des autres ethnies, qu'est-ce qui a motivé ces changements ?	<p>J'ai observé la manière dont nous vivons et je me suis dit que nous sommes tous les mêmes.....1</p> <p>La sensibilisation faite à la radio ou TV.....1</p> <p>Les séances de sensibilisation de Talking Drum Studio.....1</p> <p>Ma participation aux comites créés pour promouvoir la paix....1</p> <p>Autres (précisez).....1</p>	
113	Pensez-vous qu'il est parfois nécessaire de recourir à la violence pour faire élire votre candidat à la présidence de la république ?	<p>Oui.....1</p> <p>Non.....2</p>	
112	Très souvent durant les élections nationales ou locales, il y a des scènes de violence en Guinée, que pensez-vous doit être fait pour arrêter cela ?	<p>C'est au gouvernement de faire respecter la loi.....1</p> <p>Il faut que leaders communautaires apaisent les populations.....2</p> <p>C'est aux leaders politiques de demander à leurs partisans d'arrêter la violence.....3</p> <p>La paix est une affaire de tout le monde, c'est par le dialogue permanent entres les ethnies et les ressortissants des différentes régions que la paix se forge.....4</p>	
113	Au cas où vous pensez que les résultats des élections ont été truqués, quelle serait votre attitude ?	<p>Je vais manifester pacifiquement.....1</p> <p>Je laisse mon candidat décider de ce qu'il faut faire.....2</p> <p>L'Etat n'a peur que de la violence, je vais manifester pour que le droit soit dit.....3</p> <p>Le candidat qui a été déclaré perdant doit passer par les tribunaux pour faire appel.....4</p> <p>J'accepte les résultats qui ont été promulgués.....5</p> <p>Autres (à préciser).....99</p>	

114	Pensez-vous que les informations que vous recevez à la radio et la télévision portant sur les élections sont crédibles ?	Oui.....1 Non.....2	
115	Pensez-vous que les media ont contribué à vous amener à faire le bon choix ?	Oui.....1 Non.....2	
116	Pensez-vous que les programmes médiatiques ont contribué à envenimer la situation ?	Oui.....1 Non.....2	
117	Avez-vous une fois appelé ou envoyé un SMS à une station radio ou de télévision pour réagir à une émission qui porte sur la campagne électorale ?	Oui.....1 Non.....2	
118	Etes-vous au courant de l'existence d'un mécanisme d'alerte précoce qui vous permet d'envoyer un SMS pour informer en cas de violence électorale ?	Oui.....1 Non.....2	
119	Avez-vous une fois envoyé un message pour alerter à propos d'un cas de violence ?	Oui.....1 Non.....2	
120	Avez-vous une participé à une activité de Search for Common Ground ?	Oui.....1 Non.....2	
121	Si Oui quelle activité ?	Théâtre public.....1 Session de sensibilisation.....2 Porte à porte.....3 Autre (à préciser) .....99	
122	Est-ce que vos connaissances sur la prévention et la résolution pacifique des conflits ont augmenté	Oui.....1 Non.....2	
123	Si Oui, c'est à cause de quoi ?	Les programmes radio et TV.....1 Les sensibilisations porte à porte.....2	

		Les causeries entre voisins.....3 Les sensibilisations par les OCB.....4 Théâtre participatif.....5 Autres (à préciser) .....99	
124	Quelles sont les causes principales de la violence dans votre communauté ?	Méfiance entre les communautés.....1 Les disputes autour de la propriété terriennes.....2 Les discours des politiciens.....3 Conflits entre les membres d'ethnies différentes.....4 Conflits entre les originaires de régions différentes.....5 Toutes les réponses ci-dessus.....6 Autres (à préciser).....99	Plusieurs réponses sont permises