



CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CONFLIT SCAN

Project: Engaging Youth and Community Leaders to Prevent Mass Atrocities in Central African Republic (CAR)

Bangui – 3rd, 5th and 6th *arrondissements* – Neighborhoods PK5, Fatima et Miskine

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Executive summary

This conflict scan report is based on quantitative and qualitative data collected during July 2017. A mini survey was conducted for 105 youth and community leaders identified in the framework of the project. These respondents included 37 women and 27% of them identified as Muslim. In addition to the mini survey, 7 focus group discussions and 6 key informant interviews were organized, for a total of 81 individuals (47 men and 34 women).

The objective of the conflict scan is to ensure the project's conflict sensitivity and the respect of the Do No Harm principle through an updated comprehension of the main conflicts and their dynamics in the project implementation areas (Fatime, Miskine, Yakité, and PK5). In annex III, you will find the collected data that may inform Search and CSO on the progress of project indicators, in order to better prepare the project exit strategy.

The analysis revealed that the main issues leading to conflicts within the population are related to access to services and economic resources, urban management, domestic conflicts, religious discrimination, power structures/systems/dynamics, and political conflicts with an ethnic component. These conflicts manifest themselves in different ways; some can be violent and physical. The conflicts related to access to economic resources, power dynamics and domestic conflicts have the highest risk and degree of violence. Conflicts related to land disputes, religious discrimination, and politics are volatile conflicts that stir up tension which can cause national and regional conflicts. Simultaneously, there is another type of conflict within the Muslim community between host "indigenous" communities of PK5 and the displaced ones fleeing the crisis.

This study shows that there is no particularly visible actor or contributor to the conflicts except for the self-defense groups (GAD) who are taking the front lines as conflict drivers as opposed to the Séléka and Anti-Balaka. The dividing lines between people in conflict are not aligned with religious identity but more often align with socio-economic inequalities. The principle target beneficiaries of the project are the youth and community leaders. They represent key entry points for the project as they are essential barriers and mediators mitigating tendencies to turn towards violence when these mentioned conflicts arise.

Do No Harm

This study also aims to identify conflicts in the community resulting from NGO initiatives, and in particular Search's work. The study showed that the methodology of beneficiary identification caused conflicts between traditional authorities and the community. Some NGOs go directly through traditional authorities to identify project beneficiaries. However, community members do not appreciate this methodology of identification because they believe that authorities try to put this system to their own profit by exploiting others who wish to benefit from the project (making money off of beneficiaries for example). Consequently, it is essential for NGOs to be more transparent and clear in the management and identification of their beneficiaries by applying more direct supervision to the identification process, led by community leaders and traditional authorities. The notion of NGO accountability is also a contentious point for the community. Some communities feel that NGOs do not report back to communities suitably. Although Search was not directly associated to these issues brought up by those surveyed, it is important for the organization to take these into account in our project implementation as the project has not anticipated and budgeted for a restitution of its evaluation and final results.

Windows of opportunity for peace

This study highlights that key players ready to contribute to a peaceful resolution of conflicts include religious leaders, traditional authorities, youth leaders, community leaders, the elders, and female leaders. These individuals are those who are always present when the population most needs

leadership. They are also those who actively share messages of appeasement during crisis periods. However, these individuals are faced with social and security obstacles that prevent them from fulfilling their mission and roles. Administrative authorities and the government also wish to contribute but they are limited by their loss of influence and credibility to the detriment of GADs and armed groups in general. The population perceives these administrative authorities and the government as absent because they have not deployed effective solutions to solve conflicts in a non-violent manner.

Conclusion

In comparison to the previous conflict scan, the situation has not changed drastically in terms of types and categories of conflicts identified. The biggest changes observed pertain to the degree, intensity, and impact of conflicts and the different actors in this context. In our interactions with participants, we observe the absence of the Séléka and the AB as principal actors of conflicts. The focus previously centered on the crisis of 2013 has now diminished. Participants are now mentioning the local level conflicts more than the crisis of 2013. Even though many initiatives have contributed to improved social cohesion between communities, these efforts need to be reinforced. The two communities still do not trust each other completely because of the tense national climate. Finally, we saw that communities are unsatisfied with the procedures and methodology for beneficiary selection applied by NGOs. Search, despite not being cited, may be associated with these groups. Consequently, Search recommends that humanitarian actors, donors, and the government may focus their attention on reducing the impact of those risks and conflicts.

Support an inclusive strategy for social cohesion

- Coordinate with community leaders, local authorities, and other NGOs intervening in the sector of social cohesion to organize townhall style meetings in order to find inclusive solutions to local problems,
- Present findings of this study to the main representatives of each area including local authorities, government representatives, district chiefs, and community leaders for awareness at all levels.

Communicate on risks

Reinforce radio communication on:

- Trash disposal and management
- Management of public spaces and goods
- Management of land disputes

For the government: reinforce institutions and urban management

- Monitor and track the limits between livestock grazing areas, farming areas, and living areas,
- Provide logistical support and means to facilitate the evacuation of trash
- Support ENERCA (Central African Energy) in finding solutions to ease popular access to their services
- Reinforce the presence of law enforcement entities at each large intersections to encourage free circulation of all communities
- Review cadastral plans

Introduction

The project “Engaging Youth and Community Leaders to Prevent Mass Atrocities in the Central African Republic” is operating in a context where conflicts are fueled by political manipulation along ethno-religious lines, and which is materialized by multiple clashes between the pro-Muslim Ex-Seleka and the pro-Christians Anti-Balaka. Although these conflicts have decreased since 2013, sporadic clashes between communities appear cyclically and can lead to mass atrocities. The city of Bangui is particularly susceptible to waves of violence, notably around the Muslim enclave of the PK5. The violence has led to the creation of self-defense militias which in turn feed distrust and hatred between communities.

It is in this context that SFCG, with funding from the bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), has proposed a program of 12 months to prevent high-risk atrocities between Muslims and Christians in the PK5 and its surrounding areas. In order to achieve this goal, SFCG proposed three specific objectives:

- 1) Youth in the neighborhood of PK5, Yakité, Fatima and Miskine are deterred from participating in atrocities;
- 2) Targeted youth from PK5, Yakité, Fatima and Miskine resist political manipulation to commit violence;
- 3) Alternative livelihood activities for at-risk youth are promoted, diverting them away from political manipulation and violence.

The young people targeted by the project are considered "at risk" because they live in PK5 neighborhoods, Yakite, Fatima and Miskine. These neighbourhoods have been identified as at risk for violence on the basis of research produced by SFCG as well as other organizations and researchers. The PK5 district is an area where Muslims took refuge after the departure of ex-president Michel Djotodja, and also where Muslims have formed self-defense groups. This area has been the scene of repeated violence since 2013. Notably in September 2015, the death of a young Muslim led a wave of 5 days of violence, the violence was mostly carried out by Muslim militias but also involved groups coming from the Anti-Balaka. In October of the same year, six Christian hostages were murdered. In the neighborhoods of Fatima and Miskine, which are close to the PK5 enclave, groups from the Anti-Balaka have erected barriers to prevent the PK5 self-defense militias from entering their sectors. Finally, the Yakite district is divided into two zones. Muslim self-defense militias control one part of the area, and the Anti-Balaka control another part. These different positions confine the population of these neighborhoods, especially the youth, who cannot freely circulate and pursue their activities. Youth who attempt to move freely are at risk of being accused of being accomplices of the “other” armed groups (self-defense or Anti-Balaka) who are considered as enemies. Thus, young people cannot easily go to other areas out of fear of being perceived as spies or enemies.

Objectives of the Conflict Scan

In order to provide better guidance on conflict dynamics for the project and future proposals, it was important for SFCG-CAR to understand and identify the different conflicts occurring in Bangui, in particular in PK5 and its surrounding areas. There was also a need to map conflicts between religious and identity groups located in Bangui, as they are at a significant risk for violence in a general context of highly-volatile socio-political developments.

SFCG has therefore completed this conflict scan in order to identify the main conflicts and their dynamics in the targeted areas of Bangui. The objective of this conflict scan is to ensure the project's conflict sensitivity and the respect of the Do No Harm principle through an updated comprehension of the main conflicts and their dynamics in the project implementation areas (Fatime, Miskine, Yakité, and PK5). In annex III, you will find the collected data that may inform Search and CSO on the progress of project indicators, in order to better prepare the project exit strategy.

The specific objectives of this conflict scan are the following:

- Inform and adapt project and activity implementation by identifying entry points, leverages and opportunities for peace.
- Provide information which will support the various actors, including SFCG and its partners, in the development of different conflict scenarios to plan for rapid and appropriate responses.
- Support Search and the international community in designing interventions that are conflict sensitive by identifying changes in conflict dynamics and existing conflicts with risks of violence.

Methodology

To carry out this study, SFCG used:

- Qualitative data collection methods in order to collect perceptions of target groups on context changes. This methodology is based on data collection through two main activities: focus group discussions with community members and interviews with key informants.
- A quantitative method via a survey in order to measure, evaluate and quantify this perception.

The preparation and coordination strategy of this study were elaborated by the design, monitoring and evaluation team (DME) from data collection tools to planning to the writing of the final report. The regional Institutional Learning Team (ILT) provided support for the validation of tools, methodology, and final report.


Conflict Analysis

For each step of this analysis, we will compare data from this conflict scan and the previous one completed in December 2016. The previous conflict scan had a sample of 370 people for the mini-survey as opposed to 105 in this scan. Given this, the comparison of results will focus mainly on the tendencies and trends in order to provide an adequate overview of the conflict dynamic and situation.

Current conflict situation

Main existing conflicts

Graph 1: The most common types of conflicts (in %)



The graph here shows that most conflicts identified during this conflict scan had already been identified in the previous one – with the exception of problems related to social discrimination as it was a new possible response. However, the patterns of these conflicts identified are different. In December 2016, many conflicts were not clearly identified: 40% of respondents did not know how to answer the question, 20% refused to answer, and 17% stated that conflicts could not be categorized. The results of this study are different and much clearer than the previous scan.

Crossing the data from focus group discussions, individual interviews, and the mini survey shows that there are 7 types of conflicts: land disputes, access to services or urban management, access to economic resources, domestic conflicts, religious discrimination, power dynamics, and political conflicts with an ethnic component. It is important to note that the quantitative data shows that political conflicts represent a high proportion of answers but this was not so important in the qualitative data, which lets us think that those political tensions are considered more as latent conflicts.

The various conflicts manifest themselves in different forms. Most end up as violent verbal disputes that may lead to physical violence (physical assaults, punches, etc.).

Land disputes

Land dispute conflicts were often cited in focus group discussions and individual interviews. These are considered the most common conflict by 9% of individuals surveyed. They are visible in 4 different ways.

(1) Conflict between neighbors because of poor management of land plots. Some people go over the limits of their parcel as land purchases are poorly organized, do not rely on the land registry, as there is poor urban planning in some districts, and/or because cadastral plans were changed in certain areas.

(2) Conflicts related to the controversial illegal occupation of land plots, engendering violent verbal disputes that can lead to physical violence. Indeed, some people who fled the crisis are coming back to land plots that are now occupied. The occupants sometimes refuse to evacuate the plots. It is important to note that many lost their houses and property during the crisis and were consequently forced to leave the area. Those who lost their property were forced to occupy the houses of those who had left. This is a recurring case (24%) in the Yakité neighborhood. Both communities were present in Yakité during moments of highest tension and the district was almost divided in two: one part controlled by the Anti-Balaka and the other by the ex-Séléka. Each community sought refuge in the part controlled by the groups that are favorable to them.

(3) Conflicts related to the uncontrolled increase in the prices of rented houses particularly in the PK5 sector. The increased demand generated by the demographic shift and concentration of Muslims of Bangui in PK5 led to price hikes. Property owners decide to regularly increase the prices of their rented houses. Others, in particular merchants, also increased rent in order to make current tenants leave.

(4) The conflict related to transhumance and large livestock is a very frequent conflict in the south-west exit of Bangui. Nomadic livestock keepers are confronted to locals because of the movements of their herds. The large cattle destroy the gardens and the fields of the inhabitants, causing the anger of the latter, who attack the owners of the animals, even killing some of them which often represents a huge loss of capital. The path taken by these herds has been dedicated for several years by the government to the movement of herds to the slaughterhouse and/or pasture but due to the demographic increase of the population in these zones, houses, fields, and gardens have encroached and developed on these paths. The population demands that the axes for the passage of herds be changed while livestock owners recall that it is a path that is dedicated for their use and that they are obliged to pass there. For other animals (dogs, goats, sheep, cats etc.), they are left to circulate freely in the districts. They cause property damage and sometimes attack people, causing disputes between the owners of the animals and property owners/victims. *“One day, a goat overturned a woman’s cassava and this led to a fight between her, her family, and the family responsible for the goat.”* (Focus group discussion participant from male, non-Muslim group). For the victims of damage, the animal owners must set up fences and/or chain the animals to prevent them from moving freely around the neighborhoods. They think owner of these animals should assume the costs and compensate for the damages caused by their animals. However, the owners accuse the others of leaving their possessions within the reach of the animals.

Conflicts related to access to services

The second type of conflict identified is the conflict related to the access to urban services. This can include conflicts due to the chaotic waste disposal, electricity piracy and management of water points. This type of conflict was cited as the most frequent conflict by 5% of respondents in the mini-survey and was frequently cited in focus groups and interviews.

First, these conflicts emanated mostly from the pirating of power supply. The conflict can be between the illegal distributors of electricity in neighborhoods and their customers on payment or the conflict can be related to the passing of electricity wires through a neighbor's concession to exploit the power. The need to tap into other people's power supply and electricity comes from the fact that not everyone has the possibility to subscribe to the ENERCA (Central African Energy) considering that the prices can be deemed too high. In light of this, some pirate the power supply of their neighbors and others distribute the power and electricity to their neighbors for a compensation. Before the crisis, ENERCA - with the support of the police, patrolled neighborhoods to track illegal electricity distributors and piracy. However, now there is not any policy or measure in place to track these illegal dealings.

Secondly, there are multiple disputes around the rare water points. A traditional leader mentioned that "above all, people are fighting over the pumps that give rise to the conflicts". The rarity of water points arises from several reasons, the main ones being: (1) many water wells - which are the most used sources of water - are no longer functional because of corpses that have been thrown into them, (2) SODECA (Water Distribution Company in the Central African Republic) cannot serve all the districts of Bangui because of the low water pressure causing constant water cuts, and (3) the drought has led to the drying up of certain water wells.

There are also disputes around the chaotic random deposit of waste. The main contentions around these disputes pertain to: (1) some people throwing their waste and garbage on the space of others when their spaces are saturated which causes other people's waste volume to increase, (2) rumors of others allowing their garbage to be deliberately carried away by rainwater so that they may throw garbage into the concession of others, and (3) frustration and anger towards people outside of the neighborhood dumping their waste within certain neighborhoods and increasing the bad odors. The main problem is that there is an insufficiency of garbage rings and dump sites in the city of Bangui. Some of these rings are already full and overflowing. The absence and the poor condition or maintenance of water channels enhances the waste disposal and garbage deposit problem because water circulation carries objects from one concession to another. The city has not been able to regularly empty garbage rings for a certain time now which has led to many strikes and protests. This may be due to the city's limited financial means which constrain its logistical ability to respond adequately to the growing needs of the population.

Finally, the illegal use of toilets is also a cause of conflict. Some families, due to lack of resources, are not able to repair or empty their already-filled toilets. Many also do not have any and are thus facing the necessity to use their neighbors' facilities to relieve themselves, with or without the owners' consent.

Domestic Conflict

The third type of conflict is related to domestic problems. This conflict is one of the most frequently cited conflicts in the mini-survey (14%), focus groups and interviews. Indeed, problems around the share of inherited goods after the death of a family member is a phenomenon that occurs frequently, sometimes resulting in legal proceedings between certain family members. The conflict usually opposes children and the parents of the deceased in terms of property recovery and allocation. Through the current project and the project on justice, SFCG can address this issue by raising awareness via spot and calls on ABA's services for advice and guidance on this conflict.

Conflicts related to religious discrimination

The fourth type of conflict identified is linked to religious discrimination, which can be seen through denying Muslim victims the fundamental right to move freely in the city, but particularly in different sectors of Bangui. The numbers of the mini-survey place the conflict at the same level as domestic conflicts (14%). It is difficult for Muslims to go to certain areas dominated by Christians. They are subject to discrimination when accessing basic social services. This conflict had already been highlighted in December's study. However, the conflict lost its intensity because it was previously classified amongst the most violent conflicts, which is no longer the case. We consider that this conflict emerges from inequality, a sense of injustice, and is not associated with a specific religion.

Conflicts related to power dynamics

The conflicts related to the structure/systems/dynamics of power manifest through the monopoly of power and authority of self-defense groups (GAD) over the Muslim community of PK5. The State's authority is virtually absent in this sector of Bangui and the GADs are the ones that make decisions and laws to govern the communities living in the PK5. GADs are responsible for settling disputes and expect communities to pay a large sum of money for these services. In the event of disputes between a member of the Muslim community and that of a non-Muslim community, it has been found that the settlement is often in favor of the Muslim community. The police station in the 3rd district, which is located at PK5, is currently operational. However, due to the lack of personnel and logistical resources and their weak influence, the local community, despite all this, resort to the GAD to solve their issues.

The **conflict between political entities** is the most frequently cited type of conflict in the mini-survey (22%) and is related with the ethnic affiliation of these entities. According to our study, it is a conflict that originates in the composition of party members according to their ethnicity and sector. The Miskine area is the only area where this conflict has not been brought up unlike the other zones surveyed. This may be due to the diversity of ethnic groups in the area and the lack of dominating ethnic group. The current context is that it is difficult to criticize a political party in its stronghold or in the presence of people who are of the same ethnic group as the founding president. For example, when we talk about the RCD (Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain) party, everyone is referring to the Yakoma ethnic group and it is difficult to criticize this party in the presence of a Yakoma or in a sector dominated by the Yakoma ethnic group. Gbaka ethnic group are recognized as supporters of MDD (Democratic Development Movement), the Gbaya for the KNK party, the Kaba for the Central African People's Liberation Movement (MLPC) party.


Conflict related to the access to economic resources

Finally, the last type of conflict identified is the one related to access to economic resources that can be especially observed through the management of PK5 trader kiosks. It is ranked as the second (15.2%) most cited common type of conflict. Those who sold products before the crisis had to flee, abandoning their points of sale and kiosks. When they returned, they no longer had access to the kiosks they owned nor the market in which they were selling before they left. Some people feel threatened because they are considered non-native to the sector because they have come from another sector. A FACA representative explains during an individual interview that: *"Here, we see that the robbery and the problems with the kiosks manifest on a daily basis because Christians who had kiosks before the crisis no longer have access to their kiosks now due to the fact that Muslims now occupy them which puts Christians in a bad position."* The GADs also require merchants to pay taxes and sometimes take the freedom to confiscate kiosks or limit access to them depending on who is requesting their services to settle certain disagreements.

In conclusion, we can see an evolution since the first study where communities were not able to identify conflicts in a specific way. The great crisis was hiding the secondary crises. As the great crisis is lowering in intensity, the community is becoming more aware of the secondary conflicts that existed within their community. It is too early to say that the great crisis is already disappearing from the community's minds, but it is more latent behind other daily conflicts, which may become triggers rekindling the crisis. The different conflicts identified are generally conflicts that exist within communities but can become the causes of community-based conflict depending on the frequency, degree of violence and risk of conflagration. For example, political conflict can lead to inter-ethnic conflict. It is important to guide the community to peacefully manage these different conflicts in order to avoid their spread. The project engages youth and community leaders to prevent mass atrocities in the CAR and can help halt trends of violence in these conflicts through its SMS prevention campaign activities and radio spots promoting peace and dialogue; and on community meetings to discuss and find common and inclusive solutions.

Most Violent Conflicts and Highest Risks


Graph 2: Conflicts that give rise to the most physical violence in your community (%)



The graph above shows that patterns for the most violent conflicts has barely changed between the two studies (December 2016 and the current one) even if the proportions are different. The political conflicts and the conflicts related to accessing economic resources remain the two conflicts which result most often in physical violence. Issues linked to social discrimination are also amongst the most common causes of violent conflict.

To classify conflicts according to the risk of violence they represent, we have established scales based on qualitative data. The scales from the qualitative data are based on the statements and perceptions of the focus group participants and individual interviews on the dangers that these conflicts pose to their community.

Graph 3: Visualization of conflict according to the risk and violence frequency



Legend:

- **Red** = High risk and volatility,
- **Jaune** = Medium risk and volatility,
- **Blanc** = Low or inexistent risk and volatility

From the graph above, we observe that the conflict related to access to economic resources is the conflict which has the highest degree of danger given the level of its risk, its violence, and its frequency of violence. "Robbery, conflict over land plots, and conflict over the use of kiosks are the most violent conflicts in our community. It is said because these three conflicts cause individuals to fight on a daily basis and often lead to wounded." (Military Authority). This conflict is followed by the conflict related to power dynamics in terms of risk of violence and frequency.

Land conflict, although not presenting a risk of conflagration, is one of the most frequent conflicts and is relatively violent. "There are too many problems with the return of home owners in our community," asserted a Muslim self-defense official of PK5.

The same recommendations made in the previous section in terms of frequency of programming and broadcast on conflicts apply to this section for radio awareness. Conflicts presenting risks of conflagration require community reflection for collective and inclusive actions.

Table 1: Main conflicts which give rise to physical violence according to the district (%)

The conflict which gives rise to the most physical violence	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
Political conflicts	6,3%	23,3%	32,1%	10,0%	19,2%
Abuse of power	12,5%	0,0%	7,1%	0,0%	3,8%
Domestic conflict	12,5%	16,7%	7,1%	10,0%	11,5%
Land conflicts	12,5%	6,7%	17,9%	3,3%	9,6%
Conflicts about access to economic resources	25,0%	10,0%	14,3%	16,7%	15,4%
Conflicts about access to services	0,0%	13,3%	17,9%	3,3%	9,6%
Issues related to social discrimination	18,8%	16,7%	3,6%	16,7%	13,5%
Other	12,5%	13,3%	0,0%	30,0%	14,4%
NSP	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	10,0%	2,9%

The table allows us to see the violence of the conflicts according to the different zones. It can be seen that the conflict of abuse of power is more violent in PK5 and Yakite. This context could be explained by the fact that these areas are those where the GADs are present and considered to be the alleged instigators of the conflict, whereas these GADs do not exist in the other two zones.


These two neighborhoods were home to the two communities, but after the crisis, they are almost subdivided into two, with the GADs controlling one part and the Anti-Balaka controlling another part. This position makes Muslims much more likely to base themselves on the side of the GAD and Christians on the side of the Anti-Balaka. Some left their homes during the crisis. These homes were then occupied by those who stayed and who are for the most part, people from another community. As a result, after a period of calm, the reclaiming of the homes and properties is often tense and sometimes can become violent. The areas of Fatima and Miskine have also experienced similar displacements. There, the Muslim population was displaced leaving their homes that are now occupied by Christians. Until now, Muslims have not been able to access these two neighborhoods. This explains the predominance of land-related violence in Yakité and PK5 and not in Fatima and Miskine.

Main Risks

The conflicts identified exist and can become widespread and/or generate other conflicts at the community level or affect latent conflicts that exist but have not yet had any perceivable effects.

According to the mini-survey, conflicts presenting risks are political conflicts (35%), conflicts of access to economic resources (12%), issues related to social discrimination (9%), abuse of power (8%), and land disputes (8%), including those related to transhumance. *"A widespread crisis between the two communities (Muslim and Christian) is likely to arise because there are Muslims who live illegally in the house of Christians and vice versa"* (Military Authority). These different conflicts constitute risks of conflagration of a district and / or the whole capital of Bangui because if actions are not undertaken to calm them, these conflicts can lead to revolts either against the government or against the people from other communities. *"Ethnic and inter-community conflicts are likely to arise because in our community, people want to talk a lot about ethnic groups, which is often the source of several conflicts"*. (Administrative Authority).

Graph 4: Main type of conflict that risks to harm the community's future (%)



Another type of conflict is growing within Muslim communities. At the root of this potential conflict is the marginalization and stigmatization of Muslim communities living in PK5. Indeed, Muslims from other communities who move to PK5 feel neglected and think that they do not have the same rights as the Muslims already living in PK5. They feel rejected by those who consider themselves “natives”. For some of the Muslims native to PK5, other Muslims arriving are “women” because they fled their enemies and they are responsible for bringing disorder and hatred to the PK5 zone. For the Muslims arriving in PK5, they believe that they should have common rights and should have the right to stay in PK5.


Actors of the conflicts

Actors or group of actors in current conflicts

The different conflicts mentioned above do not have specific actors. The actors vary according to context and circumstances. Actors and victims are often members of the community. Certain people have been targeted as alleged actors in some conflicts: the illegal distributors of electricity for conflicts related to electricity piracy, livestock owners for conflicts related to transhumance and damage caused by cattle, rented property owners for conflicts related to illegal increase in house prices, and self-defense groups (GAD). Compared to the previous study, the aforementioned actors remain key players in some conflicts. The main difference is that participants reported a decrease in the intensity of crimes committed by the GAD.

Main dividing lines of conflict actors

Graph 5: Distribution of dividing lines splitting communities in conflict (%)



The graph above shows some changes on the main dividing lines of actors in conflict between the two last studies. Trends show that the actors in conflict are now mainly divided by "divergence of opinion (41.3%)" and to a lesser extent "difference of religion (24%)". As in the previous study, it is still perceived that the divide is not deeply seated in religious communities but on differences of

opinion, notably political ones. SFCG, through this project can organize popular meetings to address this issue so that community leaders and youth involved in this project can work together with the local authorities to find ways to get different parties in conflict to understand the interests of each other and use the common points for a lasting peace.

Do No Harm

The objective is to identify the conflicts that NGOs and especially SFCG could create in the framework of the project "Engaging youth and community leaders to prevent mass atrocities in the CAR".

In the eyes of the community, the approach to identify beneficiaries creates conflict between members of the community, community leaders and traditional authorities.

Some participants in the conflict scan saw NGOs often going through the heads of districts to identify the beneficiaries. These heads of districts would often suggest or select their close relatives or would have those interested in being beneficiaries pay for a spot to participate. Almost all members of the community mentioned that the sum of 10,000 FCFA needed to be paid in order to be identified as a beneficiary and participate in the rehabilitation activities set up by some NGOs. As a consequence, the same people end up benefitting from programs and selection criteria are not targeting those most in need. *"Too many problems for NGOs in the field because their policy of beneficiary identification is not good. They work directly with district leaders. This makes the community no longer want certain NGOs because of their association with the behavior of the leaders"* explained a woman in a discussion group. *"One day, I went to identify myself, the head of district who is the recruitment manager asked me for 10,000 FCFA before I can be selected"* said a Muslim woman.

On the other hand, district leaders think that the procedure of beneficiary selection puts them in danger because members of the community accuse them of being biased, corrupt, and untrustworthy. *"Especially we chiefs. People say that we are the ones who hamper the actions on the ground and also the identification of the beneficiaries for activities,"* explained a traditional leader in a focus group discussion.

The different targets proposed that there should be more clarity and transparency in the management and identification of beneficiaries by involving community leaders in addition to traditional authorities for multi-level coordination with a rigorous monitoring system set up by NGOs. *"We ask NGOs not to trust the leaders especially in the case of identification of beneficiaries because the leaders are corrupt and do not give any satisfaction"* (young Muslim). Some want international NGOs to work with national NGOs for greater transparency and neutrality. There is also a question of accountability that is being asked of NGOs. For all respondents, NGOs must inform the community about projects affecting the community by making a restitution at the end of the project to their direct representatives (local authorities, traditional authority, community leaders, etc.).

Different opinions show that the perception of the communities on the identification of the beneficiaries of projects is not very positive. SFCG, which is not a well-known NGO because it is not active in large-scale distributions, risks being associated to other NGOs and this could have negative impacts on its visibility in the framework of project implementation. In addition, the project did not foresee workshops or restitutions for final results to inform the government, civil society, as well as the community. Therefore, it is very important for the rest of project activities that project managers adopt a very transparent and regular communication on the project and its results. The most ideal solution is the inclusion of community leaders and local authorities in the identification of beneficiaries. SFCG and CSO can also work together to include sessions for the restitution of the overall results of the project to the project's community representatives in order to inform the community on what the project brings to their sector.

Finally, we sought to find out what were the good practices of NGOs. Awareness-raising policy and outreach activities accompanied by income generating activities (IGA) are perceived to have had a great deal of impact and success in the community. For them, it is a policy that NGOs must follow in order to achieve large scale performance. Within the framework of this project, IGA training is planned.

Opportunities for Peace

Actors who are willing to interact for peace and reconciliation

The involvement of traditional authorities and civil society is felt through their very active participation in solving conflicts, in particular with the messages they share and meetings that they organize. In this regard, it is said that religious leaders, traditional authorities, young leaders, community leaders, elders and women leaders are considered in the category of people willing to work for peace. *"Religious leaders, authorities, community associations and NGOs are doing their best to cope with all the conflicts that have developed,"* said a religious leader. A PK5 community leader says, *"Religious leaders, civil authorities and other personalities are the ones who provide advice before, during and after the crisis in our community."*

Moreover, the actions of the administrative authorities are relatively appreciated because their action is very limited and their influence fell sharply with the crisis. *"Authorities such as mayors, district leaders, and councilors do their job well, but the work is not accomplished because their power or authority is decreasing. On the other hand, civil society plays its role well but is still threatened by those who hold weapons"* (military authority). *"These authorities work, but they do not have any weight in the exercise of their function because weapons are still circulating and people are ready to have a negative reaction"* (PK5 community leader).

Similarly, the role of the central government in conflict resolution is perceived differently among the communities, community leaders and traditional authorities. For some, the government is not involved at all in the search for a peaceful resolution to conflict. According to them, this government is non-existent and does not play its role in all crises. It does not make enough effort to rearm the FACA, which is for them, the effective way to resolve conflict. Gaps in urban management, such as waste management, contribute to this assessment. The Government is thus judged as being too passive and is criticized for its absence on the ground outside of Bangui, especially when the population needs it most. *"We really do not see its role in resolution if conflicts arise day after day. If the municipal and traditional authorities that are the intermediaries did not exist, the situation would be much worse"* (Muslim woman).

For others, the Government is trying to intervene as best as they can in the positive resolution of conflicts by meeting the different parties in conflict and multiplying messages of relief to the affected population. However, the latter are overwhelmed by the lack of means and strength when facing and defending the population as they are expected to. Combined with the gradual loss of their authority and legitimacy within the community, it is difficult for the government to make efforts to resolve conflicts peacefully through its representatives like the mayor and chiefs of districts. Many consider them as people who take advantage of the conflict to make money and are biased in certain situations. *"The government intervenes in conflict resolution through the authorities (mayors, chiefs and councilors) who are doing their best to resolve conflicts at a basic level. But in general, their efforts are not appreciated by the community"* (military authority).

Main mechanisms for conflict resolution

In PK5, most conflicts are solved informally and handled by the GADs which are not a legitimate entity in the eyes of the government and the international community. In the absence of State authority, the GADs are the only law enforcement forces. They use this position and power to provide for their own needs and resistance. Some people are forced to involve them out of fear of reprisals. In other districts, the resolution is mainly mediated under the supervision of the district heads with the contribution of community leaders and / or religious leaders.

Some points of entry have been suggested such as common water points to raise awareness regarding conflicts related to the shared management and use of these water points. Sport activities involving conflicting parties or public meetings can also be a way to better approach conflict resolution according to some participants in the study.

The current project can therefore continue to use community leaders and youth as entry points to reach out to other members of the community because of their good relationship with the general population. The activities of popular gathering should make it possible to resolve certain conflicts raised in this report envisioning a collective solution. Although the spots have already reached the limits set in the proposal, it is considered important to continue producing and disseminating them if the budget is available in order to respond to the recommendations on the raised themes.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

This study has allowed us to highlight the perceptions and trends of communities on their experience of conflict in certain districts of Bangui (Fatima, Yakité, Miskine, PK5) and identify the leading authorities on the matter. Although the data only reflects certain districts of Bangui and certain groups of the population, we can extrapolate it to the capital because of the proximity and homogeneity of certain districts in Bangui. Through this study, we are able to identify the current problems in these districts and to what extent SFCG, other partners, NGOs, and donors can intervene to overcome these problems. We have found that the causes of disagreements are not based on the tendency to separate religious communities but more so on political opinions and socio-economic inequalities.

In comparison to the results of the previous conflict scan in December 2016, this scan shows more conflicts because participants were able to more effectively outline secondary conflicts hidden behind the great crisis. Conflicts such as "inter-household conflicts", "land dispute conflicts", "conflicts of access to economic resources" and "political conflicts" that were considered to a lesser extent in the previous scan have now become recurring conflicts and even the most violent for some. In terms of actors of the conflict, the presence and mention of the Séléka and Anti-Balaka decreased sharply in our study even if they did not disappear from the capital. While it is true that the efforts of SFCG and other actors have contributed to rebuilding the will to live together, it is also true that it is still very important to reinforce this desire to live together, to train and to raise awareness on human rights, and to improve the interactions between the population and the authorities. The study also suggests that it is still relevant to continue to regularize the interaction between the two communities, to look for solutions in relation to the identified conflicts, to provide training on the management of land conflicts, etc. while improving the procedures of beneficiary identification and selection.

Recommendations

In light of the above, some program recommendations have been developed for SFCG, humanitarian organizations, traditional authorities, as well as community leaders. In order to transform conflict peacefully, it is recommended that SFCG organizes district meetings bringing together local authorities and local community leaders on the various problems that generate conflicts in order to find common solutions. Additionally, SFCG is recommended to raise awareness through spots and radio programs on these different conflicts to raise awareness amongst the population. Finally, it is recommended that SFCG develop solidarity and community activities that take into account the identified conflicts in order to address their progression and its spread throughout the city.

SFCG can benefit from and leverage the position and authority of community leaders, religious leaders, youth and traditional leaders when carrying out activities at the end of the project. These community actors are seen as people who are ready to speak for peace and who are the most influential to the population. As part of this project, SFCG must also pay attention - in terms of risks of violence - to issues related to community conflict, conflicts related to waste management, land dispute conflicts, ethnic conflicts related to political affiliation, the illegal increase in the prices of rented houses, and the latent conflict between Muslims in PK5.

Similarly, in order to mitigate the growing risk of conflict around the target areas of the project, the media and community activities of the project can build on these themes. Based on the experience of SFCG in CAR, it is important that the themes are broadcasted on several radio stations in order to

allow other sectors of the population who are not the direct targets of the project to have access to this information. The issue of violent conflicts related to religious affiliation remains relevant. To address this challenge, it is important that the program develops and implements an action plan with local authorities and community leaders to increase community awareness regarding socio-cultural diversity. This aspect should be a key objective if the project were to continue.

In order to overcome the problem of toilets and transhumance for example, the government has to carefully monitor and address issues of urban management. This may include the boundaries between grazing areas and agricultural areas as well as inhabitable areas. The government can also support the cities through the provision of logistical means to facilitate the evacuation of the overflowed waste rings. This support should also be provided to ENERCA to help facilitate access of the population to electricity and power. The government is also called upon to bring law enforcement to each high street / intersection in order to encourage the free movement of all communities. The government through the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism should focus on revising and/or updating cadastral plans for better land delineation.

The question of Do No Harm should be reevaluated and considered by humanitarian NGOs, the CCO, and OCHA. A meeting can be called to revise practices on how to best identify beneficiaries of NGO's activities and projects. It is important that all NGOs reorient their beneficiary identification strategies by integrating traditional and community leaders for a multi-level coordination. The NGOs must reinforce their monitoring systems in order to guarantee respect of beneficiary identification clauses. SFCCG as well as other humanitarian actors must be able to continue reinforcing the practice of raising awareness accompanied by AGR because it is a highly appreciated activity that needs to be pursued on a long term.

Annex I : Presentation of conflict analysis and risk analysis




Table 2: Main conflicts according to districts (%)

Most common type of conflict in the community	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
Political Conflicts	31,3%	30,0%	31,0%	0,0%	21,9%
Abuse of Power	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	6,7%	1,9%
Domestic Conflicts	12,5%	13,3%	13,8%	16,7%	14,3%
Land Dispute Conflicts	0,0%	6,7%	24,1%	0,0%	8,6%
Conflicts of access to economic resources	12,5%	10,0%	13,8%	23,3%	15,2%
Conflicts of access to services	6,3%	0,0%	10,3%	3,3%	4,8%
Issues linked to social discrimination	18,8%	16,7%	3,4%	20,0%	14,3%
Other	6,3%	20,0%	3,4%	26,7%	15,2%
NSP	12,5%	3,3%	0,0%	3,3%	3,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Annex II : Survey Profiles

Table 3: Survey participant distribution (%)

Trained in entrepreneurship	Sexe de l'enquêté(e)		
	Male	Female	Total
Yes	57,4%	62,2%	59,0%
No	42,6%	37,8%	41,0%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%


This study is made of the people trained in the framework of this project: those trained in entrepreneurship and peaceful conflict resolution (59%), and those who are only trained in peaceful conflict resolution (41%). This represents the quantitative data. The participation rate is 87.5%. On the 120 identified persons, only 105 were reached, 37 of whom were women, representing 64.8% of the respondents.

Table 4: Focus groups discussions and individual interview participant distribution (effectives)

Type	Sex		
	Male	Female	Total
Focus group discussions	42	33	75
Individual interviews	5	1	6
Total	47	34	81

In regards to the qualitative data, 34 women and 47 men participated in the discussions and interviews. There were a total of 76 people for the focus groups, including 42 men and 33 women. For the individual interviews, there were 6 people including 5 men and 1 woman.

Graph 6: Age distribution of respondents (%)



The graph above shows that the people undergoing our quantitative analysis fall in the range of 15 to over 60 years with about 65% of those between 25 and 34 years of age. Adults account for about 24%, while those aged 15-19 make up about 8%, and the elderly make up about 4%. By regrouping proportions between youth and adults, 73% of young people represent 27% of adults. It should be noted that the population of the Central African Republic is a young population with about 49.4% of young people under 18 and about 4% of those over 18 years old. The different tendencies show that this project has placed a particular emphasis on youth which reflects the physiognomy of the country according to the ages.

About 27% of respondents identified as Muslim (73% as non-Muslim). Those who benefited from both entrepreneurship training and peaceful conflict resolution are about 67% of non-Muslims


for about 33% of Muslims. For those who have only taken training on peaceful conflict resolution, Muslims represent about 19% of the beneficiaries and 81% for non-Muslims. As a reminder, according to the last General Population and Habitat Census (RGPH3) of 2003, CAR is a highly monotheistic Christian population where more than half the population (51.4%) identifies itself as Protestant, 29% as Catholic, and 10% as Muslim. 90% of the population of the Central African Republic is non-Muslim. By disaggregating numbers for the city, 46% of the population is Protestant, 37% Catholic, and 8% Muslim. 27% of participants were Muslim: 33% for entrepreneurship trainings and 19% for conflict transformation training. This shows the project’s emphasis on participation and inclusivity of both communities.

Table 5: Religious affiliation of respondents (%)

Religion	Formé en entrepreneuriat		
	Oui	Non	Total
Non musulman	67,2%	81,4%	73,1%
Islam	32,8%	18,6%	26,9%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

The graph below shows that slightly more than 60% of respondents have either a university (30.1%) or a secondary (31.1%) level of education. 19% have high school degrees and 17.5% primary. However, those who have never attended school represent about 2%. This reflects the generational diversity of the project.

Graph 7: Level of education of respondents (%)




Annex III: Monitoring

Answers on Specific Objective 1: The youth of PK5, Yakité, Fatima, and Miskine district are dissuaded from participating in atrocities.

This section looks at project indicators and more specifically, the data on the indicators of specific objectives and outcomes identified for the project. It is therefore a question of informing SFCG and CSO about the progress of main project indicators to better prepare for project close-out.


Necessity of violence to solve conflict

Graph 8: Necessity of using violence to solve conflicts (%)



The pattern of respondents' perceptions for the need of violence to resolve conflicts has remained virtually unchanged. In both conflict scans the proportion of people rejecting this thought is still very high with more than 8 out of 10 people. It is not possible at this stage to say whether there is improvement or not in the differences between the samples of the two scans. However, data shows that the project may have contributed to maintaining the rate of those who reject violence as a means of resolving the conflict at low levels.

Graph 9 : Necessity of using violence to solve conflicts in different districts (%)



The graph below shows that almost 92,4% of youth and targeted leaders from the project think that violence is not necessary to resolve conflict. It is interesting to note that the areas of Fatima (13,3%) and Miskine (10%), which are predominantly Christian areas, are the ones where the rate of those who think that violence is necessary to resolve conflict is the highest contrary to the other districts (Yakit  and PK5 predominantly Muslim).

For questions of control, we asked the question: **if a Christian / Muslim physically assaults your child and hurts her/him and you come face to face, what will your reaction be?** Only about 4% think they would act violently while 96% have a reaction deemed nonviolent. This shows that violence is not considered a way to resolve conflicts for the youth and leaders. It is important to note that there is a similar point of view between PK5 leaders and youth on both issues. Indeed, we note that the 6.3% of youth and leaders who think that violence is necessary to resolve conflicts are also those who have a violent reaction to a conflict situation (see table below).


According to the project’s logical framework, the proportion of targeted youth who think that it is necessary to use violence to respond to conflict between different groups is 5%. The monitoring through the graph below shows that the rate is 7,6% needing to be brought down a 2,6% from to until the end of the project.

Table 6: Reaction of respondents in case of violence (en %)

Reaction of respondents in case of violence	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakit�	Miskine	Total
Violent response	6,3%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	1,0%
Law suit	0,0%	16,7%	24,1%	26,7%	19,0%
Depends on my mood	0,0%	0,0%	6,9%	3,3%	2,9%
Try to understand the problem	68,8%	63,3%	65,5%	40,0%	58,1%
Nothing	25,0%	20,0%	3,4%	30,0%	19,0%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Common interests and interactions with people from other communities

Graph 10: Common interests and interactions with people from other communities (%)



The trend on the issue of common interests substantially changed in comparison to the baseline. At baseline, the difference between respondent was not so drastically different with only a difference of 2.4 points as opposed to currently 79.1 points. There are two aspects that can explain this change. First, the baseline targeted youth and community leaders randomly while this study

targeted youth and community leaders trained through the project who are involved in project implementation and who are always together. However, the data underlines the importance of making people from different communities work for a common vision.


Table 7: Perspectives on common interests (%)

Sharing common interests or commonalities with those from other communities	Districts/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakit�	Miskine	Total
Yes	87,5%	90,0%	79,3%	96,7%	88,6%
No	6,3%	10,0%	17,2%	3,3%	9,5%
Refused to respond	0,0%	0,0%	3,4%	0,0%	1,0%
NSP	6,3%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	1,0%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

According to the table above, close to 9/10ths of youth and community leaders think that they have common interests with people from different communities. However, there are close to 10% of identified youth and leaders who think they do not have common interests with people from other communities. The respondents from Fatima and Yakite represent respectively 10% and 17.2% of those who think they have no common interest with people from other communities. These are the two districts with a high proportion compared to the other two districts, which have less than 7% identify with the position. It should be noted that there are about 6% of young people and leaders of PK5 who are not able to comment on this issue. The graph below shows that almost 91% of the young people identified have interactions with those of other communities but a remaining 10% of them do not interact with those in other communities. These proportions are higher in the Fatima (10%) and Yakite (around 21%) districts, as opposed to the PK5 (6.3%) and Miskine (0%) districts. This shows that the youth of Yakit  and Fatima may be more aware about this issue unlike those of Miskine and PK5.


By averaging the data in the table above and the graph, we observe that the proportion of targeted youth interviewed who report that they have a common interest and can interact with youth from other groups is approximately 90%. This proportion is significantly higher than what was set in the logical framework of the project (70%).

Table 8: Interactions with youth from other groups and/or communities (%)




Hate Speech against a community

Graph 11: Hate speech (%)



The level of perception of hate speech of those surveyed in 2016 seems to be better than those involved in the project. 33.3% of youth and leaders are still unable to recognize hate speech for only 13.6% during the baseline. An emphasis must be put on this issue so that these youth and leaders can improve their level of apprehension of hate speech.

Table 9: Identifying hate speeches (%)



The proportion of youth who may be able to recognize hate speech from the expression of a different opinion is still low compared to what was set in the project. The project foresaw 90%. However, the current rate is of 65.7%, (difference of 24.3%). The only area where the rate is close to 80% is the Yakite zone (79.3%). Miskine area is one where this rate is still very low at 50%.

Listening to programs or receiving messages about limiting violence and promoting peace

About 88% of youth and community leaders interviewed in the mini-survey, said they "very often" listen to programs and / or receive SMS messages that talk about limiting violence and promoting peace. Approximately 11% think they "often" listen to and / or receive this. The distribution of data by districts shows that the area of PK5 and Fatima is above or close to surpassing the average set by the project (85% on average) while the Yakite and Miskine areas have a proportion below the project average.

Table 10: Listening to programs or receiving messages about limiting violence and promoting (%)

Listening to programs or receiving messages about limiting violence and promoting peace	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
Yes, very often	100,0%	93,1%	79,3%	83,3%	87,5%
Yes, often	0,0%	3,4%	20,7%	13,3%	10,6%
Yes, but occasionally	0,0%	3,4%	0,0%	3,3%	1,9%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Answers to Specific Objective 2: The targeted youth of the PK5, Yakité, Fatima, and Miskine districts resist the political manipulation that leads them to commit acts of violence.

Ability to recognize manipulation

Table 11: Ability to recognize someone who tried to manipulate someone else (%)

Ability of recognizing someone who tries to manipulate someone else	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
Yes	75,0%	83,3%	67,9%	93,3%	80,8%
No	25,0%	16,7%	32,1%	6,7%	19,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Projected aim by the end of the project is 90% of respondents are able to recognize "someone who is trying to manipulate someone else". The table above shows that this rate is still about 81%. A 9% increase is still needed to achieve this goal. Out of the four project areas, only Miskine had a rate exceeding 90% (93.3%), followed by Fatima, which was close to 90% (83.3%). However, PK5 is the only area where a quarter (25%) of the participants are not yet able to recognize this category of person.

Ability to resist manipulation

Table 12: Ability to resist manipulation according to districts (%)

Capacity to resist manipulation	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
Yes, easily	37,5%	53,3%	51,7%	56,7%	51,4%
Yes but not always or barely	50,0%	36,7%	37,9%	43,3%	41,0%
No	12,5%	10,0%	10,3%	0,0%	7,6%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

90% of the targeted youth surveyed have declared that they can recognize manipulation and feel capable of resisting. This project target rate has been reached.

To illustrate this question, we presented a scenario in which the participants should give their point of view. This scenario is: A political leader or a civil society leader comes to your community and asks you to go out on the streets to claim your right because according to him your right is flouted by the other community. What would your community do? Responses show that 60% say they will not go out and 39% who say they will first analyze the context. This situation shows that the youth and community leaders have developed their resistance to manipulation.

Table 13: Reaction following the manipulation of one of the leaders (%)

Reaction following the manipulation of one of the leaders	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
It is dealt with easily	0,0%	3,3%	0,0%	0,0%	1,0%
We seek to understand why before reaching a decision	37,5%	50,0%	55,2%	13,3%	39,0%
It is not dealt with	62,5%	46,7%	44,8%	86,7%	60,0%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Ability to cite concrete examples of advocacy for others to resist encouraging to act violently.

Ability to cite concrete examples advocacy for others to resist manipulation encouraging violence.	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
Yes	75,0%	56,7%	55,6%	70,0%	63,1%
No	25,0%	43,3%	44,4%	30,0%	36,9%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

The project foresees that at the end of the project, 60% of targeted youth must be able to cite a concrete example of a time when they resisted manipulation encouraging violence, or where they advocated for others to resist. At the end of this monitoring, it is clear that about 63% of youth say they are able to cite a concrete example of a time when they resisted manipulation or when they advocated for others to resist. The districts of PK5 and Miskine have a rate higher than 70% while the areas of Fatima and Yakite have a rate of less than 57%.

Sharing grievances with local authorities

Table 14: Respondent having shared their grievances or complaints with local authorities (%)

Share grievances with local authorities	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
Yes	69,2%	46,2%	44,0%	50,0%	50,0%
No	30,8%	53,8%	56,0%	50,0%	50,0%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

The project aimed to reach 82% (average of 85% and 72%) of youth and community leaders who respond affirmatively to the question of their ability to share their grievances and ideas with local authorities. For now, affirmative response rate is at 50%. This situation underscores the need for additional efforts promoting the access of youth and community leaders to local authorities in order to discuss and exchange ideas on topics and questions pertaining to the life of the community. Townhall meetings are an opportunity for SFCG to gather community representatives and local authorities in order to address community problems and find inclusive solutions that may help set up mechanisms of interaction between the two groups.

Only PK5 has a rate close to 70% whereas the three other districts have rates that fall between 46% and 50%

Answer to Specific Objective 3 : 1) Alternative livelihood activities for at-risk youth are promoted, diverting them from violence and manipulation.

Inclined to join groups using violence

Table 15: Respondents inclined to join groups using violence (%)

Inclination to join groups using violence	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
Yes	12,5%	10,0%	0,0%	6,7%	6,7%
No	87,5%	90,0%	100,0%	93,3%	93,3%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

The purpose of this indicator is to reduce the number of young beneficiaries who are inclined to join groups who are favorable to the use of violence. The rate set for the project is 5%. For the moment, the indicators are at 6.7% which means that there still is a need to reduce by 1.7%. The distribution of data according to districts show that the youth and leaders most inclined to join violent groups are those from PK5 (12.5%), and Fatima (10%). There are no youths nor leaders inclined to join violent groups in Yakité.

Main reason that limit manipulation resistance

Financial issues remain one of the main cause of failing to resist manipulation. The table below shows that about 62.5% of youth who cannot resist manipulation (only 7.6% of total respondents) say it is because of financial reasons. Thus it represents 4.7% of the total – which was the target set for the end of the project (5%).


Table 16: Reason limiting resistance to manipulation (%)

Main reasons limiting resistance to manipulation	Total
Financial reason	62,50%
Other reasons	25,00%
NSP	12,50%
Total	100,00%

Access to economic opportunities


The project aimed to allow 100% of those training in entrepreneurship to access economic opportunities in which they can develop their own activities. The data collected shows that about 77% state that they have access to economic opportunities. It is to note that this study took place before the launch and the provision of economic start-up kits at the end of July.

Graph 12: Access to economic opportunities after training received (%)



The graph below shows that a little more than 98% of respondents having received training feel capable of developing and exerting income-generating activities for their own benefit.

Graph 13: Capacity to develop income generating business or activity after training received (%)



Expected results linked with cross-cutting objectives

Level of trust towards people from different religious affiliations and/or communities

The project aimed to have 70% of youths in PK5, Yakité, Fatima, and Miskine state that they trust youths from different affiliations and/or communities. The rate is at 79% currently (9% above set target). Yakité is the only area where the rate is below the 70% (69%).

Table 17: Level of trust towards people from different religious affiliations and/or communities (%)

Trust people from a different affiliation/community	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakité	Miskine	Total
Yes	81,3%	76,7%	69,0%	90,0%	79,0%
No	18,8%	20,0%	24,1%	3,3%	16,2%
Refused to respond	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	3,3%	1,0%
NSP	0,0%	3,3%	6,9%	3,3%	3,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%


To this, we also inquired on whether each person would feel comfortable inviting someone from another community to eat together. For this conflict scan, we set up a scenario: “If it were your birthday, would you be ready to invite a Muslim/Christian to eat at your house?” 93% of respondents answered affirmatively.

Table 18: Inviting a Muslim/Christian to eat at your house (%)

Inclined to invite a Muslim/Christian to eat at your house	District/Village				
	PK5	Fatima	Yakit�	Miskine	Total
Yes	100,0%	90,0%	89,7%	96,7%	93,3%
No	0,0%	3,3%	10,3%	3,3%	4,8%
NSP	0,0%	6,7%	0,0%	0,0%	1,9%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

We also asked if each would be ready to entrust your child to someone from another group ? The graph below shows that about 75% of participants would be ready to entrust their child to someone from another community.

Graph 14: Entrusting your child to someone from a different community (en %)



Annexe IV : Terms of reference

TERMES DE REFERENCE – CONFLICT SCAN

PROIETS :

« ENGAGER LES JEUNES ET LEADERS COMMUNAUTAIRES POUR
PREVENIR LES ATROCITES DE MASSE EN RCA »

JUIN-JUILLET 2017

BAILLEURS : CSO

TITRE DE L'ACTIVITE : CONFLICT SCAN

LIEUX ET DATE DE REALISATION

Ville : Bangui

Arrondissement : 3^e, 5^e, 6^e, et 8^e arrondissement.

Date : du 30/mai au 04/août/2017

CONTEXTE ET JUSTIFICATION DE L'ACTIVITÉ

Contexte :

1 : Contexte initial des deux projets (Cf. documents de projet) :

Ce projet s'inscrit dans un contexte où les conflits sont alimentés par la manipulation politique sur les points d'appartenance ethno-religieuse, matérialisés par les multiples affrontements entre l'Ex-Séléka pro-musulman et les Anti-Balaka pro-chrétien. Bien que ces conflits aient reflué depuis 2013, des heurts sporadiques entre les communautés s'intensifient cycliquement et mènent à des atrocités massives. La ville de Bangui est très susceptible à ce genre de violence et surtout autour de l'enclave musulmane de PK5 entraînant ainsi la création des auto-défenses, alimentant plus loin la défiance et la haine entre les communautés.

C'est dans ce contexte que SFCG avec l'appui de CSO a proposé un programme de 12 mois dans le but de maîtriser les contours du conflit tel que vécu dans l'enclave musulmane de PK5 et les quartiers Yakité et Fatima et, d'adapter la réponse ou les actions planifiées. Pour atteindre cet objectif, SFCG a proposé un programme conçu autour de trois objectifs spécifiques :

- Recueillir de façon systématique les perceptions des différents acteurs du conflit à PK5 et dans les quartiers Yakité, Miskine et Fatima par rapport à l'évolution du conflit ;
- Fournir des pistes des orientations programmatiques concrètes pour une meilleure adaptation au contexte, notamment : contenu des émissions radio, thèmes des SMS et spots, choix des groupes cibles pour les formations, sensibilisation des OSC partenaires.
- Augmenter la connaissance du bailleur et des acteurs humanitaires par rapport à ces perceptions locales.

Les activités du projet seront axées sur la zone de PK5 et dans les quartiers Yakité, Miskine et Fatima dont les principales sont les jeunes et les leaders communautaires existants dans ces secteurs.

2 : Contexte actuel

La capitale Bangui est actuellement dans un situation relativement calme. Mais cette accalmie pourrait être influencée par les multiples affrontements dans les arrières pays à savoir Bangassou, Bossangoa, Bria etc. On dénombre plusieurs déplacements des populations dans sites à l'intérieur du pays. Les affrontements entre les certaines milices dont l'identité reste inconnue avec d'une part la MINUSCA et d'autre part les milices de la coalition ex-Séléka, les affrontements entre d'une part les Anti-Balaka avec la coalition ex-Séléka, et entre la coalition ex-Séléka d'autre part font augmenter la tension sécuritaire non seulement à l'intérieur mais cela crée la psychose à Bangui. Pour ce qui est de la politique, on observe une vive tension entre la pouvoir exécutif et le pouvoir électif par rapport à la situation sécuritaire. En l'occurrence de la dernière interpellation du premier par les élus de la nation¹.

Justification de l'activité :

Au vu de ce qui précède, et aussi dans l'optique d'apporter une meilleure orientation programmatique du projet CAF009 et des futures propositions des projets, il est donc primordial pour SFCG-RCA d'apprécier et d'identifier des conflits à Bangui et en particulier à PK5 et ses environs. Il s'agit aussi de faire le mapping des conflits entre groupes religieux et/ou entre groupes identitaires à Bangui qui comportent un risque significatif en termes de violence, dans un contexte général de forte volatilité des évolutions socio-politiques.

Dans la perspective de rester sensible au conflit et pertinent par rapport à l'évolution du projet, une analyse partielle de l'état du projet semble nécessaire. Des tensions entre les populations locales et la communauté internationale ont été exacerbées et doivent pousser SFCG et les autres acteurs à réfléchir leur action en tenant compte des perceptions des processus en cours.

SFCG se propose donc de réaliser ce Conflict Scan en vue de la collecte des informations actualisées sur ces questions afin d'apporter une réponse pertinente à travers la mise en œuvre des activités du projet CAF009, mais aussi en informant les autres acteurs intervenant dans cette partie de la RCA.

¹ <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2017/05/rca-le-premier-ministre-proclame-enfin-son-discours-de-politique-generale.html>

OBJECTIFS DU CONFLICT SCAN

Objectif général :

Identifier les principaux conflits et leurs dynamiques dans les zones ciblées de Bangui tout en informant sur l'état d'avancement du projet.

Objectifs spécifiques :

- Identifier les conflits actuels présentant un risque significatif en termes de violence intercommunautaire et politico-militaire.
- Analyser l'existence d'éventuel(s) nouveau(x) conflit(s) afin d'y apporter une réponse adéquate prenant en compte les dynamiques de changement du contexte;
- Identifier des points d'entrée et opportunités pour la paix afin d'informer la mise en œuvre des activités du projet CAF009 et pour une meilleure adaptation au contexte.
- Obtenir des perceptions des partenaires de la mise en œuvre du projet pour une future évaluation adéquate du projet CAF009.
- Fournir des données pour le développement de futurs programmes sensibles au conflit et adaptés à la situation et aux besoins des zones ciblées.
- Fournir des informations qui vont appuyer les différents acteurs, y compris SFCG et ses partenaires, dans le développement de différents scénarios de paix et de conflit permettant de prévoir une réponse rapide et appropriée.

RÉSULTATS ATTENDUS

- Les informations permettant d'orienter les activités du projet CAF009 et les futures propositions de projet conformément au contexte actuel sont disponibles ;
- Un mapping des conflits opposant différentes religions ou groupes identitaires et présentant un risque majeur de violence est effectué.
- L'évolution de la dynamique des conflits identifiés en décembre 2016 est analysée ;
- Les points d'entrée et opportunités pour la paix sont identifiés ;
- Des recommandations programmatiques sont formulées.

Livrables :

- Un rapport d'environ 15 pages est produit pour le compte du projet CAF009 touchant la zone de PK5 et ses environs, avec en annexe un Table présentant les données du projet.

CIBLES DE L'ACTIVITE

- 1- les jeunes (musulmans **et** non musulmans) ;
- 2- les femmes (musulmanes **et** non musulmanes) ;
- 3- les autorités administratives locales (Maires) ;
- 4- Leaders communautaires ;
- 5- Les groupes d'autodéfense ;
- 6- Autorités traditionnelles (Chefs de quartier/groupement) ;
- 7- la population du PK5 et des quartiers de Fatima, Miskine et Yakité ;
- 8- les 60 jeunes formés dans le cadre du projet ;
- 8- Les 60 personnes formées en entrepreneuriat dans le cadre du projet ;

Les cibles	Mini sondage	Nombre d'entretien individuel	Nombre de groupe de discussion
Les jeunes formés dans le projet	60		
Les personnes formées en entrepreneuriat	60		
Jeunes musulmans (hommes)			1
Jeunes musulmanes (femmes)			1
Jeunes non musulmans (hommes+ femmes) ;			1
Femmes non musulmane ;			1
Femmes musulmanes ;			1
Hommes musulmans			1
Hommes non musulmans			1
Autorités traditionnelles			1
Leaders communautaires ;		4	
Groupes armés/d'autodéfense		1	
FACA (sortie 5è)		1	
Total	120	6	8

LA METHODOLOGIE

Afin d'atteindre l'objectif général et les objectifs spécifiques de cette analyse, l'équipe de SFCG va utiliser d'une part des méthodes qualitatives de collecte de données afin de collecter des perceptions de certains groupes cibles par rapport à l'évolution du contexte conflictuel pour ce qui concerne le Conflict Scan. Cette méthodologie est basée sur une collecte de données à travers deux activités principales : des groupes de discussion semi-directifs (via guide de groupe de discussion) avec les membres de la communauté et des entretiens individuels (via guide d'entretien individuel) avec les personnes/acteurs clés de la société. Et d'autre part, une méthode quantitative pour la collecte des données des avancées du projet CAF009 et une triangulation des données sur les perceptions. Ce mini-sondage concernera exclusivement les 180 personnes formées dans le cadre de ce projet. Il s'agit de 60 jeunes formés au début du projet et les 60 personnes formées récemment en entrepreneuriat. Pour réaliser ce sondage, SFCG aura besoin de 7 agents enquêteurs pour une durée de 3 jours. La saisie des données quantitatives quant à elle se fera par un agent de saisie pour une durée de 5 jours par le logiciel CSPro.

L'équipe DME travaillera en collaboration avec le programme pour la réalisation de cette étude. La préparation et la coordination technique de cette étude seront assurées par l'équipe de DME dans la mise en œuvre des outils de collecte des données, dans la planification et la rédaction du rapport final. ILT interviendra pour la validation des outils, de la méthodologie et du contenu des rapports finaux ainsi que dans la collecte des données. L'équipe programme va assurer l'utilité des rapports pour les projets et la Programme Associate sera impliquée en ce qui concerne le contrôle qualité du rapport final. ILT validera les versions finales et autorisera l'équipe de RCA à diffuser.

AXES DE RÉFLEXION

Axes du Conflict scan

- Quels sont les conflits qui existent actuellement dans votre communauté ?
- Quels sont les conflits actuels les plus fréquents, les plus violents et les plus à risque pour l'avenir de la communauté?
- Parmi ces conflits, lesquels ont pris de l'ampleur ou qui ont augmenté d'intensité durant ces derniers 30 jours ?
- Quels sont les facteurs qui ont entraîné une aggravation ou une résolution partielle de ces conflits ?
- Quels sont les principales causes de ces différents conflits ?
- Comment se manifeste ou se caractérisent ces conflits ?
- Quels sont les principaux acteurs des conflits actuels ?
- Parmi ces acteurs, lesquels ont beaucoup monté en intensité ou lesquels sont les plus influents ces derniers 30 jours ?
- Quels sont les principales raisons/causes/intérêts de divergence d ces acteurs des conflits? (religieuses, ethniques, inégalités socio-économiques).
- Qui est victime de ces conflits ? Quels sont les auteurs identifiés par les populations?
- Quels sont les principaux risques ou conflits latent dont on doit porter attention particulièrement?
- Quels sont les principaux mécanismes que la population souhaiterait ou utilise pour pouvoir résoudre des conflits dans la localité ?
- Y a-t-il des points d'entrée et des opportunités pour la paix auxquelles il faut y prêter attention ?

Axes des données de monitoring

La collecte des données de monitoring concernera les indicateurs d'objectifs spécifiques et de résultats identifiés pour le projet:

- a. **Ind 1.1** : % de diminution du nombre de jeunes ciblés qui pensent qu'il est nécessaire d'utiliser la violence pour régler les conflits entre les différents groupes.
- b. **Ind 1.2** : % des jeunes ciblés interrogés qui déclarent qu'ils ont des intérêts communs et peuvent interagir avec des jeunes d'autres groupes.
- c. **Ind** : % de personnes interrogées qui disent écouter/recevoir souvent ou très souvent des émissions ou messages parlant de limiter la violence et promouvoir la paix
- d. **Ind** : % des participants qui disent être capables de reconnaître un « discours de haine » d'un partage d'opinion différente
- e. **Ind** : % des personnes interrogées qui peuvent citer un exemple concret de collaboration avec quelqu'un d'une autre communauté
- f. **Ind 2.1** : % des jeunes ciblés interrogés qui déclarent qu'ils peuvent reconnaître des tentatives de manipulation et se sentent capables d'y résister.

- g. **Ind 2.2.** : Nombre de cas de jeunes ciblés capables de citer un exemple concret d'un moment où ils ont résisté à la manipulation pour la violence, ou bien où ils ont fait du plaidoyer pour que d'autres résistent.
 - h. Ind : % des jeunes et leaders communautaires participants qui déclarent pouvoir partager leurs doléances et idées avec les autorités locales
 - i. **Ind 3.1** : % de diminution du nombre de jeunes participants dans les activités pour le développement de moyens d'existence qui disent qu'ils sont tentés d'entrer dans des groupes qui promeuvent la violence.
 - j. Ind : % des jeunes participants déclarant qu'ils ne peuvent pas facilement résister à la manipulation pour des raisons financières
 - k. Ind : % des jeunes qui citent qu'ils ont accès à des opportunités économiques et se sentent capables de développer leurs propres activités pour vivre
 - l. Ind : % des jeunes de PK5, Yakité, Fatima et Miskine qui déclarent qu'ils font confiance aux jeunes d'affiliations différentes
- Les populations se sentent-elles directement concernées par les processus de réconciliation ? Si non, qui pensent-elles qui doit être impliqué ? Pensent-elles que ces acteurs sont prêts à mener à bien ces processus ?
 - Quelles sont les priorités post-conflit des populations ?
 - D'après les populations, comment peut-on éviter que le conflit éclate à nouveau ?

Etapas méthodologiques	Objectif(s)	Responsable	CHRONOGRAMME														
			Mai	Juin					Juillet								
			S5	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5				
Etape 1 : Préparation technique et logistique de la mission	Assurer une orientation et un déroulement harmonieux de la mission à travers la production des TdR, des outils de collecte, de l'identification des cibles à enquêter et du budget.	DME															
Etape 2 : Revue du dernier Conflict Scan à Bangui.	Disposer des éléments sur le contexte afin de mieux apprécier l'évolution de la dynamique des conflits à Bangui ainsi que la rédaction du nouveau rapport.	Fatimé + DME															
Etape 3 : Identification des agents enquêteurs	Assurer que les agents de collecte des données soient disponibles et disposés pour la collecte des données	DME															
Etape 4 : Formation des agents enquêteurs	Assurer que les agents de collecte des données comprennent et maitisent bien les outils et les techniques de collecte des données.																
Etape 5 : collecte de données à Bangui dans les arrondissements cibles	Disposer des informations qualitatives et quantitatives sur la dynamique du conflit	Fatimé, DME et enquêteurs															
Etape 6 : Analyse et traitement des données à Bangui	Ressortir des informations sous une forme exploitable sous la base des données recueillies.	DME															
Etape 7 : Elaboration des rapports provisoire	Ressortir le 1 ^{er} draft devant être soumis aux commentaires des autres parties prenantes.	DME															
Etape 8 : Partage des rapports avec l'équipe programme et ILT.	Recueillir les commentaires des parties prenantes	ILT ; Programme, Direction.															
Etape 9 : Finalisation des rapports	Prendre en compte les différentes remarques et observations éventuelles d'ILT, du Programme et de la Direction.	DME															
Etape 10 : Approbation et diffusion des rapports finaux	Autoriser la diffusion du rapport	Directeur Pays + PA															

LE CALENDRIER

Calendrier			
Etape	Effectif	Responsable	Date
Préparation des TDR + Outils	6 personnes	Teddy + Fatimé + Cécilia + George + Claire + Junior	Du 30 mai au 9 juin/2017
Revue du dernier Conflict Scan à Bangui.	4 personnes	Teddy + Fatimé + Claire + Junior	Du 5 au 9/ juin/2017
Identification des agents enquêteurs	2 personnes	Teddy + Fatimé	Du 12 au 16/juin/2017
Identification des personnes à enquêter	Toutes les personnes à enquêter	Fatimé + Abdoul + représentants des jeunes	Du 12 au 16/juin/2017
Prise de contact et rendez-vous	Toutes les personnes à enquêter	Fatimé + Abdoul + représentants des jeunes	Du 12 au 16/juin/2017
Formation des enquêteurs	9 personnes	Teddy	Du 19 au 23/juin/2017
Collecte des données : Focus Group + Entretien individuel et mini-sondage	Toutes les personnes à enquêter	Fatimé, Teddy, Junior et 7 enquêteurs.	Du 26 au 30/juin/2017
Traitement de données et rédaction des rapports provisoires	2 personnes	Junior + Fatimé, et Teddy	Du 03 au 21/juillet/2017
Commentaires sur les rapports provisoires	4 personnes	ILT + PA + George + Directeur	Du 24 au 28/juillet/2017
Finalisation du rapport	2 personnes	Fatimé+ Diogène, Cécilia et Teddy	Du 01 au 03/août/2017
Partage du rapport final	1 personne	PA (Validation par ILT)	04/ août /2017

PLANNING DE L'ACTIVITÉ

Programme des entretiens individuels

Cible	Effectif	Du 26 au 27/juin/2017		Responsable
		Lundi. 26	Mardi. 27	
FACA (sortie 5è)	1	11h00-12h00		Fatimé + Junior
Leaders communautaires de Miskine	1	14h00-15h00		Junior + Teddy
Groupes armés/d'autodéfense	1		09h00-10h00	Fatimé + Junior
Leaders communautaires de PK5	1		10h30-11h30	Junior + Teddy
Leaders communautaires de Yakité	1		12h00-13h00	Junior + Teddy
Leaders communautaires de Fatima	1		14h30-15h30	Junior + Teddy

Programme des groupes de discussion

Cible	Effectif	Du 28 au 30/juin/2017			Responsable
		Mer. 28	Jeu. 29	Vend. 30	
Jeunes musulmans (hommes)	10	09h00 10h30			Teddy + Junior + Fatimé
Autorités traditionnelles	10	11h00 12h30			Teddy + Junior + Fatimé
Jeunes non musulmans (hommes+ femmes)	10	14h30 16h00			Teddy + Junior + Fatimé
Jeunes musulmanes (femmes)	10		09h00 10h30		Teddy + Junior + Fatimé
Femmes non musulmane	10		11h00 12h30		Teddy + Junior + Fatimé
Hommes musulmans	10		14h30 16h00		Teddy + Junior + Fatimé
Femmes musulmanes	10			09h00 10h30	Teddy + Junior + Fatimé
Hommes non musulmans	10			11h00 12h30	Teddy + Junior + Fatimé

BESOIN LOGISTIQUE, MATÉRIEL, FINANCIÈRE ET HUMAIN

- ✓ 7 enquêteurs en appui lors de la collecte de données quantitatives
- ✓ Location de la salle
- ✓ Rafrachissement
- ✓ Bloc-Notes
- ✓ Enveloppe
- ✓ Stylos
- ✓ Transport des participants
- ✓ Transport des enquêteurs
- ✓ Rafrachissement des enquêteurs pour la formation
- ✓ Rafrachissement des participants
- ✓ Rafrachissement des enquêteurs lors des enquêtes
- ✓ Un véhicule de SFCG

BUDGET (VOIR ANNEXE)

Signature du Program Manager

Signature du Directeur Pays

Signature du DAF

Annexe IV : Les outils de collecte des données



Guide_Entretien
conflict scan2 CAF00!



Guide_Groupe de
discussion conflict sca



Questionnaire
monitoring CAF009.d