FINAL EVALUATION

Reducing the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia

SUBMITTED TO SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, INDONESIA

SUBMITTED BY

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
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

BAPAS	Balai Pemasyarakatan (the Indonesian Correctional	
	Institutions)	
CSO	Civil Society Organization	
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism	
FGD	Focus Group Discussion	
KII	Key Informant Interviews	
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding	
MSC	Most Significant Change	
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	
PAS	Pembela Ahlus Sunnah	
SFCG	Search for Common Ground	
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Science	
TVE	Transforming Violent Extremism	

Map of Indonesia



Executive Summary

Introduction

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Indonesia implemented a three-year project titled 'Reducing the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia.' It engaged multiple stakeholders and aimed at addressing an ongoing challenge: the recruitment of vulnerable young people into violent extremist organizations and the high risk of recidivism for released prisoners (particularly those convicted of terrorism) after their release on parole. The overall objective of the project was to reduce the risk of violent extremism amongst at-risk youth and offenders in Indonesia.

The objective of the evaluation is to gather evidence on whether the project has been effective at preventing violent extremism; and what kind of improvement is needed in the continuation of the similar measures in the future. It is based on the argument that radicalization may not necessarily lead to extremist violence, but is one of several risk factors required for this. Violent extremism encompasses the phases of a) becoming involved with groups conducting violence; b) remaining involved and engaging in violent activity. The individual must have both the opportunity for and the capacity to make decision about the engagement. Reducing the participation in violent ideology is further measured against factors at the macro-, meso- and micro-level of analysis. This was then used particularly as a framework to measure the project's relevance and effectiveness in reducing the risk of violent extremism amongst at-risk youth and offenders in Indonesia. Meanwhile coherence, coordination, and the sustainability of the project were measured against the Do-No-Harm framework.

The evaluation team conducted surveys, interviews, focus group discussions, and social media monitoring to collect primary data from five chosen locations (Banten, Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, and Palu), which include people from the following target groups: high school and university students, CSOs and the private sector, ex-offenders and local communities, and relevant government officials.

In the following pages, this summary will focus on the program's relevance and effectiveness, the results of social media monitoring, the program's coherence and sustainability, and, finally, conclusion.

The evaluation proved that the transfer of knowledge and skills to the beneficiaries was quite relevant to the cureent context. Three factors seemed to have significantly contributed to this achievement. First, the topic, CVE, touched on the current most pressing issues faced by the society at large and the youth in particular. Second, the content was easily followed and understood. Third, the medium to deliver the message was attractive and youth-friendly.

The program ended up producing beneficiaries who possess sufficient insight on the subject, but with less proven capability of dealing with actual violence and conflict. This had apparently led to the lack of beneficiaries' capability to apply the knowledge and skills acquired from this program to their surrounding real world. Considering the gravity of the issue the project is dealing with, it is a good beginning but remains an unfinished task.

Although the beneficiaries were more impressed by the program's methods and activities than its contents and purposes, the majority of respondents had developed significant understanding of violent extremism. They were able to categorize racist propaganda, exclusion based on religious beliefs, and terrorism as expression of violent extremism; and preferred to resolve their conflicts through discussion. They also possessed firm opinions on the growth of intolerant activities in Indonesia. They knew how various forms of violence were supposed to be responded.

Nevertheless, some of the youth beneficiaries still argued that violence is justifiable should one's family and religious beliefs are insulted and under threats. This shows how complicated and deep rooted are those perceptions and beliefs that needs a longer term and saturated effort in making significant an sustained changes. While most of youth beneficiaries were indifferent to this issue, some of them did not possess the courage to overtly assert their view or to communicate their ideas to people who hold different perspectives. However, there were also many stakeholders who took indirect means to communicate their messages such as through social media and peer discussion.

It is important to note that the program was able to increase cooperation among key stakeholders. It was also effective in lowering ex-offenders' susceptibility to rejoin their former group. However, it seemed that actors involved in the cooperation hold different future expectations. The program was effective in helping ex-offenders to return to society more in terms of economic than social reintegration.

The social media strategy to change perception of young people towards violent extremism was the area where the program could be taken as innovative and beneficiaries-friendly, particularly those of primary and secondary youth participants. The program helped to enhance the circulation of discourses on CVE, create awareness about the issue and enlarge the audience. Indeed, the majority of respondents felt that violent extremism can be prevented by giving more space for social media contents about peace. As such, this was yet to spark a social media shockwave big enough to raise strong awareness, even less changing perception toward violent extremism. SFCG, itself took leadership in social media campaigns, along with other stakeholders, and tried to reach out to larger section of community, especially young peoiple who are frwquent users of social media. At the same time responses to the posts were minimum and less substantive. Beneficiaries tended to post what they take as interesting issues, which does not limit to CVE related postings alone.

The success of SFCG program on CVE heavily relied on the relation between the organization and its partners, which includes—but is not limited to—schools, universities, as well as CSOs and government institutions. SFCG established working groups, which consist of representatives from the CSOs, community leaders, private sectors, and the government; and developed direct communication with teachers and professors who work at the targeted high schools or universities. Establishing working groups or direct communication indeed created a safer and comfortable environment for the beneficiaries—be it ex-offenders or students—to be actively involved in the program. In addition, several working groups admitted that lack of communication and minimal

commitment to allocate enough financial resources had been hindering coordination between the working groups' members.

As for the coherence between CVE activities for students and the program objectives, attention should be given to the way SFCG determined which students, schools, or universities to work with. While the decision to conduct the program in Bandung, Jakarta, Palu, Poso, and Solo as program sites reflected the criteria of areas vulnerable to violence, SFCG should be more careful in selecting its first beneficiaries so as to make sure that they represent different religious, ethnic, class backgrounds that serve as the main cleavage for the addressed conflict/violence in each city in the first place.

Besides concern over diversity, the second factor that may influence the coherence of CVE programs has to do with the initial capacity that the primary beneficiaries had to be peace leaders.

As for the coherence between reintegration activities for ex-offenders and the program's objectives, attention should be given to welfare as the most important factor in ex-offenders' reintegration according to almost all interviewed exoffenders and members of working group. When it comes to job security, the interviews with ex-offenders show that they not only need trainings but also access to capital provided through government grants, micro loans, etc. It was the point where the working groups have been struggling to one extent and another.

SFCG's ability to create long-term processes or structures in reducing recruitment to violent extremist groups and the risk of recidivism among terrorist exoffenders relied on the students' and working groups' capacity to organize initiatives independently to counter violent extremism among their community as well as to help ex-offenders' reintegration back to the society. Both students and the working groups seemed to understand the importance of disseminating peaceful and nonviolent values to their peers and the general public as well as the urgency to create a community-based reintegration plan for terrorist exoffenders. The social media campaigns were partially successful in increasing peaceful narratives for the wider public. When it comes to formal or informal offline activities by the students to counter violent extremism in the community, there were mixed results—some simply have not had the initiative, some already had the initiative which unfortunately did not last long, while the rests had the initiative but did not have the necessary resources or network to implement their plan.

As for the reintegration working groups, it is too early to look for the sustainable impact. On the one hand, it has to do with timeframe since it takes a long time to measure the success of a reintegration program. On the other hand, some of the working groups admitted that coordination problem, lack of continued and sufficient financial resources, and limited commitment from government agencies to one extent and another have been hindering the working groups from carrying its task optimally.

In conclusion, the program had played major roles in initiating and putting forward the primacy of CVE in Indonesia. It significantly accentuated a specific understanding and dealing with violence and, hence, enriching the existing knowledge of, and activism related to, the subject. The program's focus on youth was also a pioneering endeavor and timely as the youth has always been implicitly

part of many similar programs in the past, but rarely being located at the centre of curbing violent extremism edifice.

The initiative on preventing recidivism was equally noteworthy. While improving the ex-offenders' skills, knowledge and motivations to access job markets enhanced the other similar endeavors by other agencies on disengaging this group from violent extremism, the idea of involving wider stakeholders and related communities in dealing with the issue was strategic. It brought to the forefront several neglected, but crucial problems, that require further attention: lack of systematic coordination between different relevant government agencies, limited contacts and collaboration between government and non-government actors, and less community involvement thus far in the process of ex-offenders' reintegration.

The recommendations of this evaluation are largely based on suggestions to deal with the challenges. First, this program is largely based on a micro-level approach in understanding violent extremism. The problem is that the process of becoming a violent extremist is very context-bound as individuals are always located within larger social structure, and this context sometimes involves not only psychological problems found in a day-to-day interpersonal interaction but also structural problems such as poverty, unemployment, minimum access to education, etc. Countering violent extremism in this regard should be more than micro-level type of intervention. Second, it is necessary to address violent extremism as a problem that requires collective action for its solution. Attention should be given to increase the capacity of CVE beneficiaries in designing and dissemination activities. That said, SFCG also needs to incorporate training materials on community organizing, public campaigns, network building, nonviolence, and other topics that might equip the beneficiaries to plan a collective initiative against violent extremism. Third, it is important to have a solid assessment on the various mediums through which violent extremism is disseminated. Each medium usually has its own unique characteristics that might imply different patterns of interaction.

1. Background Information

Context Analysis

In the background of this three-year project entitled 'Reducing the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia' is the growing conflict, violence and radicalism in the society at large. It started with a series of communal conflicts in Kalimantan and riots across several north-coast small towns of Java Island in the mid-1990s; and ended up with probably two most brutal religious conflicts in the country's history in Ambon and Poso. This was followed by terrorist attacks using deadly explosives against civilian targets. Since the bombings of several churches across the archipelago on the Christmas Eve of 2000, such attacks have resulted in large numbers of human casualties and put Indonesia on the map of global terrorist hotspots. Accompanying this worrying development was the (re)emergence of Islamic radicalism. Radical Muslim groups and individuals formed Islamic fundamentalist movements seeking for the establishment of Islamic state and the full implementation of *Shari'a* (Islamic way of life). The movements adopted *jihad* as their main strategy to achieve their goals that include the use of violence.

Notable changes in conflict dynamics have been taking place since early 2010. First, the number of communal conflicts and riots have significantly reduced. Second, although the country remains haunted by terrorist attacks, the scale of attacks no longer match, for instance, those of the 'Bali Bombings'; and the security apparatus increasingly becomes a new target. Third, the radical Islamic movements still tightly cling to their ideals; nevertheless, slight changes in strategy seem to affect the way they deal with the state and formal political institutions as well as their engagement with non-radical Muslim communities. The movements also begin to air their resentment toward problems such as corruption, foreign capital penetration and poverty more often.

This latest development largely relates to a range of interventions dealing with violent extremism initiated by both the government and non-government entities. Notwithstanding the current long delay of finalizing the anti-terrorism law, the government has been gradually successful in arresting the activists of terrorist networks and neutralizing the remaining scattered violence in places such as Poso.¹ This is further supported by a number of programs on de-radicalization and reintegration aimed at reducing religiously inspired violent radicalism and preventing its reemergence in the future. While such intervention is a long process and needs time to bear its fruit of less violent extremists in Indonesia, CVE initiatives are worth preserving and improving.

Evaluation Objectives

The objective of the evaluation is to gather evidence on whether the project has been effective at preventing violent extremism; and what kind of improvement is

Poso in Central Sulawesi came to the public attention in the late 1990s and early 2000s because of a series of violent religious conflicts in the city and its surrounding areas.

needed in the continuation of the same measures in the future. More specifically, the evaluation is aimed at assessing the project's relevance, effectiveness and sustainability. The focus is on the main target of the project, that is, youth, released prisoners and stakeholders such as government, CSOs and the private sector as well as local community; social media is the main strategy of intervention and coordination between the agency, that is, SFCG and its partners.

Program Overview

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Indonesia implemented a three-year project titled 'Reducing the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia.' The project falls within the broader strategic framework of SFCG Indonesia in Transforming Violent Extremism (TVE) in Indonesia. It engaged multiple stakeholders and was aimed at addressing an ongoing challenge: the recruitment of vulnerable young people into violent extremist organizations and the high risk of recidivism for released prisoners (particularly those convicted on terrorism charges) after their release on parole.

Building on its extensive experience working with at-risk Indonesian youth and the Indonesian Corrections System, SFCG has been addressing these challenges through support of student initiatives to prevent recruitment of at-risk youth using creative media and by empowering Indonesian government services in supporting successful reintegration. The project also coached parole officers to engage communities in the reintegration of violent extremists post-release.

The **overall objective** of the project is to reduce the risk of violent extremism amongst at-risk youth and offenders in Indonesia. The **specific objectives** are:

- 1) To reduce the level of recruitment of high-risk youth in targeted universities and schools.
- 2) To increase coordination of key stakeholders (CSO representatives, government officials, etc.) in supporting the reintegration of ex-offenders (former terrorists) into society.
- 3) To build awareness of the dangers of recruitment and recidivism among vulnerable communities in Indonesia.

Key partners of the project include:

- 1) **Primary target groups**: university students, public and private high-school students, community, civil society organizations, and ex-offenders in the targeted areas (West Java, Jakarta, Central Java, Banten, and Central Sulawesi).
- 2) **Secondary target groups** (government counterparts): the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Religious Affairs.

2. Methodology

Conceptual Framework

Radicalization often refers to the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology. It may not necessarily lead to violence, but is one of several risk factors required for this. Radicalism that leads to violent extremism is the social and psychological process of increased and focused radicalization through involvement with a violent non-state movement. Violent extremism encompasses the phases of a) becoming involved with groups conducting violence; b) remaining involved and engaging in violent activity. The individual must have both the opportunity for engagement as well as the capacity to make decisions about the engagement. Hence, central to the efforts of preventing violent extremism are reducing violent participation (Jones and Morales, 2012) and ideological or cognitive shifting in one's beliefs (Ashour, 2009).

Reducing violent participation and ideology should further be measured against factors at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels of analysis that are responsible for violent extremism. Those factors are following:

- Structure: the structural aspect includes problems such as poverty, inequality and lack of political representation. Programs dealing with this aspect are targeting economic and welfare issues and addressing representation problems such as access to policy-making process and citizen rights.
- Ideology/theology: the ideological or theological aspects cover the programs that aim at introducing different religious teachings, providing alternative interpretations of religious text, religious referencing or fanaticism.
- 3) **Resource mobilization**: this includes programs targeted at distancing and disengagement from radical movements, organizations, and radical leaders or reducing the access to financial support and weapons.
- 4) **Political identity**: programs that focus on political identity should address recognition issues such as acknowledging the right to fashion including to wear *burkha*, or autonomy and certainty issues such as the rights to be different and to believe in certain values and norms.

The above factors is used particularly as a framework to measure the project's relevance and effectiveness in reducing the risk of violent extremism amongst at-risk youth and offenders in Indonesia. Meanwhile coherence, coordination, and the sustainability of the project is measured against the Do-No-Harm framework which uses the following principles as its basis:

1) Context-bound to understand the specific socio-historical context for each problem, whether it is the risk of extremist recruitment in universities or in prison. Context-bound understanding requires an assessment that includes not only the variety of relevant beneficiaries/stakeholders but also their different interests/identities and how such difference has been produced/re-produced over time. A comprehensive context-bound

baseline can be a determining factor in achieving coherent activities.

- 2) **Dividers and/or tensions** analysis to understand whether the evaluated activities have truly addressed any deep-seated problem/tension that might challenge the achievement of the intended outcome. Such problems/tensions may be internal to the beneficiaries while others might be promoted by outside powers. They also may arise from various sources such as politics, religion, ideology, demography, geography, etc. Figuring out any possible tension(s) within the beneficiaries or amongst other relevant stakeholders with whom the project engages in continuous coordination is critical to understand whether the assistance has managed to lessen or feed into the problem.
- 3) **Connectors and/or local capacities** analysis to understand whether the evaluated activities have paid enough attention to ensure sustainability by connecting actors with similar concerns and building local capacities for peace which may include knowledge transfer on conflict transformation, supports for peace infrastructure, etc.

Data Collection Methods

1) Sampling and Sample Size

The evaluation team conducted surveys, interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs) to collect primary data from five chosen locations (Banten, Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, and Palu), which include people from the following target groups:

Primary target:

High School and University Students : 281 people
 CSO & private sector : 40 people
 Related government official : 43 people

Secondary target:

High School and University Students : 7502 people
 Community members : 1300 people

We received those numbers from SFCG monitoring data that was collected through attendance lists distributed from all activities conducted from quarter 1 to quarter 10 of the project. The evaluators used interviews and FGDs to gather qualitative data from the primary target groups. The evaluation team used surveys to gather quantitative data from the secondary target groups.

The sampling technique used was *multistage random sampling*. Multi-stage sampling represented a more complicated form of cluster sampling in which larger clusters were further subdivided into smaller, more targeted groupings for the purposes of surveying. Despite its name, multi-stage sampling can in fact be easier to implement and can create a more representative sample of the population than a single sampling technique. Particularly in cases where a

general sampling frame required preliminary construction, multi-stage sampling can help reduce costs of large-scale survey research and limit the aspects of a population which needs to be included within the frame for sampling (Agresti and Finlay 2008).

In accordance to the base population above, the sample size needed to evaluate this program was (margin of error = 5% and confidence of level = 95%).

Primary target

- High school and university students : 180 - CSO and private sectors : 36 - Government officials : 40

Secondary target

- High school and university students : 698 : 216 Community members

The calculations for above sample size were done using two different formulas namely Slovin Formula for the primary target and Hypergeometric Distribution *Formula* for the secondary targets.

Primary target:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

n : sample size : population size : margin of error (0.05)

High School and University Students: 327 people

High School and University Students: 327 per
$$n = \frac{327}{1 + 327(0,05)^2} = \frac{327}{1.82} = 179.67 = 180$$

CSO and Private Sector: 40 people

$$n = \frac{40}{1 + 40(0,05)^2} = \frac{40}{1.1} = 36.36 = 36$$

Related government officials: 48 people

$$n = \frac{48}{1 + 48(0,05)^2} = \frac{48}{1.20} = 40.00 = 40$$

Secondary target

$$n = \frac{N z^2 pq}{(E^2(N-1) + z^2 pq)}$$

n : sample size
N : population size

pq : population proportions (0.5)
E : margin of error (0.05)
Z : confidence level (1.96)

- High School and University Students: 7502 peoples

$$n = \frac{7502(1.96)^2(0.5)}{(0.05)^2(7502 - 1) + (1.96)^2(0.5)} = 697.52 = 698$$

- Community members: 1300 peoples

$$n = \frac{300(1.96)^2(0.5)}{(0.05)^2(300 - 1) + (1.96)^2(0.5)} = 215.73 = 216$$

We distributed the sample size proportionally based on population of beneficiaries in each province.

2) Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

Interviews were conducted to assess and gather in-depth information on the results of the two specific objectives. It was carried out with 31 key informants in the five target areas, including government counterparts, students, civil society organizations, and ex-offenders in the targeted areas. Additional interviews were also conducted with SFCG staff and partner organizations. The evaluation planned to conduct an abridged version of Most Significant Change (MSC) Approach with the selected students to assess the changing perceptions and attitudes, as well as their role in promoting peaceful narratives around their peers and developed stories of change happening among the youth and their communities. However, due to the time constrains, the evaluation did not proceed with MSC.

During the interviews, beneficiaries were actively encouraged to exercise their own judgement in identifying stories and telling them. From those stories, we learned about how things worked in programs. As MSC can tell us about unexpected results, the intangible and the indirect consequences of our work, we can find out the most important things from the project from the beneficiaries' point of view. We screened those stories and stories already collected by SFCG from six months ago by eliminating stories that were not about change and categorizing the remaining stories into general categories of changes.

3) Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)

Three FGDs were conducted in each of five chosen target areas with the following: the students, targeted social media users, and civil society organizations. In total the evaluation process held 13 FGDs. The participants of the FGDs were selected to ensure all voices were heard and all aspects of the evaluation questions were covered.

4) Social Media Monitoring and Survey

A thorough social media tracking among the direct beneficiaries and secondary audience was conducted to gain data on the narratives and discussions on their social media accounts. This was done in three ways:

- Surveying targeted social media users to know the accounts that they
 own, their personal perception towards violent extremism and peace
 narratives in real life and in social media, and their participation and
 engagement with SFCG social media campaign materials;
- Having FGDs with targeted social media users to see their views on the effectiveness of SFCG's social media strategy. First beneficiaries were surveyed through Google Survey while the second beneficiaries were surveyed using survey monkey technique;
- Profiling on beneficiaries' social media accounts by identifying their online profiles and backtracking on their posts that are made available to the public throughout the project. As social media facilitated conversations and interactions amongst beneficiaries and between beneficiaries and other people engaged in online communities, tag searching and trend identification using certain keywords related to violent extremism and peace was conducted using a free analytics service available on the internet.

However, social media tracking was not only adopted to scrutinize the substance and pattern of the discussions but also its dissemination by looking at how many people like, share, or comment on each post. Social media accounts of beneficiaries were reviewed and analyzed from 2012 to 2014 before they took part in the project activities and 2014 to the present after they took part in the project activities. That data was compared to identify differences in keywords used, graphs, etc. The data was traced using SFCG's database of beneficiaries. Social media accounts was classified according to their posts and keywords into three different categories: (1) social media accounts that show decreasing vulnerability toward violent extremism narratives; (2) social media accounts that show no difference in their responses toward violent extremist narratives; and (3) social media accounts that show increasing vulnerability toward violent extremism narratives. These categorizations were based on how those social media accounts use keywords, graphics, or posts that are considered as violent-extremism narratives (e.g. spreading hatred among religious believers or ethnicities, portraying violent extremist groups as heros, etc.) or countering-violent extremism narratives (e.g. encouraging people to respect religious differences among them, condemning violent extremism, spreading messages of solidarity for the victims of violent extremist groups).

Social media posts require people to represent themselves to an audience and accentuate their sense of self (Bechmann & Lomborg 2012) by constructing profiles based on on their taste, and given their personal information and interest (Liu 2007). As self-presentation to their peers online might be different to offline ones, we used these data to see the gap between beneficiaries' real-life activities and their social-media activities and highlight minor and significant differences between them. This data would also enable

us to extract useful patterns in ongoing dialogues and their recent attitudes towards violent extremism and, thus, see whether there was any change on young people's perception on the issue. SPSS was utilized to produce readable statistics out of this quantitative data.

Limitations

The limitations to the assignment include:

- Difficulty to get genuine data from the interview and FGD process. This was due to following factors: (1) the respondents tended to provide socially desirable answers; (2) since interviews were conducted long after the program was finalized it was difficult to know exactly whether or not the respondents developed similar views and opinions on the program when it was conducted the first time.
- Information limitation when speaking with the government. The government officials involved in this evaluation process tended to provide socially desirable answers. This was largely due to the fact that they did not want to be seen as failing in performing their tasks.
- Surveys can only cover less than 10% of beneficiaries due to time concerns: The survey cannot be conducted simultaneously because the evaluation can only mobilize limited numbers of researchers and local assistants. The time allocated for the survey was around 5-6 days for data collection in each city. Added with 1-2 day interval between each survey, school and national holidays, and other technical delays on the field the survey needed almost 3 months just for collecting all distributed questionnaires.

The risk to the assignment include:


The obtained data will be a sample that can only give tendency/inclination.
 This was logical and the evaluation was only meant to provide general trends.

3. Findings

Relevance

In general, the program on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) was an endeavor to protect youth from violent narratives and prevent recidivism among exoffenders. There were two main questions on relevance: How relevant was the project in addressing the issue around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives and youth participation in peacebuilding?; and, how relevant was the project in addressing the recidivism problem among ex-offenders of extremist groups?

When responding to the first question, it is important to note that the general strategy adopted by the program was to inject the youth with relevant knowledge about, and skills to deal with, violence and conflict. Those relevant knowledge and skills were then expectedly transmitted through a number of specific strategies and medium—will be discussed separately in the other sections—to a wider youth community with an end product of raising awareness of violent extremism as well as initiating actions to curb such problem. The evaluation proved that the transfer of knowledge and skills to the beneficiaries was largely successful. During the interviews and FGDs, as well as results of the survey, the majority of respondents were capable of demonstrating their basic knowledge about, and how to deal with, violent extremism. They correctly identified examples of violence found in social environments closed to them, as shown in the following chart. They had developed a necessary moral stance and desirable attitude, at least theoretically, toward conflict and violence. They also showed strong understanding and support of peace and peaceful traits. This included respecting differences and managing conflicting interests and positions through various peaceful means. Three factors seemed to have significantly contributed to this achievement. First, the topic - CVE - touched on the current most pressing issues faced by the society at large and the youth in particular. Second, the content was easily followed and understood. Third, the medium to deliver the message was youth-friendly.



Graphic 1. Respondents' witnesses about violence actions taking place in their city.

Nevertheless, the effect of such effort on preventing susceptibility to extremist narratives was yet to be evidenced. As shall be discussed in more detail in the following pages, the program ended up producing beneficiaries who possess sufficient insight on the subject, but with less proven capability of dealing with actual violence and conflict. This should hardly be surprising since the program seemed to barely touch on specific socio-historical context. Violence is present in its most general and abstract forms transcending questions such as why people specifically involve themselves in violence in the first place and/or how violence is understood by people with different cultural and material backgrounds. This apparently led to the lack of beneficiaries' capability to apply the knowledge and skills acquired from this program to their surrounding real world. As indicated by the following table, most youth beneficiaries perceive violent extremism as the result of offenders' aspirations for power (45.8% among high school students) and their religious fanaticism (71.4% among university students). Both of these answers similarly assume that the practice of violence could be understood without contextualizing such practice in offenders' cultural and material backgrounds. As a comparison, the Poso community, which was badly affected by communal violence in 2000s, considers political and economic inequality as the most important factor which gave rise to violent extremism (57.5%). This answer is substantially different from youth beneficiaries' analysis since it is able to take into account cultural and material background which generates violent extremism. This data also indicates an emerging gap between the program's CVE paradigm induced to youth beneficiaries and communities' reflections on their experience.

Respondents' opinions on causing factors of the emergence of violent extremism					
Why does violent extremism emerge?					
	Students	College Students	Communities		
Economic inequality and political injustices	38.1%	47.3%	51.9%		
Fanaticism in interpreting religious text	38.6%	71.4%	56.5%		
The existence of religious blasphemy and deviant sects	40.7%	42.9%	32.8%		
The urge to have more power	45.8%	53.6%	24.4%		
Easy access to weapons	131%	17.9%	13.7%		
Peer-group solidarity	13.6%	26.8%	19.1%		
Society ignorance	25.4%	26.8%	6.9%		
Others	3.0%	3.6%	2.3%		
Cannot say	9.3%	3.6%	2.3%		

 $Table\ 1.\ Respondents'\ opinions\ on\ causing\ factors\ of\ the\ emergence\ of\ violent\ extremism.$

Unfortunately, as revealed in a number of interviews and focus group discussions during the evaluation process, the beneficiaries tended to turn to the pre-existing knowledge—that is, the knowledge on violence and conflict prior to their involvement in the program—when approached by questions asking their opinion on actual issues, particularly those of existing large-scale violence in the society at large. Very often, that pre-existing knowledge stood apart from the one imparted by the project. This was revealed by 10% of our respondents during the interview and in 8 of 13 FGDs. University students in Solo and Jakarta, for instance, overtly declare their support to Aksi Bela Islam rallies in November and December 2016 in Jakarta. One of them stated that:

"In my opinion, Aksi Bela Islam is noble. Through Aksi Bela Islam, we defend our religion from blasphemy. It means that we do not surrender although our religion is insulted. We have to defend our religion."

Beyond the data and information gathered by this evaluation, such trends in the long-run could hypothetically create cynicism. While youth will talk eloquently on the danger of violent extremism, they at the same time take it simply as the socially desirable thing to say.

Nevertheless, the ex-offenders' ultimate hope was obtaining decent jobs. Enthusiasm in attending job skills and motivation workshops provided by the program was due to this hope of getting jobs. It is important to note that the program had never been intended to provide the beneficiaries with access to job markets; but more on preparing them to entering one. SFCG has correctly taken this approach as emphasizing on the former will create a new problem of dependency among ex-convicts. Nevertheless, such unfulfilled hopes, without a proper intervention as part of long term exit strategy, could potentially produce skepticism among the ex-offenders toward similar programs in the future.

Lastly, a statement by an ex-offender in Poso is noteworthy. This person generally took the program as useful and hoped for the continuation of activities initiated by SFCG. He further suggested that reconciliation, barely an important element in this program, should be at the center of any reintegration endeavor. It was unfortunate that such reconciliation is not possible under the current program as those on the other side of the conflict in Poso were not involved.

"SFCG had done a great job with this program. However, should this program be continued, I suggest [SFCG] to involve our friends from Christian communities. The aim is to have a dialogue and reconciliation with us from Muslim communities. Up until now hardly any programs have such [CVE-related] activities [involving both communities]. I hope SFCG will continue this program."

Effectiveness

What are the major outcomes and outputs of the program? The first part of this section discusses the program's effectiveness in reducing the level of recruitment of high-risk youth in targeted universities and schools. The second part of this section evaluates the program's effectiveness in increasing coordination of key stakeholders in supporting the reintegration of ex-offenders into society.

Objective 1: To reduce the level of recruitment of high-risk youth in targeted universities and schools.


This part aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the program in increasing youth understanding on violent extremism and reduce their susceptibility to extremist groups' narratives and recruitment both through student-led peacebuilding initiatives and peer-to-peer strategy.

1) Youth's understanding on violent extremism and their susceptibility to extremist narratives.

Beneficiaries' understanding on violent extremism is developing.


A significant proportion of beneficiaries were able to develop their understanding on violence. Most youth beneficiaries in Bandung, Solo, Jakarta, Palu, and Poso are able to categorize racist propaganda, exclusion based on religious beliefs, and terrorism as expressions of violent extremism. On average, 41% of high school students and 51% of university students in all cities classify racist propaganda as a form of violent extremism. Religion-based exclusion and terrorism are considered as expressions of extremism by 44% and 46% of high school students; and 70% and 68% of university students (see Table 1 in Annex).

The development of youth beneficiaries' understanding on violent extremism could also be traced through their preferences of conflict resolution methods. The evaluation demonstrates that 81% high school students and 85% university students in all cities prefer to resolve their conflicts through discussion (82% in sum). The proportion of beneficiaries who intend to intimidate their adversaries or to use violence is very low. Only 2.5% high school students and 2% university students who prefer intimidation and violence (2% in sum). Compared to the baseline data, the portion of student beneficiaries who prefer discussion as conflict resolution method increased by 4% (from 78% to 82%) while those who prefer intimidation and violence decreased by 2% (from 4% to 2%).



Graphic 2. Beneficiaries' preference of conflict resolution method.

Yet, the program still has to (1) broaden beneficiaries' understanding on what should be considered as violent extremism (only 17% and 21% high school students in all cities consider intolerance and hate speech as violent extremism) and; (2) take into account its uneven achievement among different cities (youth beneficiaries in Bandung possess a relatively comprehensive understanding on violent extremism while most youth beneficiaries in Palu and Poso do not even consider religion-based exclusion and racist propaganda as a form of extremism).




Graphic 3. Forms of extremism according to respondents.

Uneven achievement among cities is influenced by, at least, two factors. First, city-specific context. As mentioned in the Baseline Report, most students in Bandung (51%) were already aware that Indonesia was moving in the wrong direction due to rampant corruption, religious vigilantism, etc. On the contrary, most students in Poso (74%) held the view that Indonesia experienced positive development in recent years. Moreover, most of them (59%) also argued that using violence to defend religion was justified. While students in Bandung, according to the Baseline Report, were characterized by frequent exposure to different groups, students in Poso still inherited the experience of Poso communal conflict which made them consider religiousbased violence as something normal. Second, there were differences in the youth-mapping process. In Bandung, the program tended to select students who were already exposed to a tolerant understanding of religion as its beneficiaries. The beneficiaries, for instance, were coming from progressive student movements or from higher education institutions—the faculty of psychology—which already encouraged students to understand human conflicts from others' perspectives. Selected student beneficiaries in Bandung thus possessed basic knowledge to deal with violent extremism prior to the program. This situation could not be found in Poso. Not only did student beneficiaries inherit the experience of communal conflict, they also possessed limited knowledge on violent extremism prior to the program.

Beneficiaries' anti-violence perspective is only partially developed

This program was only partially successful in inducing an anti-violence perspective among youth beneficiaries. The number of youth beneficiaries who believe in violence is extremely low. Based on Table 2, 11% of high school students and 7% of university students in all cities think that violence is justifiable under any circumstance while 30% of high school students and 47% of university students argue that violence should not be used under any conditions.


However, 58.5% of high school students and 45.5% of university students in Solo, Jakarta, Poso, Palu, and Bandung still argue that violence is justifiable under specific circumstances. On average, high school students tend to hold this view stronger than university students. In Solo, Jakarta, and Poso, the number of high school students surveyed who hold this view exceeds 60% (74%, 63%, and 76%, respectively).



Graphic 4. Respondents' perceptions toward justificiation of violence.

Further analysis presented in the graphics below demonstrates that insults and threats on one's family and religious beliefs work as two significant conditions which make the use of violence justifiable. 58% students argue that violence is justified to defend their family while 48% students believe that violence is justified to defend their religion and belief. Compared to Baseline Data, this evaluation observes a significant shift in beneficiaries' behaviour to violence. According to the Baseline, violence is justified when one's honor and family (55%) or religion (10%) are insulted. The evaluation therefore demonstrates that students are increasingly attracted to use violence whenever their religion is insulted (from only 10% to 48%). Similar trends although at much lesser level—could also be found in honor and family issues where beneficiaries increasingly intend to defend their honor and family through violence (from 55% to 58%). Mobilizations² of religious sentiment for election purposes in Indonesia in recent years, this evaluation contends, explains the significant rise of this understanding of violence. This data also indicates that youth beneficiaries targeted by this program remain vulnerable to violent extremism narratives fuelled by religious sentiments.

² The term 'mobilization' is selected since this term assumes that there is no 'true' understanding of religion. Religion could be interpreted in numerous ways, depending on interpreters' understanding, belief, and experience. Religion, hence, could not be manipulated since religion possesses no essence that could be manipulated.



Graphic 5. Justifications of violence.

Beneficiaries understand the danger of intolerant activities, but lack sufficient knowledge to create non-violent initiatives to combat intolerant activities.

Most youth beneficiaries possessed firm opinions on the growth of intolerant activities in Indonesia. Table 3 shows that most youth beneficiaries possess practical knowledge on how to respond to intolerant activities. In responding to intolerant activities, both high school students and university students intended to: (1) condemn such activities (13% and 26%, respectively); (2) give the victims support (13% and 36%); (3) report the perpetrator to authorities (48% and 22%). The amount of youth beneficiaries who intend to remain idle is relatively low compared to those who choose to take actions (18% and 12.5% for high school and university students respectively).

Interviews among students in Bandung show that youth beneficiaries in the city hold unempathetic views on raids against Christian activities. On 6th December 2016, an Islamic vigilante group, Pembela Ahlus Sunnah (PAS), attempted to disband Christmas celebrations in Sabuga, Bandung. The students believe that such vigilantism departs from narrow political interests or shallow understandings on religion and peace. Yet, they were still unable to formulate arguments and concrete practices on this issue based on their knowledge on violent extremism, on the one hand, and youth beneficiaries find difficulties in developing arguments and practices to respond to intolerant activities in their everyday life, on the other hand. For instance, interviewed university students in Bandung held the view that violence is unjustifiable, including when they have to combat violent extremism. However, they did not possess sufficient knowledge how to deal with violent extremism through non-violence means. This gap thus made youth beneficiaries unable to make their knowledge practical.

Beneficiaries find difficulties to apply knowledge provided by SFCG to conflicts characterized by power-asymmetry

Youth beneficiaries in Bandung and Palu, were not able to fully apply their acquired knowledge as a guiding tool in practice due to the differing nature of the conflict in those regions. In these two cities, students and youth primarily worked in land grabbing and urban eviction issues. During FGDs, four university students in Palu said that they were not able to fully apply the conflict resolution knowledge acquired from the training to resolve conflicts they confronted since those conflicts were characterized by power asymmetry among actors and limited space for deliberation among them. This shows that the youth and students gained the knowldge and skills but were unable to deal with social hierarchy prevalent in their society since time immemorial. Probabaly, overcoming this traditional power dynamics was beyond the scope of a short 3-year project. One of the students said:

"When we are witnessing vertical conflict between authority and people, mediation will not resolve the problem since this is a long agrarian conflict. When we are voicing out our aspirations through mediation, they [authority] will only listen and take note, yet take no action"

Similar perspectives were found in Bandung. During KIIs, four university students in Bandung, for instance, mentioned urban evictions in Bandung and agrarian conflict in Mt. Ciremai as their prioritized issues and said they were not able use those skills learned from the program to resolve conflicts characterized by power asymmetry. While the activists in Palu and Bandung emphasized the importance of the skills learned from the project in resolving their organizational conflicts, they did apply some knowledge acquired from the program to find a common ground among conflicting parties in the communities they work for. Nevertheless, they also argued that the same techniques were less relevant in conflicts involving parties with unequal power, such as between small peasants and large corporations. In such circumstances, they talked about the importance of a "frontal" technique demonstrations and blockage, for instance—and non-cooperative strategy. In this respect, for them, SFCG's methods to resolve conflicts therefore were more useful to help beneficiaries to manage their internal conflicts than to resolve conflicts they considered important as part of their advocacy program in empowering marginalized groups in the society at large. Although the programs were not designed to address issues like urban eviction and land grabbing, opinions offered by student beneficiaries in Palu and Bandung indicate that an improved need assessment is necessary in the future. SFCG needs to not only address issues it considers as important, but also to listen to beneficiaries' perspectives on what they consider as crucial and necessary.

Some beneficiaries tend to be impressed more by the methods and activities of the program than its contents and purposes

A significant number of beneficiaries were more impressed by the methods and activities adopted by the program than its ultimate goal to deal with violent extremism. The school teachers promoted this program not only by describing its purposes, but also by highlighting that the students will acquire

skills in designing posters, writing blogs, or making films delaing with religious tolerance, communal harmony and some other issues of their interest. Hence, students were interested to participate in the proejct activities. Second, SFCG has deliberately designed the curriculum of this program with posters, blog, and film training in order to attract youth beneficiaries. While the curriculum was successful in attracting their attention, this curriculum also makes youth beneficiaries distracted from the substance of the program. Some respondents in Bandung, Solo, and Poso consider training as a primary learning platform for the use of social media, making short-movies, and designing posters while having better understanding of violent extremism as the secondary benefit of joining the program. When youth beneficiaries were asked to identify the most valuable lessons they acquired through the program, a better understanding of violent extremism was usually mentioned after those trainings. When he was interviewed about knowledge he gained from SFCG training, a student in Jakarta said that it was about:

"Taking a good camera angle to get a good background, good themes, good movements. [It was about] how to do that. From the training, we were taught how to use camera and, then, how to make a short-film on issues of local concern."

However, the majority of the beneficiaries were already able to grasp the substance of the training *through* the method. A student in Solo said that his understanding on violent extremism was growing as he made films on former terrorists in East Java. He said that he was gradually able to understand conflicts from others' perspective—including why individuals decided to be terrorists.

"We needed a different approach to understand terrorism since they are mostly exclusive. [...] We need to employ a 'soft' approach, to, first and foremost, understand their perspectives, were taught this aproach in this training. Why were they involved in terrorism? Was it because economic factors? Was it because of the influence of their peer-group? Was it because their erroneous paradigm [in understanding religion and others]? Then, we had to personally approach them. [...] When we are able to gain their trust through repeated conversations, we could invite them to our activities. [This approach] eventually makes them open up their personality to us."

SFCG formulated an approach by balancing the substance (countering violent extremism) and the method of training (design, film, and blog training), not only in order to make the substance of the programs received properly by the beneficiaries, but also to make the beneficiaries completely understand the strong connection between the substance and the method, instead of experiencing them as two different messages of the program. By emphasizing the inseparability of peaceful message and techniques required to convey the message, student beneficiaries developed better skills to counter violent extremism narratives.

2) Student-led peacebuilding initiative and campus' resilience against violent extremism narratives and recruitment

Beneficiaries knew how various forms of violence were supposed to be responded, however, their attempts to promote peaceful narratives through concrete actions remained limited.

Youth beneficiaries in Bandung, Solo, Jakarta and Palu were able to grasp the sense of urgency of the program—that the program is highly crucial as Indonesia is increasingly suffering from violent extremism. As discussed previously, both groups of youth beneficiaries had already possessed normative understanding on violent extremism, which led them to 1) condemn violent activities (13% and 26%, respectively); (2) give the victims support (13% and 36%); (3) report the perpetrator to authorities (48% and 22%) (see Table 23 in Annex). A similar pattern was also found in their understanding of discrimination, vigilantism, gang fighting, poverty and corruption. In other words, youth beneficiaries possess knowledge on how various forms of violence—ranging from discrimination to corruption—are supposed to be responded to.

Interviews with youth beneficiaries also confirm this data. Youth beneficiaries are able to understand violence as a result of one's inability to understand others' positions and perspectives. During KIIs, a student in Bandung said that:

"I was previously abhorred by the act of terrorism [...] However, I am currently encouraged to rethink the meaning attributed by terrorists to their activities [...] Perhaps, there are specific situations that compel them to do so, specific reasons that might explain why they decide to organize such activities. It is understandable to hate what they do. Yet, we should not hate them as persons."

Another student emphasised the importance of finding common ground among conflicting parties to resolve conflicts.

"People's perspectives depart from specific understanding acquired through someone's life. It remains unproblematic as long as it does not encourage any activities that might create trouble for others. Whenever such problem exists, it is our task to encourage people to think beyond their narrow perspectives and interests. We need to help them recognize that we have greater goals that should be pursued collectively."

Thus beneficiaries widely believed that it was crucial to understand others' argumentations and life experiences in order to make sense of what they actually wanted to convey. They argued that cooperation, instead of violent conflict, could be developed through such endeavors. As previously discussed, 82% of youth beneficiaries believed that conflicts should be resolved through discussion. This number increased 4% compared to the Baseline Data (78%).

Surveys on primary beneficiaries further demonstrated that beneficiaries feel motivated to spread their knowledge on violent extremism (82%) and claim that they have attempted to do so. However, further investigations conducted through KIIs and FGDs showed that the beneficiaries did not feel strong urge to materialize their motivation into concrete initiatives. KIIs conducted with several peace leaders indicate that they did not intend to develop initiatives capable of tackling the growing risk of violent extremism in Indonesia—indicated by the blasphemy accusations of Ahok and several raids organized against minority groups' activities.

Several interviews demonstrated that beneficiaries' attempts to promote peaceful narratives through various repertoire of actions remain limited. Some of the young people, in the lack of comprehensive understanding of the cases involving religious dimension, remained indifferent to growing intolerant activities in Indonesia. During KIIs, a high school student in Poso was

specifically asked about her opinions on blasphemy accusation (case filed by radical Islamic Clerics in the court) faced by Jakarta's first Chinese Descent Governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama aka Ahok. She said:

"I remain indifferent to that case [Ahok blasphemy accusation imposed by Islamic Clerics]. We only need to wait for the judges to decide whether Ahok actually commits blasphemy or not. I think it is unnecessary to spread the controversy"

Interestingly, the same beneficiary actually was capable to define the concept of peace and explain how multiculturalism should work in society's everyday life. Yet, she does not consider the case of Ahok as a threat toward multiculturalism, despite her knowledge that how Governor Basuki was targeted by the radical religious groups to dethrone him for the post of the Governor, just because he was outspoken, a Chinese Descent Christian leader and did not care what the fundamental groups believe, despite doing quite a good job as the Governor Of Jakarta. This is also important to understand in Indonesia politics that the position of Governor of Jakarta is the platform for many to run and win the presendiatial election. So, the fundemantal groups were worried that he (a non-Muslim individual) might run and win next presidential election.

During KIIs, a high school student shortly answered "Not even think about it" when he was asked whether he intended to spread his knowledge or not. A similar response was given by a university student in Bandung. During KIIs, he said that:

"I am now capable to identify my friends who could be potentially involved in radical activities. My awareness on radicalism is also improving. [...] [Yet] I did not feel to be motivated to spread the knowledge [acquired from the program]"

The program was successful in creating a significant number of students with knowledge on violent extremism. Yet, beneficiaries found difficulties in initiating activities.

This program was successful in creating a significant number of young students with sufficient knowledge on how to deal with violent narratives. Students' knowledge could be classified as sufficient insofar as they are capable to describe what violence is, make ethical judgements on the use of violence, identify various forms of violence, and know how to properly respond to violence. Firstly, students are able to identify several features of violence. Students associate violence with the presence of coercion (22%), the result of intergroup conflict (9%), the existence of fear and danger (7%), human rights violations (17%), and the harmful nature of violence (43%) (Table 4). Although they remain scattered, these descriptions successfully capture various dimensions of violence. Secondly, only 9% of student beneficiaries still argue that violence is justifiable under all circumstances. Thirdly, as discussed previously, most students are able to formulate proper responses against extremism. 17% of the beneficiaries intend to condemn the action, 20% of them aim to support the victims, while 40% of them want to report the perpetrator to authorities (Annex Table 3).

In Bandung and Palu, this program already targeted university students which were considered as influential in their cities. However, it remained difficult to

map the spread of knowledge generated by the program. In the absence of a reliable method in selecting peace leaders, teachers often chose peace leaders based on their knowledge of students. Hence, their influence was only limited of their peers and not to adults. A student in Bandung said that:

"Actually, the problems lie in our spher eof influence. To what extent we are capable to influence adults to understand it [violent extremism? Our influence was only limited to our peers and not the other adults.."

Another high school student in Solo argued that the problems lie at a deeper level, that is her limited knowledge on the subject:

"My challenge lies in my limited knowledge on this [violent extremism and method to counter it]. I was involved in the program only for three days. I think it is still necessary for me to learn more about this."

Consequently, youth-to-youth connections amongst youth beneficiaries or between youth beneficiaries and their surrounding was not fully developed. Despite their proximity, youth beneficiaries in targeted cities rarely met to discuss violent extremism issues, which did not result in initiatives to strengthen peace narratives. Even when beneficiaries met each other, they were interested more in discussing issues related to their daily life instead of violent extremism issues. All youth beneficiaries in Bandung and most students in Palu were not able to conduct meetings frequently to discuss issues related to violence and intolerance. They found several difficulties mainly in arranging meetings, finding resources, and, if any were created, sustaining their initiatives.

In order to resolve this problem, SFCG should equip beneficiaries with more practical knowledge on how to initiate movements, maintain networks, manage resources, as well as preserve the spirit of the movements. Furthermore, SFCG needs to improve its youth-mapping method. The youth mapping done at the beginning of the project relied on information provided by teachers to select youth beneficiaries—particularly in high school. This resulted in a relatively higher drop out rate of youth participants than SFCG would have expected. Had the youth mapping focused on understanding youth's personal interest in joining the groups rather than using teachers' intelligence and influence, there was a higher possibility that the beneficiaries would have been eager to be involved in forming youth-to-youth connections after the program.

Objective 2: To increase coordination of key stakeholders (CSO representatives, government officials, etc.) in supporting the reintegration of ex-offenders (former terrorists) into society.

The program is partially effective in increasing coordination of key stakeholders.

The program was able to increase cooperation among key stakeholders. These stakeholders previously did not possess a collective forum within which they could discuss and resolve issues related to ex-offenders. The Kelompok Kerja (Pokja/Working Group) functions to facilitate this meeting. SFCG's partners also consider these initiatives as beneficial. It offered SFCG's partners novel knowledge and approaches to dealing with former combatants. However, the Pokja could not

properly function according to its intention. In Jakarta, the Pokja actually provided stakeholders with a platform which enabled them to enhance their cooperation. However, the Pokja comprised various stakeholders which were geographically dispersed. It, for instance, included stakeholders from Tangerang. This condition resulted in Pokja's difficulties in maintaining their activities like regular meeting. Their coordination was limited only to Whatsapp groups. Moreover, limited funding and inflexible organizational structure hindered states' involvement in the Pokja, making the Pokja heavily dependent on SFCG's resources and initiatives. In contrast, in Poso, the Pokja facilitated the coordination of stakeholders which had already met occasionally. The Pokja hence could only provide limited improvement toward stakeholders' coordination in Poso. The Pokja in Poso and Solo also faced similar challenges with Pokja in Jakarta. Due to limited resources, the Pokja became heavily dependent to SFCG and found difficulties in sustaining their operation.

Quite naturally the stakeholders involved in Pokja were expecting sustained technical and financial support to run the groups, which was beyond the capacity of SFCG after the project ended. On the ohter hand, SFCG also expected that the groups would operate independently as they helped build their capacity in conflict resolution, developed a platform of multistakeholder groups and provided direction on how can they collaborate as a group in the future and support the reintegration of ex-offenders. Government officials in Solo said that it was very difficult for them to provide the cooperation without sufficient financial resources, a common attitude of government officials in the developing world and demonstrated a lack of ownership of the program. On the other hand, ex-offenders expected SFCG, local CSOs, and government not only to continue their assistance, but also to broaden the scope of the program to include their fellow ex-offenders who had not been involved in the existing program.

The program is effective in lowering ex-offenders' susceptibility to rejoin their former group.

The program was able to provide ex-offenders with necessary support, particularly by providing them with basic skills and tools which help them to obtain jobs and sustain their livelihood. SFCG's partners involved in Kelompok Kerja (working group or Pokja) also consider this program timely, innovative, and addressing crucial problems. BAPAS officials in Solo argued that ex-offenders remained susceptible to recidivism because they were unable to maintain their livelihood after their release. In this condition, their previous extremists group could support reengagement by offering ex-offenders resources to maintain their survival. SFCG provided former combatants with skills, knowledge, and network necessary for them to acquire a decent job. However, SFCG could not provide them with access to capital.

Ex-offenders also offered a similar perspective. They argued that they faced serious difficulties in maintaining their livelihood since they did not possess sufficient working skills, network, and financial capability. Through cooperation with SFCG they were gradually increasing their capability to develop their own business and access a more decent livelihood. In other words, SFCG's technique to

disengage former combatants from their groups could be considered as successful.

However, SFCG's program still possessed limitations. Firstly, existing support to ex-offenders was obviously limited. Without sufficient capital, it will remain difficult for ex-offenders to sustain and expand their businesses. Ex-offenders in Solo, for instance, still expected SFCG and its partners to provide "business trainings, assistance and evaluation" and "skills and [financial] stimulus". It is no tlegal for SFCG to provide direct financial assistance to the ex-offenders and also facilitating a mechansim for giving former combatants direct financial grants from other institutions or actors is also considered as counter productive both to community and former combatants' relations with their fellows, SFCG could facilitate a process amd mechansim that provides them with access to financial loans. Ensuring Ex-offenders with loan will give them financial security while avoiding risks associated with direct financial grant.

SFCG has been successful in economic as well as social reintegration. SFCG contributed through life skills training, helping to find descent job opportunities, and creating conducive environment through the working group. Data from the extended Table 60 shows that a large majority of people do not hold any specific grudge against the ex-offenders, while only 14% still feel uncomfortable in Solo, Jakarta, and Poso, while this was quite low in Solo (3%). In general, community members tended to keep their distance from ex-offenders =, remain indifferent, or even share empathy. Solo also became city with the highest number of respondents who have empathy toward the ex-offenders (29%) and, even, are willing to cooperate with them (13%).


Social Media Monitoring

This section aims to evaluate the social media strategy to change the perception of young people towards violent extremism. This was the area where the program conducted by SFCG to curb violent extremism could be taken as innovative and beneficiaries-friendly, particularly young primary and secondary participants.

The combined campaign using Hipwee³ articles discussing violent extremism and curated Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook posts correctly targeted the young users of social media, albeit not in the mainstream for general public and non-beneficiaries alike. Most of the youth beneficiaries used social media on a daily basis and they shared SFCG's posts and events related to the program. The most well-known social media campaign for the beneficiaries was the #ciptadamai campaign.⁴

³ Hipwee is an Indonesian internet media company based in Jakarta. The firm was launched in 2014 and covers various topics such as "motivation, productivity, pop culture, relationship, travel journey, and social commentary" to provide "entertaining quality content that can also enrich Indonesian youths' lifestyle".

⁴ #CiptaDamai campaign is a multiplatform campaign by SFCG as a part of CVE program. The campaign aims to show that conflict can be addressed without violence. #CiptaDamai is also the hashtag that is used when beneficiaries or SFCG share their moment during SFCG events in social media.



Graphic 6. Respondents' knowledge about some peace campaigns. As a note, #Kamitidaktakut campaign was a response for Sarinah bombing and was not started by SFCG.




Picture 1. Sample of SFCG-sponsored article on Hipwee.


Observing the #ciptadamai hashtag on Twitter and Instagram suggested that most of the posts were done by SFCG. SFCG had been posting posts with peaceful narratives as the caption from the beginning of the program until late 2016. Even so, some beneficiaries suggested that those posts were not massive enough and cannot compete against hate speeches commonly found in social media. Some of them also mentioned that follow ups from the initial #ciptadamai campaign were

minimum. During one FGD session in Jakarta, when asked about the hashtag campaign, a student mentioned that:

"[The hashtag campaign] could change people psychologically, from being afraid to being not afraid. But technically, it is still cannot [change terrorist]. There has to be follow up action to fight the terrorist."



Picture 2. Samples of #ciptadamai posts on Instagram.



 ${\it Picture~3.~Samples~of~\#cipta damai~campaign~on~Twitter.}$

Reproduction of the movement's messages were limited to live-reporting during events held by SFCG, sharing what has been posted by SFCG, and sounding repetitive peaceful narratives such as bridging differences and highlighting the importance of tolerance between human beings. Thus, the usual high traffic for the #ciptadamai posts were achieved during multimedia trainings, multimedia competitions, and/or other events held related to #ciptadamai program such as film screenings and discussions.



Picture 4. Post with #ciptadamai with most likes.

Responses to the posts are minimum to likes. Most comments to the beneficiaries are only asking to be followed back or simplistic supportive comment like "Keren" (Cool) and "Mantap" (Awesome). Most liked Instagram posts with #ciptadamai hashtag are coming from indovidgram's account to promote SFCG's festival. Most liked Instagram posts with #ciptadamai hashtag from SFCG's beneficiary is coming from this following account:




Picture 5. Post from beneficiary using #ciptadamai with most likes.

"As a part of youth community in Poso, we keep innovating to protect the peaceful state of Poso. We, the younger generation, do not talk much or scream in the street to protest, demanding things from the government. Instead, we act as a part of the government who is responsible to develop our region. One of the way to do it is to safeguard the peace in Poso with positive and inspiring activities, like what we currently do (discussing Cipta Damai activities) #ciptadamai #searchforcommonground #poso #pemuda."

Social media profiling and surveying suggested that most of the beneficiaries tend to post what interests them in the first place, which predominantly does not include violent extremism as a ongoing controversial issue in Indonesia. From 2014 to 2017, beneficiaries' posts were mostly about social activism that they had

already joined, religion-related information, political news, and other current issues. Again, most of them posted content related to violent extremism during SFCG events. From 16 accounts that we profiled, 10 accounts posted content related to violent extremism during SFCG events. Responses to the post were mostly supportive in the form of likes and simple comments like "Keren" or "Cool" and "Terbaik" or "The best". When asked about why did they not like, post, or share the SFCG social media campaign in their social media account, from 75% of respondents who never like, post, or share SFCG's campaign, 12.2% of respondents from all cities answered "Not interested" (see table 55b).



Graphic 7. Theme of Contents that are mostly posted, liked, or shared in respondent's social media accounts in all city.

As shown in the samples of Facebook posts by beneficiaries (see below) and statistics from the survey, various topics can be expressed and communicated in different ways. As also reflected in the statistical sample of social media profiling (see below), beneficiaries tend to treat their social media account as a form of a journal, thus mainly daily happenings, religious expression, and social commentaries on various issues were posted on their account. Only one of the 16 beneficiaries' accounts posts solely to promote peaceful narratives about violent extremism or religious related issues - as this account was created by a group of beneficiaries in Poso after SFCG's training. This account currently has 5 posts, with the latest post uploaded on April, 16 2016.

Transformation of beneficiaries' posts from before joining the SFCG project and after the SFCG project can be described as varied. For NGO beneficiaries based in Bandung, Semarang, and Banyumas, there is no change in their social media narrative as they consistently post about their activism, activities, and events which did not include peaceful narratives regarding violent extremism specifically. For individual beneficiaries, the awareness of social media as a tool to

discuss various issues is omnipresent as they transformed from communicating only their personal life in a simplistic way to communicating their interests in organizational activities, agrarian conflict, and political issues with a more substantial narrative. Most of them were posting about their SFCG activities, and some even reflected on it in a long paragraph Facebook status and uploaded it during the program. One beneficiary from Poso regularly posted and shared violent extremism content before and after SFCG program.

The result of the profiling is partly a function of how exploratory beneficiaries' posts and experiences are, and also a reflection that they value different things over time. But, it should be noted that most of the beneficiaries are also joining other initiatives and youth organizations which can also be very influential to them. Nevertheless, one can say the program has helped in enhancing such transformations.



Figure 1. Social Media Profile of @dwiputeraofficial



Figure 2. Social Media Profile of @andri_ruslam



Figure 3. Social Media Profile of Komune Rakapare



Picture 6. Sample of Beneficiary's posts over time




Picture 7. Sample of Beneficiary's posts over time



Picture 8. Sample of Beneficiary's posts over time

By circulating the discourse of CVE, like through promotion of the peace festival and peace competition, among social media users, the issue was noticed by new audiences. The increasing visibility of the issue in the public sphere was due to the combined efforts by SFCG's social media strategy, multimedia training, and peace leaders training. It was undeniable that SFCG's posts help to create awareness about violent extremism to social media users using eye-catching images, catchy captions, and videos.

However, it does not mean that the posts alone can not provide substantial knowledge about violent extremism. These posts have enough resonance among the beneficiaries and their group of friends as shown by the large number of likes and views. It was too early to expect such resonance would dissepitate to larger group of youth who are more exposed to extremism or reside in areas and environments susceptible to conflicts. Responses for posts about CVE from SFCG are coming in the form of likes and views from their group of friends and did not spark any discussion in the comment section. Interaction in the most liked beneficiary's post about CVE asked for a follow up and interaction to #ciptadamai posts on Twitter.



Graphic 8. Respondents' opinion on whether violent extremism can be prevented by giving more space for social media contents about peace.

Even so, while 75% of survey respondents never liked, posted, or shared campaign content related to violent extremism on social media, 80% of survey respondent feel that violent extremism can be prevented by giving more space for social media content about peace. Their motivation is to create awareness about the importance of peace and nonviolent actions. One university student from Jakarta also remarked that increasing peaceful posts on social media might work to counter violent extremism:

"For me, the best [strategy] is to increase media propaganda. Now is the era of instagram and twitter. [Campaign on those platforms] must be increased so more people can understand, not only us [beneficiaries]"

Based on the survey, beneficiaries learned that being in peaceful situations is indeed beautiful from the campaign by SFCG. Beneficiaries also stressed the importance of fostering an attitude of tolerance, respect, and respect for others. As such, this does translate to 1 of 16 accounts that were profiled. Meanwhile, the #ciptadamai campaign had not gone viral while the beneficiaries' posts about CVE and SFCG program were mostly one-dimensional and did not spark discussion among their peers. Thus it remained unclear whether the social media strategy had created a shockwave big enough to make a change in perception towards violent extremism while there are interests in bringing more space to peaceful social media content.

Coordination and Coherence

This part evaluates the coordination between SFCG and its partners, which are schools and universities for Stream 1 as well as communities, CSOs, governmental bodies, and private sector for Stream 2, including how SFCG responded to challenges in coordination. The success of the SFCG program on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) heavily relies on the relation between the organization and its partners, which includes—but is not limited to—schools, universities, as well as CSOs and government institutions. SFCG employed at least two types of engagement with its target groups to ensure better coordination. First, through the establishment of working groups, which mainly consisted of representatives from the CSOs, community leaders, private sectors, and the government, such as in Jakarta, Poso, and Solo. These working groups were supposed to be a hub where the relevant stakeholders could communicate with the targeted communities and ex-offenders to design and implement reintegration activities. Second, through direct communication with teachers and professors who work at the targeted high schools or universities such as in Bandung, Jakarta, and Palu, SFCG would consult with the teachers or the professors to determine which students were invited to join SFCG trainings. Then it was these students who were expected to form a "student club for peace" to disseminate the knowledge they received from their peers.

Establishing working groups or direct communication with teachers/professors as a figure of authority indeed created a safer and more comfortable environment for the beneficiaries—be it ex-offenders or students—to be actively involved in the program. Students in Bandung, Jakarta, Palu, Poso, and Solo, for example, repeatedly asserted that they learned about the program from their teachers/professors. These students decided to join the program once they consulted with their teachers/professors on how the program would be beneficial for them. Students who received support from their teachers/professors tended to have more space to create follow-up activities to disseminate what they have learned from SFCG to their peers in school. For example, students in Palu initiated a film-making club at school where they would encourage the members to use films to celebrate International Peace Day. Several students in Solo and Jakarta also once organized trainings on conflict management with the help of their teachers/professors. In Poso, students who felt inspired by SFCG trainings decided to join peace-related organizations.

Meanwhile for the ex-offenders, the working groups have been helpful in providing them with a channel to access the stakeholders crucial to their integration back into the society. Ex-offenders in Jakarta, Poso, and Solo stated that they had to meet each stakeholder separately before the working groups existed. Each would usually come up with different or sometimes even conflicting responses when asked for assistance. The presence of

working groups allowed the ex-offenders to share the reintegration challenges that they have been facing with community leaders, government officials, and CSOs which are then required to jointly respond to the problem.

The project was managed by a Project Coordinator and Project Assistant at the SFCG Jakarta office and two field officers covering five cities in Indonesia. The field officers were in constant touch with the working groups, student and youth groups in the community, ensuring a deeper and genuine bond betwen field officers and the groups. However, in hindsight, it also created dependency, as the working groups and the student clubs tended to rely on the presence and direction from SFCG field officers in their activities as reported during the interviews. Further, having few field officers also meant that their time and energy were divided to oversee several program sites in Indonesia each with its own contexts and challenges. There was a differnece in monitoring patterns as communications with beneficiaries and monitoring were more frequent in Jakarta or Bandung while less frequent in Palu or Poso. SFCG field officers did try to overcome the above challenges by utilizing social media to build direct communications and to have post-activities monitoring on the beneficiaries. Some of the working groups, particularly those in Jakarta and Poso, admitted that a lack of communication and minimal commitment to allocate enough financial resources have hindered coordination between the working groups' members. Respondents said 'it is difficult for the working group to have routine meetings in Jakarta due to geographical distance and traffic jams'. Online communication via WhatsApp group might help but face-to-face meetings were considered (by members) more effective to address the need of ex-offenders, to monitor, and to evaluate their reintegration process such as demonstrated by the following testimony from a member of the reintegration working group in Jakarta:

"I think the working group in Jakarta has not worked optimally due to problems with geographical distance, complex bureaucracy, and limited budget. ...[so the program] is not specific enough and routine. If we are going to have a meeting, we have to set a specific output and outcome. We can use WhatsApp to discuss the technicalities: a place to meet, the time, and the agenda, but there has to be a follow-up. Most of our conversations in WhatsApp are small talks. With no one acting as the initiator, our group can easily be forgotten by its own members, unless we will be able to meet regularly."

In Poso, there were several occasions when the expected government officials did not come to the working group meetings, because of prior commitments, lack of material incentives for them to be actively involved, among others. The Indonesian Correctional Institution (Bapas, *Balai Pemasyarakatan*) was also less active in Poso, which was a source of disappointment among CSOs who were involved in the working group. A CSO respondent said:

"We feel that we are not supported by BNPT and Bapas as the main stakeholders in exoffenders' reintegration. We have to cover their expenses to come to our discussion. They should understand that we already tried our best to help their program, so they must be more active. I did make a complaint to Bapas for their ignorance. We can do the field work, the coordination and communication work is no problem for us, but we need them to make sure that our program can achieve its goal. The burden should not be borne solely by us...."

Lack of financial incentives was cited as the common cause of minimal involvement from government officials. When asked why these working groups have not been able to solve the communication and financial problems, they tended to turn on SFCG as the organization that initiated the working groups in the first place, which might not be as intended because SFCG only expected to play the role of a facilitator between stakeholders:

"I hope [SFCG] as an NGO that works with ex-offenders, that is based abroad with better links to resources can deal with the roots of the problem. All ex-offenders must have their own basic skills, which should be empowered. If the ex-offender has driving skills then SFCG should help him to get a driving job. If the ex-offender used to have small enterprise, then we should assist him to an entrepreneur. An NGO usually has many resources and links that can be used [to guarantee reintegration] besides introducing the ex-offenders to community. All I know SFCG only invites us to attend a movie screening and introduce us to the ex-offenders living in our community."

Another possibility to solve the problem of differing expectations and communication would be to involve all parties in the making of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the working groups, where each actor can negotiate their specific responsibility right from the start, as stated by one member of the reintegration working group in Poso:

"Although SFCG intends to involve the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Correctional Institution, and other actors in its program design, I think the coordination is not yet effective because the MoU is not legally binding. ...before making MoU with different stakeholders, I guess it is better for SFCG to involve us in the negotiation so that we know what the roles are for each stakeholder right from the beginning. We need to know this because we are the ones who do the fieldwork."

Besides coordination, it is also important to look at how the overall activities were coherent with SFCG's goals in the first place, which are: (1) students are less accepting of violence as a means of conflict resolution and see themselves as positive agents of change by stopping violence and spreading positive messages in their respective communities; (2) community members have increased understanding of extremism and its dangers through documentary videos and are more welcoming and capable of humanizing exoffenders in reintegrating back into the society; as well as (3) related government agencies can coordinate effectively in handling the reintegration of ex-offenders.

As for the coherence between CVE activities for students and the first objective, attention should be given to the way SFCG determined which students, schools, or universities to work with. It is stated in the baseline report that SFCG selected universities or schools which are located in areas vulnerable to violence, with known terrorist groups, where there is the presence of radical groups or in close proximity to communities where there have been reported terrorist activities. But there are several findings that deserve further attention on this point: first, the decision to have Bandung, Jakarta, Palu, Poso, and Solo as program sites have reflected the above criteria to a certain extent, but SFCG should be more careful in selecting its first beneficiaries so as to make sure that they represent the different religious, ethnic, and class backgrounds that serve as the main cleavage for the addressed conflict/violence in each city. Better selection of primary beneficiaries can be seen in Poso and Jakarta, where students who participated in SFCG trainings came from schools and universities that are struggling with religious-based prejudices and hatred to the extent that they could not only relate with the topics brought by SFCG but also were determined to apply what they had learned in their schools and universities, as stated by the following student from Poso:

"There were three candidates during school-wide election for the Student Council. Two pairs who were nominating themselves for Chair and Vice-Chair of Student Council came from different religious background—Muslim and Christian. But we can prove that Chritians nominee can still be chosen to lead us although most of us are Muslims."

However, in Bandung and Solo where the burning issue was also more about the religious-based intolerance between the Muslims and non-Muslims, SFCG still needed to make sure that its program in the city recruited an equal proportion of Muslims and non-Muslims to provide a similar chance of exposure for each group—bearing in mind that,

according to SFCG's officers for CVE, only 5% of the training participants in these cities are non-Muslims. Priority should also be given to beneficiaries who never enjoy exposure to differences to avoid "preaching to the same choir", as stated by the following student from Bandung when asked whether he has a different attitude in dealing with differences now that he has participated in SFCG trainings:

"Not really. I mean, I have been living with my grandfather who is a Buddhist. In my village, the majority are Christians."

A note from a participating student in Palu further highlights the importance of having a more thorough understanding of the nature of the conflict in each program site and selecting the sites accordingly. In Palu, the conflict was more between unemployed youngsters from different villages or agrarian conflict between farmers and large plantations than between religious groups. Though the students could not apply the project learning in directly addressing religious extremism issues, the project has been able to instill important conflict resolution skills among the target participants, which they have been applying in resolving those local conflicts. The student said:

"I can say that what I learnt from SFCG is the conflict management technique. It is very important for us to understand each conflicting actor's position. ...after SFCG, we learn that there are different approaches to conflict such as negotiation and mediation. SFCG should further look deeper into the nature of conflict itself. While helping youngsters to understand conflict is good it should also pay attention to the types of conflict happening in our community, such as agrarian conflicts in Central Sulawesi, andhelp resolve them."

Besides concern over diversity of the primary beneficiaries, the **second** factor that may influence the coherence of CVE Stream 1 has to do with the initial capacity that the primary beneficiaries had to be peace leaders. SFCG asked professors/teachers to recruit potential peace leaders in several occasions, such as in Bandung, Solo, Palu, and Poso. Professors or teachers identified the students based on their knowledge about the students and the general criteria given by SFCG. A sepecific set of selection criteria, other than age, gender, ethno-religious diversity and gender, and a thorough assessment could have further helped in identifying stronger peace leaders as admitted by one of SFCG's senior staff members in Jakarta:

"I think we need mapping for the youth program. We already thought about it on the methodological level, but we failed to find young people who can show strong leadership experience, are active online, and possess the motivation to spread peaceful values in their future life. If we were given a second chance, we would do a selection process that really highlights track records. Leadership record or any indicator that shows they will continue the program without us. That is the first crucial point. Second, we need to also focus on how to unify them in one strong, national movement."


On the ability to lead a bigger movement, many of our interviewees stated that fear is what stopped them from taking action or making a public campaign. Such responses were commonly said during interviews with several primary beneficiaries in Bandung, Jakarta, Palu, Poso, and Solo. This is not to mean that they have not learned a great deal from SFCG trainings. They admitted that they gained new knowledge on conflict management, but some of them felt doubt when they tried to use that knowledge in their daily lives.

As for the coherence between reintegration activities for ex-offenders and the second and third objectives, attention should be given to welfare as the most important factor in ex-offenders' reintegration according to almost all interviewed ex-offenders and members of the working group in Jakarta, Poso, and Solo. This is good information for SFCG (coming from the beneficiaries) for similar actions in the future. Since SFCG does not work directly in providing welfare, this demand should be understood as a concern

beyond SFCG's scope of this project. The project scope is to initiate a working group which can effectively link ex-offenders with a sustainable source of income—be it from the governmental project as in the case of Poso or from private sector as in the case of exoffenders in Jakarta and Solo. The link between employment for ex-offenders in the postrelease period to the success of their reintegration has been recognized in the baseline study for CVE Stream 2, and this data is consistent with the survey results in Jakarta, Poso, and Solo. When asked to choose what an ex-offender should do after finishing terms in prison, the top three priorities for the surveyed communities are showing that he/she was showing signs that he/she has changed and has become deradicalized (51.9%), is finding a job (50.4%), as well as is getting proper education and job training (43.5%).

Nevertheless when it comes to job security, the interviews with ex-offenders show that they not only need trainings but also access to capital provided through government grants, micro loans, etc. This is the point where the working groups have been struggling to one extent and another. All working groups have been providing business training for ex-offenders. Two ex-offenders in Solo initiated small businesses selling juices and milk. They hoped the working group can assist them in developing their ventures. Mixed results were present in Poso where several offenders have reintegrated back in the society working as farmers, while some others still found it hard to access government grants. The working group in Poso then took the initiative to write joint proposals for government grants on behalf of the ex-offenders. It is the working group who would be responsible for the monitoring of the proposed activities. Meanwhile the working group in Jakarta still could not come up with a solution. As stated in the above paragraph, they even had the tendency to put the responsibility on other's shoulders or turn to SFCG as the one that initiated the working group in the first place. Some ex-offenders in Jakarta wanted to work as taxi drivers but they could not fulfill the paperwork requirements. The working group should have and could have provided the solution due to their multistakeholder nature, but it remained a problem.

Given the above challenge in coherence for CVE Stream 2, it is important for SFCG to allocate more resources to monitor and empower the working groups. Not only to enable them to function on their own, but also to work effectively and efficiently in getting the community's involvement in ex-offenders reintegration. Such a close and intensive monitoring is all the more important given the fact that the survey shows rather paradoxical results, which can be seen as a chance for SFCG to get more involved. On the one hand, the community's perspective on ex-offenders remains negative:



Graphic 9. Community's perception towards terrorist.

Many of those respondents admitted that they will need a lot of time to think before taking ex-offenders as their employee (38.2%) while some declared that they will avoid recruiting them at all (19.8%) over fear that the ex-offenders might influence other coworkers. The respondents' attitude toward ex-offenders is more open when it comes to sharing the same neighborhood although the fear that they will bring negative influence is still present. On another hand, when asked to prioritize what conditions could change an ex-offender, most of these respondents chose support from communities and family members as the first priority (49.6%), followed by severe punishment (43.5%), peaceful religious understanding (38.2%), then better education/economic opportunity (26.6%).

Sustainability

This part evaluates SFCG's ability to create long-term processes or structures in reducing recruitment to violent extremist groups and reducing the risk of recidivism among terrorist ex-offenders by looking at the students' and working groups' capability and capacity to organize formal/informal initiatives independently to counter violent extremism among their community as well as to help ex-offenders' reintegration back to the society.

SFCG relied on both the student peace clubs and the working groups in reducing recruitment to violent extremist groups and the risk of recidivism. Most members of these clubs and groups seemed to understand the importance of disseminating peaceful and nonviolent values to their peers and the general public as well as the urgency to create a community-based reintegration plan for terrorist ex-offenders. However, there are problems when it comes to implementing a concrete action plan to achieve the aforementioned goal.

SFCG launched several peace campaigns to promote their values, such as the Second Chance web series, the #CiptaDamai campaign, Hipwee articles, and other content posted

on the organization's official social media sites and website. These campaigns were supposed to be one of the mechanisms through which peace leaders and their peers could contribute to the effort of increasing peaceful narratives in social media for the wider public. However, when some of the primary and secondary beneficiaries were asked whether they have ever heard about the campaigns, 58.8% (of 1170) of them said they knew about it. They were asked to prioritize the campaigns that are most relatable to them and #KamiTidakTakut campaign, which was launched in response to the Sarinah bombings, came first (38.4%), followed by #CiptaDamai campaign (36.1%), Second Chance web series (7.5%), SFCG's social media posts (5%), and Hipwee articles (4.2%). 40.5% of respondents in Jakarta, Palu, and Poso stated that these campaigns have motivated them, to some extent, to engage in public discussions about the dangers of violent extremism, while 51.3% and 55.8% respectively in Bandung and Solo agreed the campaigns have inspired the students and community members to discuss the danger of violent extremism. When asked to the remaining others why it was less inspiring to them (multiple answers), the respondents said that many people simply do not care (13.4%), the publicity for each campaign was limited (12.4%), small coverage (11.9%), no followups (8.8%), the material is less interesting (8.2%), reluctance in provoking controversy (8.2%), and limited internet access (6.7%).

When it comes to formal or informal offline activities by the students to counter violent extremism in the community, there were mixed results—some simply have not had the initiative, some already had the initiative, while the rest had the initiative but did not have the necessary resources or network to implement their plan.

Uncertainty over one's knowledge on peacebuilding and conflict transformation as well as the techniques in gathering group members were the two factors that prevented some of the student peace clubs from having clear and coordinated action plans. Several student peace clubs admitted that the knowledge they gained from SFCG programs is useful in dealing with inter-personal conflicts in their comunities and at school. They found it difficult to spread the knowledge to the wider public through seminars and public discussions. Nevertheless, such a difficulty came in various degrees—high school students tended to face more difficulties than university students. Students who thought they live in a relatively peaceful environment like Bandung tended to show lesser passion to do something than students living in cities like Poso, and students who enjoyed support from their teachers/professors tended to have more courage to organize something. Given this condition, it is very important for SFCG to transfer knowledge not only about conflict management, but also on how to initiate a collective effort for peace as implied in the following statement by a student from Solo:

"I think we know violence is wrong. But we do not have the bravery to tell them to reject violence, that there is a better way. I guess Common Ground should pay more attention to this in the next trainings. The knowledge I learned is more than my bravery to promote it. So I need to be told to be "brave, brave, and brave in saying no to violence!"

These clubs also find it hard to organize routine meetings because many of their members are now busy with their own daily activities as freshmen, workers, etc. such in the case that we found in Bandung:

"I was once intending to make a film and blog workshop, I also wanted to invite one of the SFCG staff. But because we did not have the time and the place to do so, we decided to postpone it. We discussed on the plan and tried to tell other friends about what we have got from SFCG. I also tried to arrange a meeting with Raka Pare, but they were all busy."

They moreover admit that they have been waiting for SFCG to actually take the initiative to organize follow-up activities, for which they will gladly offer their assistance. Despite the expectation of the student peace clubs to receive more support form SFCG, they also have a willinness to be contunually engaged in the activities. They also furnished suggestions on how SFCG could reach larger number of people directly to disseminate messages on addressing violent extremism. Explaining their expectation from SFCG, one youth said:

"If possible, Common Ground should not only involve people with already "good" track records but also more people coming from various backgrounds [who were never exposed to such an initiative in the first place]. The message should be delivered to the general public because I have not seen that done directly by Common Ground. So I want Common Ground to directly tell us what is extremism, what should be done to solve the problem, what should we do as a society. That's it."

On the other end of the spectrum, the clubs who already had the initiatives usually cannot implement their plan or sustain their work because of a lack in resources or a mismatch between what they are required to do by SFCG and what is actually needed by beneficiaries. Some student peace clubs do not have enough seed money or the network needed to implement their plan. Those aspiring to produce movies on tolerance, for example, often do not know the local film community from which they can continue their learning process in film-making or with which they can cooperate on any future initiative.

The impact of the reintegration working groups is yet to be seen since it takes a long time to measure the success of a reintegration program. All working groups in Jakarta, Poso, and Solo said that coordination challenges, lack of financial resources, and limited commitment from government agencies have been slowing down the working groups from carrying its task optimally. Each working group then adopted their own coping mechanism to deal with this problem— in Jakarta tend to put the blame in other's shoulder while hoping SFCG would take the lead, ex-offenders in Solo tend to turn to their own friend circles to guarantee smooth reintegration, while the working group in Poso tried to keep looking for external assistance despite minimal cooperation from the government. All three suggested more intensive empowerment and more focus on "linking" the group to external actors as a solution to solve sustainability challenges in each working group. By linking, it does not only mean introducing the working group to meet relevant stakeholders but also teaching them to be able to do so. For example, how to write a proposal to government agencies or NGOs, how to arrange a transparent and accountable budget at the village level to make sure that there is an allocation for reintegration activities, etc.

4. Conclusions

To begin, the program has played major roles in initiating and putting forward the primacy of CVE in Indonesia. It significantly accentuated a slightly different way of understanding and dealing with violence and, hence, enriching the existing knowledge of, and activism related to, the subject. The program's focus on youth is also a pioneering endeavor and important. It is timely as youth have always been implicitly part of many similar programs in the past, but rarely have been located at the center of the curbing violent extremism edifice.

The initiative on preventing recidivism is equally noteworthy. While improving the exoffenders' skills, knowledge and motivations to access job markets enhances similar endeavors by other agencies on disengaging this group from violent extremism, the idea

of involving wider stakeholders and related communities in dealing with the issue is strategic. However, there were also some challenges that SFCG faced while implementing activites. Lack of coordination between different relevant government agencies in managing ex-offenders was a challenge that was beyond the control of SFCG. Lack of stronger williningness among government officials to collaborate with non-government actors, and less community involvement thus far in the process of ex-offenders' reintegration were some factors that slowed down the process more than SFCG would have expected.

Having said that, the rest of this section will raise a number of critical notes. These notes are not meant to say that SFCG's program on CVE failed to achieve its goals, nor was it irrelevant or ineffective. On the contrary these critical notes are to identify areas for improvement for the continuation of this program in the near future.

First, this program is largely based on a micro-level approach in understanding violent extremism. It is logical that countering and preventing violent extremism calls for the primacy of social, economic, cultural and psychological intervention at the individual level. Early identification of worldviews, knowledge, socio-cultural habits and perception prone to violent extremism adopted by individuals is highly crucial. Such identification supplies the program with useful information to develop its mode of intervention.

The problem is that the process of becoming a violent extremist is very context-bound as individuals are always located within larger social structures, and this context sometimes involves not only psychological problems found in day-to-day interpersonal interaction but also structural problems such as poverty, unemployment, minimum access to education, etc. Without having to abandon capacity to take independent action at the level of self—that is, agency—individuals are equally shaped by identity, interests and (social) roles assigned by structures such as (social) class, cultural bond (ethnicity and religion), geography and language. Some beneficiaries, for example, clearly said that they embraced violent extremist values in the first place because they were trapped in a situation of conflict where taking armed resistance was a better choice than doing nothing. Such context is missing in the case of other beneficiaries and it is precisely these different structural scenarios that should be acknowledged by the program.

Investigating specific structural locations such as social class and geo-cultural space provides a more complete insight on causes of, and reasons for, violence conducted by individuals. Countering violent extremism in this regard should be more than a microlevel type of intervention. It begs for structural transformation, involving concerted actions by a range of movements, organizations, groups and individuals. To do justice to the program, however, structural transformation is a complex and time consuming process. Hardly a three year-long project could bring significant changes at such a level. More critically, the importance of structural factors does not necessarily imply the absence of intervention at the individual level. The question is then how structural factors are taken into account without losing emphasis on a micro-level approach and, hence, a combination of individual-based intervention within larger structural dynamics.

SFCG defines violence extremism as 'the choice individuals make to use of or support violence to advance a cause based on exclusionary group identities. The particular identity of the perpetrator of violence does not determine what constitutes violent extremism, nor does the nature of the ideology, even if that ideology may be considered radical by many. Rather, violent extremism relates to an individual or group's violent advancement of an exclusionary ideology, which seeks to eliminate the 'other' group,

culture, or identity'. The evaluation took notice that SFCG took an approach to reach out to individuals, especially among youth, who are highly vulnerable to manipulation to violence and violent extremism. Considering the limited scope of the project, it did not try to deal with the historial, larger, and lingering social dynamics through this proejct, despite realizing the role such factors paly in shaping the violent behavior of any society.

The lack of structural analysis is also evidenced in the way the program beneficiaries refer themselves to violence. Very few involved in this program paid significant attention to the major existing violence in the society at large and in their social surroundings. It was surprising that the majority of youth beneficiaries in Poso, for example, failed to touch upon brutal communal conflict in this area beginning in the late 1990s. Rather, most students attached to this program mentioned a violent conflict between two students from different school's departments. A similar trend was also found in other cities. Beneficiaries mostly referred to small-scale violence on a daily basis.

This is not an intention to say that small-scale violence is less important. Nevertheless, the urgency and significance of the program under evaluation is the growing large-scale violence across the country such as the one in Poso. Identifying the small and daily-based violence and associated with the social environment within the reach of beneficiaries is undoubtedly important. For it is argued that this level of violence provides a sort of cultural repertoire consisting of sets of attitude, behavior and perception for the large-scale violence. Yet, these two levels of violence should be better juxtaposed, so that the beneficiaries could learn how one relates to and transforms the other; as well as the significance of learning the skills and knowledge on dealing with violence at the micro level could notably contribute to a less-violent condition in the society at large.

The aforementioned analysis seemed to have been implied in the way the program was prepared and initiated. Since violence was largely perceived in normative terms and based on individual chioce, anyone could be involved in violence, so as any parts of social system and everyday life. Samples for this program were then selected based on non-specific criteria such as those who are "structurally" most exposed to violence. Above all sufficient information on the beneficiaries' socio-cultural background, their very location within a larger structural context is absent. In addition, the selection process of program beneficiaries seemed to pay less attention to the relations between the selected groups and individuals and the major large-scale violence in the given areas.

Second, it is necessary to address violent extremism as a problem that requires collective action for its solution. Knowledge transfer on peaceful coexistence and tolerance should be taking place not only between SFCG trainers and the beneficiaries, but also, and foremostly, between CVE beneficiaries and the wider public. Therefore attention should be also given to increasing the capacity of CVE beneficiaries in designing dissemination activities. That said SFCG also needs to incorporate training materials on community organizing, public campaigns, network building, nonviolence (which were not within the scope of this project), and others that might equip the beneficiaries to plan a collective initiative against violent extremism.

Third, it is important to have a solid assessment on the various mediums through which violent extremism is disseminated. Each medium usually has its own unique characters that might imply different patterns of interaction. Social media, for example, often becomes the sites where hate speech and violent incitation take place. Some people would keep it from being manifested in real life, while some can be radicals both in social media and in real life. Knowing how beneficiaries use social media is important before

the training activities begin—whether they are exposed to violent narratives because they agree to the idea, or because they cannot logically process and differentiate which contents are hoax, or because they are simply ignorant. For the participating youth coming from a traditional culture, the trainings are interesting new knowledge that might help them to decide how they interact with social media in the future.

Finally, there are two notes on how the activities were organized. *First,* it seems that the transfer of ideas and substance is partially successful as many beneficiaries could not demonstrate sufficient knowledge and skills to initiate an action or communicate messages to minimize violent extremst ideas. These beneficiaries developed instead their own goals and targets, which do not necessarily overlap with the program ideas and objectives. However, it possibly leads them to a journey where they can use those technical knowledge and skills to respond to violent extremism. *Second,* the program relied on few field project officers to support the beneficiaries groups scattered over five cities. They were responsible for organzing a lot of activities: transferring the program substance to the beneficiaries, managing every activity, and acting as a sort of main hub for the network of beneficiaries—without which the groups would not have worked effectively or those involved in this program could not be mobilized.

5. Recommendations

Based on the findings and with the spirit of improving the performance of such important programs in the future, this evaluation suggests the following recommendations.

- 1. It is important to take into account the structural factors in arranging and developing this program in the future. It is suggested by this report that sociohistorical context of violent extremism, socio-cultural backgrounds of beneficiaries, and current violence related issues should be better reflected in every stage of program, its activities and materials.
- 2. The program on CVE is meant to increase public awareness and promote peace initiatives to a wider community. SFCG could take into account the importance of skills and knowledge on collective action as part of the program's material; and incorporate such concerns into the criteria of selecting beneficiaries.
- 3. There is a variety of ways to spread CVE discourses. While using social media is probably the most attractive and up-to-date method, SFCG should also consider other instruments of discourse dissemination. It is better to select the instrument that fits not only one type of beneficiaries; and takes into account its accessibility and familiarity. Every instrument develops its own nature of communicating messages, involving audiences, producing issues and affecting lives outside the media. The program and its activities should better be arranged in accordance with the selected media specificity.
- 4. For such a program, as important and huge as the one conducted by SFCG, organization and coordination is highly crucial in running activities, mobilizing participants and nurturing networks. This evaluation suggests SFCG to improve the presence of human capital in the program in terms of number and capacity relevant to the level of the task.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference Final Evaluation of the Project Reducing the Risk of Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia

Search for Common Ground seeks an experienced team of evaluators or firm to carry out the final evaluation of a multi-year initiative, "Reducing the Risk of Recruitment and recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia". The project, which is funded by the US Department of State, aims to reduce the risk of violent extremism amongst at-risk youth and recidivism among ex-terrorist-prisoners.

It is being implemented in five provinces, including Banten, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java and Central Sulawesi. The evaluation of this project provides a unique opportunity to identify how early engagement with at-risk youth –those who might be swayed by extremist ideologies – can contribute to preventing engagement in violent extremism and terrorism.

This Terms of Reference (TOR) defines the scope of work; it provides a brief outline of the project, specifies the scope of the evaluation, and outlines the evaluation method.

1. Background of the Organization

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is an international conflict transformation NGO with a mission to transform the way the world deals with conflict away from adversarial approaches towards collaborative solutions. SFCG has been working in Indonesia since 2002 engaging with a range of stakeholders to promote peace and democracy.

SFCG-Indonesia works primarily with teachers, students, youth, governmental bodies, religious leaders and groups, and general community in Indonesia to promote peace and tolerance to end violent conflict in Indonesia.

2. Background of the project

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Indonesia is currently implementing a multi-year project

entitled 'Reducing the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia.' The project, which is part of a larger CVE strategy engaging multiple stakeholders, aims to address an ongoing challenge, the recruitment of vulnerable young people into violent extremist organizations and the high risk of recidivism for released prisoners (particularly those convicted on terrorism charges) after their release on parole.

Building on its extensive experience working with at-risk Indonesian youth and the Indonesian corrections system, SFCG has been addressing these challenges by initiating student initiatives to prevent recruitment of at-risk youth using creative media and by empowering Indonesian government services in supporting successful reintegration. The project also coached parole officers to engage communities in the reintegration of violent extremists post-release.

Although the challenge of preventing terrorism in Indonesia is complex and multifaceted, this initiative seeks to touch on two specific leverage points, both of which have been deemed critical to long-term stability in the country.

2.1. Project objectives

The **overall objective of the project is** to reduce the risk of violent extremism amongst at-risk youth and offenders in Indonesia.

The specific objectives:

- 1) To reduce the level of recruitment of high-risk youth in targeted universities and schools
- **2)** To build awareness of the dangers of recruitment and recidivism among vulnerable communities in Indonesia;

Key partners of the project include:

Primary partners: university students, public and private high-school students, community, civil society organizations, and ex- offender in the targeted areas (West Java, Jakarta, Central Java, Banten, and Central Sulawesi).

Secondary partners (Government counterparts):

The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Religious Affairs.

We expect to accomplish the following results:

Youth in targeted area becomes less susceptible to extremist narratives and more vocal in promoting peaceful, non-violent narrative; Students in the targeted universities have increased their understanding on the dangers of extremism activities and the challenges in preventing them; Students in the targeted universities offer positive message on peacebuilding activities; Ex-terrorist prisoners have own career and could develop it in their community and their career will be accepted by the community surrounding them; Communities living in targeted areas (vulnerable areas) have increased their understanding of extremism and its dangers through Stream 2 video; and Communities living in targeted areas are more welcome and humanize ex-offender facing post release.

3. The Evaluation

3.1 Organizational Goal

SFCG as an organization is committed to conducting program evaluations in order to assess the effectiveness of our programs and engage in continuous improvement and learning within programs and across the organization. The overall goal of this evaluation is to generate evidence on the effectiveness of a preventive approach which combines social media and youth-led initiatives in countering violent extremism.

The SFCG approach to evaluations is grounded in the guiding principles of our work: participatory; culturally sensitive; affirming and positive while honest and productively critical and valuing knowledge and approaches from within the context. SFCG- Indonesia will apply this approach to the evaluation of this project, which will be carried out in consultation and in participation with key relevant stakeholders, appropriate community groups or key civil society individuals.

3.2 Evaluation Criteria and Key Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will specifically focus on the three following core dimensions of the project and their key questions:

Relevance

- How relevant was the project in addressing the issues around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives and youth participation in peacebuilding?
- How relevant was the project to address the recidivism problem among exoffenders of extremist groups?
- Did the project target the right group of participants with right set of strategies and activities?

Effectiveness

- What are the major outputs and outcomes of this project? How is the progress in comparison to the relevant baseline data?
- What unexpected positive or negative results did the project lead to?

Youth

- Does giving support to youth groups in higher education increase youth's understanding on violent extremism activities and decrease their susceptibility to these extremist narratives?
- Does a student-led peacebuilding initiative increase school and campus' resilience against the recruitment to violent extremist groups among young people in higher education?
- Does a youth to youth approach reduce the risk of recruitment to violent extremist groups among young people? How effective is peer to peer strategy in strengthening the narratives to countering violent extremism among youth groups?

Social Media

- How widely accessed was the social media strategy? Did it correctly target the young users of social media?
- Did they gain new knowledge and developed new attitudes as a result of the social media strategy?
- Does being exposed regularly to peaceful, non-violent narrative actually change perception of young people towards violent extremism?
- Does the change of perception of young people towards violent extremism lead them to be peace propagandist and thus spark discussion among their circle about the danger of recruitment to violent extremist groups?
- What changes occur in the society as a result of the social media strategy? Did it develop new behaviors in addressing extremist narratives? Did it create safe environment or bring down barrier for individuals to spread peaceful messages in oppose to violent narratives?

Prisoner Release and Reintegration

- How does support from community members towards ex terrorist prisoners lead to a lower susceptibility among them to rejoin their former violent extremist groups?
- Are there any noteworthy examples demonstrating increased cooperation between governments, CSOs, and private sector which could be attributed (fully or partially) to the project initiatives?
- How does a systemic collaboration between the government, CSOs, and private sector in helping reintegration of ex-offenders reduce the potentiality of recidivism among former terrorist ex-offenders?

Coherence and Coordination

- How was the coordination between SFCG and its partners (schools, universities, communities, CSOs, governmental bodies, private sectors) in implementing the project?
- What were the challenges, if any, and how did SFCG and partners overcome them?
- How coherent were the activities implemented in achieving the goal/objectives set for the project?

Sustainability

- What steps were planned or have been taken by the project team (SFCG and partners) to create long term processes or structures in reducing recruitment to violent extremist groups and reducing the risk of recidivism among terrorist exoffenders?
- Have the students been able to independently organize formal or informal initiatives to counter violent extremism among their community? How much have the students' capacities to independently organize the initiative increase? What were the challenges?

In regards to change in project context and dynamics, Search will revisit the lines of inquiry and evaluation scope with the consultant.

3.3 Audience

The primary audience of this evaluation includes:

- The staff of SFCG Indonesia and partner organizations to draw out reflections and lessons learned from the project and to use the recommendations for future project design.
- DOS/CT, the funding agency, for assessing the effective and efficient use of the funds to achieve the stated goals and results of the project.

3.4 Evaluation Methodology

The SFCG approach to evaluation is grounded in the guiding principles of our work: participatory; culturally sensitive; committed to building capacity; affirming and positive while honest and productively critical and valuing knowledge and approaches from within the context. The evaluator will visit the five targeted cities in the project for the purpose of evaluation. S/he will meet with the project participants, partners, SFCG staff and relevant stakeholders. The evaluator will develop the methodology and tools of the evaluation in consultation with SFCG management and DM&E staff. The evaluator will compare the findings form the final evaluation process with the data generated in the baseline. The evaluation methodology and data collection tools are required to be

included in an inception report to be submitted within a week of signing the contract. S/he will use quantitative and qualitative methods of evaluation, which include:

- **Desk study review**: It is important to review academic literature on the topic of violent extremism and prisoner reintegration in Indonesia in order to clearly understand the dynamics. It is also mandatory to review project proposal, logical framework, quarterly reports, baseline survey data and report, training manuals, and other monitoring data and secondary sources of data to complete the evaluation. The evaluation will take special reference form the baseline and will use the baseline data as a comparison to the endline.
- **Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)**: Interviews will be conducted to assess and gather in-depth information of the results of the two specific objectives. It will be carried out with at least 50 key informants in the five target areas, including government counterparts, students, civil society organizations, and ex- offenders in the targeted areas. Additional Interviews will also be conducted with SFCG staff and partner organizations. An abridged version of Most Significant Change (MSC) Approach will be conducted with the select students to assess the changing perception and attitude, as well as their role in promoting peaceful narratives around their peer and develop stories of change happening among the youth and their communities. This will form sub-set of the KIIs we will be doing. These first hand stories of change will give human face to the project's results and provide information about the personal development of the students and their abilities to play the role as 'multiplier youth' in countering violent extremism within their communities.
- **Focus Group Discussion**: Several FGDs (one with the youth involved in the program and one with the secondary target youths) will be conducted with the students and avid young social media user (Stream 1) and civil society organization (Stream 2) in each of the chosen five target areas. The participants of the FGDs will be selected to ensure all voices are heard and all aspects of the evaluation questions are covered.
- **Social Media Monitoring**: A thorough social media tracking among the direct beneficiaries and secondary audience will be conducted to gain data on the narratives and discussions which have circled around their social media accounts. If it is possible, a comparison between the narratives discussed before the project and after the project will be conducted to see if there is any shift or change around the narratives, and how far the social media activity among the beneficiaries influenced their circles to discuss about violent extremism.
- Participant Survey: A survey among direct beneficiaries and their wider social
 media audience will be conducted to gain data on the reach, resonance, and
 response of the social media strategy.

4. Scope of Work

4.1 Location

This evaluation will take place in five chosen locations where program activities are implemented: Banten, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, and Central Sulawesi.

4.2 Deliverables:

The following specific deliverables are expected form the consultant:

- Based on the timeline, the consultant shall submit the Inception Report, which
 clearly defines the evaluation methodology, such as clear outlines of FGDs and KII
 checklist, survey questionnaires, social media tracking method and an evaluation
 timeline with specific deadlines for each deliverable. The inception report should
 also clearly explain the sampling methodology and sample size for the quantitative
 survey and clear and logical explanation of the number of FGDs and KIIs planned
 in each location. The inception report will be reviewed and approved by the SFCG
 Team. The evaluator cannot start the data collection process without the SFCG
 team's approval on the inception report, including the sample size calculation and
 distribution across different locations.
- Data collection in the field, including but not limited to conducting FGDs, public perception survey, MSC and KIIs with selected Peace Leaders. Draft evaluation report to be submitted within 10 days of completion of the data for the review and comments from SFCG Indonesia Team and Institutional Learning Team from the headquarters. The review and feedback of the report could be more than one rounds depending on the quality of the report submitted by the consultant and the extent to which the comments and suggestions from the first round of review have been incorporated.
- The final evaluation report after incorporating the comments from SFCG. The report should be written strictly in English language and should be approximately 30-40 pages (excluding annexes) in length and consists of:
 - a. Cover Page. SFCG will provide sample cover sheet for reference.
 - b. Table of contents, list of acronyms/abbreviations and list of tables and charts
 - c. Executive summary of key findings and recommendations no more than 3 pages.
 - d. Introduction: Context analysis, project description, evaluation methodology with clear explanation of sampling, survey methodology, FGDs/KIIs participant selection and data analysis approach.
 - e. Evaluation findings, analysis, and conclusions with associated data presented per evaluation objective and per evaluation criteria, via a reasonable balance of narrative vs. graphs and charts (mandatory). The findings can include subsections for each evaluation criteria.
 - f. Recommendations for future activities/intervention. The recommendations should be forward looking and should focus on program design, planning vs implementation, implementation methodology and approach, project monitoring and evaluation system, among others. The recommendations should also be frame according to the evaluation criteria.
 - g. Appendices, which include collected data, detailed description of the methodology with research instruments, list of interviewees, bibliography, and evaluator(s) brief biography.
- The consultant is required to check at least first 15 completed questionnaires of every interviewer to ensure the quality and accuracy of data, compile and responsible for data entry process in SPSS, and recheck a minimum of 15% of entered data through double entry system.
- Once SFCG sees that all feedback has been incorporated by the consultant, the final report will be approved by SFCG through an official e-mail to consultant from SFCG DM&E Officer with the knowledge of SFCG Director of Program and HR Manager.

Other means of communication that might imply that the work has been completed will not be regarded.

- Once the first draft is submitted and reviewed, SFCG may decide based on the quality of the draft whether the consultant may be required to revise the draft at the SFCG Indonesia office working closely with SFCG DM&E Officer during the scheduled back and forth review.
- The report should be submitted electronically in a MS-Word document. The consultant is responsible for English editing of the final report and should be well formatted. The
 - report will be credited to the evaluator and potentially placed in the public domain at the decision of SFCG. A verbal presentation of the findings of the evaluation in a meeting organized by SFCG for its staff and its partners. The representative of the donor may be present in this meeting.
- All handwritten and electronic transcripts of interviews and FGDs, hard copies of
 the survey questionnaires, any logistics taken from SFCG for the baseline purpose
 and photographs taken during the baseline should be submitted to SFCG. Further
 to this, all information generated during the baseline will be the sole property of
 SFCG and is subject to submission to SFCG along with the final report or the
 termination of contract.

4.3 Duration & Deadlines

The duration of contract will be no more than a total of 5 months between May 5 2016 and September 30th 2016. The proposal package should be submitted to Pramita Handayani via email: phandayani@sfcg.org and cc: usandyarani@sfcg.org no later than April 25 2016.

Deadline of application	April 25th 2016
Decision of the selected evaluator	May 3rd 2016
Signing of contract	May 5th 2016
Inception Report writing	May 6th - May 13th 2016
The evaluation plan/inception report submission	May 14th 2016
Comments on the inception report incorporated and finalized	May 25st 2016
Ongoing and regular (field data collection and document review	June 1st - August 31st 2016
First draft of the report	September 14th 2016
Back and forth review between SFCG & consultant	September 14th - September 28th 2016
Final Evaluation Report	September 30th 2016

4.4 Evaluation Team

The evaluation team will include the evaluators, SFCG Indonesia DM&E Coordinator, and SFCG Asia DM&E Specialist. The evaluator will be under the direct supervision of the DM&E

Coordinator an overall guidance of the SFCG Country Director. SFCG's DM&E Coordinator will be responsible for facilitating the needs of the consultant for the purpose of the evaluation.

4.5 Logistical Support

SFCG will provide preparatory and logistical assistance to the evaluator, including:

- Background materials (project proposal, periodic reports, existing evaluations, etc.)
- Meetings, phone/e-mail communication with program administrators
- Identify interviewees and provide contact information
- All logistical support for the field visit, including travel cost (local as well as air travel)
- Arrange meetings and appointments with stakeholders and beneficiaries in the field (if necessary).

5. Evaluator's Role and Competencies

5.1 Evaluator's Role

The evaluation will be carried out by a team of evaluators or firm, who will report to and work under the guidance of SFCG's DM&E Coordinator, who is also the evaluation manager for this

project. The external evaluator will:

- Form, budget, and manage the team e.g. social media expert, research assistant, and enumerators if possible
- Identify and define evaluation priority areas, methodology and indicators;
- Design and implement data collection;
- Analyze data and findings and prepare a report;
- Write and submit a final report;
- Make a brief presentation of findings and recommendations to SFCG Indonesia and partners, including donors.

5.2 Evaluator competencies

- 1. At least 7 years of experience in research on counter-violent extremism, especially on the root and causes of terrorism.
- 2. Sound knowledge on conflict and peacebuilding, prison-reform, inter and interfaith issues and dynamics in the Indonesian context;
- 3. Sound understanding of youth and social movements
- 4. Cultural competency and strong ethics particularly around interviewing children and evaluative process related to youth.
- 5. Gender-sensitivity in incorporating gender perspectives when analyzing problems.
- 6. Sound knowledge on program development;
- 7. Candidates with degree in security, terrorism, or conflict and peacebuilding studies will be given a priority.
- 8. Excellent command over written English;
- 9. Prior experience in evaluating peacebuilding programs will be an added advantage.

6. Application

A complete proposals/application should be submitted to phandayani@sfcg.org with cc: usandyarani@sfcg.org by **April 25th 2016** and should include:

- Proposal (maximum 6 pages, including the methods and methodology to be adopted)
- Budget estimates and price quote
- CV of team members
- Cover letter
- Availability
- References
- Writing sample Example of written evaluation report

Annex 2: Evaluation Matrix

		Sur	vey	Focus g	roup discı	ıssion	Social Media	Monitoring		rviews			
Evaluative question/theme	Sub-Questions	Survey – Direct beneficiarie S	Survey - Direct beneficiarie s' social media audience	FGD - student s	FGD - social media users	FGD – CSO's	Monitoring – Direct beneficiaries	Monitoring - Secondary beneficiarie s	KII - government counterpart s	KII - student s	KII - CSO's	KII – ex- offenders	KII - SFCG and partner s
	1.1. Does giving support to youth groups in higher education increase youth's understanding on violent extremism activities and decrease their susceptibility to these extremist narratives?												
Youth	1.2. Does a student-led peace- building initiative increase school and campus' resilience against the recruitment to violent extremist groups among young people in higher education?												
	1.3. Does a youth to youth approach reduce the risk of recruitment to violent extremist groups among young people?												
	1.4. How effective is peer to peer strategy in strengthening the narratives to countering violent extremism among youth groups?												
	2.1. How widely accessed was the social media strategy? Did it correctly target the young users of social media?												
	2.2. Did they gain new knowledge and developed new attitudes as a result of the social media strategy?												

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Social Media	2.3. Does being exposed regularly to peaceful, nonviolent narrative actually change perception of young people towards violent extremism? 2.4. Does the change of perception of young people towards violent extremism lead them to be peace propagandist and thus spark discussion among their circle about the danger of? recruitment to violent extremist groups?						
	2.5. What changes occur in the society as a result of the social media strategy?						
	2.6. Did it develop new behaviors in addressing extremist narratives?						
	2.7. Did it create safe environment or bring down barrier for individuals to spread peaceful messages in oppose to violent narratives?						
	3.1. How does support from community members towards ex terrorist prisoners lead to a lower susceptibility among them to rejoin their former violent extremist groups?						
Prisoner Release and Reintegration	3.2. Are there any noteworthy examples demonstrating increased cooperation between governments, CSOs, and private sector which could be attributed (fully or partially) to the project initiatives?						
	3.3. How does a systemic collaboration between the government, CSOs, and private sector in helping reintegration of ex-offenders reduce the						

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	potentiality of recidivism among former terrorist exoffenders?						
Coherence and	4.1. How was the coordination between SFCG and its partners (schools, universities, communities, CSOs, governmental bodies, private sectors) in implementing the project?						
Coordination	4.2. What were the challenges, if any, and how did SFCG and partners overcome them?						
	4.3. How coherent were the activities implemented in achieving the goal/objectives set for the project?						
	5.1. What steps were planned or have been taken by the project team (SFCG and partners) to create long term processes or structures in reducing recruitment to violent extremist groups and reducing the risk of recidivism among terrorist ex-offenders?						
Sustainability	5.2. Have the students been able to independently organize formal or informal initiatives to counter violent extremism among their community?						
	5.3. How much have the students' capacities to independently organize the initiative increase and what were the challenges?						

Annex 3: Evaluation Plan and Field Schedule

Evaluation Plan according to Inception Report

Inception Report writing	June 4 th – 11 th 2016
The evaluation plan/inception report submission	June 11 th 2016
Back and forth review process until inception report finalized	June 11 th – June 17 th 2016
Signing of contract	June 17 th 2016
Ongoing and regular (field data collection and document review	June 18 th – August 31st 2016
First draft of the report	September 14th 2016
Back and forth review between SFCG & consultant	September 14th – September 28th 2016
Final Evaluation Report	September 30th 2016

Field Visit Schedule

Field visit in Bandung	13-18 December 2016
1st Field visit in Solo	27-28 December 2016
2 nd Field visit in Solo	6 January 2017
Field visit in Jakarta	10-14 January 2017
Field visit in Palu	23-29 January 2017
Field visit in Poso	23-29 January 2017

Annex 4: Questionnaires

Survey

Survey for CVE Primary Beneficiaries (Youth, Social Media Users)

This survey is taken as part of evaluation activities of a multi-year effort "Reducing the Risk of Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia" by Search for Common Ground. Your genuine response to the questionnaire will be very helpful to the development of the program's social media initiative which intends to spark discussion about the danger of violent extremism through more exposure of peaceful, nonviolent narratives in social media. Please be assured that your answers will be treated as an aggregate in the strictest confidence. Individual response will NOT be identifiable. The information given by you are kept confidential and used for combined analysis and none of your responses will be linked to you directly, unless you desire to do so. You are not compelled to answer every question asked. If you feel uncomfortable during the interview, please feel free to stop the interview at any point of time.

Thank you for giving your few minutes to fully complete this questionnaire.

Name	: [name is required to ensure that you only complete the survey once]
Current Address	:
Sex	: Male/Female /Others
Religious affiliation	Islam, please add your affiliation if any (i.e. NU, Muhammadiyah etc.)
Ethnicity	:
Education (Completed)	: □ Junior high school

	valuation ng the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia
	High schoolUndergraduate or diplomaGraduate
Occuj	pation :
Are yo	ou active in any on-campus or off-campus extra-curricular activities?
	□ Yes □ No
If yes,	what are the extra-curricular activities that you are most involved in? □ Student organizations, such as
Perso 1.	onal Perception towards Violence Extremism and Peace Narratives What passes your mind when you hear the word "violence"?
2.	What passes your mind when you hear the word "extremism"?
3.	What passes your mind when you hear the word "peace"?
4.	Which of the following is a form of violent extremism? You can choose more than one. Acts of intolerance Hate speech Racist propaganda Religious exclusion Terrorism

	\Box Others, plea	se fill the blank
5.	a. I'd rather to b. I look for a r c. I usually ave d. I nonviolent e. I sometimes f. Cannot say	ally solve conflict in your daily life? Please select all that apply. talk about the conflict (musyawarah) neutral third party to listen to both side and make the decision old confrontation and just accept what the other party wants ly force the other party to accept my solution use violence to intimidate the other party to accept my solution se fill the blank
6.	☐ Yes, in gene☐ No, never	ence is justified under any circumstances? ral the situation or case
7.	choose more than a When myse When my be When my et When my id When my ve When my liv	ion(s) do you think it is justified to engage in violence? You can one. If or my family is insulted or threatened elief or religion is insulted or threatened hnic background is insulted or threatened eology or political choice is insulted or threatened bice is unheard yelihood is threatened see fill the blank
8.	a. Violence is tb. People felt sc. They have td. They are coe. They do not	the to use violence in solving conflict? Please select all that apply. The effective way to make people listening to you recared and they'd rather attack first than be attacked ried talking it out but it went nowhere nvinced by a third party that violence can be the best solution have/know alternative, nonviolent way to deal with conflict see fill the blank
2.	How do you rate the Peaceful Volatile	e situation of your community or city?

 $\quad \ \ \, \square \quad Occasionally \ violent$

 \Box Violent

	□ Cannot judge			
3.	Have you witnessed the following forms of violence taking place	in you	r city?	
	Acts of intolerance between groups		Yes No	
	People are discriminated due to their identity		Yes No	
	Attack against people from different groups		Yes No	
	Gang fight		Yes No	
	Poverty and corruption		Yes No	
	Terrorism		Yes No	
	 □ I showed support to the victims, verbally or in written via □ I reported the perpetrator to the authority □ I kept silent □ I opposed them, even though I had to use violence as well □ I joined them □ Others, please fill the blank 	l	media	
5.	Have you personally experience any act of intolerance? Yes No Cannot say			
6.	What topic instigates the act of intolerance that you experience select all that apply. Religion Ethnic or racial Political difference Different opinion Socio-economic status Sexual orientation Others, please fill the blank		erved? Plo	ease

7.	_	oes violent extremism emerge? You can choose more than ones.
		Cannot say
		Economic inequality and political injustices
		Fanaticism in interpreting religious text
		The existence of religious blasphemy and deviant sects
		The urge to have more power
		Easy access to weapons
		Peer-group solidarity
		Society ignorance
		Others, please fill the blank
8.	Why a	re people attracted to violent extremism? You can choose more than ones.
		Cannot say
		Economic problem, such as being jobless
		Low level of education
		Lack of physical security, such as living in conflict zones
		Experience of being marginalized or discriminated socially
		Peer-group solidarity
		The feeling that one's religion should be defended from impurity
		Others, please fill the blank
9.	What a	are the factors that may discourage people to involve in violent extremism? You
	can ch	oose more than ones.
		Cannot say
		Job training
		Access to education
		Better law enforcement
		Inclusive understanding of Islamic teachings
		More involvement in social and political activities
		Others, please fill the blank
Social	l Media	Usage in General
1.	How m	nany social media account do you have?
		No account
		1-2 accounts
		3-5 accounts
		More than 5 accounts
2.		social media account do you have? You can choose more than one.
		Facebook
		Twitter
		Line
		Instagram

Reducing the Recruitment	and Recidivism of	Violent Extremists in	Indonesia
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	 YouTube Path WhatsApp WeChat Others, please fill the blank
3.	If you checked more than one social media accounts in the above question, please rank them from the social media where you are most to the least active. 1
4.	Please indicate the average number of your friends/followers for all of your account stated above 1. <500 2. 500-2.000 3. 2.000-5.000 4. >5.000
5.	How many estimated hours in total do you spent for your social media activities per day? □ Less than 1 hour □ 1-3 hours □ 4-6 hours □ More than 6 hours
6.	Why do you use social media? You can choose more than one. □ To stay up-to-date with news and current events □ To reconnect and stay in touch with friends and colleagues □ To share opinions, photos, videos, and other contents □ To meet new people □ To fill up spare time □ Others, please fill the blank
7.	On average, how often do you post, like, or share contents (i.e. statuses/opinions, articles, etc.) in your social media per day? □ Between once to twice a day □ Between twice to five times a day □ Between six to ten times a day □ More than ten times a day
8.	Which content do you often post, like, or share in your social media? □ Statuses/opinions

5. When acts of terror in Sarinah, Jakarta on January 2016 took place, what did you do in your social media account?

- $\hfill \square$ Searching up-to-date information about the event
- □ Liking or posting status condemning the event

.....

4. Did you ever like, post, or share the above campaign in your social media account?

□ Yes□ No

5.	Why did you or did you not like, post, or share the above campaign in your social media account? Please answer briefly.		
6.	Did you find the campaign interesting and important? ☐ Yes ☐ No		
7.	Why did you or did you not find the campaign interesting and important? Please answer briefly.		
8.	Has the campaign motivated you to involve in discussion about the danger of violent extremism?		
	□ Yes		
	□ No		
9.	What are the new learning that you got from the campaign?		
	1		
	2		
	3		
	4		
	5		
10.	What are the limitations of the campaign?		
	1		
	2		
	3		
	4		
	5		

Youth-Led Peace-building

1. Have you ever participated in training/workshop/event organized by SFCG? Yes/No

2.	If yes, please mention the training/workshop/event you ever participated below (write as many as you remember):
	1.
	3
3.	What are the most interesting and important topics covered in the training/workshop/event. Please answer briefly.
4.	What are the new learning that you got from the training/workshop/event?
	1
	3
	4
	5
5.	Has the training/workshop/event motivated you to create a peace-building initiative in your school, university, or community? □ Yes □ No
	□ NO
6.	If yes, what are the peace-building initiatives that you have started/organized? Please answer briefly.
7.	How do you measure your initiative's achievement and successes?
	Number of participantFrequency of activities
	□ Deliverable contents
	☐ Changing attitudes of the participants
	 More initiatives coming from the participants.
	□ Others, please specify

9. What buildi 1. 2.	are the challenges you encountered when you started/organized your peaceng initiative? Please answer briefly. Lack of resources Lack of support from local authorities/local mass organizations/universities/school/communities Threat from local authorities/local mass organizations/universities/school/communities Uncommitted organizers Disinterested participants Others, please specify are the necessary skills that you might need to develop/expand your peaceng initiative in the future?
5.	VE Secondary Beneficiaries (Youth, Social Media Users)
of Recruitme Ground. Your of the progra of violent ex media. Pleas confidence. I kept confidence to you direct	s taken as part of evaluation activities of a multi-year effort "Reducing the Risk ent and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia" by Search for Common genuine response to the questionnaire will be very helpful to the development am's social media initiative which intends to spark discussion about the danger tremism through more exposure of peaceful, nonviolent narratives in social e be assured that your answers will be treated as an aggregate in the strictest individual response will NOT be identifiable. The information given by you are notial and used for combined analysis and none of your responses will be linked ly, unless you desire to do so. You are not compelled to answer every question feel uncomfortable during the interview, please feel free to stop the interview of time.
Thank you fo	or giving your few minutes to fully complete this questionnaire.
Name	: [name is required to ensure that you only complete this survey once]
Current Add	lress :

: Male/Female /Others

Sex

Religious affiliation		Islam, please add your affiliation if any (i.e. NU, Muhammadiyah, etc.)
Ethnicity :		
Education (Completed) :		Junior high school High school Undergraduate or diploma Graduate
Occupation :		
Are you active in any □ Yes □ No	on-cai	mpus or off-campus extra-curricular activities?
□ Student□ Hobby-□ Religiou□ Ethnic-l	orgar based is-bas based	arricular activities that you are most involved in? nizations, such as
•		ind when you hear the word "violence"?
2. What passes ye	our m	ind when you hear the word "extremism"?

	valuation ng the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia
3.	What passes your mind when you hear the word "peace"?
4.	Which of the following is a form of violent extremism? You can choose more than one. □ Acts of intolerance □ Hate speech
	□ Hate speech □ Racist propaganda
	□ Religious exclusion
	□ Terrorism
	□ Others, please fill the blank
5.	How do you generally solve conflict in your daily life? Please select all that apply. □ I'd rather to talk about the conflict (musyawarah)
	☐ I look for a neutral third party to listen to both side and make the decision
	☐ I usually avoid confrontation and just accept what the other party wants
	☐ I nonviolently force the other party to accept my solution
	 I sometimes use violence to intimidate the other party to accept my solution Cannot say
	□ Others, please fill the blank
6.	Do you believe violence is justified under any circumstances?
	□ Yes, always
	Yes, in generalNo, never
	 Depends on the situation or case
	□ Cannot say
7.	Under what condition(s) do you think it is justified to engage in violence? You can
	choose more than one.
	□ When myself or my family is insulted or threatened
	 When my belief or religion is insulted or threatened When my ethnic background is insulted or threatened
	□ When my ideology or political choice is insulted or threatened
	□ When my voice is unheard
	□ When my livelihood is threatened
	□ Others, please fill the blank
8.	What causes people to use violence in solving conflict? Please select all that apply.
	□ Violence is the effective way to make people listening to you
	 People felt scared and they'd rather attack first than be attacked

Reducing the	Recruitment and	Recidivism of	of Violent	Extremists in	Indonesia
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		They have tried talking it out but it went nowhere They are convinced by a third party that violence can be to They do not have/know alternative, nonviolent way to do Others, please fill the blank	eal with	n conflict
Perso	nal an	d Communal Experience of Violent Extremism		
		ong have you been living in your community or city?		
		Less than a year		
		1-3 years		
		4-6 years		
		7-10 years		
		More than ten years		
2.	How o	lo you rate the situation of your community or city? Peaceful		
		Volatile		
		Occasionally violent		
		Violent		
		Cannot judge		
3.	Have	you witnessed the following forms of violence taking place	in you	r city?
	A	cts of intolerance between groups		Yes No
	P	eople are discriminated due to their identity		Yes
				No
	A	ttack against people from different groups		Yes
				No
	G	ang fight	П	Yes
				No
	P	overty and corruption	П	Yes
	1	overty and corruption		No
	Т	errorism	П	Yes
	*	CHOLISII		No
4.	What	was your reaction when the above forms of violence took of I condemned the action, verbally or in written via social repower I showed support to the victims, verbally or in written via I reported the perpetrator to the authority I kept silent I opposed them, even though I had to use violence as well I joined them Others, please fill the blank	nedia a social	media

5.	Have you personally experience any act of intolerance? □ Yes
	□ No
	□ Cannot say
6.	What topic instigates the act of intolerance that you experienced/observed? Please select all that apply. □ Religion
	P. Line J. Liefe
	□ Different opinion□ Socio-economic status
	□ Sexual orientation
	□ Others, <i>please fill the blank</i>
	□ I don't know what causes the incident
7.	Why does violent extremism emerge? You can choose more than ones.
	□ Cannot say
	 Economic inequality and political injustices
	□ Fanaticism in interpreting religious text
	 The existence of religious blasphemy and deviant sects
	□ The urge to have more power
	 Easy access to weapons
	□ Peer-group solidarity
	□ Society ignorance
	□ Others, please fill the blank
8.	Why are people attracted to violent extremism? You can choose more than ones.
	□ Cannot say
	□ Economic problem, such as being jobless
	□ Low level of education
	 Lack of physical security, such as living in conflict zones
	 Experience of being marginalized or discriminated socially
	□ Peer-group solidarity
	☐ The feeling that one's religion should be defended from impurity
	□ Others, please fill the blank
9	What are the factors that may discourage people to involve in violent extremism? You
٦.	can choose more than ones.
	□ Cannot say
	□ Job training □ Access to education
	□ Better law enforcement
	T 1 . 1 . 1. CT1 1.
	□ Inclusive understanding of Islamic teachings

	 □ More involvement in social and political activities □ Others, please fill the blank
	Media Usage in General How many social media account do you have? □ No account
	 1-2 accounts 3-5 accounts More than 5 accounts
2.	Which social media account do you have? You can choose more than one. Facebook Twitter Line Instagram YouTube Path WhatsApp WeChat Others, please fill the blank
3.	f you checked more than one social media accounts in the above question, please rank them from the social media where you are most to the least active. 1
4.	Please indicate the average number of your friends/followers for all of your account stated above <500 500-2.000 2.000-5.000 >5.000
5.	How many estimated hours in total do you spent for your social media activities per lay? Less than 1 hour 1-3 hours 4-6 hours More than 6 hours

6. Why do you use social media? You can choose more than one.

Reducing the Recruitment and Recidivism of	of Violent Extremists in Indonesia
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		To stay up-to-date with news and current events
		To reconnect and stay in touch with friends and colleagues
		To share opinions, photos, videos, and other contents
		To meet new people
		To fill up spare time
		Others, please fill the blank
7.		erage, how often do you post, like, or share contents (i.e. statuses/opinions, es, etc.) in your social media per day?
		Between once to twice a day
		Between twice to five times a day
		Between six to ten times a day
		More than ten times a day
8.	Which	n content do you often post, like, or share in your social media?
		Statuses/opinions
		News articles
		Photos
		Videos
		Others, please fill the blank
9.		theme do you often post, like, or share in your social media?
		Politics
		Arts
		Lifestyle, i.e. foods, books, recipes, sports, travel, etc.
		Sciences
		Entertainment, i.e. memes, jokes, etc.
		Others, please fill the blank
		emism and Peace Narratives in Social Media: Action and Response
1.	-	you ever intentionally visited or viewed websites or social media accounts with
	violen	at extremist contents?
		Yes
		No
2.	-	please mention the name of websites or social media accounts below (write as
	many	as you remember):
	1.	
	2.	
	3.	
	4.	
	5.	

3.	Have you ever liked or shared violent extremist contents in your social media account? $\hfill Yes \\ \hfill No$
4.	If yes, why did you like or share violent extremist contents in your social media account? Please write your answer briefly.
5.	When acts of terror in Sarinah, Jakarta on January 2016 took place, what did you do in your social media account? Searching up-to-date information about the event Liking or posting status condemning the event Liking or posting status showing empathy to the victims Liking or sharing news article covering the event Joining internet campaign against violent acts of terrorism Others, please fill the blank
6.	Do you think violent extremism can be prevented by giving more space for social media contents about peace, cooperation, tolerance, and nonviolence? □ Yes □ No
7.	Why do you think violent extremism can or cannot be prevented by giving more space for social media contents about peace, cooperation tolerance, and nonviolence?
	Media Users' Interaction with SFCG Social Media Strategy Do you think the availability of internet for everyone contributes to the prevalent violent extremism? □ Yes □ No □ Cannot say
2.	Have you ever heard about or view the following campaign? Please select that applies. □ Second Chance comedy web series

	Reducing the	Recruitment and	Recidivism of	Violent	Extremists in	Indonesia
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	 #CiptaDamai campaign #KamiTidakTakut campaign Hipwee articles which is sponsored by Search for Common Ground Search for Common Ground social media account and websites No, I have never heard about it
3.	If yes, what passes your mind when you heard about or viewed the above campaign? 1
4.	Did you ever like, post, or share the above campaign in your social media account? $\hfill \square$ Yes $\hfill \square$ No
5.	Why did you or did you not like, post, or share the above campaign in your social media account? Please answer briefly.
6.	Did you find the campaign interesting and important? □ Yes □ No
7.	Why did you or did you not find the campaign interesting and important? Please answer briefly.
8.	Has the campaign motivated you to involve in discussion about the danger of violent extremism? $ \ \ \Box Yes \\ \ \Box No$

9. What are the new learning that you got from the campaign?

	1.	
	2.	
	3.	
	4.	
10.	What	are the limitations of the campaign?
	1.	
	2.	
	2. 3.	

Survey for CVE Secondary Beneficiaries (Communities)

This survey is taken as part of evaluation activities of a multi-year effort "Reducing the Risk of Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia" by Search for Common Ground. Your genuine response to the questionnaire will be very helpful to the development of the program's social media initiative which intends to spark discussion about the danger of violent extremism through more exposure of peaceful, nonviolent narratives in social media. Please be assured that your answers will be treated as an aggregate in the strictest confidence. Individual response will NOT be identifiable. The information given by you are kept confidential and used for combined analysis and none of your responses will be linked to you directly, unless you desire to do so. You are not compelled to answer every question asked. If you feel uncomfortable during the interview, please feel free to stop the interview at any point of time.

Thank you for giving your few minutes to fully complete this questionnaire.

Name	: [name is required to ensure that you only complete this survey once]			
Current Address	:			
Sex	: Male/Female /Others			
Religious affiliatio	 Islam, please add your affiliation if any (i.e. NU, Muhammadiyah, etc.) Catholic Protestant, please add your denomination if any Hindu Buddhist Konghucu 			
	□ Others, please fill the blank			

	valuation ng the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia
Ethni	city :
Educa (Com	pleted) : Junior high school
Occup	oation :
Perso	onal Perception towards Violence Extremism and Peace Narratives What passes your mind when you hear the word "violence"?
2.	What passes your mind when you hear the word "extremism"?
3.	What passes your mind when you hear the word "peace"?
4.	Which of the following is a form of violent extremism? You can choose more than one Acts of intolerance Hate speech Racist propaganda Religious exclusion Terrorism Others, please fill the blank
5.	How do you generally solve conflict in your daily life? Please select all that apply. I'd rather to talk about the conflict (musyawarah) I look for a neutral third party to listen to both side and make the decision I usually avoid confrontation and just accept what the other party wants I nonviolently force the other party to accept my solution

Reducing the Recruitment	and Recidivism of	f Violent Extremists in	Indonesia
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		I sometimes use violence to intimidate the other party to accept my solution
		Cannot say
		Others, please fill the blank
6.	Do you	believe violence is justified under any circumstances?
		Yes, in general
		No, never
		Depends on the situation or case
		Cannot say
7.	Under	what condition(s) do you think it is justified to engage in violence? You can
	choose	more than one.
		When myself or my family is insulted or threatened
		When my belief or religion is insulted or threatened
		When my ethnic background is insulted or threatened
		When my ideology or political choice is insulted or threatened
		When my voice is unheard
		When my livelihood is threatened
		Others, please fill the blank
8.	What c	auses people to use violence in solving conflict? Please select all that apply.
		Violence is the effective way to make people listening to you
		People felt scared and they'd rather attack first than be attacked
		They have tried talking it out but it went nowhere
		They are convinced by a third party that violence can be the best solution
		They do not have/know alternative, nonviolent way to deal with conflict
		Others, please fill the blank
Perso	nal and	Communal Experience of Violent Extremism
1.	How lo	ng have you been living in your community or city?
		Less than a year
		1-3 years
		4-6 years
		7-10 years
		More than ten years
2.	How do	you rate the situation of your community or city?
		Peaceful
		Volatile
		Occasionally violent
		Violent
		Cannot judge
3.	Have y	ou witnessed the following forms of violence taking place in your city?

4.

5.

6.

7.

1	Acts of intolerance between groups		Yes No	
]	People are discriminated due to their identity		Yes No	
1	Attack against people from different groups		Yes No	
(Gang fight		Yes No	
]	Poverty and corruption		Yes No	
ŗ	Terrorism		Yes No	
	was your reaction when the above forms of violence took of I condemned the action, verbally or in written via social of I showed support to the victims, verbally or in written via I reported the perpetrator to the authority I kept silent I opposed them, even though I had to use violence as well I joined them Others, please fill the blank	nedia a social	media	-
Have	you personally experience any act of intolerance? Yes No Cannot say			
select	topic instigates the act of intolerance that you experience all that apply. Religion Ethnic or racial Political difference Different opinion Socio-economic status Sexual orientation Others, please fill the blank			Please
Why	does violent extremism emerge? You can choose more than Cannot say Economic inequality and political injustices Fanaticism in interpreting religious text The existence of religious blasphemy and deviant sects	ı ones.		

- □ Facebook
- □ Twitter
- □ Line
- □ Instagram
- □ YouTube
- □ Path
- □ WhatsApp
- □ WeChat
- □ Others, *please fill the blank*.....

	rank them from the social media where you are most to the least active.
	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
4.	Please indicate the average number of your friends/followers for all of your account stated above $ \begin{array}{c c} \hline \hline \\ $
5.	How many estimated hours in total do you spent for your social media activities per day?
	□ Less than 1 hour
	□ 1-3 hours
	□ 4-6 hours
	□ More than 6 hours
6.	Why do you use social media? You can choose more than one.
	 To stay up-to-date with news and current events
	 To reconnect and stay in touch with friends and colleagues
	 To share opinions, photos, videos, and other contents
	□ To meet new people
	□ To fill up spare time
	□ Others, please fill the blank
7.	On average, how often do you post, like, or share contents (i.e. statuses/opinions
	articles, etc.) in your social media per day?
	□ Between once to twice a day
	Between twice to five times a day
	□ Between six to ten times a day
	□ More than ten times a day
8.	Which content do you often post, like, or share in your social media?
	□ Statuses/opinions
	□ News articles
	□ Photos
	□ Others, please fill the blank

9. Which theme do you often post, like, or share in your social media?

3. If you checked more than one social media accounts in the above question, please

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 □ Politics □ Arts □ Lifestyle, i.e. foods, books, recipes, sports, travel, etc. □ Sciences □ Entertainment, i.e. memes, jokes, etc. □ Others, please fill the blank 	
Violent Extremism and Peace Narratives in Social Media: Action	and Response
1. Have you ever intentionally visited or viewed websites or social violent extremist contents?YesNo	al media accounts with
 If yes, please mention the name of websites or social media ac many as you remember): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 	counts below (<i>write as</i>
3. Have you ever liked or shared violent extremist contents account? ☐ Yes ☐ No	in your social media
4. If yes, why did you like or share violent extremist contents account? Please write your answer briefly.	•

5.	When acts of terror in Sarinah, Jakarta on January 2016 took place, what did you do
	in your social media account?

- □ Searching up-to-date information about the event
- ☐ Liking or posting status condemning the event
- □ Liking or posting status showing empathy to the victims
- ☐ Liking or sharing news article covering the event
- □ Joining internet campaign against violent acts of terrorism
- □ Others, *please fill the blank*.....

6.	Do you think violent extremism can be prevented by giving more space for social media contents about peace, cooperation, tolerance, and nonviolence? $\hfill Yes \\ \hfill No$
7.	Why do you think violent extremism can or cannot be prevented by giving more space for social media contents about peace, cooperation tolerance, and nonviolence?
	Media Users' Interaction with SFCG Social Media Strategy
1.	Do you think the availability of internet for everyone contributes to the prevalent
	violent extremism? □ Yes
	□ No
	□ Cannot say
2.	Have you ever heard about or view the following campaign? Please select that applies. □ Second Chance comedy web series
	 □ Second Chance comedy web series □ #CiptaDamai campaign
	□ #KamiTidakTakut campaign
	☐ Hipwee articles which is sponsored by Search for Common Ground
	 Search for Common Ground social media account and websites
	□ No, I have never heard about it
3	If yes, what passes your mind when you heard about or viewed the above campaign?
0.	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
4.	Did you ever like, post, or share the above campaign in your social media account?
	□ Yes
	□ No
5.	Why did you or did you not like, post, or share the above campaign in your social
٥.	media account? Please answer briefly.
	······································

	g the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia
6.	Did you find the campaign interesting and important? □ Yes □ No
	□ NO
7.	Why did you or did you not find the campaign interesting and important? Please answer briefly.
8.	Has the campaign motivated you to involve in discussion about the danger of violent extremism?
	□ Yes
	□ No
9.	What are the new learning that you got from the campaign? 1
	2
	3
	4
	J
10.	What are the limitations of the campaign?
	1
	2
	3
Perso	nal Perception towards Ex-Offenders Reintegration
	What passes your mind when you hear the word "terrorist"?
2.	What do you do if you meet a person who had been serving prison terms because of act of terrorism charges? □ Cannot say □ I hate them

Reducing the Recruitment and Recidivism of Violent Extremists in Indonesia

	 □ I do not hate them, but trying my best to keep myself away from them □ I don't care □ I empathize with them □ I will work with them to help them □ Others, please fill the blank
3.	If you are about to meet or interact with a terrorist convict who just came out of prison, what would be your expectation about this person?
4.	What does it take for a terrorist to change? Please select all that apply. Severe punishment Better education and economic opportunities Peaceful religious understanding Support from communities and family members They will never change Others, please fill the blank
5.	What will you do if a former terrorist convict chooses to rent a house in your neighborhood? Cannot say I will try my best to prevent him/her be part of my neighborhood I will welcome him/her as a new part of my neighborhood I will let others decide on this issue I will reluctantly accept him/her I don't care, I never think of this as a problem Others, please fill the blank
6.	Why do you choose not to accept a former terrorist living in your neighborhood? □ I am scared that he/she might influence the other community members □ I am worried for my children □ The chance that he/she might still believe in radical ideas □ The chance that he/she might commit petty crimes □ They bring bad reputation to my neighborhood □ Others, please fill the blank
7.	If you were the boss of a company, will you recruit a former terrorist as your employee? □ Cannot say □ I will recruit him/her without hesitation

☐ They should go away from this village/town/country

□ They should stay in jail and given life terms
 □ They should get a better education and skill
 □ Others, please specify

□ Showing repentance

FGD Guidelines

Consent to Participate in Focus Group Discussion

The purpose of the focus group discussion and the nature of the questions have been explained to me. I consent to take part in a focus group about my knowledge and experiences and to be tape-recorded during this focus group discussion. My participation is voluntary. I understand that I am free to leave the group at any point of time during the interview. If I decide to leave the discussion at any point of time during the interview, my decision in no way represents the general attitude of my organization/institution on the discussed issues. None of my experiences or thoughts will be shared to anyone outside of Search for Common Ground unless all identifying information is removed first. The information that I provide during the focus group will be grouped with answers from other people so that I cannot be identified.

Please Print Your Name	Respondent ID
Please Sign Your Name	Date

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION NOTE TAKING FORM

Instructions: Please use this form to record the proceedings of the focus group. Notes should be extensive and accurately reflect the content of the discussion, as well as any salient observation of nonverbal behavior, such as facial expressions, hand movements, group dynamics, etc.

Date of Focus Group: Location of Focus Group: Name of Note Taker:

FGD with YOUTH

Relevance

- 1. How relevant was the project in addressing the issues around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives and youth participation in peace-building?
 - **a.** What do you think about the relevance of SFCG's project in addressing youth susceptibility to extremist narratives and youth participation in peace-building?
 - b. In your opinion, what are the major issues around youth vulnerability to extremist narratives that need to be addressed? Did SFCG address those issues in its project?
 - c. In your opinion, do youth nowadays really need this project? Do you feel the sense of urgency of this project?
 - d. If it is so, do you find SFCG's approach helpful in empowering youth capabilities in countering extremist narratives and organizing peace-building activities? Are there any important issues that remain neglected by SFCG?
 - e. Do you have critics or suggestion on SFCG's approach? Could you offer SFCG alternative approaches in addressing the issues around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives and youth participation in peace-building?
 - **f.** Do you think that it will be better for SFCG to address more important issues around youth rather than addressing youth susceptibility to extremist narratives and youth participation in peace-building? Could you provide us with some examples?
- 2. Did the project target the right group of participants with right set of strategies and activities?
 - a. Do you think that your environment is susceptible to extremist narratives?
 - b. Do you think that youth participation in peace-building activities is limited?
 - c. Do you think that the capabilities of youth around you in countering extremist narratives and participating in peace-building activities need to be improved?
 - d. Do you find SFCG strategies and activities interesting and important for you and your peer-group? What make those activities interesting/not interesting and important/not important for you? Do you have any suggestions on this matter?

Effectiveness

- 1. Does giving support to youth groups in higher education increase youth understanding on violent extremism activities and decrease their susceptibility to these extremist narratives?
 - a. What passes on your mind when you hear 'violent extremism'? Why?
 - b. Do you believe that 'violent extremism' is justified under any circumstances?
- 2. Does a student-led peace-building initiative increase school and campus' resilience against the recruitment to violent extremist groups among young people in higher education?
 - a. What were your experiences with student-led peace-building initiative in school and campus?
 - b. Have you ever taken part in an activity at school/campus that aim to promote peace or raising the awareness of the dangers of violent extremism? What do you think about it?
 - c. Did you and your friends discuss it later afterwards? How?
 - d. Are there any steps taken by you/your group/school-campus board members as a follow up to the activity?
 - e. Are there any subtle or vivid changes in regards to discussions about violent extremism in your school/campus?
- 3. Does a youth to youth approach reduce the risk of recruitment to violent extremist groups among young people? How effective is peer to peer strategy in strengthening the narratives to countering violent extremism among youth groups?
 - a. What is your opinion on the recruitment to violent extremist groups among young people in higher education? What should be done by school, campus, and students to respond the recruitment?
 - b. What will you do if someone is trying to recruit you to join violent extremist groups? Why?
 - c. What actions do you expect from your friends when someone is trying to recruit you to join violent extremist groups?
 - d. What will you do if someone is trying to recruit your friends to join violent extremist groups? Why?
 - e. In your opinion, who is influential in forming your perspectives on 'violent extremism'?
 - f. What are the roles of your friends in forming your perspectives on and attitudes to violent extremism?
 - g. Do you think a youth to youth approach is effective to reduce the risk of recruitment to violent extremist groups? Why?

Coordination and Coherence

- 1. What is your general assessment on how this program is arranged, organized, and operated?
 - a. What do you think about SFCG coordination with you in implementing the project?

- b. What were the challenges, if any, and how did SFCG and partners overcome them?
- c. How many times throughout project span have you been reached by SFCG staff?
- d. What has been the usual means of communication between you and SCFG in coordinating program? How does the communication work for you?

Sustainability

- 1. Have the students been able to independently organize formal or informal initiatives to counter violent extremism among their community?
 - a. Have you ever organized any activities or programs related to countering violent extremism in your community?
 - b. If yes, can you tell us about the activities or programs that you organize?
- 2. How much have the students' capacities to independently organize the initiative increase and what were the challenges?
 - a. What were the obstacles and challenges on the activities or project that you organize?
 - b. What changes would you make if you can organize another activities or programs related to countering violent extremism?
 - c. Have you utilized your own resources fundraising/recruiting new members/publishing visibility etc. in organizing the initiatives?
 - d. Do you think you can organize initiative independently without SFCG support? Why and why not?

FGD with SOCIAL MEDIA USERS

Relevance

- **1.** How relevant was the project in addressing the issues around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives and youth participation in peace-building?
 - **a.** What do you think about the relevance of SFCG's project in addressing youth susceptibility to extremist narratives in social media?
 - b. In your opinion, what are the major issues around youth vulnerability to extremist narratives in social media that need to be addressed? Did SFCG address those issues in its project?
 - c. In your opinion, do youth nowadays really need this project? Do you feel the sense of urgency of this project?
 - d. If it is so, do you find SFCG's approach helpful in empowering youth capabilities in countering extremist narratives and organizing peace-building activities through social media? Are there any important issues that remain neglected by SFCG?
 - e. Do you have critics or suggestion on SFCG's approach? Could you offer SFCG alternative approaches in addressing the issues around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives in social media and youth participation in peace-building through social media activities?
- **2.** Did the project target the right group of participants with right set of strategies and activities? Did it correctly target the young users of social media?
 - **a.** Do you think that youth around you is susceptible to extremist narratives through social media?
 - **b.** Do you think that youth participation in peace-building activities through social media is limited?
 - **c.** Do you think that the capabilities of youth around you in countering extremist narratives in social media and participating in social-media-based peacebuilding activities need to be improved?
 - e. Do you find SFCG strategies and activities interesting and important for you and your peer-group? What make those activities interesting/not interesting and important/not important for you? Do you have any suggestions on this matter?

Effectiveness

- 1. How widely accessed was the social media strategy?
 - a. How did you access SFCG social media campaign?
 - b. Were there any difficulties in accessing those campaigns?
 - c. Did your friends access SFCG social media campaign? How did they access them?
 - d. Were those social media campaigns gone viral among your friends?
 - e. Were you and your friends trying to spread and share SFCG social media campaigns?
 - f. Did you find those campaigns interesting? Why/Why not?
- 2. Did the young users of social media gain new knowledge and developed new attitudes as a result of the social media strategy?

- a. What are the most interesting topics and issues covered by SFCG social media campaign?
- b. Did you gain new knowledge from the campaign?
- c. Did the campaign inspire you to develop new attitudes toward violent extremism?
- 3. Does being exposed regularly to peaceful, non-violent narrative actually change perception of young people towards violent extremism?
 - a. Could you tell us about your opinion on 'violent extremism' before you are exposed to SFCG social media campaign?
 - b. What is your opinion today on 'violent extremism'?
 - c. Do you think that violent extremism is justified in any circumstances?
 - d. Who is influential in forming your point of view on violent extremism?
 - e. What are the roles of SFCG social media campaign in influencing your perspectives on violent extremism?
- 4. Does the change of perception of young people towards violent extremism lead them to be peace propagandist and thus spark discussion among their circle about the danger of recruitment to violent extremist groups?
 - a. Have you ever involved in any peace-building initiatives before you are exposed to SFCG social media campaign?
 - b. Are you involved in any initiatives that aim to counter violent extremism narratives, spread peaceful messages, and increase the awareness about the danger of recruitment to violent extremist groups among your circle after the campaign?
 - c. Do you consider yourself as a peace propagandist?
 - d. Why do you decide to be a peace propagandist, i.e. countering violent extremism, spread peaceful messages, and increase the awareness of society about the danger of recruitment to violent extremist groups?
 - e. Who is influential in forming your decision?
 - f. What are the roles of SFCG social media campaign in influencing your decision?
 - g. Do you consider that your changing perception on violent extremism has encouraged you to take action to counter violent extremism? If not, why?
- 5. What changes occur in the society as a result of the social media strategy in oppose to violent narratives? Did it develop new behaviors in addressing extremist narratives? Did it create safe environment or bring down barrier for individuals to spread peaceful messages?
 - a. Could you identify changes that occur in society as a result of the social media campaign?
 - b. How did the people around you respond to extremist narratives before the campaign?
 - c. How did the people around you respond to extremist narratives after the campaign?
 - d. How did the people around you respond to peaceful initiatives to counter extremism before the campaign?
 - e. How did the people around you respond to peaceful initiatives to counter extremism after the campaign?

f. Do you think that it is easier and safer to spread peaceful message toward people around you after the campaign? Are there any challenges you face as a result of your participation in this project? How did you overcome it and to what extend did SFCG provide you with assistance in overcoming it?

Coherence and Coordination

- 1. What is your general assessment on how this program is arranged, organized, and operated?
 - a. What do you think about SFCG performance in implementing the project?
 - b. In your opinion, did the program activities achieve the program objectives? Were there any gaps between program implementation and program objectives?
 - c. Why did the gaps emerge?

Sustainability

- 1. Have the students been able to independently organize formal or informal initiatives to counter violent extremism among their community?
 - a. Have you ever organized any activities or programs related to countering violent extremism in your community?
 - b. If yes, can you tell us about the activities or programs that you organize?
- 2. How much have the students' capacities to independently organize the initiative increase and what were the challenges?
 - a. What were the obstacles and challenges on the activities or project that you organize?
 - b. What changes would you make if you can organize another activities or programs related to countering violent extremism?
 - c. Have you utilized your own resources fundraising/recruiting new members/publishing visibility in organizing the initiatives?
 - d. Do you think you can organize initiative independently without SFCG support? Why and why not?
- 3. What steps were planned or have been taken by the project team to create long term processes or structures in reducing recruitment to violent extremist groups?
 - a. What are the plans of SFCG and partners to expose society with peaceful and non-violent narratives in the long term?
 - b. What are the objectives that SCFG and partners aim to achieve through these long term projects?

FGD with CSOs

Relevance

- 1. Did the project target the right group of participants with right set of strategies and activities?
 - a. Were you involved in any activities to decrease ex-offenders potentiality of recidivism?
 - b. What challenges and obstacles did you face in organizing those activities?
 - c. Why did those challenges and obstacles emerge?
 - d. Could you identify major improvements needed by your organization?
 - e. Do you find SFCG strategies and activities helpful in improving your organization ability to deal with the problem of recidivism?

Effectiveness

- 1. How does a systemic collaboration between the government, CSOs, and private sector in helping reintegration of ex-offenders reduce the potentiality of recidivism among former terrorist ex-offenders?
 - a. Could you give best examples of cooperation between governments, CSOs, and private sector attributed to the project initiatives?
 - b. Why do you take it (them) as best example(s)?
 - c. What are the enabling factors for the cooperation?
 - d. How is the cooperation supportive toward the project initiatives?
 - e. How does the collaboration between government, CSOs and private sector helping the reintegration of ex-offenders?
 - f. How does the collaboration reduce the push factors of recidivism?
 - g. How does the collaboration reduce the pull factors of recidivism?
- 2. How has the project contributed in bringing attitude and behavior shift in communities living in targeted areas to become more welcoming and humanizing exoffender post release?
 - a. What kind of difficulties faced by the ex-terrorist prisoners in their after-prison-life?
 - b. What kinds of supports are received by the ex-terrorist?
 - c. How do you see the supports have weakened the push factors?
 - d. How do you see the supports have weakened the pull factors?

Coherence and Coordination

- 1. How was the coordination between SFCG and its partners (schools, universities, communities, CSOs, governmental bodies, private sectors) in implementing the project)?
 - a. What are the notable issues in the coordination between SFCG and its partners?
 - b. How do you rate the coordination in terms of the project accomplishment?
 - c. What are the enabling factors for the coordination?

- 2. What were the challenges, if any, and how did SFCG and partners overcome them?
 - a. What area(s) of coordination does need improvement?
 - b. What kind of difficulties do you find in this area(s) of coordination?
 - c. What is the best way to deal with those difficulties?
- 3. How coherent were the activities implemented in achieving the goal/objectives set for the project?)
 - a. How do implemented activities achieve the project objectives?
 - b. What are the factors that lead to the achievement of the objectives?
 - c. Do you find any gaps between the implemented activities and the objectives?
 - *d.* Why do the gaps occur?

Sustainability

- 1. What steps were planned or have been taken by the project team to create long term processes or structures in reducing recruitment to violent extremist groups and reducing the risk of recidivism among terrorist ex-offenders?
 - a. What are the plans of project team to increase CSOs capacities and commitments in reducing the risk of recidivism?
 - b. What are the plans of project team to reduce the potentiality of ex-offenders to rejoin violent extremist's groups?

Interview Guidelines

INTERVIEW GUIDE

I volunteer to be interviewed by _____ from the Independent Evaluation Team under Search for Common Ground. I understand that the interview is conducted for the purpose of I will be one of approximately people being interviewed for this evaluation.

- My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty. If I decline to participate or withdraw from the interview, there will be no repercussion.
- If at any point during the interview I feel uncomfortable in any way, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the interview.
- The interview will last approximately 45 60 minutes. Notes will be written during the interview session. An audio tape of the interview and subsequent dialogue will be made. If I don't want to be taped, I will not be able to participate in the study.
- I understand that the interviewer will not identify me by name in any reports using information obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of individuals.
- I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.

Please Print Your Name	Interviewer
Please Sign Your Name	 Date

• I have been given a copy of this consent form.

Interview Guide for Youth

Relevance

- 2. What are the most pressing issues around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives?
- 3. What are the most pressing issues around youth participation in peace building?
- 4. What did the project do in addressing the issues?
- 5. How did the project achieve its goals?
- 6. Was it relevant to tackle the problems?
- 7. What are the most important recidivism problems?
- 8. How did the project address the problems?
- 9. What is your assessment on the project relevant?
- 10. Who are the targets of the project?
- 11. What strategies and activities did the project take?
- 12. In your opinion, has the project selected the right targets and adopted the right strategies?

Effectiveness

- 1. How do you asses any consequences of the project results?
- 2. What are the negative and the positive consequences?
- 3. In your opinion, are the consequences unexpected?
- 4. What do you know about violent extremism?
- 5. How did the program improve youth understanding about violent extremism?
- 6. How did the program reduce youth susceptibility to extremist narratives?
- 7. What is your assessment on the school and campus' resilience against recruitment to violent extremist groups?
- 8. How did the student-led peace-building initiative increase the resilience?
- 9. What is the most important recruitment risk to violent extremism among youth groups?
- 10. What is the best way to deal with the risk?
- 11. How did a youth-to-youth approach reduce the risk?
- 12. What do you know about peer-to-peer strategy?
- 13. How did this strategy strengthen narratives to countering violent extremism?
- 14. How do you describe the change in perception towards violent extremism among the youth?
- 15. How did this change of perception lead them to be peace propagandist?
- 16. In your opinion, did the change also lead to discussion within their circle about the danger of violent extremist recruitment?
- 17. What do you know about new behaviors in relation to addressing extremist narratives?
- 18. Could you give examples of new behaviors?
- 19. How did the project affect the development of new behaviors?
- 20. What kind of difficulties faced by the ex-terrorist prisoners in their after-prison-life?
- 21. What kind of supports are received by the ex-terrorist?
- 22. How do you see the supports have weakened the push factors?
- 23. How do you see the supports have weakened the pull factors?

Coherence and Coordination

- 1. Could you give the best examples of cooperation between governments, CSOs, and private sector associated with the project initiatives?
- 2. Why do you take it (them) as best example(s)?
- 3. What are the enabling factors for the cooperation?
- 4. How is the cooperation supportive toward the project initiatives?
- 5. How does the collaboration between government, CSOs and private sector helping the reintegration of ex-offenders?
- 6. How does the collaboration reduce the push factors of recidivism?
- 7. How does the collaboration reduce the pull factors of recidivism?
- 8. What are the notable issues in the coordination between SFCG and its partners?
- 9. How do you rate the coordination in terms of the project accomplishment?
- 10. What are the enabling factors for the coordination?
- 11. What area(s) of coordination does need improvement?
- 12. What kind of difficulties do you find in this area(s) of coordination?
- 13. What is the best way to deal with those difficulties?
- 14. How do the implemented activities achieve the project objectives?
- 15. What are the factors that lead to the achievement of the objectives?
- 16. Do you find any gaps between the implemented activities and the objectives?
- 17. Why do the gaps occur?

Sustainability

- 1. What do you know about long-term processes in reducing the violent extremist recruitment and the recidivism risk? What are the most pressing issues?
- 2. In relation to this, what is the plan taken by the project team? What steps have been implemented?
- 3. In your opinion, are those plan and steps relevant to the long-term strategy?
- 4. Could you describe the students' ability in organizing formal and informal initiatives to counter violent extremism?
- 5. Could you give examples of the initiatives?
- 6. What is your assessment to the initiatives?
- 7. How will it reduce violent extremism in the longer run?
- 8. How do you asses the students' capacity?
- 9. What kind of resources/capital was at their disposal?
- 10. In your opinion, did the initiatives increase?
- 11. What is the long-term prospect of the initiatives?
- 12. What are the challenges?
- 13. What is the strategy to deal with the challenges?

Interview Guide for Government Officials

Relevance

- 1. What are the most pressing issues around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives?
- 2. What are the most pressing issues around youth participation in peace building?
- 3. What did the project do in addressing the issues?

- 4. How did the project achieve its goals?
- 5. Was it relevant to tackle the problems?
- 6. What are the most important recidivism problems?
- 7. How did the project address the problems?
- 8. What is your assessment on the project relevant?
- 9. Who are the targets of the project?
- 10. What strategies and activities did the project take?
- 11. In your opinion, has the project selected the right targets and adopted the right strategies?
- 12. How do you assess any consequences of the project results?

Effectiveness

- 1. What are the negative and the positive consequences?
- 2. In your opinion, are the consequences unexpected?
- 3. What kind of difficulties faced by the ex-terrorist prisoners in their afterprison-life?
- 4. What kind of supports are received by the ex-terrorist?
- 5. How do you see the supports have weakened the push factors?
- 6. How do you see the supports have weakened the pull factors?

Coherence and Coordination

- 1. Could you give the best examples of cooperation between governments, CSOs, and private sector associated with the project initiatives?
- 2. Why do you take it (them) as best example(s)?
- 3. What are the enabling factors for the cooperation?
- 4. How is the cooperation supportive toward the project initiatives?
- 5. How does the collaboration between government, CSOs and private sector helping the reintegration of ex-offenders?
- 6. How does the collaboration reduce the push factors of recidivism?
- 7. How does the collaboration reduce the pull factors of recidivism?
- 8. What are the notable issues in the coordination between SFCG and its partners?
- 9. How do you rate the coordination in terms of the project accomplishment?
- 10. What are the enabling factors for the coordination?
- 11. What area(s) of coordination does need improvement?
- 12. What kind of difficulties do you find in this area(s) of coordination?
- 13. What is the best way to deal with those difficulties?
- 14. How do the implemented activities achieve the project objectives?
- 15. What are the factors that lead to the achievement of the objectives?
- 16. Do you find any gaps between the implemented activities and the objectives?
- 17. Why do the gaps occur?

Sustainability

- 1. What do you know about long-term processes in reducing the violent extremist recruitment and the recidivism risk? What are the most pressing issues?
- 2. In relation to this, what is the plan taken by the project team? What steps have been implemented?

3. In your opinion, are those plan and steps relevant to the long-term strategy?

Interview Guide for CSO

Relevance

- 1. What are the most pressing issues around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives?
- 2. What are the most pressing issues around youth participation in peace building?
- 3. What did the project do in addressing the issues?
- 4. How did the project achieve its goals?
- 5. Was it relevant to tackle the problems?
- 6. What are the most important recidivism problems?
- 7. How did the project address the problems?
- 8. What is your assessment on the project relevant?
- 9. Who are the targets of the project?
- 10. What strategies and activities did the project take?
- 11. In your opinion, has the project selected the right targets and adopted the right strategies?

Effectiveness

- 1. How do you asses any consequences of the project results?
- 2. What are the negative and the positive consequences?
- 3. In your opinion, are the consequences unexpected?
- 4. What kind of difficulties faced by the ex-terrorist prisoners in their after-prison-life?
- 5. What kind of supports are received by the ex-terrorist?
- 6. How do you see the supports have weakened the push factors?
- 7. How do you see the supports have weakened the pull factors?

Coherence and Coordination

- 1. Could you give the best examples of cooperation between governments, CSOs, and private sector associated with the project initiatives?
- 2. Why do you take it (them) as best example(s)?
- 3. What are the enabling factors for the cooperation?
- 4. How is the cooperation supportive toward the project initiatives?
- 5. How does the collaboration between government, CSOs and private sector helping the reintegration of ex-offenders?
- 6. How does the collaboration reduce the push factors of recidivism?
- 7. How does the collaboration reduce the pull factors of recidivism?
- 8. What are the notable issues in the coordination between SFCG and its partners?
- 9. How do you rate the coordination in terms of the project accomplishment?
- 10. What are the enabling factors for the coordination?
- 11. What area(s) of coordination does need improvement?
- 12. What kind of difficulties do you find in this area(s) of coordination?
- 13. What is the best way to deal with those difficulties?
- 14. How do the implemented activities achieve the project objectives?
- 15. What are the factors that lead to the achievement of the objectives?

- 16. Do you find any gaps between the implemented activities and the objectives?
- 17. Why do the gaps occur?

Sustainability

- 1. What do you know about long-term processes in reducing the violent extremist recruitment and the recidivism risk? What are the most pressing issues?
- 2. In relation to this, what is the plan taken by the project team? What steps have been implemented?
- 3. In your opinion, are those plan and steps relevant to the long-term strategy?

Interview Guide for Ex-Offenders

Relevance

- 1. What are the most pressing issues around youth susceptibility to extremist narratives?
- 2. What are the most pressing issues around youth participation in peace building?
- 3. What did the project do in addressing the issues?
- 4. How did the project achieve its goals?
- 5. Was it relevant to tackle the problems?
- 6. What are the most important recidivism problems?
- 7. How did the project address the problems?
- 8. What is your assessment on the project relevant?
- 9. Who are the targets of the project?
- 10. What strategies and activities did the project take?
- 11. In your opinion, has the project selected the right targets and adopted the right strategies?

Effectiveness

- 1. How do you asses any consequences of the project results?
- 2. What are the negative and the positive consequences?
- 3. In your opinion, are the consequences unexpected?
- 4. What kind of difficulties faced by the ex-terrorist prisoners in their afterprison-life?
- 5. What kind of supports are received by the ex-terrorist?
- 6. How do you see the supports have weakened the push factors?
- 7. How do you see the supports have weakened the pull factors?

Coherence and Coordination

- 1. Could you give the best examples of cooperation between governments, CSOs, and private sector associated with the project initiatives?
- 2. Why do you take it (them) as best example(s)?
- 3. What are the enabling factors for the cooperation?
- 4. How is the cooperation supportive toward the project initiatives?
- 5. How does the collaboration between government, CSOs and private sector helping the reintegration of ex-offenders?
- 6. How does the collaboration reduce the push factors of recidivism?
- 7. How does the collaboration reduce the pull factors of recidivism?

Interview Guide for SFCG

Relevance

- 1. What are the most important recidivism problems?
- 2. How did the project address the problems?
- 3. What is your assessment on the project relevant?
- 4. Who are the targets of the project?
- 5. What strategies and activities did the project take?
- 6. In your opinion, has the project selected the right targets and adopted the right strategies?

Effectiveness

- 1. How do you asses any consequences of the project results?
- 2. What are the negative and the positive consequences?
- 3. In your opinion, are the consequences unexpected?

Coherence and Coordination

- 1. Could you give the best examples of cooperation between governments, CSOs, and private sector associated with the project initiatives?
- 2. Why do you take it (them) as best example(s)?
- 3. What are the enabling factors for the cooperation?
- 4. How is the cooperation supportive toward the project initiatives?
- 5. How does the collaboration between government, CSOs and private sector helping the reintegration of ex-offenders?
- 6. How does the collaboration reduce the push factors of recidivism?
- 7. How does the collaboration reduce the pull factors of recidivism?
- 8. What are the notable issues in the coordination between SFCG and its partners?
- 9. How do you rate the coordination in terms of the project accomplishment?
- 10. What are the enabling factors for the coordination?
- 11. What area(s) of coordination does need improvement?
- 12. What kind of difficulties do you find in this area(s) of coordination?
- 13. What is the best way to deal with those difficulties?
- 14. How do the implemented activities achieve the project objectives?
- 15. What are the factors that lead to the achievement of the objectives?
- 16. Do you find any gaps between the implemented activities and the objectives?
- 17. Why do the gaps occur?

Sustainability

- 1. What do you know about long-term processes in reducing the violent extremist recruitment and the recidivism risk? What are the most pressing issues?
- 2. In relation to this, what is the plan taken by the project team? What steps have been implemented?
- 3. In your opinion, are those plan and steps relevant to the long-term strategy?

Annex 5: Respondents List

No	Name	Organization	City
1	Dipa	Search for Common Ground	Bandung
2	Andika	Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia	Bandung
3	Mars	Komune Rakapare	Bandung
4	Anggar	Komune Rakapare	Bandung
5	Andi	Komune Rakapare	Bandung
6	Husein	Komune Rakapare	Bandung
7	Intan	Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia	Bandung
8	Tari	Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia	Bandung
9	Ucok	Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia	Bandung
10	Cita	Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia	Bandung
11	Robby	Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia	Bandung
12	Jojo	SMA N 6 Bandung	Bandung
13	Krani	Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia	Bandung
14	0ki	Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia	Bandung
15	Rifki	Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia	Bandung
16	Amir	Ex-offender	Jakarta
17	Bella	Universitas Negeri Jakarta	Jakarta
18	Fatur	Universitas Negeri Jakarta	Jakarta
19	Bowo	Komunitas Kelurahan Cempaka Baru	Jakarta
20	Darmono	Komunitas Kelurahan Cempaka Baru	Jakarta
21	Fajar	Komunitas Kelurahan Cempaka Baru	Jakarta
22	Refi	Komunitas Kelurahan Cempaka Baru	Jakarta
23	Ganang	Universitas Negeri Jakarta	Jakarta
24	Adit	Universitas Negeri Jakarta	Jakarta
25	Afis	Universitas Negeri Jakarta	Jakarta
26	Hamdan	Universitas Negeri Jakarta	Jakarta
27	Iko	Universitas Negeri Jakarta	Jakarta
28	Febri	Universitas Negeri Jakarta	Jakarta
29	Ical	Universitas Negeri Jakarta	Jakarta
30	Lusi	Kanwil Kementrian Hukum dan HAM	Jakarta
31	Mira	Search for Common Ground	Jakarta
32	Robby	Indonesia Muslim Crisis Center	Jakarta
33	Shakib	Indonesia Muslim Crisis Center	Jakarta
34	Rustini	BAPAS Jakarta	Jakarta
35	Sri	BAPAS Jakarta	Jakarta
36	Alfi	Ex-offender	Solo
37	Himawan	IAIN Surakarta	Solo

38	Dini	Universitas Muhammadyah Surakarta	Solo
39	Yeni	Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta	Solo
40	Ari	Ex-offender	Solo
41	Heri	Ex-offender	Solo
42	Denny	Ex-offender	Solo
43	Irfan	Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta	Solo
44	Sofan	POKJA	Solo
45	Sami	Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta	Solo
46	Sarif	Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta	Solo
47	Gusty	Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta	Solo
48	Dayu	Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta	Solo
49	Endah	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
50	Galih	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
51	Zaenab	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
52	Rasemi	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
5 3	Suandi	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
54	Fahrul	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
55	Manaen	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
56	Chio	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
57	Ngajo	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
58	Widya	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
59	Fani	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
60	Rahmawati	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
61	Wulan	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
62	Sendi	Universitas Tadulako	Palu
63	Adhie	Celebes Institute	Poso Poso
64	Anto	Ex-offender	Poso
65	Anwar	SMAN 3 Poso	Poso
66	Nurul	SMAN 3 Poso	Poso
67	Lurah	Lurah	Poso
68	Nesi	SMAN 3 Poso	Poso
69	Gerry	SMAN 3 Poso	Poso
69 70	Gerry Salumun	SMAN 3 Poso Ex-offender	Poso Poso
	<u>-</u>		

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Annex 6: Tables

Table 1

C:	Responden	Which of the following is a form of violent extremism? You can choose more one.								
City	t Categories	Acts of intolerance	Hate speech	Racist propaganda	Religious exclusion	Terrorism	Others			
Bandung	Student	18	19	48	43	58	5			
	(N=85)	21.2%	22.4%	56.5%	50.6%	68.2%	5.9%			
	University	12	6	17	15	16	2			
	Student (N=28)	42.9%	21.4%	60.7%	53.6%	57.1%	7.1%			
	All Bandung	30	25	65	58	74	7			
	(N=113)	26.5%	22.1%	57.5%	51.3%	65.5%	6.2%			
Solo	Student	6	5	10	8	18	1			
	(N=19)	31.6%	26.3%	52.6%	42.1%	94.7%	5.3%			
	University	8	7	11	13	20	2			
	Student (N=27)	29.6%	25.9%	40.7%	48.1%	74.1%	7.4%			
	Community	14	13	11	16	27	2			
	(N=31)	45.2%	41.9%	35.5%	51.6%	87.1%	6.5%			
	All Solo	28	25	32	37	65	5			
	(N=77)	36.4%	32.5%	41.6%	48.1%	84.4%	6.5%			
Jakarta	Student	9	16	11	20	20	5			
,	(N=41)	22.0%	39.0%	26.8%	48.8%	48.8%	12.2%			
	University	24	20	29	24	40	1			
	Student (N=57)	42.1%	35.1%	50.9%	42.1%	70.2%	1.8%			
	Community	25	12	14	16	36	1			
	(N=60)	41.7%	20.0%	23.3%	26.7%	60.0%	1.7%			
	All Jakarta	58	48	54	60	96	7			
	(N=158)	36.7%	30.4%	34.2%	38.0%	60.8%	4.4%			
Poso	Student	1	3	4	9	25	1			
	(N=29)	3.4%	10.3%	13.8%	31.0%	86.2%	3.4%			
	Community	19	8	9	10	25	3			
	(N=40)	47.5%	20.0%	22.5%	25.0%	62.5%	7.5%			
	All Poso	20	11	13	19	50	4			
	(N=69)	29.0%	15.9%	18.8%	27.5%	72.5%	5.8%			
Palu	Student	7	7	23	24	44	1			
	(N=62)	11.3%	11.3%	37.1%	38.7%	71.0%	1.6%			
	All Palu	7	7	23	24	44	1			
	(N=62)	11.3%	11.3%	37.1%	38.7%	71.0%	1.6%			
All cities	Student	41	50	96	104	165	13			
	(N=236)	17.4%	21.2%	40.7%	44.1%	69.9%	5.5%			
	University	44	33	57	52	76	5			
	Student (N=112)	39.3%	29.5%	50.9%	46.4%	67.9%	4.5%			
	Community	58	33	34	42	88	6			
	(N=131)	44.3%	25.2%	26.0%	32.1%	67.2%	4.6%			
	All categories	143	116	187	198	329	24			
	(N=479)	29.9%	24.2%	39.0%	41.3%	68.7%	5.0%			

Table 2

	Responde	Do you believe violence is justified under any circumstances?						
City	nt Categories	Yes, in general	No, never	Depends on the situation or case	Cannot say	Total		
	Ctudent	14	30	40	1	85		
Bandung	Student	16.5%	35.3%	47.1%	1.2%	100.0%		
	University	2	16	10	0	28		
	Student	7.1%	57.1%	35.7%	0.0%	100.0%		
	All	16	46	50	1	113		
	Bandung	14.2%	40.7%	44.2%	0.9%	100.0%		
	Student	2	3	14	0	19		
		10.5%	15.8%	73.7%	0.0%	100.0%		
	University	0	16	11	0	27		
Solo	Student	0.0%	59.3%	40.7%	0.0%	100.0%		
	Communit	3.2%	25.8%	21	3.2%	100.00/		
	У	3.2%	25.8%	67.7% 46	3.2%	100.0% 77		
	All Solo	3.9%	35.1%	59.7%	1.3%	100.0%		
		3.770	10	26	1.570	41		
	Student	9.8%	24.4%	63.4%	2.4%	100.0%		
	University	6	21	30	0	57		
	Student	10.5%	36.8%	52.6%	0.0%	100.0%		
Jakarta	Communit	6	38	15	1	60		
	у	10.0%	63.3%	25.0%	1.7%	100.0%		
	All Jakarta	16	69	71	2	158		
	Ali Jakai ta	10.1%	43.7%	44.9%	1.3%	100.0%		
	Student	1	6	22	0	29		
	Student	3.4%	20.7%	75.9%	0.0%	100.0%		
	Communit	2	22	15	1	40		
Poso	у	5.0%	55.0%	37.5%	2.5%	100.0%		
	All Poso	3	28	37	1	69		
	7111 1 030	4.3%	40.6%	53.6%	1.4%	100.0%		
	Student	5	21	36		62		
D. I	Student	8.1%	33.9%	58.1%		100.0%		
Palu	All Palu	5	21	36		62		
	All Falu	8.1%	33.9%	58.1%		100.0%		
	Student	26	70	138	2	236		
	Student	11.0%	29.7%	58.5%	0.8%	100.0%		
	University	8	53	51	0	112		
	Student	7.1%	47.3%	45.5%	0.0%	100.0%		
All cities	Communit	9	68	51	3	131		
	у	6.9%	51.9%	38.9%	2.3%	100.0%		
	All	43	191	240	5	479		
	categories	9.0%	39.9%	50.1%	1.0%	100.0%		

Table 3

		What was your reaction when <u>intolerance actions between some societal groups</u> took place in your city?									
Cities	Respondent Categories	No Answer s	I condemned the action, verbally or in written via social media	I showed support to the victims, verbally or in written via social media	I reported the perpetrators to the authority	I opposed them, even though I had to use violence as well	I kept silent	I joined them	Others*	Total	
	Students	1	10	14	32	4	16	1	7	85	
	Students	1.2%	11.8%	16.5%	37.6%	4.7%	18.8%	1.2%	8.2%	100.0%	
D	College	0	6	11	6	0	5	0	0	28	
Bandung	Students	0.0%	21.4%	39.3%	21.4%	0.0%	17.9%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	
	All Dandung	1	16	25	38	4	21	1	7	113	
	All Bandung	0.9%	14.2%	22.1%	33.6%	3.5%	18.6%	0.9%	6.2%	100.0%	
	Students		2	4	9	0	4		0	19	
	Students		10.5%	21.1%	47.4%	0.0%	21.1%		0.0%	100.0%	
	College		8	8	8	1	2		0	27	
Solo	Students		29.6%	29.6%	29.6%	3.7%	7.4%		0.0%	100.0%	
3010	Communities		15	4	11	0	0		1	31	
	Communices		48.4%	12.9%	35.5%	0.0%	0.0%		3.2%	100.0%	
	All Solo		25	16	28	1	6		1	77	
			32.5%	20.8%	36.4%	1.3%	7.8%		1.3%	100.0%	
	Students	1	11	4	20	1	4		0	41	
		2.4%	26.8%	9.8%	48.8%	2.4%	9.8%		0.0%	100.0%	
	College	2	15	21	11	0	7		1	57	
Iakarta	Students	3.5%	26.3%	36.8%	19.3%	0.0%	12.3%		1.8%	100.0%	
Jakarta	Communities	3	32	6	15	1	3		0	60	
	Communities	5.0%	53.3%	10.0%	25.0%	1.7%	5.0%		0.0%	100.0%	
	All Jakarta	6	58	31	46	2	14		1	158	
	Ali Jakai ta	3.8%	36.7%	19.6%	29.1%	1.3%	8.9%		0.6%	100.0%	
	Students	0	1	2	19		6		1	29	
	Students	0.0%	3.4%	6.9%	65.5%		20.7%		3.4%	100.0%	
Poso	Communities	10	12	3	12		1		2	40	
F 020	Communicies	25.0%	30.0%	7.5%	30.0%		2.5%		5.0%	100.0%	
	All Poso	10	13	5	31		7		3	69	
	All FUSU	14.5%	18.8%	7.2%	44.9%		10.1%		4.3%	100.0%	
Palu	Students		6	7	33	1	13		2	62	
1 aiu	Students		9.7%	11.3%	53.2%	1.6%	21.0%		3.2%	100.0%	

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			What was your reaction when intolerance actions between some societal groups took place in your city?									
Cities	Respondent Categories	No Answer S	I condemned the action, verbally or in written via social media	I showed support to the victims, verbally or in written via social media	I reported the perpetrators to the authority	I opposed them, even though I had to use violence as well	I kept silent	I joined them	Others*	Total		
	All Palu		6	7	33	1	13		2	62		
			9.7%	11.3%	53.2%	1.6%	21.0%		3.2%	100.0%		
	Students 0.	2	30	31	113	6	43	1	10	236		
		0.8%	12.7%	13.1%	47.9%	2.5%	18.2%	0.4%	4.2%	100.0%		
	College	2	29	40	25	1	14	0	1	112		
All cities	Students	1.8%	25.9%	35.7%	22.3%	0.9%	12.5%	0.0%	0.9%	100.0%		
All cities	Communities	13	59	13	38	1	4	0	3	131		
	Communicies	9.9%	45.0%	9.9%	29.0%	0.8%	3.1%	0.0%	2.3%	100.0%		
	All categories	17	118	84	176	8	61	1	14	479		
	All categories	3.5%	24.6%	17.5%	36.7%	1.7%	12.7%	0.2%	2.9%	100.0%		

Table 4

City	Respondent Categories	What passes your mind when you hear the word 'violence'?								
		Physical violence, Fight	Conflict, war, inter-group dispute, rebellion	Causing fear, danger, worry, anxiety, insecurity	Human rights violation, extraordinary crime, sadism	Coercion of will, threat, terror	Negative, vicious, harmful, malicious, inimitable behavior	No Answer	Total	
	Student	19	8	2	17	0	37	2	85	
	Student	22.4%	9.4%	2.4%	20.0%	0.0%	43.5%	2.4%	100.0%	
D	University	10	0	3	5	1	9	0	28	
Bandung	Student	35.7%	0.0%	10.7%	17.9%	3.6%	32.1%	0.0%	100.0%	
	All Bandung	29	8	5	22	1	46	2	113	
	All balluting	25.7%	7.1%	4.4%	19.5%	0.9%	40.7%	1.8%	100.0%	
	Student	4	6	0	1	1	7	0	19	
	Student	21.1%	31.6%	0.0%	5.3%	5.3%	36.8%	0.0%	100.0%	
	University Student	7	2	4	5	0	8	1	27	
0.1		25.9%	7.4%	14.8%	18.5%	0.0%	29.6%	3.7%	100.0%	
Solo	Community	4	2	8	4	3	9	1	31	
		12.9%	6.5%	25.8%	12.9%	9.7%	29.0%	3.2%	100.0%	
		15	10	12	10	4	24	2	77	
	All Solo	19.5%	13.0%	15.6%	13.0%	5.2%	31.2%	2.6%	100.0%	
	C. l.	5	2	3	8	0	16	7	41	
	Student	12.2%	4.9%	7.3%	19.5%	0.0%	39.0%	17.1%	100.0%	
	University	9	5	10	9	0	24	0	57	
	Student	15.8%	8.8%	17.5%	15.8%	0.0%	42.1%	0.0%	100.0%	
Jakarta		23	6	2	9	3	16	1	60	
	Community	38.3%	10.0%	3.3%	15.0%	5.0%	26.7%	1.7%	100.0%	
		37	13	15	26	3	56	8	158	
	All Jakarta	23.4%	8.2%	9.5%	16.5%	1.9%	35.4%	5.1%	100.0%	
Poso	Student	7	2	1	3		16	0	29	

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		What passes your mind when you hear the word 'violence'?								
City	Respondent Categories	Physical violence, Fight	Conflict, war, inter-group dispute, rebellion	Causing fear, danger, worry, anxiety, insecurity	Human rights violation, extraordinary crime, sadism	Coercion of will, threat, terror	Negative, vicious, harmful, malicious, inimitable behavior	No Answer	Total	
		24.1%	6.9%	3.4%	10.3%		55.2%	0.0%	100.0%	
	Community	11	1	3	6		16	3	40	
	Community	27.5%	2.5%	7.5%	15.0%		40.0%	7.5%	100.0%	
	All Poso	18	3	4	9		32	3	69	
	All Poso	26.1%	4.3%	5.8%	13.0%		46.4%	4.3%	100.0%	
	Student	8	6	2	12		33	1	62	
Palu		12.9%	9.7%	3.2%	19.4%		53.2%	1.6%	100.0%	
raiu	All Palu	8	6	2	12		33	1	62	
		12.9%	9.7%	3.2%	19.4%		53.2%	1.6%	100.0%	
	Student	43	24	8	41	1	109	10	236	
	Student	18.2%	10.2%	3.4%	17.4%	0.4%	46.2%	4.2%	100.0%	
	University	26	7	17	19	1	41	1	112	
All cities	Student	23.2%	6.3%	15.2%	17.0%	0.9%	36.6%	0.9%	100.0%	
All clues	Cit	38	9	13	19	6	41	5	131	
	Community	29.0%	6.9%	9.9%	14.5%	4.6%	31.3%	3.8%	100.0%	
	All goto gowi	107	40	38	79	8	191	16	479	
	All categories	22.3%	8.4%	7.9%	16.5%	1.7%	39.9%	3.3%	100.0%	