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## **BASELINE EVALUATION FOR INUKA PROJECT**

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.dolficode.com/kwalenew/kwale-gallery>

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### Disclaimer

These are the views from the study representatives and the data collected from the selected community by Scofield Associates and are not necessarily the views of Search for Common Ground.

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b> .....   | <b>II</b>  |
| <b>ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....  | <b>III</b> |
| <b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b> .....   | <b>V</b>   |
| INTRODUCTION .....   | V          |
| METHODOLOGY .....  | V          |
| LIMITATIONS.....   | V          |
| KEY FINDINGS .....   | V          |
| RECOMMENDATION TO THE INUKA PROJECT TEAM.....  | VIII       |
| <b>PART 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION</b> .....  | <b>1</b>   |
| 1.1 INTRODUCTION .....   | 1          |
| 1.2 VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA AND KENYA.....                                       | 1          |
| 1.3 APPROACHES TO P/CVE ON THE HORN OF AFRICA.....                                   | 2          |
| 1.4 RECENT INCIDENTS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE PROPOSED PROJECT<br>LOCATIONS ..... | 2          |
| <b>PART 2: METHODOLOGY</b> .....   | <b>4</b>   |
| 2.1 OBJECTIVES .....   | 4          |
| 2.2 SAMPLING .....   | 4          |
| <b>A.</b> Kilifi: hotbed areas .....   | 4          |
| <b>B.</b> Mombasa: hotbed areas.....   | 4          |
| <b>C.</b> Kwale hotbed areas .....   | 4          |
| <b>D.</b> Lamu hotbed areas .....  | 5          |
| 2.3 LIMITATIONS .....  | 6          |
| 2.4 ANALYSIS .....   | 6          |
| <b>PART 3: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS</b> .....                                  | <b>7</b>   |
| 3.1 RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS .....  | 7          |
| 3.2 CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS.....   | 10         |
| 3.3 ACTORS INVOLVED IN CVE IN THE COASTAL COUNTIES .....                             | 17         |
| 3.4 CAPACITY TO ENGAGE IN CVE IN COASTAL COUNTIES.....                               | 27         |
| <b>PART 4: BASELINE-INDICATOR TABLE</b> .....  | <b>33</b>  |
| <b>PART 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS</b> .....                                 | <b>35</b>  |

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| ACT!        | Act Change Transform   |
| AIWA        | Africa Initiative for Women in Africa                                |
| CBOs        | Community Based Organizations  |
| CHRIPS      | Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies                           |
| CIPK        | Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya                              |
| CSOs        | Civil Society Organization   |
| CVE         | Countering Violent Extremism   |
| DAI         | Development Alternatives, Inc  |
| DiPaD       | Daima Initiatives for Peace and Development                          |
| DPCs        | District Peace Committees  |
| EMU         | Efficiency Monitoring Unit   |
| EU          | European Union   |
| FBOs        | Faith Based Organizations  |
| FGD         | Focus Group Discussion   |
| GoK         | Government of Kenya  |
| HAKI Africa | Human Activism Knowledge and Integrity                               |
| IFES        | International Foundation for Electoral Systems                       |
| IMLU        | Independent Medico Legal Unit  |
| IMO         | International Migration Organization                                 |
| ISS         | Institute for Security Studies                                       |
| KASH        | Keeping Alive Societies Hope   |
| KECOSCE     | Kenya Community Support Centre                                       |
| KII         | Key Informant Interview  |
| KMDI        | Kwale Muslims Development Initiative                                 |
| KYMA        | Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance  |
| MoI         | Ministry of Interior Kenya   |
| MUHURI      | Muslim for Human Rights  |
| NCTC        | National Counter Terrorism Centre                                    |
| NDI         | National Democratic Institute for International Affairs              |
| NDMA        | National Drought Management Authority                                |
| NPS         | National Police Service  |
| NSC/NSCPBCM | National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management |
| OCPHR       | Oslo Centre for Peace and Human Rights                               |
| PVE         | Preventing Violent Extremism   |

|            |   |
|------------|---|
| RUSI       | Royal United Services Institute                         |
| SA         | Scofield Associates                                     |
| SFCG       | Search for Common Ground                                |
| TI-K       | Transparency International Kenya                        |
| UK/CSSF    | United Kingdom/Conflict, Stability and Security Fund    |
| UK/DFID    | United Kingdom/Department for International Development |
| UN Women   | United Nation Women                                     |
| UNCT/Kenya | United Nations Country Team/ Kenya                      |
| UNDP       | United Nations Development Programme                    |
| USAID      | United States Agency for International Development      |

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Introduction

This study, contracted by Search for Common Ground (SFCG), is a baseline evaluation for the two-year project “Inuka!”: Community-Led Security Approaches to Violent Extremism in Coastal Kenya,” being implemented in four counties: Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu and Mombasa in the coastal region of Kenya since September 2016.




Figure 1 Counties Under Study

## Methodology

The study focused on nine selected wards<sup>2</sup> from four counties in Kenya, namely Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu and Mombasa. The selection of the wards and specific research areas was based on the prevalence of violent extremist (VE) activities as identified by the existing scholarly literature, relevant information obtained from SFCG and in target areas for partner activities. A total of 394 persons participated in the study using the following qualitative and quantitative methods: 1) focus group discussions (FGDs) (18 groups consisting of 144 people), 2) Key informant interviews (KIIs) (39 people), and 3) a general survey (211 persons). The mixed method of inquiry was analysed through contextual, and content analysis.

## Limitations

- The key limitation of the study was related to security of both the field data collectors and respondents, which affected the proposed sampling distribution among the quantitative and qualitative data; especially for data collection from Kiunga in Lamu, FGD for Gombato Bongwe in Kwale, and survey data in Majengo, Mombasa.<sup>3</sup>
- Data from this study is a representation of areas with similar frequency of VE incidents/activity; and thus, should not be over generalized if the area of reference is/are not similar to the areas and counties mentioned in this study.
- Views expressed by the study participants may be biased due to the influence of political issues on security and the nearness to the August 2017 general election in Kenya.

## Key Findings

1. **Contextual analysis:** According to the research participants in Mombasa<sup>4</sup> and Kwale<sup>5</sup>, violent extremism has reduced in these areas, as compared to the previous three to four years. In Lamu and Kilifi, most of the FGD discussants and the interviewees were somewhat unclear on whether there was some level of reduction or not. In general, violent extremism is still significant at the coast because of the continuing inhumane treatment by police (unlawful and arbitrary arrests, kidnapping and forced disappearances, torture

<sup>2</sup> These are the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission published electoral boundaries. Currently there are 290 constituencies with 1450 county wards

<sup>3</sup> The rising tensions as a result of the elections made it abit challenging for the study respondents to participate more openly and give more information. In addition, areas like Kwale that have witnessed disappearances, the respondents were not comfortable being seen with the enumerators in public.

<sup>4</sup> MOM MAJ FGD 001

<sup>5</sup> KWA WAA FDG 013

and extrajudicial killings). Additionally, structural and economic developments like road construction and tourism in the coastal areas have had both positive and negative impacts on VE. The former has usually led to the destruction of people's property and livelihoods, while the latter has created more jobs but mostly for non-locals, creating resentment among locals. This creates conflicts and influences the **push factors** to VE.

Radical groups like Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) are present at the coast of Mombasa (31%). Members of these groups are viewed as inhumane. However, radicalization into VE is also viewed by the community as a cry for justice, especially by the oppressed, unemployed and idle youth. Holy war, stolen resources, invasion and the influence of foreigners were said to be, to some extent, a motivating narrative to violent extremism. The key drivers of VE and recruitment were found to be: seeking revenge for extrajudicial killings (24%), unemployment, illiteracy, poor parenting (7%), poverty, oppression of Islamic States or Muslims within Kenya, governance exclusion and marginalization (18%) (land, political involvement, resource and development distribution). Other drivers include frustration and hopelessness, peer pressure and radical interpretation of Islamic teachings by recruiters. From the findings, it can be concluded that these push factors are caused by poor governance and less effective community-security management apparatus. The common push factor as mentioned in Mombasa and Kwale was the revenge for extrajudicial killings and the poor treatment by law enforcement agencies. In addition to those factors, Kilifi and Lamu had other factors mentioned, including; financial gain due to marginalization and peer pressure. Perceived historical injustice was identified as a critical issue that shapes violent extremism, especially in Lamu.

The significant **pull factor** identified through this study in the four targeted counties is the lucrative incentives that violent extremist groups offer. For instance, qualitative data<sup>6</sup> revealed that Al-Shabaab usually offers 200,000 Kenyan Shillings upfront for joining the group and 80,000 Kenyan Shillings monthly for those that remain. Field Data indicated some narrow distinction between the gang groups and violent extremist groups at the coast. They were of the opinion that the gang groups focused on theft and were uncoordinated, while terrorists or violent extremists are highly coordinated with an ideology that is internationalized. In Kwale<sup>7</sup> specifically, the qualitative data revealed a link between the two because, usually, the youth engaged in gangs have the same vulnerabilities that expose them to violent extremism, and gang groups (spaces) may act as training grounds before youth transition into violent extremist groups.

33% of the respondents were of the opinion that religious activities like Christian festivals and cultural events, sports and community meetings bring the people together. Politics and tribalism create division among the community members. Extremist activities have been influenced by the changing aspects of political and electoral conflicts, a sense of historical marginalization and the extremists' quest to challenge the system of governance (especially at in the coastal counties of Kenya led by the marginalization narrative). Political instability, historical injustices and tribalism are usually the causes of conflict which ultimately influence or act as precursors to VE.

- 2. Existing initiatives and actors to counter violent extremism:** the study found that the police, policy makers, youth, religious leaders, CSOs/CBOs and the international community are some of the key actors working to counter violent extremism in these communities. The police maintain law and order, as well as investigate and arrest suspects and perpetrators of VE. The religious leaders preach peace for co-existence in the community as outlined in the Quran, but have also been accused by the government of engaging in suspicious activities and spreading teachings that encourage VE. Civil

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<sup>6</sup> LAM FAZ KII 034

<sup>7</sup> KWA GOM KII 027

Society Organizations (CSOs) especially Community Based Organizations (CBOs) are usually engaged in creating awareness on de-radicalization and countering violent extremism. Finally, the women in the community usually promote and engage in good parenting; while the youth remain vigilant and act as ambassadors of peace, especially in Kwale.<sup>8</sup> Lack of parenting was mentioned as some of the drivers to VE due to the vulnerabilities it creates among the youth.

Even though 85% of the respondents had no idea of any initiative to deal with VE in the communities, they stated that; CSO effort like those led by the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA), Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) and Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) in educating the people on security issues through focused group discussions, seminars and forums has led to reduced tensions and intent to engage in VE acts. Generally, the Government of Kenya (GoK), in partnership with CSOs and especially CBOs, have implemented programs that focus on fostering harmony, peace and solving conflict as well as engaging the community in forums and sensitization platforms like Barazas and peace committees. These actors seem to have positively impacted the community as, according to the qualitative data collected, there has been a decrease in the rate at which violent extremism acts as mentioned by 63% of the survey respondents in Kwale.<sup>9</sup>

Despite of the fact that 70% of the survey respondents indicated that development and policy issue have not negatively impacted them; the relationship between the police and members of the community is poor due to mistrust and cruelty as indicated by 62% of the respondents. In Kilifi, 86% of the respondents stated that there is no good impact from the activities implemented by various actors on VE. Furthermore, from the general KII and FGD deductions, a substantial number of those citizens that are under security-watch are perceived to be innocent, thus creating the impression in the community that the police are the enemy. Collaboration is only perceived to exist between and among the chiefs, police, village elders and police informants. However, these collaborations are said to not have yielded the desired positive outcomes.

- 3. Capacity to deal with violent extremism:** the study found that 64% of the respondents were of the opinion that issues related to VE are rarely discussed individually and when they are, are considered highly sensitive and shrouded in secrecy. The community engages with issues of security usually through the village elders and religious leaders, while communal conflict resolution mechanisms, and provincial administration teams at county level also play a crucial role. Issues related to violent extremism are talked about in social gatherings by the leaders, Friday prayer sermon, Chief meetings and political meetings. The community manages conflict through communal conflict resolution mechanisms, including discussions with the village elders. However, the youth engaged in violent extremism are perceived to be protected by the community in which they live in, this is attributed to the fact that the community fears the threat from both the law enforcers and the violent extremist groups. The provincial administration team at respective county levels and village elders play a key role in managing conflict. Through village elders and religious leaders, the community can engage in issues related to security.<sup>10</sup>

Unwillingness to give damning information about relatives engaged in violent extremism, fear of victimization, lack of confidentiality, profiling and stereotyping of the Muslim community on the coast, and community mistrust of security forces are all key challenges that the Coast faces with regards to VE. Lack of dialogue and engagement forums is a key challenge to building the community-police relationship.

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<sup>8</sup> KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>9</sup> KWA WAA FDG 013; KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>10</sup> KIL MAT FGD 009; KIL MAT FGD 010; KIL MNA KII 023



## Recommendation to the Inuka project team

### 1. With regard to activities led by CSO partners in the communities

- Expand initiatives like ‘security and peace commitment’<sup>11</sup> for new residents, which have proven successful in Ziwani in Mombasa and Mpeketoni, in Lamu county; as part of security monitoring process led by the communities.
- Involve youth and women from the targeted communities as implementers of peace processes not only to create jobs and financial benefit, but to create a sense of ownership. This is through organizing for avenues where they can suggest solutions to the problems facing them.
- Facilitate socialization forums between the police and community; to train the police on better approaches to enhance community-police relationship.
- There is need to integrate and coordinate the NGOs, CBOs and CSOs that are engaged in CVE. In addition to KMYA and MUHURI, organizations like International Migration Organization (IMO) and Red Cross are present at the grassroots level. Thus, it will be of strategic importance to partner with those organizations in their respective capacities while also using them as entry points to the community.
- Work with small and existing initiatives as entry points when engaging with the community. As an example, there are Nyumba Kumi initiatives that seem to be working in Mpeketoni and Ziwani in Lamu and Mombasa county respectively. Inuka can work with these initiatives to strengthen them beyond the specific wards to the neighboring areas.

### 2/ With regard to engaging the Government of Kenya

- Partnership with the police and security arm of the GoK should take into consideration the need to train the police force on respect for human rights to reduce VE consequences of brutality, victimization and profiling, to foster friendly community-police relationships that improve information and intelligence sharing, thereby reducing and preventing VE.
- The second phase of engagement should involve the GoK’s development offices, supporting them to strengthen equality in economic governance, promote and facilitate involvement of women and youth in the entrepreneurial and governance sector, and address land issues which have been neglected for long.
- The project should increase partnership and collaboration between the community and the all the law enforcement agencies to deal with VE. This is because, different counties where the program will be working has a representation of both the Kenya Army, administration police and the regular police.

### 3/ With regard to Do No Harm considerations

- Be cognizant of the possibility that some of the law enforcement agencies, especially in Kwale, may sympathize with extremist organizations<sup>12</sup>, specifically Al-Shabaab, and therefore exercise caution while engaging with them to avoid exposing the community to more risk.

### 4/ With regard to the needs for further research

- Due to the fluid nature of conflict in the regions where the program will be implemented, simple activity specific needs analysis should be employed to ensure activities align with the realities of the changing conflict systems in the communities.

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<sup>11</sup> This is a Nyumba Kumi initiative that ensures the new residents in the communities in Lamu fill in forms as a way of introducing them to the community and being part of the security monitoring process. Filling of peace and security form in Ziwani, for those wanting to rent a house in the area has been one of the ways the community have kept good record and played a part to reducing crime. (MOM MAJ FGD 002).

<sup>12</sup> This have made it easier for extremists to bribe their way out of been prosecuted (LAM FAZ FGD 018)

- Further research should be conducted to understand the influence of gangs on VE in Kenya's coastal area, youth engagement as double agents<sup>13</sup> in both CVE initiatives and VE, the effectiveness of community-based monitoring systems for community self-protection against VE, and sustainable means to address land-based conflicts that have a significant influence on VE in these areas.

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<sup>13</sup> This was revealed specifically from the qualitative data; where the interviewees alluded to the fact that some of the youth who participate in CVE initiatives are also allegedly linked to extremist groups as accounted from the focus group discussions in Majengo. (MOM MAJ FGD 002).

## **PART 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

### **1.1 INTRODUCTION**

Apart from the myriad of reasons, the proximity of Kenya to Somalia has made the North Eastern and Coastal areas of Kenya vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremist group as well as sympathetic support for extremist ideologies. Specifically, vulnerable areas include the Counties of Garissa, Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu, Mandera, Mombasa, Tana River, Wajir, and Nairobi.<sup>14</sup> These areas have therefore experienced many intervention programs aimed at strengthening communities' resilience to radical ideology and violent extremism (VE).<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, these areas have also been the target of major crackdown by government armed forces; because they double up as hotspot areas to VE.<sup>16</sup> While the government claims that hard power approaches have seen some successes, there is also evidence of negative impact in the communities where these activities have taken place.<sup>17</sup>

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) endeavours to prevent violent extremism by working to strengthen the relationships between the community and the law enforcement authorities. SFCG will work with local civil society partners including MUHURI, KYMA and Kiunga Youth Bunge Initiative (KYBI), to build relationships and contribute towards CVE efforts. To this end, SFCG requested Scofield Associates (SA) to conduct a baseline study in four counties in the coastal area (Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu) with the following three main objectives:

1. Analyze the current context, especially with regards to drivers and risk factors of VE in the target areas, and regional and national CVE approaches, assessing the challenges and opportunities for constructive engagement around countering and preventing VE;
2. Assess the project Objectives, Indicators, and Theory of Change (TOC); and
3. Conduct a risk assessment in order to ensure "Do No Harm" and conflict sensitivity are respected in the project.

This report documents the findings of the study and provides recommendations to the implementers, policy makers and researchers.

### **1.2 VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA AND KENYA**

Global insecurity is on the rise and manifests differently everywhere. The effects of globalization and the ease of flow of information has made it easier for both creative and destructive ideas to spread globally. Africa, and specifically Kenya, is not excluded from this phenomenon. The launch of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy Document by the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)<sup>18</sup> in Kenya, aimed to address these new trends. However, the efforts of the national strategy have focused on the use of hard power approaches.<sup>19</sup> In every activity at the community level the government of Kenya has been forced to strike a balance between hard power approaches and soft power strategies, the latter being the focus of civil society organizations and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). In the Coastal areas of Kenya, grievances associated with hard power approaches including forced disappearances (extrajudicial killings), harassment, arrests, and torture, have served to radicalize and recruit more young people into extremism.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> UNDP. 2016 "Strengthening Community's Resilience Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism." Accessed February 8, 2017. <http://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/operations/projects/peacebuilding/strengthening-communitys-resilience-againstradicalization-and-vi.html>.

<sup>15</sup> See Annex 1: table 1.1

<sup>16</sup> Judy Gitau, Civil-Military Relations in an Era of Violent Extremism: Policy options for the Kenya Defense Forces, Center for Human Rights and Policy Studies, 2016

<sup>17</sup> Martina Gastaldello, Literature Review; "Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya and Tanzania: An Innovative Mapping of Key Opportunities for Civil Society- Led Engagement," 31 December 2016, National Endowment for Democracy

<sup>18</sup> This is a government body mandated with the coordination of CVE activities in Kenya.

<sup>19</sup> Simon Allison, Analysis: Why does Kenya's counter-terrorism strategy keep failing?, Daily Maverick, 6 April 2015, accessed 9 February 2017. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-04-06-analysis-why-does-kenyas-counter-terrorism-strategy-keep-failing/#.WJxSsRiw2-U>

<sup>20</sup> Charles Villa-Vicencio, Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, and Alex Humphrey, Community Perceptions of Violent Extremism in Kenya, Occasional Paper 21, The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Africa. <http://life-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/IJR20Violent20Extremism20in20Kenya20final20web2028129.pdf>

### 1.3 APPROACHES TO P/CVE ON THE HORN OF AFRICA

The horn of Africa is an important theatre for CVE and PVE activities.<sup>21</sup> International and multilateral organizations have invested heavily in countering violent extremism in this region. The need to develop new approaches to CVE saw the emergence of *preventing* violent extremism (PVE) in an effort to strengthen peace and security. This new strategy has gained traction, and many international, national, governmental and nongovernmental entities have begun to take this approach. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have been the focus of CVE work, while in countries like Ethiopia and Somalia, there is still considerable focus on counter terrorism due to the lack of the environmental security required to implement CVE programs.<sup>22</sup>

Apart from a focus on numerous push factors focusing on structural conflict; in programming and policies, some governments in the region have relied on law enforcement and hard power approaches to deal with violent extremist groups like Al-Shabaab.<sup>23</sup> This has meant that even with substantial investment in softer approach CVE/PVE activities by some organizations in the region, the hard power actions of governments, as perpetuated by law enforcements agencies, serve to further entrench radicalization and recruitment.<sup>24</sup> To address the challenge of VE, the need for partnership and harmonization of efforts has never been as critical as it is today. The Government of Kenya (GOK), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) and all other non-state actors need to work in a collaborative effort to counter violent extremism. The private sector involvement;<sup>25</sup> at the financial<sup>26</sup> and technological<sup>27</sup> level is also necessary, if efforts to reduce the vulnerability of at-risk communities<sup>28</sup> are to be successful. Search for Common Ground's project comes at a time when partnership and collaboration will provide for more opportunities for success.

### 1.4 RECENT INCIDENTS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE PROPOSED PROJECT LOCATIONS

#### 1. Kwale

On Saturday, April 11<sup>th</sup>, 2015 in Diani, Kwale County, two suspected Al-Shabaab members and one police officer were shot dead after a shootout between the two groups. Two pistols with 16 arms of ammunitions were recovered.<sup>29</sup> Further reports indicated that about 230 Al-Shabaab trainees are hiding in Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu as of April 2015.<sup>30</sup>

#### 2. Mombasa

On October 31<sup>st</sup>, 2011, one suspect linked to Al-Shabaab was arrested in Mtwapa, Mombasa.<sup>31</sup> On July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2013, seventeen people were killed and six injured after an explosion at a religious public rally in Likoni, Mombasa.<sup>32</sup> On June 10<sup>th</sup>, 2014, Sheikh Mohammed Idris,

<sup>21</sup> José Luengo-Cabrera, and Annelies Pauwels. 2016. Countering violent extremism: The Horn of Africa. April 2016. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) p3

<sup>22</sup> USDOS. 2016. "Country Report on Terrorism 2015 - Chapter 2 - Uganda | Ecoi.Net - European Country of Origin Information Network". Ecoi.Net. Accessed February 8, 2017. [http://www.ecoi.net/local\\_link/324733/450869\\_en.html](http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/324733/450869_en.html).

<sup>23</sup> Melissa Finn, Bessma Momani, Michael Opatowski, Michael Opondo, 2016. "Youth Evaluations of CVE/PVE Programming in Kenya in Context" *Journal for Deradicalization Summer 2016 no7*. p176; Arigatou International and Golden Institute. 2015. Activities Conducted in East Africa: Quarter Report (Jan-March) 2015 p7

<sup>24</sup> Martina Gastaldello, Literature Review; "Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya and Tanzania: An Innovative Mapping of Key Opportunities for Civil Society- Led Engagement," 31 December 2016, National Endowment for Democracy

<sup>25</sup> Neal, S., Business as Usual? Leveraging the Private Sector to Combat Terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism, 2(3). (2010). Accessed February 8, 2017. <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/31/html>

<sup>26</sup> Business-standard., Kenya cracks down on financial firms over terror links. (2016). Accessed February 8, 2017. [http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-cracks-down-on-financial-firms-over-terror-links-115040800973\\_1.html](http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/kenya-cracks-down-on-financial-firms-over-terror-links-115040800973_1.html)

<sup>27</sup> The Christian Science Monitor., New encryption technology is aiding terrorists, intelligence director says. (2016). Accessed February 8, 2017. [http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/monitor\\_breakfast/2016/0425/New-encryption-technology-is-aiding-terrorists-intelligence-director-says](http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/monitor_breakfast/2016/0425/New-encryption-technology-is-aiding-terrorists-intelligence-director-says)

<sup>28</sup> Regional Conference on Countering Violent Extremism, "Outcome Document - Deepening Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism," Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, 25 to 28 June 2015

<sup>29</sup> "Police Gun Down 2 Terror Suspects in The Coastal Town of Kwale". 2015. *News Ghana*. Accessed February 8, 2017. <https://www.newsghana.com.gh/police-gun-down-2-terror-suspects-in-the-coastal-town-of-kwale/>.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid*

<sup>31</sup> Standard, The. 2017. "Terror Suspect Arrested in Kilifi." *The Standard*. Accessed February 8, 2017. <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000045983/terror-suspect-arrested-in-kilifi>.

<sup>32</sup> "16 Injured in Likoni Church Terror Attack". 2013. *Daily Nation*. Accessed February 8, 2017. <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/16-injured-in-Likoni-church-terror-attack/-/1056/1878546/-/view/printVersion/-/tq3xqg/-/index.html>.

the head of Imams and Preachers of Kenya was shot dead in a Mombasa mosque by groups who opposed his championing of anti-radicalization campaigns.

Since then, many similar killings have been carried out by groups that are pro-radicalization, against factions considered to be informants and loyal to the police. By the end of July 2014, more than twenty-one clerics, among other Muslims, had been killed by suspected actions of law enforcement agencies.<sup>33</sup> In June 2015, an Imam in Mombasa was charged convicted for radicalization of young men into Al-Shabaab, being sentenced to 20 years in jail.<sup>34</sup> On September 4<sup>th</sup>, 2016, in Majengo, Mombasa, Mohamed Soshi was shot dead, and weapons recovered from the apartment he was residing. Soshi was linked to Harun Fazul; an Al-Qaeda member who was killed in 2011 and Jaysh Ayman militant group in Lamu. Soshi coordinated other significant attacks like the February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2015 Bondeni attack, September 18<sup>th</sup>, 2015 assassination of a police officer, and other killings recorded on July 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2015, and March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2015 in Mombasa.<sup>35</sup>

### 3. Lamu

On 26<sup>th</sup> January 2016, seven police officers were killed by a landmine planted by Al-Shabaab members in Kiunga, Lamu East. A June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2014 attack in Mpeketoni left fifty people dead. The attackers specifically targeted non-Muslims. The Mpeketoni attack revealed some ethnic tensions even though there were religious associations of the group and the attack.<sup>36</sup> The attackers did not target the native Banjui community. Though there are mentions of police brutality and extremist attacks, politics and ethnicity also play an important role in the conflicts in Lamu.

### 4. Kilifi

On December 12<sup>th</sup> 2014, twenty gang members attacked Kinarani Administrative Police post at Mwanamwanga, Kaloleni, in Kilifi County, killing one police officer and stealing two police guns.<sup>37</sup> On January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2016, the police killed four of the most wanted Al-Shabaab members and injured one in Kwa Chocha, Malindi, Kilifi County.<sup>38</sup> In February 2016, a Madrassa teacher was arrested along with three others in Malindi, Kilifi, over links to Al-Shabaab and acting as an agent of radicalization and recruitment for the extremist group. One of the detainees, Kassim, is alleged to have killed a police officer in January the same year in Mombasa.<sup>39</sup>

On August 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016, two suspected terrorists who were medical students were apprehended in Malindi, Kilifi County. They were suspected to have been planning to join ISIS.<sup>40</sup> On October 5<sup>th</sup> the same year, four Al-Shabaab returnees were tracked, and one was caught while the other three escaped. The arrested returnee provided information that Likoni was a safe haven and hide-out for some of the most wanted criminals from Kwale and Mombasa, a training ground for Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) recruits and an Al-Shabaab returnee's hideout.<sup>41</sup> As of November 2016, there were reported cases of a significant number

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<sup>33</sup> IRIN. 2014. "Kenya: Gunned down in Mombasa: the clerics that have died." IRIN, July 28.

<http://www.irinnews.org/report/100412/gunned-down-in-mombasa-the-clerics-that-have-died>

<sup>34</sup> Bwana, Joachim. 2015. "Imam in Mombasa Court For 'Luring Boys into Al Shabaab.'" The Standard. Accessed February 8, 2017. <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000170801/imam-in-mombasa-court-for-luring-boys-into-al-shabaab>.

<sup>35</sup> Ombati, Willis. 2016. "Fugitive Terror Suspect Ismail Mohamed Soshi Killed In Police Raid On Mombasa House." The Standard. Accessed February 8, 2017. <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000217611/fugitive-terror-suspect-ismail-mohamed-soshi-killed-in-police-raid-on-mombasa-house>.

<sup>36</sup> Bryden, Matt. 2014. *The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?* Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies

<sup>37</sup> "Police Launch Manhunt After Gang Attacks AP Camp In Kilifi." 2017. Daily Nation. Accessed February 8, 2017.

<http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Kilifi/Kilifi-AP-Police-Post-Attack/1183282-2553452-rg804z/index.html>.

<sup>38</sup> "Four 'Most Wanted' Terror Suspects Killed In Raid." 2017. Daily Nation. Accessed February 8, 2017.

<http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Kilifi/Four-terror-suspects-killed-in-Malindi/1183282-3040846-fwcr26z/index.html>.

<sup>39</sup> "Six Terror Suspects Arrested In Kwale Crackdown." 2016. The Star, Kenya. Accessed February 8, 2017. [http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/06/22/six-terror-suspects-arrested-in-kwale-crackdown\\_1373659](http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/06/22/six-terror-suspects-arrested-in-kwale-crackdown_1373659).

<sup>40</sup> "Medical Students Arrested Over Terrorism Links." 2017. Hivisasa.Com. Accessed February 8, 2017.

<http://www.hivisasa.com/wb/national/news/165445>.

<sup>41</sup> Agnon, Shmuel. 2016. "Anti-Terror Police Arrest Rama Ali, Suspected Al-Shabaab Returnee In Likoni, Mombasa Kenya." Strategic Intelligence Service. Accessed February 8, 2017. <http://www.strategicnewskenya.com/anti-terror-police-arrest-rama-ali-suspected-al-shabaab-returnee-in-likoni-mombasa-kenya/index.html>.

of enforced disappearances in Kwale County, most of which were alleged to have been perpetrated by the security forces.<sup>42</sup>

## PART 2: METHODOLOGY

### 2.1 OBJECTIVES

The baseline objectives of the study are to:

1. Analyze the current context, especially with regards to drivers and risk factors of violent extremism (VE) in the target areas, regional and national countering violent extremism (CVE) approaches, assessing the challenges and opportunities for constructive engagement around countering and preventing VE;
2. Assess the project Objectives, Indicators, and Theory of Change (TOC)
  - a. **Project General Objective:** To build increased trust and collaboration among key community stakeholders to prevent radicalization and violent extremism in coastal Kenya.
    - i. Obj. 1: To strengthen the capacity and leadership skills of civil society and community leaders to meaningfully engage the government and security actors to address security challenges in their communities.
    - ii. Obj. 2: To cultivate working partnerships between communities and security forces across ethnic and social divides.
    - iii. Obj. 3: To develop collaborative responses to shared community security challenges at the local, county, and national levels.; and
3. Conduct a risk assessment in order to ensure “Do No Harm” and conflict sensitivity are respected in the project.

### 2.2 SAMPLING

The SFCG project target areas covered the coastal region of Kenya and captured four (Kwale, Kilifi, Mombasa and Lamu) out of the nine counties considered to be hotspots for interventions against violent extremism. From the county review in the previous section and based on references to violent extremism, frequency of law enforcement actions and CVE intervention programs; the following nine (9) areas or wards were identified in 4 targeted counties, as the baseline study locations:

#### A. Kilifi: hotbed areas

1. Kilifi North Sub-county, Matsangoni Ward (Chumani area) 33,563<sup>43</sup>
2. Kilifi North Sub-county, Mnarani Ward (Mkwajuni area)<sup>44</sup> 33,375<sup>45</sup>

#### B. Mombasa: hotbed areas

1. Mvita Sub-county, Mvita Constituency, Majengo Ward 38,834<sup>46</sup>
2. Likoni Sub-county, Likoni Constituency, Mtongwe Ward (Ziwani Area)<sup>47</sup> 28,168<sup>48</sup>

#### C. Kwale hotbed areas

1. Matuga Sub county, Matuga Constituency, Waa Ward (Ngombeni Area)<sup>49</sup> 37,783<sup>50</sup>
2. Msambweni Sub county, Msambweni Constituency, Gombato Bongwe Ward (Bongwe area) 34,846<sup>51</sup>

<sup>42</sup> "Cases Of Forced Arrests And Disappearances Common In Kwale County - Human Rights In Kenya." 2017. Akvo RSR. Accessed February 8, 2017. <http://rsr.akvo.org/en/project/3990/update/16011/>.

<sup>43</sup> National Census, 2009 <http://www.infotrackea.co.ke/services/leadership/constituencyinfo.php?cinf=wards&t=11>

<sup>44</sup> Tobias Chanji, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2014. Fleeing suspect drops grenade, rifles

Read more at: <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000129158/fleeing-suspect-drops-grenade-rifles>

<sup>45</sup> 2009 National Census, <http://www.infotrackea.co.ke/services/leadership/constituencyinfo.php?cinf=wards&t=11>

<sup>46</sup> 2009 National Census, <http://www.infotrackea.co.ke/services/leadership/constituencyinfo.php?cinf=wards&t=11>

<sup>47</sup> Benard Sanga, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2014. Police shot dead two terror suspects believed to have been behind the Sunday attack in Likoni <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000108063/police-shot-dead-two-terror-suspects-believed-to-have-been-behind-the-sunday-attack-in-likoni> and, Dominic Wabala, 4<sup>th</sup> July 2015. Kenya: Face of Terror As Police Hunt for Shabaab. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201507040099.html>

<sup>48</sup> <http://www.infotrackea.co.ke/services/leadership/constituencyinfo.php?cinf=wards&t=3>

<sup>49</sup> Tobias Chanji, 30<sup>th</sup> January 2015. Suspected Al-Shabaab returnees kill police informer in Kwale

Read more at: <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000149898/suspected-al-shaabaab-returnees-kill-police-informer-in-kwale>

<sup>50</sup> [http://www.kwalecountygov.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=featured&Itemid=814](http://www.kwalecountygov.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=814)

#### D. Lamu hotbed areas

1. Lamu West Sub-county, Mpeketoni Ward (Mpeketoni town) 50,000<sup>52</sup>
2. Lamu East Sub-county, Faza Ward (Tchundwa)<sup>53</sup> 13,524<sup>54</sup>
3. Lamu East Sub-county, Kiunga Ward (Kizingitini) 4265<sup>55</sup>

The sample size for this study was derived using the formula below<sup>56</sup>;

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where:

n = sample size

N = sum of population figure of the selected sample areas. (total population = 274,358

E = maximum limit of tolerable error (0.05)

Hence,  $n = 1 + 274,358 \times 0.05 = 685.8975$

$$\frac{274,358}{685.897} = 399.99 = 400$$

The proposed sample size was 400; but the actual sample size from the field was, including both qualitative and quantitative respondents, was limited to 394 participants, as shown in the table below.

#### Breakdown of Baseline Study Participants

| Name of the Site | Hotspot Identified | FGD (persons) | KII          | Survey        |    |
|------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|----|
| Mombasa          | Majengo Ward       | 5 (40p)       | 7            | 9             | 32 |
|                  | Mtongwe Ward       | 3 (48p)       | 7            | 23            |    |
| Kilifi           | Matsangoni Ward    | 2 (16p)       | 5            | 30            | 64 |
|                  | Mnarani Ward       | 2 (16)        | 4            | 34            |    |
| Kwale            | Waa Ward           | 2 (16p)       | 3            | 30            | 60 |
|                  | Gombato Bongwe     | 0 (0p)        | 4            | 30            |    |
| Lamu             | Mpeketoni          | 2 (16p)       | 4            | 29            | 55 |
|                  | Faza Ward          | 2 (16p)       | 1            | 22            |    |
|                  | Kiunga Ward        | 0 (0p)        | 4            | 4             |    |
| Sub-Total        | 9                  | 144 (persons) | 39 (persons) | 211 (persons) |    |
| Grand Total      |                    | <b>394</b>    |              |               |    |

Table 1 Sample size breakdown

#### Qualitative data

**FGDs:** The FGDs with men and women included eight individuals in each. They were conducted to gain an understanding of experiences of both genders.<sup>57</sup> The total number of FGD participants was 144 people.

**KIIs:** The key informant interviews focused on the youth and other stakeholder groups in the community including; Law enforcement agents, elders, women, religious leaders and other VE actors operating in the area. The research team employed snowball sampling to identify many of the key informants, especially in Kiunga ward. The total number of KIIs conducted is 39.

<sup>51</sup> Kwale County Government, [http://www.kwalecountygov.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=featured&Itemid=816](http://www.kwalecountygov.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=816)

<sup>52</sup> <http://www.infotrackea.co.ke/services/leadership/constituencyinfo.php?&cinf=wards&t=3>

<sup>53</sup> Patrick Beja, 17<sup>th</sup> June 2014. How radical Islamists have over time turned Lamu into terrorists' playground

Read more at: <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000125007/how-radical-islamists-have-over-time-turned-lamu-into-terrorists-playground>

<sup>54</sup> Faza County Assembly Ward information,

<http://www.infotrackea.co.ke/services/leadership/constituencyinfo.php?cinf=wards&t=21>

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.infotrackea.co.ke/services/leadership/constituencyinfo.php?cinf=wards&t=21>

<sup>56</sup> Yamane, Taro. Statistics: An Introductory Analysis, 2nd Ed. (New York: Harper and Row. 1967) p258.

<sup>57</sup> Richard A. Krueger. 2002. Designing and Conducting Focus Group Interviews. 2017. p1 Accessed February 7, 2017.

<http://www.eiu.edu/ihec/Krueger-FocusGroupInterviews.pdf>.

## Quantitative data

A total of 211 persons were sampled for the survey. The ratio of male to female in the Coastal Province of Kenya was 49:50,<sup>58</sup> an indication of slightly higher female population than male. The survey was considered a randomized gender representation since females are most likely to be represented in the youth and security personnel group. However, the research team was also cognizant of the fact that women are less likely to respond to random surveys than men.

The quantitative and qualitative data collected was analysed through textual, content and conductive analysis.

## 2.3 LIMITATIONS

- **Sampling:** A sample of 399 respondents was proposed for the study, but only 394 persons effectively participated in the study.
  - **Survey:** The evaluation team originally planned to survey 52 persons per site in the four locations totaling 208 survey respondents. However, 211 respondents in total were sampled. This translated to 32 respondents in Mombasa instead of 52; and 64,60, and 55 in Kilifi, Kwale and Lamu respectively. **FGDs:** 4 FGDs were planned per site (10 participants in each FGD). A total of 160 people was therefore proposed for the study but only 144 persons participated, owing to the fact that the sensitivity of the study made it difficult to convene more than 8 participants in each FGD. This was especially sensitive in Gombato Bongwe and as such FGDs were not conducted in the area because people were more comfortable speaking on an individual basis than in groups.
  - **KIIs:** 8 KIIs per site totaling to 32 KIIs were proposed for the study. However, 39 people were interviewed, because key informants were added in Mombasa to compensate for the fact that less surveys were conducted there.
- **Security:**
  - Due to security challenges in Kiunga, and the ethical consideration associated with the safety of both the field agents and respondents, the research team decided to conduct 4 surveys and 4 KIIs employing a snowball sampling approach in Kiunga.
  - Security issues in Kwale meant many respondents were uncomfortable opening up and sharing due to mistrust in the community.
- **Political biases:**
  - Within the communities were another limitation. With the August 2017 elections fast approaching, most of the responses had a political angle to them. Though the respondent tried giving feedback based on their preference to political affiliation, we tried as much as possible to request them to give examples that related to VE and the relationship between the law enforcement and the community.

## 2.4 ANALYSIS

Textual and content analysis was used to explore the data collected from the surveys, KIIs and FGDs. The percentage of the total response is not directly displayed on the graphs, but can be calculated by dividing the sum of responses (percentage within counties) presented in the graph by four (4 counties). The qualitative analysis used quotes and paraphrasing of the responses from the KIIs and the FGDs. Quotes are indented while paraphrasing is referenced in footnotes.

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<sup>58</sup> GoK, KNBS. 2014. Statistical Abstract 2014. Kenya National Bureau of Statistics



## PART 3: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

This section presents the baseline research findings from the four counties, focusing on the main objectives, evaluation criteria and baseline indicators.

### 3.1 RESPONDENT DEMOGRAPHICS

As shown in table 2.1 below, a sample size of 394 individuals from the four counties were sampled for this study.

#### Summary of the Sample by Gender

| SITE             |                | FGD       |        | KII  |        | SURVEY     |        |                | TOTAL      |
|------------------|----------------|-----------|--------|------|--------|------------|--------|----------------|------------|
|                  |                | MALE      | FEMALE | MALE | FEMALE | MALE       | FEMALE | Missing Gender |            |
| Mombasa          | Majengo        | 16        | 24     | 5    | 2      | 6          | 3      |                | 56         |
|                  | Mtongwe        | 4         | 16     | 5    | 2      | 13         | 10     |                | 54         |
| Kilifi           | Matsangoni     | 8         | 8      | 2    | 3      | 16         | 14     |                | 51         |
|                  | Mnarani        | 8         | 8      | 2    | 2      | 20         | 14     |                | 54         |
| Kwale            | Gambato Bongwe | 0         | 0      | 1    | 3      | 17         | 12     | 1              | 34         |
|                  | Waa            | 8         | 8      | 2    | 1      | 24         | 6      |                | 49         |
| Lamu             | Mpeketoni      | 8         | 8      | 2    | 2      | 16         | 13     |                | 49         |
|                  | Faza           | 8         | 8      | 0    | 1      | 9          | 13     |                | 39         |
|                  | Kiunga         | 0         | 0      | 2    | 2      | 2          | 2      |                | 8          |
| <b>Sub-Total</b> |                | 60        | 84     | 21   | 18     | 123        | 87     | 1              |            |
| <b>Total</b>     |                | <b>39</b> |        |      |        | <b>211</b> |        |                | <b>394</b> |

Table 2 Sample size by gender

Out of the total sample (FDGs, KIIs and Surveys), 28% were from Mombasa County (14% Majengo and 14% from Mtongwe), 27% from Kilifi (13% from Matsangoni and 14% from Mnarani), 21% from Kwale (9% from Gambato Bongwe and 12% from Waa), and 24% from Lamu (12% from Mpeketoni, 10% from Faza, and 2% from Kiunga). Study participants included 52% male and 48% female in total.

#### County Representation of Respondents<sup>59</sup>

From the survey, 64 respondents were from Kilifi, 60 from Kwale, 55 from Lamu and 32 from Mombasa.




Figure 2 Respondent representation per county

<sup>59</sup> Respondents refers to individuals that participated in the survey; hereinafter referred as 'Survey respondents'

## Age of Respondents




Figure 3 Respondent Ages

A majority (21%) of the survey respondents were aged 25-29 (Middle Youth). More than half of the respondents (63%) were aged between 18-35. Within Kilifi, most of the respondents were 20-24 early youth (27%); 25-29 middle youth (27%) within Kwale; 20-24 early youth (18%) within Lamu; and 25-29 middle youth (25%) and 36-40 early adulthood (25%) within Mombasa.

## Religion of Respondents




Figure 4 Religious affiliation of the respondents

In overall, the survey respondents were 52.61% Muslim, 46.92% Christian and 0.47% did not disclose. Within Lamu, 71% were Christians and 29% were Muslims; 65% Muslims and 35% Christians within Kwale; 59% Muslims and 41% Christians within Mombasa; and 59% Christians and 39% Muslims in Kilifi. One of the respondents from Kilifi did not disclose their religion.

## Occupation of Respondents




Figure 5 Occupation

The majority of the survey respondents were unemployed (25%). Of those employed, the top four occupations in the four counties are formal employment, small scale businesses, casual

labour, and religious or faith based jobs. Those that are dependent are categorised unemployed, retired, housewives, or other (often students). The dependency rate<sup>60</sup> of the respondents stands at 47%; 48% within Kilifi, 48% within Kwale, 42% within from Lamu, and 50% within from Mombasa. Within Lamu, the majority of the survey respondents were engaged in formal employment (office based) (22%), a figure equal to the number of those that are also unemployed within Lamu. While within Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa respectively, the highest percentage of respondents are unemployed.

**Educational Background of the Respondents**




Figure 6 Education Background

The majority of the respondents (41%) are secondary school certificate holders. 89% have received some formal education. Within Kilifi 30% have completed secondary school, 48% in Kwale, 47% in Lamu and 41% in Mombasa. Respondents in Kilifi (25%) and Mombasa (13%) had higher rates of university attendance than those in Kwale (5%) and Lamu (2%).

**Length of Stay of Respondents**




Figure 7 Length of Stay

The majority of the survey respondents (78%) have been in their location for more than three years. Within respective counties, 55% have stayed in Kilifi, 98% in Kwale, 80% in Lamu, and 81% in Mombasa.

<sup>60</sup> Referred to as the cumulative percentage of the unemployed, retired, housewives, or other (often students)

### 3.2 CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

#### Have any actions from international organizations and foreign policy, county or national government affected radicalization, recruitment and violent extremism in general?




Figure 8a Actions from international organizations, foreign policy, county or national government and local initiatives affecting VE

Overall, 70% of survey respondents (69% in Kilifi, 72% in Kwale, 87% in Lamu and 53% in Mombasa) stated that policy actions of international organizations, foreign governments, national and local governments have had no effect on radicalization, recruitment and violent extremism. On the other hand, 26% of survey respondents (31% within Kilifi, 27% within Kwale, 11% within Lamu and 41% within Mombasa) indicated that those policies did have an effect on radicalization, recruitment and VE. However, of those that felt this way, their opinions differed as to whether the effect was positive or negative.




Figure 9b Explain actions from international organizations, foreign policy, county or national government and local initiatives affecting VE

Of those who believed that these policies had had an effect, 17% believed it was negative. Issues mentioned ranged from corruption, natural resources conflict, private and community land exploitation at the expense of the locals, lack of jobs, bad influence from media/televised movies, drugs/alcohol, and even loss of life through retaliatory acts of violence<sup>61</sup>.

On the other hand, 11% believed the effect of these policies had been positive (20% within Kwale and 16% within Mombasa). They explained that CVE initiatives like information exchange, VE awareness, CVE program funding, economic and health support to VE victims, job creation, scholarships for youth education, amnesty to extremists, and inclusion in governance had reduced radicalisation and recruitment. Within Kwale, an interviewee from Gambato Bongwe stated that the Kwale county development projects have reduced VE, through employment that has engaged the youth.<sup>62</sup> Specifically interviewees in Kwale stated that:

*“County Government does offer interest free loans to spur economic empowerment and address unemployment. Many youths have invested in business and agri- business in this area.”<sup>63</sup>*

*“I feel there is a high improvement because of a lot of effort in countering conflicts and VE. The arrests and killings have discouraged other youths from joining. Supporting youth with income generating activities has also reduced the impact of VE. No one wants war or*

<sup>61</sup> Retaliatory violence in this context is associated with the negative effects of development; more often than not, those that feel sense of oppression find it easier to engage in negative and violent actions as a means to addressing their issues.

<sup>62</sup> KWA GOM KII 029

<sup>63</sup> KWA GOM KII 028

violence when their stomach is full. This is what the county and other partners strive to achieve by coming up with community oriented project.”<sup>64</sup>

The responses from Kwale are different from those in other areas. An FGD in Mtongwe, Mombasa, highlighted that the government has not made effort to increase the minimum wage in Kenya. One of the discussant stated that;

“For example, if paid 8,000 Kenya shillings per month; and an extremist or terrorist comes with an offer of 30,000 Kenya shillings; many will accept such an offer.”<sup>65</sup>

Another FGD in Majengo revealed that development led by the county government has benefitted most of Majengo community, except those in Ziwani village.<sup>66</sup> Thus, a validation that development in one area may cause marginalization in another community and increase vulnerability to VE. Also, an interviewee from Kiunga in Lamu revealed that the boom in tourism in the area has had less positive impact because most of the available jobs are for non-locals.<sup>67</sup>

**Are there links between gangs and extremist organizations?**




Figure 10a Are there links between VE and criminal gangs?

A total of 77% of the total survey respondents stated that there is no link between the gangs in the community and VE groups. Those respondents explained that gangs are easier for the law enforcers to manage. They are also amateurish, localised and incompatible with VE groups, which are opportunistic and threaten global peace and security. However, a small number of survey respondents in Kwale (13%), Mombasa (6%) and Lamu (2%), stated that without proper monitoring, gang members can easily transform into extremists as cited by an interviewee in Mtongwe, Mombasa.<sup>68</sup>




Figure 11b Explanation of are there links between VE and criminal gangs?

Some survey respondents from Mombasa (31%), Kwale (25%) and Lamu (25%) stated that there are links between VE and criminal gangs. Respondents described links around shared

<sup>64</sup> KWA GOM KII 027  
<sup>65</sup> MOM MTO FGD 006  
<sup>66</sup> MOM MAJ FGD 003  
<sup>67</sup> LAM KIU KII 036; LAM KIU KII 037  
<sup>68</sup> MOM MTO KII 014

substance abuse, political ideology, attacks on innocent individuals, and use of extremist groups as safe-havens. An FDG participant in Majengo said:

*“In the whole of Majengo there are two groups; the gangs and the extremist groups or organizations. The gangs have no links with the extremists because the gangs want money compared to the extremists who are ready to shed blood for the sake of faith or religion. But when it comes to the relationship of youth they do have a link and they understand one another well.”<sup>69</sup>*

Finally, the data indicated some linkages at the individual level, where extremist organizations may recruit from gang groups as a platform to influence the youth into VE activities.

### What are the drivers of VE in this community?




Figure 12 Drivers of Violent Extremism

Of all survey respondents, 24% cited desire for revenge as a driver of VE in their community, 18% cited resourced based issues and 13% drug and substance abuse. Within the counties, illiteracy (20%) was significant in Kilifi, desire for revenge (45%) in Kwale, poor parenting in Lamu, and desire for revenge (34%) in Mombasa.

The desire for revenge mentioned by respondents may be a response to oppression and mistreatment either by the police or gangs in their communities. An interview conducted in Mtongwe revealed that police crackdown and hard security approaches without proper intelligence have created backlash. The interviewee said that those approaches have also pushed young people to join both gangs and VE groups as an alternative, not only in Mombasa, but also in the other coastal counties.<sup>70</sup>

The perceived oppression of Islamic countries or Muslims anywhere in the world cannot be ruled out as a factor in recruitment narratives, encouraging desire for revenge. The use of misinterpreted verses in the Quran may also contribute. The second most mentioned VE driver across all four locations was resource-based issues (18%). An interviewee from Kwale revealed that the system of land ownership and acquisition of land ownership certificate from the government has displaced many and in many cases people are denied title deeds. An interviewee from Gombato Bongwe stressed the role of tribalism in the acquisition of land. This driver was also cited by 35% of respondents in Kwale. An interviewee in Kwale revealed that there was a group called “Kaya Bombo” which was formed along ethnic lines to fight for the land rights of the people in the community.<sup>71</sup> Land issues were also echoed in a FGD in Mpeketoni where discussants stated that tribal tensions in relation to land issues have influenced VE. Many alleged that some Muslims’ involvement in VE leads to stereotyping and blanket victimization of the Muslim community. This stereotyping and blanket victimization has pushed some individuals to join VE groups like Al-Shabaab to seek revenge.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>69</sup> MOM MAJ FGD 001

<sup>70</sup> MOM MTO KII 014

<sup>71</sup> KWA GOM KII 030

<sup>72</sup> LAM MPE FGD 015

Drugs and substance abuse (13%) were the third most often mentioned driver by the survey respondents. In Mombasa county, 31% of respondents cited this as a driver. A FDG in Majengo Mombasa revealed that youth in the county have rates of addiction and therefore will take almost any paying job, even those which may be linked to VE, just to sustain their life style.<sup>73</sup> “Furthermore,” a FGD participants in Faza explained, “*the psychological effects of drugs makes it easier for them to be convinced to join VE groups*”.<sup>74</sup>

Overall, 9% of respondents cited illiteracy and lack of quality education as drivers. 7% of respondents cited poor parenting as a driver which they explained as the loss of cultural, Islamic and family values, and lack of behavioural training and parental monitoring. A FGD respondent in Faza Lamu cited the exposure of youth to unacceptable values in the society as a driver.<sup>75</sup> Lastly, unemployment and indoctrination were only mentioned by 6% and 5% of respondents, respectively, as drivers of VE.

An interviewee in Kwale identified the drivers of VE as:

1. *Lack of job of opportunities in the county and country means they are lured with the opportunity of good jobs abroad where there are recruited as fighters.*
2. *Oppression of other Muslims in other countries is being used as platform to recruit so that they stand for the oppressed as taught in the Quran.*
3. *Tribalism and nepotism within the country leave those without godfathers without any opportunities. Recruiters/VE groups use equality for all as an incentive for some to join them.*
4. *VE is also a source of earning an income. Once you become a fighter, you will be on the VE payroll.*
5. *Pride of being a fighter and use of weapon (guns).*
6. *Frustration with unemployment, historical injustices and the belief that VE is the only way to get justice.*<sup>76</sup>

An interviewee in Faza, Lamu county, said that youth are vulnerable to joining extremist groups because of unemployment and the high financial benefit that some extremist groups offer:

*“Al-Shabaab usually offers people 200,000 Kenyan Shillings up front for joining and a monthly salary of 80,000 Kenyan Shillings as long as you are part of their team. And in the event of death in the line of duty, your family receives the pay for a period of time and this is believed to be a better way of overcoming poverty.”*<sup>77</sup>

A FDG participant in Kwale summarised the drivers of VE in their area stating that:

*The main drivers or triggers of violent extremism are:*

1. *Lack of jobs whereby one engages in terrorism to get their daily earning and satisfy their basic needs.*
2. *Bribery and corruption by the law enforcement officers whereby youths nowadays have no fear of joining violent extremist organizations since they know they can easily escape punishment from the law by bribing police officers.*
3. *Drug abuse among youths is very common in many communities and as we know drug addicts tend to lose their minds and can engage in any illegal acts.*
4. *Peer pressure is also a driver where youth mislead one another to engage in legal activities.*
5. *Parental irresponsibility: where parents tend to ignore their responsibility of raising their children with acceptable values, being unfriendly to their kids, not educating them as well as not guiding and counseling them on the prevailing issues in the society.*
6. *Poor career guidance and insufficient education facilities for the youths so they end up joining extremist organizations.*<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> MOM MAJ FGD 002

<sup>74</sup> LAM FAZ FGD 018

<sup>75</sup> LAM FAZ FGD 018

<sup>76</sup> KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>77</sup> LAM FAZ KII 034

<sup>78</sup> LAM FAZ FGD 018

## What are the activities that bring the community together or divide the community in general?

Different communities and county respondents provided a myriad of activities that either unified them or separated them. Their open-ended responses were coded into themes as illustrated in Figure 11. The top unifiers in the community were anniversaries (33%), sports and religion (17%), and public campaigns (13%). The top dividers mentioned were culture (referencing ethnicities) (32%), politics (21%), corruption (20%) and land disputes (15%). Sporting activities were reported as the top unifying activity that cut across all the counties.<sup>79</sup> Anniversaries and celebrations (33%) included: weddings, birthdays, and burials.




Figure 13a What unifies the communities?

Football was the most referenced sporting activity mentioned. Lamu had the most mentions of football (35% of respondents mentioned it) as a unifier. Public campaigns involving Barazas and community meetings were also mentioned as major unifiers, especially in Kilifi and Kwale. Other unifiers mentioned included: religious worship in the Church and Mosque; political activities like elections and rallies; cultural and traditional festivals; and educational, work and vocational events which included school events, as well as workplace and training events.




Figure 14b What divides the communities?

The main dividers mentioned by respondents were tradition and tribalism (32%); political activities like elections and rallies (21%), corruption, bribery and nepotism (20%). Land disputes were a key divider in Lamu, while politics and religion in Kwale. An interviewee from Kwale<sup>80</sup> revealed that conflict over religious differences are due to the divide usually between believers and unbelievers<sup>81</sup>. Other issues mentioned were the political divide usually between

<sup>79</sup> LAM FAZ FGD 017; KIL MAT KII 015; KWA WAA FDG 013; MOM MTO FGD 006

<sup>80</sup> KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>81</sup> Believers and unbelievers in this context means we against them; either in Islam or Christianity



ODM and Jubilee supporters, land issues often caused by government reallocation of land, tribal disputes over land ownership, and social issues like forced marriages, early pregnancy, rape and witchcraft.

**How does the activities that unify and divide the community relate to VE?**




Figure 15a Do those unifiers and dividers relate to VE?

71% of all respondents said that the unifiers and dividers which influence conflict within the county do not necessarily influence VE. This is supported by an interviewee in Kiunga who indicated that the unifiers and dividers do not usually have direct links to VE.<sup>82</sup>




Figure 16b Explanation on do those unifiers and dividers relate to VE?

However, 70% of the respondents did not give a reason as to why the unifiers and dividers do or do not relate to VE. However, some of the respondents (29%), felt that the unifiers and dividers influence VE based on the fact that; the financial gap within the community can be exploited for VE activities, some ideological and religious narratives support use of VE; societal ills like the lack of family values, drug, alcohol, substance, and child abuse act as breeding ground for VE behaviours; land based conflict may result in VE acts and lastly; marginalization creates grief which may result to use of VE tactics.

**Is there a link between general (normal) conflict and violent extremism?**




Figure 17a Is there a link between VE and general conflict? What is the link?

<sup>82</sup> LAM KIU KII 035

Most of the total respondents (79%) stated that there is no link between regular conflict and VE. 27% of these respondents indicated the reason was that VE management strategy differs from 'regular' conflict.




Figure 18b Explanation on Is there a link between VE and general conflict? What is the link?

51% of the respondents did not explain if there are any links between conflict and VE. However, those respondents who felt there is a link said it was based on the fact that VE actors can be easily be recruited from conflict situations; those who share their religion, ideology, or tribe; using drugs and substance abuse.

**How do the members of this community deal with conflict?**




Figure 19 How communities deal with conflicts

Within the respective research locations, conflicts are managed in different ways. They are predominantly managed through the intervention of village heads and chiefs who act as mediators. 57% in Kwale and 55% in Lamu responded that this was how conflict was managed in their location. Other means of conflict management cited by the survey respondents in the four counties include: mediation by religious leaders, Barazas<sup>83</sup>, government administrators, Nyumba Kumi<sup>84</sup> representatives, and internal resolutions among friends and within families.

<sup>83</sup> Community or Government forum to discuss security or community issues; aimed at having community wide participation.

<sup>84</sup> Community Policing program implemented by GOK to act as information sharing channels

### 3.3 ACTORS INVOLVED IN CVE IN THE COASTAL COUNTIES

#### Who are the major stakeholder's individuals involved in Countering Violent Extremism in this Community?




Figure 20 Stakeholders identified by the communities

Interviewees in FGDs, KIIs and 37% of all survey respondents, stated that CVE actors include the government, security agencies, CSOs, policymakers, youth, women, and the collective representation of community members (including family heads, women, youth, elders, religious leaders and parent). 47% of respondents within Kilifi, 40% within Kwale and 34% in Mombasa were able to identify all these actors. An interviewee in Kwale identified the key actors in CVE as:

- Police – maintain peace and order, investigations, arrests
- Religious leaders – Preaching peace and co-existence as indicated in the Holy Quran
- CBO and CSOs – Creating awareness
- Women – Good parenting
- Youth – to remain vigilant and become good ambassadors of peace<sup>85</sup>

An FGD participant in Majengo Mombasa said:

*“CSOs are always assisting the community in solving most of the issues affecting the community, so with this, we can proudly say that these organizations have helped us a lot, because when you compare where Majengo was two-three years ago, Majengo was so radical, but after these groups came in things changed. Now police raids have decreased. Religious leaders have also helped, after the government ordered the closing of masjid Musa, a mosque in Majengo where youth were trained to be terrorists, religious leaders thought of ways to end those activities. One of the ways was to encourage people to read and understand their religion so that people misinterpreting some of the verses cannot manipulate them. So, religious leaders have helped. When it comes to police, police made it reduce because they were killing the suspects.”<sup>86</sup>*

Respondents explained that police maintain law and order, investigate and make arrests; the religious leaders preach peace and co-existence; the CSOs, especially the CBOs, are usually engaged in creating awareness on de-radicalization and sensitization of CVE; the women in the community often promote good parenting; while the youth were mentioned to be ambassadors of peace.<sup>87</sup> 16% of the total respondents pointed out the significance of religious leaders in CVE, especially in Lamu (25%) and Kilifi (22%); an indication that religious leaders are major actors involved in CVE related activities in the coastal region. However, an interviewee in Mnarani in Kilifi, stated that the role played by religious leaders is challenged by the actions of the police who are hard power oriented.<sup>88</sup> Additionally, 9% of the total respondents mentioned NGOs/CSOs like MUHURI, KYMA, and IMO, as other key CVE actors,

<sup>85</sup> KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>86</sup> MOM MAJ FGD 002

<sup>87</sup> KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>88</sup> KIL MNA KII 021

especially within Kwale (22%). Other actors mentioned included the local chiefs and village elders at 13% in Mombasa and 9% in Kilifi.

**Do those major stakeholders engage one another to deal with VE and terrorism in this area?**

The majority of respondents (65%) indicated that the stakeholders engage with one another while, 32% stated that they do not engage. When asked how stakeholders engage with one another respondents answered: in Barazas (27%); awareness and sensitization programmes (24%) on countering extremist ideology, de-radicalization and human rights activities; and project implementation (13%) through government and organization partnerships; as well as Nyumba Kumi initiatives. 93% of the respondents within Lamu indicated that the stakeholders engage with each other while those 59% in Kilifi stated that there are no engagements.

**What is the impact of the activities of these major stakeholders in this community?**

An interviewee from Kwale explained that CVE actors have different levels of impact based on the activities they conduct in the community.<sup>89</sup> The perceived level of impact is determined by the opinions of the community on the activities. For example, law enforcement actors are perceived to have had a negative impact on the community based on their actions.<sup>90</sup>




Figure 21a Impact of the stakeholder engagements

From Figure 16a, we can see that 45% of respondents feel the impact of these stakeholders’ activities is positive<sup>91</sup> and 55% feel it is negative<sup>92</sup>. Many respondents in Kwale (63%) asserted positive impacts, while Kilifi many asserted either average or negative impacts (86%).




Figure 22b Explanation on Impact of the stakeholder engagements

<sup>89</sup> KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>90</sup> KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>91</sup> Total ‘Good’

<sup>92</sup> Average of Total ‘Bad and Average’

There were reports of police involvement in deaths, kidnappings, and forced disappearances within Kwale (13%), Kilifi (3%) and Mombasa (3%). These actions have pushed the community to lose faith and trust in the police, instead choosing to engage in self-policing with other community members, excluding the police.<sup>93</sup> In addition to these assertions about law enforcement, the activities of politicians in the VE space were said to have negative impacts.

A high percentage of survey respondents in Kwale (63%) and Lamu (60%) felt the impact of stakeholder engagement was positive. Interviewees from Faza (Lamu) and Gambato Bongwe (Kwale) echoed the positive impacts of CVE activities in the area. 22% of survey respondents stated that the risk of VE has reduced, while 27% said the community is united. Religious leaders were mentioned to be on the forefront of fighting VE, holding inter-denominational talks, and engaging in conflict resolution.<sup>94</sup> An interviewee from Kilifi noted that key partnerships exist between the local chiefs, police, village elders, police informers and the Nyumba Kumi representatives. Partnerships were also reported between the youth, women, elders and the CSOs/CBOs through awareness and sensitization programmes. However, the relationship between law enforcement and the community is still in a bad state with little or no collaborative efforts mentioned between the law enforcement and members of the community on CVE.<sup>95</sup>

**Do organizations work together to deal with VE and terrorism in this area?**




Figure 23a Do organizations work together? What activities are done together on CVE and CT?

A majority of respondents (56%) stated that there is no coordination between organisations in the county on VE issues.




Figure 24b What activities are done together on CVE and CT?

However, 42% indicated that organizations and CSOs work together on; economic and financial empowerment programs (11%); sensitization and awareness programs (17%); and on training programs (7%). Within Kwale and Kilifi, respondents asserted CSOs do not work

<sup>93</sup> KWA GOM KII 030

<sup>94</sup> LAM FAZ KII 034; KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>95</sup> KIL MNA KII 020

together because there is no coordination among them at the community level (especially in Kwale (77%)).

**How often do CSOs meet to discuss issues on conflict management and CVE?**




Figure 25a Frequency of conflict management and CVE discussions between the community and the NGOs

The majority of the total respondents (85%) stated that CSOs and the community do not frequently meet to discuss CVE and conflict management issues.




Figure 26b Explanation on the Frequency of conflict management and CVE discussions between the community and the NGOs

Open responses revealed that CSOs work less at the community level (29%) especially within Mombasa and Kwale. Within Kilifi (39%) and Mombasa (38%) the respondents said the CSOs do to not usually meet with the community to discuss conflict management and security issues. Within Mombasa (13%) and Lamu (13%) they were said to be more engaged with the community during election periods. Finally, respondents said that CSOs only engage with the community when a conflict or VE incident occurs (21%). Some of the respondents pointed out that this was due to issues of insecurity and the fear of community influence on projects implemented by the CSOs.

**Do you think women in this community have enough training to deal with issues of violent extremism in this community?**




Figure 27a Do women have enough training to deal with VE?

A small percentage of the total respondents (7%) stated that women have enough training to deal with issues of VE. However, the majority of the total respondents (93%) stated that the women had not received enough training to deal with VE issues.




Figure 28b Explanation of “Do women have enough training to deal with VE?”

The open responses revealed the respondents felt women do not have enough training to deal with issues of VE because they; lack of confidence and high female ignorance on women’s role in CVE, victimisation in the community resulting to less opportunity, and their domestic engagement and exclusion due to religious and cultural marginalization. Other reasons offered were that women are not called or mobilized for CVE events because the timing for community engagements are usually not favourable to women who have other commitments to the family.

**Do you think the youth in this community have enough training to deal with issues of violent extremism in this community?**




Figure 29a Do the youth have enough training to deal with VE?

The majority of total respondents (97%) stated that youth do not have enough training to deal with issues of VE, while 3% stated that the youth have training to deal with issues of VE. The open responses revealed that 23% mentioned no opportunities for engagements, 15% of the youth are occupied with non-productive things like drug use and other social vices, 8% youth often neglect participation in CVE events if there are no financial benefits, 6% mentioned youth illiteracy and ignorance; and 5% fear being profiled as Violent Extremists or VE sympathizers.




Figure 30b Do the youth have enough training to deal with VE?

**What is the relationship between people in this community and the police regarding conflict management and terrorism?**




Figure 31a Relationship between the community and police

Generally, the community did not see law enforcement as partners in CVE instead, they saw them as those who arrest and detain VE suspects; who are often innocent.




Figure 32b Explanation on “Relationship between the community and police”

The community-police relationship is not good according to 83% of respondents, especially in Kilifi (63%) and Kwale (97%). In open responses, this uneasy relationship was attributed to fear of brutality and inhumane treatment especially within Kilifi (29%), Kwale (22%) and Mombasa (22%) respectively; police secrecy and lack of confidentiality especially within Kwale (23%) and Mombasa (19%); death and enforced disappearance especially within Kwale (37%); profiling especially within Lamu (20%); engaging in bribery and corruption especially within Mombasa (13%); arrest especially within Mombasa (3%); and prolonged detention especially in Lamu (4%). Overall, it is clear the relationship between the community and the police is not positive. An interviewee in Faza explained that:

*“...Police brutality is so rampant in this area and this badly affects the relationship. ...I personally don’t trust our law enforcement and neither do my people. We have lost trust and hope in them. My cousin had reformed and he came back home. As a family, we talked to him and we kept a close eye to ensure that he did not slide back, he was doing very well but one day he was picked for questioning and we never heard from him again. A week later we were called and told to go and pick up his body from Malindi... another family member disappeared under the same circumstances. They are so biased. They are recruiting women informants from the community and the messages they are given they do not investigate they just act in a biased way.”<sup>96</sup>*

<sup>96</sup> LAM FAZ KII 034



**Do you think that the community works together with the law enforcement in dealing with violent extremism? (partnership)**




Figure 33a How the community works with law enforcement on CVE

Generally, there is an observed level (33%) of community-police cooperation in CVE related activities, but majority of the survey respondents (67%) stated that there was no such partnership.




Figure 34b Explanation of “How the community works with law enforcement on CVE”

Within counties, especially in Lamu (76%) partnership includes; people reporting to the police and helping in investigations, participation in Baraza meetings and the Nyumba Kumi initiatives. As confirmed in an FGD in Faza as well as a KII in Kiunga: Discussants and interviewees stated that while the relationship was generally poor, some members within the communities have a good relationship with the police. To a certain extent, there has been some cooperation and partnership in terms of information sharing and youth involvement to prevent VE.<sup>97</sup> This could serve as an entry point for further similar activities. However, even though the community members occasionally partner or share information with law enforcement, there is still fear of reprisal attacks from violent extremists or profiling from the law enforcement agencies.

However, there is also a general feeling that those who are in close engagement with the police are government-paid informants; and they are compelled to give information to the police. Those mentioned included the parents and relatives of those who had directly or indirectly linked to radicalization and recruitment.<sup>98</sup> An interviewee response, in Gombato Bongwe, to the question of community-police partnership indicated that there is lack of trust between the police and the community:

*“These people do not help us. They instead torture and mistreat our people and the brutality levels are very high. You cannot even dare report a case of violent extremism because they will first arrest you and claim that unless you are one of them you would have not known. This makes the community become very silent about these acts for fear of being killed. The only parties that partner with the law enforcement agencies are the informants who are assigned the tasks by the law enforcement. Other parties who partner though not willingly are parents whose*

<sup>97</sup> LAM FAZ FGD 017; LAM KIU KII 035

<sup>98</sup> KWA GOM KII 030

children have gone missing or have in one way or another been linked to radicalization and recruitment.”<sup>99</sup>

Within the counties, 72% of respondents showed Lamu as the most cooperative with the police, because of the high community policing initiatives (55%) and Barazas participation (9%); while Kwale is the least at 2%. Respondents within Kwale stressed victimization, brutality and disappearances as reasons for not working with the police. 41% of respondents in Kilifi did not give a reason why they do not work with the police.

**What are the roles of military and police in violent extremism in this community?**




Figure 35 Understanding the role of the law enforcement on VE

The survey respondents stated that the role of the police and military in preventing VE is making arrests and detaining people (28%) and additionally to maintain law and order (64%). This clearly shows that the police and military are less likely to be engaged in the use of soft approaches. An interviewee in Kwale said:

*“They arrest, investigate and assassinate suspects. However, some of their actions cause more harm than good. Police do not follow the law when dealing with suspects. When they act tough and harass people they lose the goodwill and are seen as enemies of the community. Suspect executions by police are a drawback to building trust with the community.”<sup>100</sup>*

An interviewee from Gambato Bongwe in Kwale said the activities the law enforcement agencies engage in affect CVE in other ways as well:

*“The law enforcement has done its fair share if promoting violent extremism in the way they deal with people in this community. They have been assassinating people; Muslim clerics and other scholars without taking into account collateral damage that they are doing. This has pushed many affected family towards becoming sympathizers to the militia groups. For example, the Agaiza Mosque not forgetting Musa and Sakina Mosques in Mombasa, which were said to be harbouring Al-Shabaab members. They were raided by police who did not adhere to the roles that are observed in the mosques. They did not care about the other people and most of all they did not respect the Muslim leaders leading the prayers in the said mosques.”<sup>101</sup>*

**How have the actions of the community and police partnership affected members of this community?**




Figure 36a Perception of the partnership between the police and the community

The majority of survey respondents (65%) stated that partnerships between the community and the police is bad, 21% stated average, 12% good.

<sup>99</sup> KWA GOM KII 030  
<sup>100</sup> KWA GOM KII 027  
<sup>101</sup> KWA GOM KII 030




Figure 37b Explanation of "Perception of the partnership between the police and the community"

The open responses revealed that the bad effect of the partnership between the police and the community is because of loss of life and property, alleged incitement to violence by religious leaders, death from police actions; and lack of cooperation and thus unchecked VE and terror cases. The majority of responses stating the existence of high insecurity were in Kilifi (81%) and Kwale (72%) respectively.

**Do you know of or have you heard of any radicalization processes, activities, areas or events happening in this community?**




Figure 38a Knowledge on Radicalization in the communities

Most of the survey respondents (94%) reported that they were not aware of ongoing radicalization especially in their county; while 6% stated otherwise. The percentage indicating to have no knowledge of an occurred radicalization was especially high in Kilifi (98%) and Kwale (93%). This is likely because most of the radicalization processes occurs in secret so people are not aware or the respondents are afraid to speak out.




Figure 39b Explanation on "Knowledge on Radicalization in the communities"

Those that reported awareness of radicalization stated that radicalization occurs in the mosques, educational centres like Madrasas, and at political gatherings through rhetoric that fosters violence. In an FGD in Kilifi a respondent indicated that radicalization is taking place, to a certain extent, in their community and those vulnerable to it are the youth, both

employed and unemployed.<sup>102</sup> Two interviews in Gombato Bongwe highlights below as the drivers of radicalization:

*“It is a Holy War between the Muslims and non-Muslims. You will be rewarded hereafter (in paradise). It is a must to fight for your right.”<sup>103</sup>*

*“It is a Holy War between the Muslims and non-Muslims and we must protect the religion. Our resources are being stolen e.g. land. Our jobs are taken away by foreigners.”<sup>104</sup>*

### Do you think recruitment is taking place in this community?




Figure 40a Knowledge on recruitment in the communities

Majority of respondents (75%) stated that they are not aware of any recruitment processes in their community.




Figure 41b Explanation on “Knowledge on recruitment in the communities”

Most of those that indicated not having knowledge of on-going recruitment failed to give reasons why they are not aware (51%). Some respondents (24%), especially in Kwale (72% within Kwale) indicated an alarming number of missing youths and suspected that they might have left to join extremist groups. During the FGD in Majengo respondents revealed that recruitment has been silent because the processes change constantly and with the use of technology platforms it has become harder to physically observe recruitment, which is allegedly taking place on the internet.<sup>105</sup> During a KII in Kwale, the interviewees said that recruitment to VE groups targets youth, criminals and orphans; especially those who live in poverty.<sup>106</sup>

### Who among the community do you think are most likely to be radicalized? (target groups)

Many respondents indicated that target groups for radicalization are youth (37%) especially within Kilifi and Mombasa. Other target groups reported were idlers, unemployed and jobless persons (16%) especially in Kilifi, the uneducated and illiterate, drug and substance abusers, and widows (victims of enforced disappearances).

<sup>102</sup> KIL MNA FGD 011; KIL MNA FGD 012

<sup>103</sup> KWA GOM KII 027

<sup>104</sup> KWA GOM KII 028

<sup>105</sup> MOM MAJ FGD 002

<sup>106</sup> KWA GOM KII 027; KWA GOM KII 028




Figure 42 At-risk populations in the communities

### 3.4 CAPACITY TO ENGAGE IN CVE IN COASTAL COUNTIES

#### How do members of this community discuss issues related to violent extremism and terrorism?




Figure 43a Community discussions on VE and CVE issues

Most of the discussions about terrorism and VE issues are held in secret (64% of respondents said); and only 32% of the survey respondents stated that they openly discuss VE issues.




Figure 44b Explanation of "Community discussions on VE and CVE issues"

The open responses revealed that the members in the community do not discuss issues related to VE because of fear and personal safety. They discuss secretly due to fear of personal safety, thus the ease of discussing openly (although few of them) in rallies, business centres and relaxation centres. The residents in these counties are left out as security agents engage only with chiefs, community leaders and religious leaders.<sup>107</sup>

#### What channel is this information shared between the members of the community?

The open responses revealed the channels of information sharing among community members including: Barazas, community meetings and forums, and through village head and chiefs. The second most reported communication channel is face-to-face through physical and verbal communication. Other channels reported included: mass media through television, radio programs, newspapers and phone conversations through calls and texts, social media and religious gatherings. Community meetings and physical communication were popular in Kwale while phone, mass media and community meetings were popular in Mombasa.

<sup>107</sup> KWA WAA KII 025




Figure 45 the communications channels used by members of the community

**Does this information get to the security agencies and law enforcement teams?**




Figure 46a Communications between the members of the community and law enforcement

Majority of the survey respondents (64%) stated that the information gets to the security and law enforcement agencies while 34% stated that the information does not get to them. Sources cited by respondents as those used to share information from the community to the police included the village heads and designated community leaders<sup>108</sup> (51% of respondents). Other channels include publicly circulated information, communications from religious leaders, informants of the police and also police and independent investigators. 34% of all respondents stated that the police may not be informed of ongoing VE related activities while 16% of all respondents indicated that this is because those that would have volunteered information fear for their security and safety.




Figure 47b Explanation on “Communications between the members of the community and law enforcement”

**Are there avenues where people interact and discuss issues of security in this community?**

<sup>108</sup> LAM KIU KII 035




Figure 48a Avenues of VE discussion in the community

Majority (64%) of the survey respondent stated that their avenues through which security issues are discussed while 34% said there are no avenues.




Figure 49b Explanation on “Avenues of VE discussion in the community”

The avenues that exist to facilitate open discussions on issues of security include: Barazas and community forums; district peace committees (DPCs); Nyumba Kumi initiatives; religious functions; personal events like weddings, funerals, family and friendship conversations; CSO activities like seminars and conferences provided by the Red cross, International Migration Organization, Kwale Muslims Development Initiative (KMDI). A FGD in Waa war highlighted that people interact and engage with issues of security through,

*“Baraza organized by organizations. Chiefs meetings where they share information. Village elders are also involved. On few occasions, the police are informed”<sup>109</sup>*

Members of the community were said to deal with conflict issues by:

*“...[Involving] village elders in dialogue with the concerned individuals, chiefs and the local administration is involved. Joint meetings with concerned parties, Chiefs meetings and use of police when situations get out of hand, religious gatherings to expound on the context of VE.”<sup>110</sup>*

### Are there any stakeholders who interact with law enforcement and government on security issues?




Figure 50a Stakeholder engagement with government on VE issues

42% of respondents stated that stakeholders don not interact with law enforcement and government on security issues, while 56% stated that there are stakeholders that interact with law enforcement and government.

<sup>109</sup> KWA WAA FDG 014

<sup>110</sup> KWA WAA KII 024




Figure 51b Explanation on “Stakeholder engagement with government on VE issues”

The stakeholders referred to were CSOs like the Red Cross, Aphia Plus, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), Kwale Muslims Development Initiative (KMDI), International Migration organization (IMO); village chiefs and heads; religious leaders; civil servants; and private businesses like hotels.

**Do you think this community protects itself against violent extremism?**




Figure 52a Community's' protection against VE

Close to half of the total respondents (45%) indicated that there is no mechanism to protect the community from VE. However, 54% of the respondents stated that there were mechanisms to protect against VE.




Figure 53a Community's' protection against VE

The open response indicated that the mechanism that exist to protect the community includes; education and sensitization on VE and CVE, youth engagement and empowerment, community reporting mechanisms<sup>111</sup>, community to police intelligence, dialogue, and promotion of family values to prevent drivers of radicalization, recruitment, and VE. A FDG participant in Majengo stated that:

*For example, if there is a person who wants to rent one of the houses at Ziwani, there is a form which he/she should fill for us to agree .... So, if he/she refuses to fill in that form we do not accommodate them. These strategies were discussed at a chief Baraza, where we normally meet to discuss issues to deal security.<sup>112</sup>*

<sup>111</sup> LAM KIU KII 036; LAM MPE FGD 015; KWA WAA KII 025

<sup>112</sup> MOM MAJ FGD 002



The communal system of conflict resolution employs the assistance of the county’s provincial administrators when it fails.<sup>113</sup>

**Have you heard of or do you know of any community initiatives that work to counter violent extremism in this community?**




Figure 54a Community CVE initiative

The majority of survey respondents (82%) stated that they have no knowledge of any community CVE initiatives implemented in their area, while 18% stated that they are aware.




Figure 55b Explanation on “Community CVE initiative”

Those who knew of community CVE initiatives cited training and empowerment programs by CBOs (like IMO and MUHURI), religious meetings, formation of women and youth groups on community matters and sports, security operations, cultural events, and amnesty programs; as some of the initiatives. The challenging difference is that 37% of the research respondents acknowledged the CVE actors in the previous section, while 18% identified that those actors are involved in community CVE initiative. This suggests that CVE initiatives may be non-community oriented CVE initiatives.

**Are there any challenges to those community CVE Initiatives?**




Figure 56a Challenges to Community CVE initiatives

The Majority (68%) of the survey respondents stated that there are no challenges to community CVE initiative that exit in their area, because there are no community CVE

<sup>113</sup> KIL MAT FGD 009; KIL MAT FGD 010; KIL MNA KII 023

initiatives that those respondents identified. A few percentage (26%) of the survey respondents indicated that there are challenges to the community CVE initiatives.




Figure 57b Explanation of “Challenges to Community CVE initiatives”

The major challenges faced by the initiatives included; poor community integration and relationships, funding issues<sup>114</sup>, issues related to consistency and sustainability of initiatives, low engagement of the youth and women, and limited involvement from the government. One challenge of youth involvement in CVE initiatives noted was that the youth, who should champion anti-recruitment and anti-radicalization, can also be extremists themselves<sup>115</sup> or VE promoters/supporters.

<sup>114</sup> LAM MPE FGD 015; LAM KIU KII 037

<sup>115</sup> KIL MAT KII 016; KIL MAT KII 018; KIL MAT KII 016; KIL MNA KII 022

## PART 4: BASELINE-INDICATOR TABLE

This section shows table of baseline indicators that are relevant to the project management plan (PMP) of the Inuka project.

**Table 4.1 Indicator Table**

| SURVEY (Respondents)   | Location      |              |             |                |       | Reference in PMP  |
|--|---------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|-------|---|
| Indicator relevant to the PMP  | Within Kilifi | Within Kwale | Within Lamu | Within Mombasa | Total |   |
| <b>Contextual Indicators</b>   |               |              |             |                |       |   |
| Are there links between gangs and extremist organizations?   | 25%           | 25%          | 4%          | 31%            | 20%   | N/A   |
| Is there a link between general (normal) conflict and violent extremism?   | 19%           | 13%          | 15%         | 47%            | 20%   | N/A   |
| <b>Actors Indicators</b>   |               |              |             |                |       |   |
| Do they (major stakeholder) engage one another to deal with VE and terrorism in this area?                               | 36%           | 65%          | 93%         | 75%            | 64%   | % of respondents in the target communities report improved capacity of key community stakeholders to engage one another on community security and preventing radicalism and VE. |
| Do organizations work together to deal with VE and terrorism in this area  | 31%           | 27%          | 67%         | 50%            | 42%   | % of project participants reporting improved partnerships with their community, government, or security counterparts across ethnic and social divides.                          |
| Do you think women in this community have enough training to deal with issues of violent extremism in this community?    | 3%            | 0%           | 15%         | 16%            | 7%    | % of women trained who see their effective leadership and advocacy skills increase as a result of the project.  |
| Do you think the youth in this community have enough training to deal with issues of violent extremism in this community | 3%            | 2%           | 2%          | 6%             | 3%    | % of youth trained who see their effective leadership and advocacy skills increase as a result of the project.  |
| Do you think that the community works together with the law enforcement in dealing with violent extremism? (partnership) | 6.6%          | 5%           | 19.9%       | 5.2%           | 32%   | % of community members surveyed who were in contact with project activities and who report increased trust in and willingness to collaborate                                    |

|   |       |       |       |       |     |  |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|--|
|   |       |       |       |       |     | with security forces.  |
| Are there avenues where people interact and discuss issues of security in this community?                               | 36%   | 95%   | 68%   | 72%   | 67% | % increase in key community group members who report having access to information and collaborative platforms on critical security challenges.   |
| Do people talk openly about VE in this community?   | 41%   | 2%    | 44%   | 53%   | 32% |  |
| What channel is this information shared between the members of the community? (Those answering no channel))             | 16%   | 3%    | 9%    | 0%    | 8%  |  |
| Does this information get to the security agencies and law enforcement teams?   | 14%   | 98%   | 78%   | 72%   | 64% |  |
| <b>Community Capacities</b>   |       |       |       |       |     |  |
| Are there any stakeholders who interact with law enforcement and government on security issues                          | 10.9% | 91.7% | 74.5% | 50.0% | 56% | % of respondents in the target areas who report increased collaboration to address community security and CVE at all levels.   |
| Do you think this community protects itself against violent extremism?  | 18.8% | 80.0% | 74.5% | 40.6% | 54% | N/A  |
| Have you heard of or do you know of any community initiatives that work to counter violent extremism in this community? | 3.1%  | 15.0% | 34.5% | 15.6% | 17% | % of community members surveyed who were in contact with project activities and who report that they are now more aware and sufficiently understand the localized, collaborative security provisions in their communities. |

## **PART 5: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS**

### **1. With regard to activities led by CSO partners in the communities**

- Expand initiatives like ‘security and peace commitment’<sup>116</sup> for new residents, which have proven successful in Ziwani in Mombasa and Mpeketoni, in Lamu county; as part of security monitoring process led by the communities.
- Involve youth and women from the targeted communities as implementers of peace processes not only to create jobs and financial benefit, but to create a sense of ownership. This is through organizing for avenues where they can suggest solutions to the problems facing them.
- Facilitate socialization forums between the police and community; to train the police on better approaches to enhance community-police relationship.
- There is need to integrate and coordinate the NGOs, CBOs and CSOs that are engaged in CVE. In addition to KMYA and MUHURI, organizations like International Migration Organization (IMO) and Red Cross are present at the grassroots level. Thus, it will be of strategic importance to partner with those organizations in their respective capacities while also using them as entry points to the community.
- Work with small and existing initiatives as entry points when engaging with the community. As an example, there are Nyumba Kumi initiatives that seem to be working in Mpeketoni and Ziwani in Lamu and Mombasa county respectively. Inuka can work with these initiatives to strengthen them beyond the specific wards to the neighboring areas.

### **2/ With regard to engaging the Government of Kenya**

- Partnership with the police and security arm of the GoK should take into consideration the need to train the police force on respect for human rights to reduce VE consequences of brutality, victimization and profiling, to foster friendly community-police relationships that improve information and intelligence sharing, thereby reducing and preventing VE.
- The second phase of engagement should involve the GoK’s development offices, supporting them to strengthen equality in economic governance, promote and facilitate involvement of women and youth in the entrepreneurial and governance sector, and address land issues which have been neglected for long.
- The project should increase partnership and collaboration between the community and the all the law enforcement agencies to deal with VE. This is because, different counties where the program will be working has a representation of both the Kenya Army, administration police and the regular police.

### **3/ With regard to Do No Harm considerations**

- Be cognizant of the possibility that some of the law enforcement agencies, especially in Kwale, may sympathize with extremist organizations<sup>117</sup>, specifically Al-Shabaab, and therefore exercise caution while engaging with them to avoid exposing the community to more risk.

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<sup>116</sup> This is a Nyumba Kumi initiative that ensures the new residents in the communities in Lamu fill in forms as a way of introducing them to the community and being part of the security monitoring process. Filling of peace and security form in Ziwani, for those wanting to rent a house in the area has been one of the ways the community have kept good record and played a part to reducing crime. (MOM MAJ FGD 002).

<sup>117</sup> This have made it easier for extremists to bribe their way out of been prosecuted (LAM FAZ FGD 018)

#### **4/ With regard to the needs for further research**

- Due to the fluid nature of conflict in the regions where the program will be implemented, simple activity specific needs analysis should be employed to ensure activities align with the realities of the changing conflict systems in the communities.
- Further research should be conducted to understand the influence of gangs on VE in Kenya's coastal area, youth engagement as double agents<sup>118</sup> in both CVE initiatives and VE, the effectiveness of community-based monitoring systems for community self-protection against VE, and sustainable means to address land-based conflicts that have a significant influence on VE in these areas.

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<sup>118</sup> This was revealed specifically from the qualitative data; where the interviewees alluded to the fact that some of the youth who participate in CVE initiatives are also allegedly linked to extremist groups as accounted from the focus group discussions in Majengo. (MOM MAJ FGD 002).