



BASELINE EVALUATION OF:
Katika Usalama Tunategemeana and
Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience
in Tanzania

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Acronyms

CHADEMA – Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Party of democracy and development)

CCM – Chama cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution)

CUF – Civic United Front

CYD – Center for Youth Dialogue

CVE – Countering Violent Extremism

FDG – Focus Group Discussion

GNU – Government of National Unity

ILPI – International Law and Policy Institute

KII – Key Informant Interview

LHRC – Legal and Human Rights Centre

SFCG– Search for Common Ground

SMZ – Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar)

SUZA – State University of Zanzibar

TAYODEA – Tanga Youth Development Association

ToC – Theory of Change

ToR – Terms of Reference

SzW – Sauti za Wananchi mobile phone based panel survey on Tanzania mainland 2012-to date

UAMSHO – The Association of Islamic Mobilization and Propagation

URT – United Republic of Tanzania

VE – Violent Extremism

WWz – Wasemavyo Wazanzibari mobile phone based panel survey on Zanzibar 2013-2016

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Executive Summary

Although Tanzania has historically been known as a peaceful and stable nation, violent extremism and radicalization have increasingly become a concern. Tanzania, including the mainland and Zanzibar, has seen a significant uptick in violent incidents in recent years¹ stemming from economic, social-political, and religious marginalization. As an effort to counter the appeal and pull of violent extremism and radicalization, international and local stakeholders have designed projects intended to combat these issues throughout the country. Search for Common Ground, as one of these stakeholders, is implementing two projects: “Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience to Violent Extremism” and “Katika Usalama Tunagetemeana: A Community-Owned Approach to Promoting Moderate Voices and Preventing Violent Extremism.” These two projects target different parts of Tanzania, with Pamoja! focusing on Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Tanga, and Zanzibar, and Katika Usalama solely focusing on Tanga.

This combined baseline evaluation was conducted with the aim of informing on the current context in the target communities, providing baseline statistics to measure the impact of the programming for both projects and testing the projects’ theories of change (TOCs). The baseline evaluation included surveys, focus group discussions (FGDs), and key informant interviews (KIIs). Data was collected from each location, totaling 311 survey respondents from Tanzania mainland, 63 participants from eight focus groups, and 17 key informant interviews in both Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. Quantitative data was collated, coded, then was analyzed in Stata statistical software.

The evaluation was not free from limitations. The researchers encountered some limitations during the evaluation including political biases among respondents, particularly KIIs and in FGDs. Time constraints in country during the data collection were also another challenge. The combined approach of qualitative and quantitative data collection during the study did not allow enough time for some respondents to be reached. The researchers were also unable to collect quantitative data in Zanzibar due to the lack of clearance for a survey in Zanzibar. These challenges were taken into consideration and mitigated where possible.

Key Findings

- Although quantitative data suggested significant participation in interfaith dialogue, the qualitative data demonstrated that for religious leaders and others working on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) knowledge of interfaith dialogue is relatively low.
- Those who do participate in these dialogues see the value and potential in helping to counter violent extremism, however this should be more sustained and proactive.
- Citizens across the board are very worried about the presence of violent extremism in their communities, as well as attacks. Stemming from this worry, people from all surveyed areas feel responsible for countering violent extremism in their community. This sense of responsibility highlights a real opportunity for the two projects if they can turn this into broad based action.

¹ See Figure 1 in the main report on the large increase of violence events in Tanzania.

- There is little or no coordination with the central government, particularly the Ministry of Home Affairs by actors and development partners in the CVE space in Tanzania. This leads to challenges for INGOs, local NGOs, media and others to address issues head on. It also ensures low capacity on CVE amongst decision makers and important influencers in the executive and legislative branches.
- Political tensions are viewed as more serious than religious tensions in all of the target communities. However, since religion is viewed as increasingly politicized these two issues are not completely distinct and CVE work should include local political leaders
- Female youth are more prone to engage with other youth and youth leaders than religious or political leaders
- Both qualitative and quantitative results suggested that the poor economy, lack of economic opportunity and promise of financial gain were key pull factors for youth to join VE groups
- Interfaith trust is mixed, but there is clearly a need for proactive and sustained engagement, rather than reactive efforts. Many interfaith leaders and civil society actors expressed the need to ensure that Tanzania doesn't go down or any further down the VE path as say Kenya.
- Coordination is increasing amongst actors working in the CVE space, but it is still difficult to get a complete overview of the projects and actors working in the CVE space.

Recommendations

Informed by evaluation findings, the research provides recommendations to enhance the achievement of project goals.

- There is a need for religious and political empowerment as part of the programming. This would also have an amplifying effect in terms of awareness and reach of the projects
- The inclusion of economic empowerment in conjunction with civil empowerment will help ensure better overall outcomes. Data showed that respondents had a very negative view of the economy both personally and nationally and also saw lack of economic opportunity as a significant challenge for youth (see figure 10)
- To increase effectiveness of the programs and to adhere to “do no harm” principles, SFCG and local partners should seek buy-in from the central government for CVE programming.
- It should be noted that many government officials are hesitant to use CVE terminology because of either of their limited understanding of the issue or the sensitive nature of the issue, and in fact “CVE” terminology is likely a contributing factor to the government's resistance. As such, reframing the discussion using new and less loaded terminology might help to improve government cooperation and buy in. This would also have an amplifying effect in terms of awareness and reach of the projects.
- The projects and activities should build upon existing civil society efforts, such as peace building and empowerment programs so as to leverage existing networks, capacities and trust in communities.
- There is a need for religious and political empowerment as part of the programming

- Include economic empowerment in conjunction with civil empowerment will help ensure better overall outcomes. Our data showed that respondents had a very negative view of the economy both personally and nationally and also saw lack of economic opportunity as a significant challenge for youth (see figure 10)
- A mapping exercise of CVE and CVE related work would help to decrease duplication of efforts and increase impact. As part of this mapping exercise there should also be a political economy analysis to better understand the formal and informal actors in the CVE space and ensure programming works “with the grain” of the political economy.

1 Introduction

Tanzania has been described as a harbor of peace in an unstable neighborhood. Yet, in recent years Tanzania's ability to remain insulated from both regional and global drivers of insecurity has decreased. From the 1998 Al-Qaida US Embassy bombing in Dar es Salaam to recent reports of several young women arrested in Kenya en route to Somalia to join Al-Shaabab²; extremist groups have seen Tanzania as not only a potential soft target in the region, but also a fertile ground in which to recruit new members. Violent extremist groups and their offshoots have become increasingly adept at exploiting existing narratives of marginalization, poor governance, and economic hardship to radicalize and recruit Tanzanians.

The political culture of Tanzania has become increasingly diverse following the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1995. However, the increasing political and social diversity has also led to an increasingly competitive and divisive discourse between the opposition and ruling parties. Since the 2015 elections³, the governments of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) and Zanzibar (SMZ) have rolled back a number of actions to reform the political platform and have allegedly tightened their grip on the media, civil society and political actors nationwide.⁴ These actions have resulted in seemingly increased divisions and the apparent dominance of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), despite complaints from the opposition and some Tanzanians about poor service delivery and high profile corruption scandals. This has resulted in an increase of illiberal Tanzania where legitimate political voices and civil society activities are supposed to be silenced or driven underground.

The current context is a challenging one for international development partners, international NGOs, and local NGOs to support governmental and non-governmental efforts aimed at economic development, accountability, rule of law, and providing counter narratives to extremist groups. However, the right mix of understanding local grievances and needs combined with strategic engagement with local and central government authorities can help strengthen the resilience of Tanzanian communities and their efforts to build better lives for themselves, their families and to help ensure Tanzania remains a harbor of peace in East Africa.

1.1 Overview of the projects

This combined baseline evaluation report is a part of the implementation of two projects. The first is "Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience to Violent Extremism", which is funded by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) and is targeting Tanga, Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Zanzibar for a period of 21 months. The second is "Katika Usalama Tunagetemeana: A Community-Owned Approach to Promoting Moderate Voices and Preventing Violent Extremism", which is funded by U.S Department of State's

² Muyanga, Philip. "TZ girl arrested en route to join Shaabab militants" The Citizen March 31 2015 retrieved on 18.3.17 at <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/TZ-girl-arrested-en-route-to-join-Shabaab-militants-/1840392-2671154-8nmmblz/index.html>

³ Roop, Sterling, and Keith Weghorst. "The 2015 National Elections in Tanzania." *Electoral Studies* 43 (2016): 190-194.

⁴ Since the reintroduction of multiparty politics, the Governments in Tanzania have been highly adept at reform when pressured by international development partners, then rolling back aspects of these reforms if not wholly, at least in part.

Bureau of Counterterrorism (CTU) and is targeting Tanga for a period of 24 months. In the implementation, SFCG is partnering with local organizations in order to make coordination more effective, such as the Tanga Youth Development Association (TAYODEA).

1.2 Objectives of the baseline evaluation report

Before beginning implementation of the two projects, SFCG and its partners sought to conduct a survey to establish the baseline data according to the indicators they intend to measure throughout the course of the projects. Likewise, the baseline intended to measure the theories of change, goals, objectives and activities of the projects in relation to the reality of each of the targeted areas in Tanzania. The evaluation also sought to assess the risks facing the projects and to ensure “Do No Harm” and conflict sensitivity are addressed during implementation. The findings from the baseline evaluation will inform SFCG and its partners if the assumptions behind the theories of change for the two projects are applicable to the intended population and geographic areas; inform the project implementer regarding the actual situation at the beginning of the project providing the ability to measure change over time and impact of the projects; and enable the project team to adapt or tailor project activities for each region to ensure intended results are achieved.

1.3 Scope of the Baseline Report

As per the Terms of Reference and our final agreements with the SFCG team, the baseline data collection was conducted in four targeted areas: Tanga, Dar es salaam, Arusha and Zanzibar. Within those targeted areas, the consultants and the Search team agreed to focus on nine districts and 15 wards, considering the target areas for project implementation and the vulnerability of the community. In Tanga, the focus was in Tanga town, Mkinga and Lushoto. In Dar es Salaam, the focus was in Ilala and Kinondoni Districts. In Arusha, the focus was in Arusha town and Arumeru district. In Zanzibar, the focus was in Mjini and Mjini Magharibi districts. In each district, the focus was on areas where activities with violent extremist elements had occurred in the past.⁵ Because of the constraint of not being able to engage with the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (SMZ), only qualitative data was collected in Zanzibar. However, the consultants used quantitative data collected by a previous national survey tool Wasemavyo Wazanzibari on VE and CVE in 2015 to inform the qualitative data collected during this evaluation. In Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Tanga, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected. The household survey respondents were drawn from the target populations in the three areas and focused on younger demographics in those communities.

The following research questions were outlined in the terms of reference. Questionnaires as well as interviews and focus group discussion questions were tailored around these questions and the project indicators:

- What long-term and recent developments have affected conflict dynamics and VE?
- What is the state of CVE/PVE work regionally and nationally? What are the current approaches being taken? What are the gaps and opportunities? (This built on the current literature review developed by SFCG).

⁵ Refer to Annex 4: Mapping and overview of surveyed areas for the Wards breakdown.

- What are the key drivers and triggers of extremism and recruitment? What unifiers and dividers shape VE dynamics in communities?
- How do these existing dynamics and conflicts affect VE?

Processes Supporting and Protecting Against Radicalization

- How is VE/radicalization understood in the communities of intervention?
- Do people talk about VE? Who, and where do they talk about it?
- Who influences/plays a role in VE? Who influences/plays a role in CVE?
- Who is most vulnerable to VE?
- What are the key narratives driving VE/radicalization?
- What are the key positive narratives (CVE) that resonate with communities?

Community assessment

- What are the capacities of local leaders and organizations currently to work with communities to counter violent extremism and radicalization?

Theory of Change and program design

- Considering the current status of project indicators, objectives and theory of change, are there recommendations for adaptations to improve the potential impact of the projects?

Risk Assessment

- What are the contextual and project-related risks that require monitoring?
- What can the project do to assure it is conflict sensitive and respects “Do No Harm” principles?

1.4 Methodology and Limitations

1.4.1 Survey Methodology

The lead researcher selected four enumerators based on merit and gender balance after interviewing up to eight enumerators in each area where the survey was conducted. The lead researcher trained the enumerators in each location for one half-day prior to beginning the survey in each location. The training included the selection of qualified enumerators and training on best practices, proper behaviors during the evaluation, sampling protocols, and questionnaire administration. In each area, the goal was to collect 100 surveys with a gender parity of 50/50. An effort was also made to select areas where youth or individuals between 18-35 would be possible to be selected nearly randomly. The purposeful selection of enumeration areas in each community was based on insights from SFCG and its partners so as to ensure collection of 100 responses in each community.

Each day a starting point was selected based on discussions with SFCG and key informants on which areas were the most at risk and representative samples could be obtained. The enumerators then went with the supervisor to a local landmark starting point. From here, the enumerator team used a random walk pattern using the “right hand rule” selecting every third household on the right side of the road to interview (all enumerators went off in different compass directions). The respondent in each home was selected from those individuals who were the same gender as the enumerator, were above 18 years old, and who lived in the house. From this group in the household the enumerator selected the youngest, oldest and middle of these groups on a rotating

basis from household to household. If there is no one was willing to participate or of the same gender as the enumerator in the household they would then replace this household with the next house down. The data was collected between 22 February and 11 March 2017. 311 respondents comprised of 161 male and 150 female were interviewed in three target areas as shown in Tables 1-3 below.

Table 1: Household Respondents by Gender

Surveyed Area	Gender		Total	Percentage	
	Male	Female		Male	Female
Tanga	57	45	102	56%	44%
Arusha	50	51	101	50%	50%
Dar es Salaam	54	54	108	50%	50%
Combined Total	161	150	311	52%	48%

Table 2: Household Respondents: Youth and Head of the House

Surveyed Population	Gender		Total	Total percentage	Percentage	
	Male	Female			Male	Female
Heads of Household	66	31	97	31%	68%	32%
Youth	98	111	209	66%	47%	53%

Table 3: Combined Household Respondents: Age and Religious Disaggregation

Age	Religion				Total	Percentage			
	Muslim	Catholic	Protestant	Other		Muslim	Catholic	Protestant	Other
15-19	14	4	-	-	18	78%	22%	-	-
20-24	33	17	13	2	65	51%	26%	20%	3%
25-30	30	19	10	3	62	48%	31%	16%	5%
31-35	30	18	13	2	63	47%	29%	21%	3%
36-40	12	9	5	3	29	41%	31%	17%	10%
41-50	20	6	2	1	29	69%	21%	7%	3%
51-60	18	2	3	-	23	78%	9%	13%	-
61+	16	2	4	-	22	73%	9%	18%	-
Combined Total	173	77	50	11	311	55%	25%	16%	4%

1.4.2 Data protection and Quality Assurance

The lead researcher supervised the enumerators and kept the surveys and questionnaires before and after data collection. Each of the enumerator's questionnaires was labeled with their name and a number on each page of the survey. The lead researcher also provided quality assurance throughout the data collection process to ensure that the enumerators were following their training and protocols through back checks and random oversight visits in the field. The team leader

entered data from the surveys on a rolling basis based on the scans of the original questionnaires. The team leader also conducted random checks of data entered to provide additional quality assurance and entry checks as the data was collected.

1.4.3 Key Informant Interviews

Key informant interviews (KIIs), as a source of qualitative data for this evaluation, focused on people with first-hand knowledge and information on VE/CVE from the local, regional to national level. The initial plan was to conduct interviews with four to eight informants in each target area, with additional interviewees in Dar es Salaam, in order to gain a holistic picture of VE/CVE. The lead researcher organized and conducted all interviews.

Table 4: Key Informants Disaggregation

KII area	Gender		Total	Percentage			
	Male	Female		Male	Female	Christian	Muslim
Dar es Salaam	4	1	5	80%	20%	100%	-
Zanzibar	5	1	6	83%	17%	33%	67%
Arusha	2	1	3	67%	33%	100%	-
Tanga	3	-	3	100%	-	66%	34%
Combined total	14	3	17	82%	18%	71%	29%

The nature of the KII questions reflected the TOR, but were loosely structured to enable the informants to freely flow with his/her ideas and information regarding the issue. However, the interviewer facilitated by asking questions, following the trajectory of the informant, and took notes which were elaborated upon after the interview.

1.4.4 Focus Group Discussions

Twelve focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in four areas of the evaluation. The lead researcher organized and conducted all FGDs. The targets of the focus group discussions were youth (males and females separately), religious leaders, and local leaders.

Each focus group consisted of 4-10 people, and the discussions lasted between 45-60 minutes. The sessions were semi-structured, guided by key questions and followed by probing questions to delve further into areas of interest for the evaluation and Theory of Change (ToC).

Table 5: Focus Group Disaggregation

Surveyed Area	Focus Groups	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Dar es Salaam	1	6	7	13	54%	46%
Zanzibar	1	4	-	4	100%	-
Arusha	2	14	1	15	93%	7%
Tanga	8	20	11	31	65%	35%
Combined total	12	44	19	63	70%	30%

1.4.5 Limitations

The goals of the evaluation were to serve as the first measure to identify if the assumptions behind the theory of changes of the two projects were applicable to the intended areas, to collect data that will inform the project implementer regarding the actual situation during the beginning of the project, and to enable the project team to adapt or tailor project activities for each region to ensure intended results are achieved and measurable. The baseline evaluation was conducted in target areas of SFCG Tanzania and thus were not completely random, but purposeful and thus do not necessarily provide a truly representative sample of the population or allow for generalization of the findings

Furthermore, because of the sensitive nature of this study, some bias/hesitance among sources was expected. Political bias was a factor in some of the FGDs and KIIs. This contributed both to a limited bias in responses as well as hesitance from some respondents to give their opinion completely openly. To counter this problem the evaluation team worked to triangulate responses based on these known biases from different KII and FDG participates to provide a holistic picture from differing views. Also, due to time constraints in country and the dual nature of the qualitative and quantitative data, as many interviews and focus groups were conducted as possible, but not all stakeholders were covered. Due to the lack time to obtain clearance for the survey, we were not able to collect quantitative data in Zanzibar and many of the religious authorities could not be interviewed as well.

2 Political and Economic Context of Tanzania

The security situation in Tanzania has been relatively stable since independence, however, there are tensions that have contributed to incidences of violence, and if not controlled, these incidences may continue to grow and destabilize the country. The ruling party CCM has been in power since independence and holds regular elections. Thus far CCM has had five different Union Presidents in peaceful transitions of power since 1964. However, Freedom House characterizes Tanzania as “partly free” and political tensions on mainland Tanzania have been on the rise as competition has increased nationally.⁶

Like many other Sub-Saharan African countries, Tanzanian socio-economic issues are a challenge. Immigration, urbanization, an unstable rural economy, unemployment, corruption, poor social services and crime are among many social and economic issues challenging the country. Despite the recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) report showing Tanzania is the fastest growing economy in East Africa⁷, the growth is not equitably shared. There is an increasing gap between a small number of wealthy individuals concentrated in the business capital Dar es Salaam and the large number of individuals living under the poverty line in both the urban and rural areas. This increasing gap between the “haves” and the “have nots”, combined with a rapidly growing and young population, is driving tensions in the country.⁸ In addition, while most Tanzanians remain poor following the liberalization of the economy, the political and

⁶ Freedom House Index, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania>

⁷International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2016.

⁸ Kessel, E. Durner, T. Schwerts, M. Violent Extremism and Instability to the Great Horn of Africa: An Examination of Drivers and Responses. Global Center on Cooperative Security. April, 2016.

economic elite's hold a large share of the country's economic wealth. This consolidation of the economic elite's grip on power in Tanzania has, in part, contributed to an increase in violent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers as well as between foreign investors and locals, which on many occasions have resulted in destruction of property, injury, and loss of life. On several occasions these conflicts have evolved into demonstrations and disputes, which resulted in violence between law enforcement and businesses on the streets.

With a population of just under 50 million people, Tanzania is dominated by two main religions, Christianity and Islam, each accounting for 30% to 35% of the total population.⁹ The nation building effort and national ideology of African socialism, championed by the Father of the Nation Julius Nyerere, helped to ensure the creation of a collective nationalism that superseded tribe and religion. However, this was done by co-opting or replacing independent religious institutions to bring them under the CCM party apparatus, which was the supreme body in the country. As a result, as the political and civil society systems were liberalized in the 1990s, the party and state lost their monopoly on civil organizations, including religious groups. The new diversity of opinions while welcome in regards to constitutional rights of freedom of expression and democratic development, has also put pressure on and created new tensions in interfaith relations.

These tensions can be in part attributed to the increasing politicization of religion and the long running grievances (some perceived, some real) of Muslims against the government. Some Muslim leaders and followers allege that the Muslim community has been marginalized and discriminated against by the government. In recent years, political parties have increasingly turned to religion, religious leaders, and their followers as part of their overall electoral strategies.¹⁰ Although there are few direct statements during the campaign by any politician showing religious affiliation, voters can be polarized by religious issues, especially between the three main parties: CCM, Chadema, and CUF.

Being disappointed and concerned by this politicization of religion in the country, then President, Dr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, while addressing the first 10th Tanzanian National Assembly, expressed his distress about the emergence of religious issues during the campaign of the 2010 general election. He also expressed concern over the threat to national unity and security posed by the politicization of religion. He called for politicians, religious leaders and other stakeholders to come together to find a solution to the issue.¹¹ However, little tangible action resulted from the call.

A long running narrative in Tanzania is that the government favors Christians over Muslims in both social-political and economic issues. Sections of the Muslim community in Tanzania believe that there is discrimination against Muslims in the education system, both towards students and employees. For example, the number of Muslim students selected for secondary school has historically been less than Christians and appointments to government positions were also less common among Muslims.

⁹ <http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/tanzania/tzfacts.htm>

¹⁰ Gahnstrom, L.S. Ethnicity, Religious and Politics in Tanzania: The 2010 General Election and Mwanza. *University of Helsinki*. <https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/34058/Gahnstrm%20final.pdf?sequence=2>

¹¹ The Citizen. "JK sets his Agenda as Chadema Walks out. November 18th". Mwananchi Communication Ltd. November 19th, 2010.

Frans Wijzen and Bernardine Mfumbusa, in their article, *Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation: Multifaith Ideals and Realities*, provide statistical findings from their field work on religious antagonism in Tanzania. The findings show that, in 1998, when the survey was conducted, 37% of the respondents felt that there was no religious equality in Tanzania, while 63% felt that there is religious equality in Tanzania. In determining whether religious conflict posed future threats to Tanzanian national security, 80% of the respondents said yes, while only 20% disagreed. When the researchers asked the respondents “why they felt that religious conflict [was] likely to flare up in Tanzania, some Muslim respondents answered that the government favored Christians, that Muslims were second class citizens....”¹²

This claim is supported by statistical data provided by Aboud Jumbe, who claimed that although Muslims compose 45% of Tanzanian population, only 40%, 36%, and 13%, are registered for primary, secondary and university levels of education, respectively. On the other hand, Christians, who account for only 39% of the population, have much higher enrollment rates than Muslims, with 40%, 64% and 86% enrollment in primary, secondary, and university levels, respectively.¹³

Another concern which has been raised is the tendency for the government to interfere in internal Muslim affairs. Shortly after independence, the Government dissolved the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS) and established the Supreme Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA) instead, which is viewed by some Muslims as a “puppet” of the CCM government.¹⁴ This action is an example of how the Government of Tanzania has been undermining the efforts of Muslims to spread the Islamic word and to influence the Tanzanian population. These perceptions have created a conducive environment and the narratives needed for extremists to frame the social and economic issues facing Muslim communities in a way that suggests that the government favors Christians and discriminates against Muslims. These extremists often fail to differentiate between the government and the Christian religion, and as they are unable to attack the government directly, they attack vulnerable Christians or more moderate Muslim leaders in a misguided attempt to address these real and perceived grievances.

3 Increasing conflict, nascent violent extremism in Tanzania, and efforts to counter it

In recent years, Tanzania has experienced an increase in the number of reported conflict events (see Figure 1 below), including those with elements or affiliation to violent extremist groups. The increase in these activities can be attributed to the growing marginalization of people along social-political, economic and religious lines within communities. Violent extremism has continued to emerge as one of the most serious national security threats in Tanzania. Activities such as acid attacks on clerical leaders, the burning of churches in both Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar, multiple grenade attacks in Arusha, decapitation of number of Kibatini villagers in Tanga, and violent conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in different parts of the country are indicative of the continuing increase of violence and extremism in Tanzania. Before 2010, Figure 1 shows a clear pattern of an increase in conflict events in the run up to election years and peaking around

¹² Wijzen, F.Mfumbusa, B. Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation: Multifaith Ideals and Realities(2002, pp.318)

¹³ Wijzen, F.Mfumbusa, B. Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation: Multifaith Ideals and Realities(2002)

¹⁴ Ndaluka, Thomas, and Frans Wijzen, eds. *Religion and State in Tanzania Revisited: Reflections from 50 Years of Independence*. Vol. 7. LIT Verlag Münster, 2014.

these years (2000¹⁵ and 2005). 2010 was an outlier, likely due to the reconciliation process in Zanzibar, but since then conflict events have reached new sustained and significantly higher frequencies.




Figure 1: Violent conflict events from 1997-2016

3.1 Political Marginalization and Violent Extremism

After the re-introduction of a multi-party politics in Tanzania in the 1990s, elections became a primary driver of tensions and political violence, particularly in Zanzibar. However, political violence was primarily driven by the combative political culture in Zanzibar from 1995-2010 until the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU). But, while Zanzibar political tempers cooled off briefly, political pressure and tensions as well as violence began increasing on Tanzania mainland. These tensions, combined with a long running narrative of political, social and economic marginalization of Muslims¹⁶, has created a more fertile ground for radical narratives in both Christian and Muslim communities. As a result, there has been an increasing worry about the emergence of violent extremist activities.

The 2015 election cycle and its aftermath have been remarkable for a number of reasons in relation to political marginalization. First, on Tanzania mainland, high level defections from the ruling party including the UKAWA Presidential candidate former Prime Minister Edward Lowassa shook the country and party and resulted in a more competitive election cycle, although CCM still not only retained the Presidency, but also a 2/3rd majority in the Parliament. Even though there is evidence that political competition is increasing in Tanzania, recent actions such as prohibition of political party rallies, arrest of MPs and other political leaders on what allegedly were trumped up charges, and what has been viewed as an effort to control freedom of speech through new and contested legal tools such as the Media Service Act of 2016 and Statistics and Cyber Crimes Act of 2015 could push legitimate political grievances and discourse towards more radical forms of political expression. Second, in Zanzibar, the annulment of the October 2015

¹⁵ The 2001 data includes the post-election violence of the partially aborted and contested elections in 2000.

¹⁶ Ndaluka, Thomas, and Frans Wijzen, eds. *Religion and State in Tanzania Revisited: Reflections from 50 Years of Independence*. Vol. 7. LIT Verlag Münster, 2014.

election until the election re-run in March 2016, and boycotting by CUF to the latter, has not only weakened Zanzibaris' faith in democracy, but also led to the *de facto* end of the reconciliation and unity government process embarked upon in 2010.¹⁷ The boycott of the re-run election and new government, as well as calls for civil disobedience, have produced a superficially calm situation in Zanzibar. However, tensions are simmering just under the surface. Much of the electoral and post electoral violence has been attributed to "Mazombi" or youth groups who are allegedly promised jobs/money to commit these acts, usually to be left out in the cold when they have served their purpose.¹⁸ This is not a new trend in Zanzibar, and it is one that produces disaffected youth with experience with violence, crime and who are soft targets for extremist groups to recruit.

Overall, the current political situation and space for civil society and citizens to engage in legitimate political discourse in Tanzania appears to be regressing on both sides of the United Republic. This highlights the urgency for local, regional and national actors to find new ways to engage with the government and for new pathways for citizen's voices to shape development in their communities and nationally.

3.2 Economic Marginalization and Violent Extremism

Economic problems are beginning to be more substantial issues for Tanzanian security and are contributing to the violence seen around the country. There are long standing violent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, which on many occasions have resulted in destruction of property, loss of life, and injury. There are also demonstrations and disputes which have resulted in violence between law enforcement and businesses on the streets. These types of issues indicate future threats that may erupt because of socio-economic issues. Although the economy has boomed, sustaining GDP growth above 6.5% annually over the last decade¹⁹, a majority of Tanzanians remain at or near the poverty line.²⁰ In addition to most Tanzanians remaining poor following the liberalization of the economy, the political and economic elite's grip on the economic and political levers of power that emerged during that process continues to dominate the economy today. The consolidation of the economic elite's grip on power in Tanzania has been described as neo-patrimonial or a political-economic oligarchy²¹; two different ways to describe the same political settlement.

Tanzania's political settlement is one dominated by competitive patronage politics that has permeated the government bureaucracy, major public corporations, and political elites allowing both lower level rent seeking and centralized elite and high level rent seeking to keep key constituencies loyal. Fundamental to the operation of such a political settlement is the ability to

¹⁷ Roop, Sterling, and Keith Weghorst. "The 2015 National Elections in Tanzania." *Electoral Studies* 43 (2016): 190-194.

¹⁸ Personal communication, NGO leader in Zanzibar, on 8 March 2017.

¹⁹ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tanzania/overview>

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Loftchie, Michael F. (2014): *The political economy of Tanzania – Decline and recovery*, Penn – University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia; Cooksey, Brian (2015): *Does Tanzanian Democracy Improve Governance?* Final Report.; See also Hoffman, Barak D. (2013): "Political Economy of Tanzania", and Therkildsen, Ole and France Bourgouin (2012): "Continuity and change in Tanzania's ruling coalition: legacies, crises and weak productive capacity", DIIS Working Paper 2012:06.

seek rents (both productive/unproductive). This is reflected both in Tanzania's corruption ranking by Transparency International which ranks Tanzania 117 of 168 globally²² and Tanzania's GINI co-efficient of inequality that has remained high and increasing since economic liberalization from 35.3 in 1991 to 37.8 in 2011.²³ There is also regional economic marginalization within Tanzania, which in recent years has resulted in violent conflict. The Mtwara gas pipeline protests and the resulting strong government response in 2012 demonstrates clearly that if communities and citizens feel marginalized and left out of social and economic development plans violence can result.

3.3 Religious Relations and Marginalization

The occurrence of violence because of religious tensions has continued to rise over the last decade as religion has become increasingly politicized. This can be attributed to inter-religious and intra-religious tension and tension between the government and religious groups. Tanzania has experienced many inter-religious problems. Often these issues between Muslims and Christians begin as verbal arguments, for example, the debate about Jesus being the Son of God, a God or just a Prophet as others.²⁴ It is also often debated who has the right to slaughter animals for food as seen in Geita in 2013. These struggles sometimes escalate, resulting in violence. Additional religious tensions have been expressed by certain Muslims, leaders and followers, alleging that the Muslim community has been marginalized and discriminated against by the government. Such narratives of social and economic marginalization have proven effective in mobilizing for extremist groups in Coastal Kenya and similar narratives have also driven political violence in Zanzibar during the UAMSHO protests in 2012. Countering these narratives both on the ground and online and providing citizens ways in which to express their concerns to religious and political leaders is key to addressing extremism along the Swahili Coast and in Arusha.

4 Community Voices

Citizen voice is essential to ensuring interventions not only are successful, but also address real needs of communities. The primary aim of this report is to test the two project's theories of change (ToCs) and also provide baseline data that will enable SFCG and its partners to measure the impact of the project amongst the target communities and demographics. These two Theories of Change are:

- **Pamoja!:** *If* populations vulnerable to extremism in at-risk areas, especially young men and women, have the skills and opportunities to participate and constructively engage within their communities, *if* local leaders, including religious leaders, are better equipped to recognize the risk of violent extremism and include marginalized groups, *and if* credible and constructive narratives are amplified, *then* marginalization of vulnerable populations will be reduced, inclusive participation and self-agency will be increased and alternatives to violent action and division will be promoted, reducing the risk of

²² <http://www.transparency.org/country#TZA>

²³ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2011&locations=TZ&start=1991&view=chart>

²⁴ Sarota, Anthony, International Law and Policy Institute and Tanzania National Defense College, "National and Homeland Security in Tanzania" Special Report Series from ILPI 2016.

radicalization, recruitment and violent action and preventing the threat of violent extremism.

- **Katika Usalama Tunategemeana:** *If* space to constructively dialogue and engage on issues of VE is opened, *if* community stakeholders are better equipped to recognize and understand the risks of VE and have the opportunities to collaboratively address these risks, *and if* credible and constructive narratives are amplified, especially among youth, *then* marginalization of vulnerable populations will be reduced, inclusive participation and self-agency will be increased and alternatives to violent action and division will be promoted, reducing the risk of radicalization, recruitment and violent action and preventing the threat of VE in Tanga.

The data presented in this section was collected in Arusha (101 respondents), Dar es Salaam (108 respondents) and Tanga (102 respondents) between 22 February and 11 March 2017. Additionally, data from a Twaweza mobile phone based panel survey collected in October 2015 will be used to compare community perceptions to national ones.

The age distribution of our survey is skewed towards youth with 209 (98 male and 111 female) of the 311 respondents (161 male and 150 female) equal to 67% between the ages of 18-35. 97 of the respondents were the head of household (66 male and 31 female). Additionally, there were significantly more Muslim households interviewed (55% of respondents) than Christian (41%), see Figure 3. However, because census data collection in Tanzania does not include questions about religion, both Muslim and Christian groups claim to be in the majority in the country, yet are likely roughly equal as a percentage of the population.

But, given our purposeful selection of areas of each of the community that had been most impacted by recruitment or violence associated with violent extremists, it is not surprising that our survey has a larger share of Muslim respondents as Muslim communities have been targeted by extremists’ groups both in Tanzania and across the East African region.




Figure 2: Age of respondents in all three survey areas




Figure 3: Religious affiliation of respondents in all three communities

4.1 Current Political context in Tanzania

The apparently shrinking political, media, and civil space in Tanzania is a worrying trend that is likely counterproductive to the long-term stability and democratic development of Tanzania. However, in the short term the increased pressure on anyone critical of the government or deemed to pose a threat is aimed to boost the political fortunes of the current administration. This is particularly important for a new President who was viewed as an outsider in the upper echelons of power in CCM. However, if this persists the distance between government and civil society will likely make it more difficult to engage with communities and address grievances of at risk youth and communities. Which are in a large part driven by a lack of political voice and weak service delivery. Furthermore, government officials are still hesitating to address the issue of CVE and have securitized the matter, thus blocking out many actors including many development partners who seek to engage with the government of Tanzania to address the drivers of violent extremism (VE).

Yet VE is a growing concern, and has been for a number of years in Tanzania. Figure 4 shows national figures in Tanzania from October 2015 about the fears that friends or family would be recruited. About 12% of respondents were very worried about recruitment to a VE group. In the baseline survey the number was significantly higher with 31% of respondents very worried about recruitment of family/friends to VE groups (see Figure 5). Additionally, 7.4% of respondents said that they themselves or someone they knew had either been radicalized/recruited or attempted to be radicalized or recruited to join a VE group. This is slightly more than was reported nationally in 2015 when 5.4% nationally reported that they themselves or someone they knew had been recruited to a radical group or attempted to join a radical group.²⁵ In all of the focus group discussions both male and female participants expressed concerns about their fears of

²⁵ Sauti za Wananchi Mobile Phone panel survey Round 1 October 2015.

radicalization in their communities in each of the research areas. Furthermore, in a KII in Tanga a religious leader said, “...For example youth have been lied to about work opportunities outside of the country and when they go they are recruited into violent extremist groups. There were two or three youth who this happened to here in Tanga.”²⁶




Figure 4: Fears of recruitment to VE groups nationally in Oct. 2015 (Tanzania mainland only)




Figure 5: Fear of recruitment to VE groups.

²⁶ Personal Communication (KII), Tanga, February 24, 2017




Figure 6: Know someone/yourself have been attempted to join VE group

When we disaggregate the 7.4% of those who know or knew someone who had been recruited or approached without success to be recruited by a VE group, we see that Arusha is the region where we saw the highest incidence of reported radicalization, followed by Dar es Salaam and Tanga. This is linked to a number of factors, including the fact that Arusha is a hotbed of opposition politics, is a magnet for criminals due to tourism, and is close to Kenya, among others. Interestingly, we also see from the survey data that respondents in Arusha reported religious tensions higher than those in Dar or Tanga (Figure 8), which is also a contributing pull factor towards VE in the community.




Figure 7: Know someone/yourself have been attempted to join VE group by location





Figure 8: Do religious tensions exist in your community?

Despite the tribal and religious diversity in Tanzania our data suggests that more than 77% of respondents don't believe that there are religious tensions in their communities. This indicates that despite the increasing politicization of religion in recent years (Figure 9) local communities still generally perceive that these tensions do not or no longer impact their community after the 2015 elections.



Source: Twaweza SzW Round 1 October 2015

Figure 9: Politicization of religion is creating interfaith tensions in Tanzania from October 2015

Economic issues have been cited by returnees from Kenya and Tanzania as reasons for why they joined extremist groups.²⁷ Figure 10 shows that 62% of respondents view their personal economy as bad or very bad and nearly the same percentage of respondents (58%) view the national economy the same way. In all focus groups as well economic marginalization was cited as a primary driver of radicalization. This highlights the need for intertwining economic development, entrepreneurship and CVE programming.




Figure 10: Current view of personal economic situation (left) and national economy (right)

We will now turn to the current situation in the target communities where these national trends are playing out on a localized scale and how these relate the ToC and project indicators.

4.2 CVE Landscape on Tanzania Mainland

4.2.1 Youth ability to express themselves and engage

The opportunity to express one’s opinions, engage with political leaders, follow your economic and personal dreams are fundamental rights that many around the world are unable to pursue. In Tanzania, many do not have the opportunity to articulate their interests and needs to peers, nor to decision makers. As Figure 11 shows, more than 52% of respondents (162 individuals) believe that youth do not have opportunities to articulate their interests and work with decision makers to address their concerns. This was also reiterated by all of the youth focus groups and KIIs who said that youth lack opportunities to be heard and to contribute economically and socially.

²⁷ Botha, Anneli. "Radicalisation in Kenya. Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council." *Institute for Security Studies Papers* 2014, no. 265 (2014): 28




Figure 11: Youth opportunities to engage with local leaders on key issues.

From the 48% of respondents who said that youth did have opportunities to engage with local leaders to articulate their opinions or share their views a plurality, but not a majority, saw other youth and youth leaders as the primary outlet, followed by political leaders. Notably, there is a significant difference in the perception of the outlet for youth between genders. Thirty-one percent of female respondents reported that other youth were the main outlet for youth if they can and need to articulate their interests compared to just 15% of males (figure 12). Conversely, 26% male respondents saw political leaders as the outlet for youth compared to only 10% of females. This suggests that while special seats and other quota aspects in regards to political representation can help to provide women more political voice and power, there is still a long way to go for young women to be engaged with the political system in Tanzania (Figure 13). For males, it appears political leaders are key influencers and as such should be woven into programming activities to reach at risk male youth. Male focus group members in Tanga highlighted that in fact they, as youth, engaged with other youth, but rarely if ever discussed issues with faith or political leaders.²⁸ These mixed sentiments suggest that while overall there are outlets for youth, the access or ability is not uniform across segments of the community.




Figure 12: Outlets for youth by gender




Figure 13: Outlet for youth by region

²⁸ Personal Communication (FGD), Tanga, February 24, 2017

There are also notable differences by region in terms of the outlets for youth to articulate their needs or issues. For example, in Arusha youth seem to be significantly more self-reliant or isolated from their peers, as compared to Dar es Salaam or Tanga, perhaps due to higher religious and political tensions which could put them off from engaging with political and religious leaders.

4.2.2 Community Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Skills

In addition to having an outlet for political or social issues, it is important for communities and community members to have the skills to address conflict through peaceful means. To measure this, the survey began with a question about if it is ever acceptable to use violence to solve a conflict if other means have been exhausted. A significant majority, 61% of respondents agreed completely that it was acceptable to use violence, see Figure 14. However, 70% of respondents (218 individuals) also said that they can use peaceful means or go to local religious leaders to solve inter-faith disputes when they arise (Figure 15).

Male respondents were more likely to respond that they could use peaceful means or engage with religious leaders, suggesting that engagement with women and female religious leaders as well as encouraging male faith leaders to engage with women may want to be a focus of the interventions. This was also mentioned in a discussion where a male religious leader emphasized the importance of female youth perspectives saying, "...we need to make sure even youth and women can come together and discuss these issues from their perspectives."²⁹ Hearing different voices or allowing diverse views to be heard was a reoccurring theme in the qualitative discussions suggesting that citizen voice or lack thereof is a key push factor towards VE groups.




Figure 14: Acceptability of violence if other means have been used.

²⁹ Personal Communication (KII), Dar es Salaam, February 16, 2017.




Figure 15: Ability to use local religious leaders to resolve interfaith conflict.

In order to ensure constructive dialogue and space exists to address the push and pull factors of VE in communities, being able to foster interfaith dialogue is key. Fifty-eight percent of respondents believe that youth in their communities can discuss VE issues, with a fairly even distribution across the three communities (Figure 16). More generally, a majority of respondents (57%) in all three communities believed that their community had the ability and understanding of the issues to discuss VE, with the greatest ability in Tanga. Although this is a majority, it does indicate that a significant number of community members feel that there is a need to further develop the skills, interaction and understanding required to address threats to peace and development in these communities. In the focus groups conducted in different target areas, when respondents were asked about the freedom to discuss VE in their areas and country in general, the majority of youth respondents from Tanga viewed that there is freedom, while the majority of youth respondents from Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Zanzibar, view that there is no freedom to discuss VE in their areas and in the country in general.

Following this, the FGD participants were asked probing questions on whether they had ever been involved in interfaith dialogues or what improvements could be made to strengthen interfaith dialogues in their communities. A majority of respondents, including those in Tanga who were likely to be more aware than others, were not only unable to provide suggestions on how to improve such dialogue, they were unaware of its existence and saw it as not that important. During a focus group with the Bodaboda group in Kiyomoni, Tanga, one male respondent argued that there is no need for interfaith dialogue because Islam is the only religion in their communities.³⁰ This supports the conclusion from quantitative analysis that further intervention to ensure communities understand these issues and engage with other groups in society should be supported.

³⁰ Personal Communication (FG) with the authors, Tanga. February 23, 2017.




Figure 16: Feel youth can discuss VE issues




Figure 17: Community has ability address VE issues

4.2.3 Existing Tensions and worries in Communities

Extremists try and take advantage of existing tensions in communities and fit these into their narratives to drive recruitment and sow division. When asked what is the biggest tension in the community across all three communities we see that political issues were seen as the biggest cause of tension in communities constituting 59% of responses (Figure 18). After politics, respondents saw the lack of economic opportunities as the second biggest driver of tension in their communities. Positively, only 2.3% of respondents saw interfaith tensions as the biggest tension in their community. This suggests that while politics and faith have become increasingly intertwined across all of the communities surveyed, interfaith tensions were far below political tensions. This suggests that a strong majority believe that people from different faiths coexist peacefully, but that political tensions and marginalization isolate members of the community. Furthermore, as previously shown in Figure 15, 70% of respondents can go to a religious leader or use peaceful means to resolve inter-faith conflict.




Figure 18: Biggest tension in communities

It appears from our respondents that communities are already on the path to having the skills and outlets to engage across faiths to resolve issues peacefully. However, many do believe that youth lack outlets and opportunity. This is likely why 45% of respondents were very worried about violent extremist attacks. If we take those who are somewhat worried, it brings the total number of those worried to some extent to 72% of respondents in the three communities (Figure 19).




Figure 19: Fear of VE attack in target communities

Although there is significant worry about VE attacks in Tanzania, across each of the target communities we see that the overall population is split (51% to 49%) on youth discussing or dealing with VE issues as they arise in Figure 20. These figures are also in line with the responses that there were outlets for youth suggesting that a dual track engagement for inter-youth dialogue and local leaders can address these challenges jointly. These sentiments were also echoed by a focus group consisting of CCM, CUF and government officials interviewed in a government office in Mzizima, Tanga. Participants agreed that the participation in dialogues on these issues cuts across all sections in the community.³¹




Figure 20: Youth address/discuss VE issues as they arise in community

³¹ Personal Communication (KII) with the authors, TANGA. February 24, 2017




Figure 21: Youth, religious and political leaders work to address VE issues

4.2.4 Existing Community Responses

Beyond youth alone we also see in Figure 22 that 60% of respondents believe that youth, political and faith leaders are working to address VE issues and drivers in their communities. Although it is positive that a majority of respondents believed that leaders were working on VE issues and drivers, 40% of respondents did not believe that leaders local or national are addressing these issues, suggesting that there is significant room for progress. As such, working with governmental, political, faith, and youth leaders who are already working on these issues and promoting new leaders to engage is important to achieve success for the projects in achieving their goals.




Figure 22: Types of leaders working on these issues

Personal responsibility and a sense of community is strong in Tanzania, due to the foundation of self-reliance philosophy espoused in the one-party era and as well as the ten house networks from this period. The legacy of these policies is that many people when they see something, they say something, such as in 2015 where a plot was foiled in Morogoro by attentive citizens. Figure 23 shows that 78% of respondents essentially equally distributed across the three communities believed that they personally had a responsibility for countering VE in their communities.




Figure 23: Personal responsibility for CVE in your community

Translating personal responsibility into action to address tensions before they evolve into threats is fundamental to ensuring peace and effective counter messaging to VE groups. Ensuring productive and frank interfaith dialogue can help communities to air issues and address them early on. Figure 24 shows that most respondents (79%) had never participated in interfaith dialogue, particularly in Arusha where participation was lowest. The fact that Arusha has the highest interfaith tensions reported in any of the three communities and lowest level of interfaith dialogue suggests that there should be a concerted focus here on interfaith relationship building and dialogue.

When speaking with a Catholic priest in USA river, Arusha about interfaith dialogue, his response was interesting. He had never heard of such programs in his community. He gave the example that Catholic followers were accidentally attacked with bombs by what was believed to be police, after the night Christmas Eve mass. According to him, there was not even a “note of sympathy” from other religions. However, when the authors asked him what his thoughts about interfaith dialogue were, the priest said he was very open to participate if such dialogues were to be introduced in his area.³²

In Tanga, participation in interfaith dialogue was the highest (Figure 25), suggesting that the CVE and interfaith focus in the community is paying some dividends. Speaking with a BAKWATA leader for the Tanga region, he noted interfaith dialogue in Tanga is very active compared to other

³² Personal Communication (KII) with the authors, USA River, Arusha. March 2, 2017.

surveyed areas. Showing this activeness, the Sheikh explained the flow of interfaith dialogue through peace building initiatives from the national level to his region. He mentioned that at national level, peace building initiatives are co-chaired by Archbishop Pengo and Mufti Sheik Zuberi. The general secretary is Peter Mkude, a Christian. In his region, the program name is “hope for tree”, where the chairman is Muslim and secretary is Christian. He concluded that they are active in interfaith dialogues.³³ Figure 25 shows that many who said they participated in interfaith dialogue felt that it was valuable or useful. However, it also shows in Arusha where participation was lowest even those who had attended interfaith dialogue felt it was less valuable.




Figure 24: Interfaith participation by region




Figure 25: Views on the value of interfaith dialogue if attended

4.2.5 Community Perceptions of needed support

In order to ensure maximum buy in from local communities and maximize the effectiveness of programming it is important not only listen to community’s opinions and ideas, but also hear them. It appears that both programs and their ToCs cite empowering youth and women voices in the community and building capacity of religious leaders to engage to reduce the risk of radicalization. This aspect of the ToC is clearly in line with community opinions focusing on

³³ Personal Communication (KII) with the authors, TANGA. February 24, 2017.

interfaith dialogue, youth agency and empowerment and facilitating broader participation amongst local actors (Figures 26 and 27). When responding to the question on what would be their focus and objectives if they had an opportunity to run a program, the unemployed youth focus group from Arusha, responded that it is important to make sure youth are completely involved and that donors should know what youth want before implementing a program. After that, the focus should be on those ideas and not otherwise. To them, this will not only make the program accepted by the community but will also help yield positive and sustainable results.³⁴




Figure 26: Best way to help communities counter VE




Figure 27: 2nd best way to counter VE in communities

³⁴ Personal Communication (FG) with the authors, Arusha. March 1, 2017.

4.2.6 The Role of Media in CVE

The media’s role in ensuring an informed and engaged citizenry is important and currently under attack globally, including in Tanzania. Despite some mistrust between the government and media recently due to issues such as the storming of a news room at a media station in Dar es Salaam allegedly by government officials, there are some still some areas of the existing relationship between the two where mutual trust and cooperation can be fostered and improved.

Media in relation to VE can be an ally in countering VE narratives. Overall, nearly 2/3rds of respondents viewed the media as covering VE issues in a fair and balanced way (Figure 28). However, a significant percentage of respondents either viewed the media as biased, adding to tensions, or not covering VE issues sufficiently. By engaging media (something SFCG has deep experience in) in programing, the projects can help to further build the credibility of the media, while also furthering the reach of programs and providing positive messaging.




Figure 28: Media coverage/role of VE issues

Social media has recently been a significant focus of attention as VE groups have used this tool to radicalize and recruit youth globally. In contrast to traditional media, social media is viewed in a more negative light as a significant number of respondents believed that social media played a role in radicalization (Figure 29). However, by avoiding social media in East Africa, governments have ceded the entire space to VE groups. Youth male/female focus groups from Dar es Salaam and the female group from Tanga acknowledged the role social media plays in recruitment. This opinion was also shared by some key informants. In the interview with a human rights expert from the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), when responding to the question of what techniques are used by extremist groups to recruit, he suggested that... “Youth are easily manipulated by social media...especially when the group advertises themselves by using actions

such as decapitating people on their website...this might attract many youth looking for revenge and so forth...”³⁵




Figure 29: Social media role in radicalization

4.3 Katika Usalama Tunategemeana: A focus on Tanga

Tanga is a strategic community in countering VE in Tanzania. It is a center for not only illegal smuggling that funds regional extremist groups, but also has been the scene of some VE attacks in recent years. As such, there has been a strong focus on Tanga for CVE programming. However, despite the recent engagement and focus we see in Figures 30 and 31 that 47% of respondents, particularly younger ones, do not discuss or feel comfortable discussing VE in their communities. Additionally, as Figure 32 highlights nearly a third of respondents (29%) in Tanga do not have opportunities to engage with local leaders to address interfaith issues or tensions. Youth in focus groups also highlighted that while some of them do discuss issues surrounding VE, it is amongst themselves, not with religious or other leaders. This suggests that efforts to build bridges and lines of communication between faith leaders and youth will help to broaden and deepen such conversations as well as encourage those not comfortable or not discussing to add their voices to the conversation.

³⁵ Personal Communication (KII) with the authors, Dar es Salaam. March 7, 2017.




Figure 30: Comfort in discussing VE in Tanga by age




Figure 31: Comfort in discussing VE in Tanga




Figure 32: Opportunities for engagement with local leaders on interfaith tensions.

As shown across the three target communities, a majority of respondents believe that they have personal responsibility for CVE in their communities. Both the quantitative data (Figure 33) and the FGD/KII data from Tanga further highlighted the community's engagement and support for addressing VE. In focus groups, the participants all felt they had responsibility, but mixed the availability of space to address this. During a focus group with government officials and political party representatives, they confirmed that there is an increase in citizen awareness and feelings of being responsible for countering violent extremism. One respondent, in showing the need for this, suggested for local authorities to create certain rules locals would be required to follow when hosting unknown guests or moving to a new place, for instance. He went further by suggesting citizens should inform their local authorities on these two issues. In his community, he started to implement this kind of rule by telling people to report if they are hosting anybody from outside their community, or if someone moves to their community, they should go to his office and register. He does this to make sure VE will never happen again in his community, he said.




Figure 33: Feel personal responsibility for CVE in Tanga

5 Zanzibar

5.1 Historical context in Zanzibar

Zanzibar holds a unique place in the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) having been an independent country prior to 1964 when Tanzania was created and remains semi-autonomous in its governance. Although it is part of the union government, the Zanzibar political timeline has a different path than Tanzania mainland. To understand the drivers of fragility and tension in Zanzibar, it is vital to understand the social, religious, and political history of the Isles.

The history and political situation of Zanzibar, which is comprised of more than 95% Muslims and about 5% non-Muslims, can be traced way back to the 1880s when the Sultan of Oman's dynasty decided to move its capital to Zanzibar Stone Town.³⁶ Before the Portuguese, who were the first foreign power to settle in Zanzibar, and the Arab invasion, indigenous East Africans were in Zanzibar, living and doing business. Nevertheless, after the Arab domination and Sultan becoming the one of the most respected Muslim leaders in East Africa, the archipelago slowly evolved and became a predominantly Muslim community, though thoroughly multi-cultural.³⁷

Religious multiculturalism in Zanzibar can be traced back to the 1840s when the Sultan moved to Zanzibar. After the move, Zanzibar adopted Arab-Omani culture, which is predominantly Muslim. The spread of Christianity in Zanzibar arrived in the mid-1840s and early 1850s with French Catholics and few years later Universities Ministry to Central Africa (UMCA), a British Anglican Church missionary wing.³⁸ Recognizing the dominance of Sultan and Arab culture in Zanzibar, Christian Missionaries avoided colliding with their hosts by not evangelizing locals, focusing more on provision of education and healthcare services.³⁹ Christianity then later spread to the mainland through Bagamoyo where the majority of African followers came from.⁴⁰ This led to a longstanding religious tolerance in Zanzibar.

Why does the longstanding tolerance between religions appear threatened now? There is a wide range of explanations for this; however, there appears to have been a turning point in the mid 1980s to 1990s where there was a shift in the original traditions on Zanzibar religious practices both for Muslims and Christians. During this time, on one hand there was spread of Wahab teaching from Saudi Arabia, which is considered extremist ideology by moderate Muslims and non-Muslims. Wahabism, among other things, promotes a radical and violent interpretation of Salafi Islam. This ideology is based on a "them-versus-us" relationship, meaning that "they" are non-believers and "we" are Muslims. Salaf-Jihadism is war against non-believers and calls for reunification of the global Muslim community (Ummah) under a global Islamic State

³⁶ Mohammed, B. *The Democratization Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition*. Humburg-Africa Studies. Umburg Univ. 2000

³⁷ https://www.zanzibarhistory.org/zanzibar_christians.htm

³⁸ Illife J. *A Modern History of Tanganyika*. Cambridge. Cambridge press. 1979.

³⁹ https://www.zanzibarhistory.org/zanzibar_christians.htm

⁴⁰ Ibid.

(Caliphate).⁴¹ Original Zanzibari Islam is Sunni Shafiya, which is considered moderate Islam originating from Oman.⁴²

Research shows that during the mid-1980s and 1990s, some Imams educated in Saudi Arabia returned home and started to preach this ideology. During an interview, a researcher from Zanzibar pointed out their findings that since the 1990s Muslims with Wahabism ideology are taking over the local Muslim ideology. For instance, a number of Mosques in some areas are now run by Sheikhs believed to support or exopause this ideology. They have also found that some imams and their followers with this ideology are starting to buy land and build what are called Makaazi. Although makaazi are supposed to be good and peaceful Muslim places, these Makaazi are run in a very secret way and to get in you must be very well known by the members. It alleged that in some of the Makaazi they have madrasas which teach extremist ideology. He implied it was surprising that no action has been taken.⁴³

During the 1990s and early 2000s, evangelical denominations came to Zanzibar and began to spread the Word of Christ to local Muslims in Zanzibar. A number of local Muslims started to convert into Christianity during this period. Several converted Muslims became Christian preachers and tried to convert more Muslims on the Island.⁴⁴ An example of this can be seen through one key informant who converted to Christianity and became preacher. His conversion was around this period; he is now not only a preacher, but also a researcher on Zanzibar religious issues.

Likewise, during this period there was an emergence of new churches in Zanzibar. Traditionally, the three most common churches were Catholic, Anglican and Lutheran. Currently there are more than 13 churches in Zanzibar. The impact from this is two fold. Firstly, the fundamentalists claim that Islam in Zanzibar has been invaded and have used that opportunity to radicalize Zanzibaris. Secondly, the new churches are also seen by some Zanzibaris to have failed to understand the traditions of religious tolerance of the archipelago, hence, they have lost support. These arguments were also supported by a key informant who said "...Zanzibar has it is own traditions. New emerging Christian religions in Zanzibar are failing to cope with that culture."⁴⁵

5.2 Political context in Zanzibar

The current political context in Zanzibar has rapidly declined following the 2015 election annulment and now the *de facto* end of the GNU government format. CUF's boycott of the election re-run and new government as well as calls for civil disobedience have produced a superficially calm situation in Zanzibar, with tensions simmering just under the surface and allegations of state led violence continuing at a low, but sustained level.

The deep political grievances and religious polarization, are increasing the potential for violent extremism and radicalization in the archipelago. Despite reports from authorities which show that

⁴¹ NAVANT group. Somalia's Al-shabaab: Down but not Out. Homeland Security Policy Institute. George Washington University. 2013.

⁴² Personal communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar. March 9, 2017.

⁴³ Personal communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar. March 9, 2017.

⁴⁴ Personal communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar. March 9, 2017

⁴⁵ Personal Communication (KII) and authors, Dar es Salaam. March 8, 2017

the situation is calm, several informants suggested that the situation on the ground is getting worse. While as of yet there are few if any links to regional or international violent extremist groups, there is the potential for these groups or others to tap into the real economic, political and social marginalization. UAMSHO tapped into this openly during the constitutional review process, driven by a mix of nationalism and religious fervor. In the current political and social environment, more radical groups with more hardline religious or political agendas will operate not in the open, but underground. If the governance issues in Zanzibar cannot be solved, the potential for increasing violence locally and recruitment regionally could increase.

Figure 34 shows that the main drivers of violent attacks in Zanzibar are political/separatist and religious, constituting 98% of the reported violent attacks in Zanzibar between 1997 and 2015.⁴⁶ This further highlights the intermingling of religion and politics in the Isles particularly about Zanzibar’s place in the United Republic of Tanzania.




Figure 34: Motivations behind incidents of violence attacks in Tanzania/Zanzibar linked to or attributed to extremist groups from 1997 to 2015

5.3 CVE Landscape in Zanzibar

The original aim of the baseline data collection was to conduct both a household survey and qualitative focus group discussions and key informant interviews in Zanzibar in order to a gain

⁴⁶ Sarota, Anthony, International Law and Policy Institute, and Tanzania National Defense College, “National and Homeland Security in Tanzania, An investigation into Domestic Threats in Tanzania” Special Reporting Series, February, 2016.

holistic picture of VE and CVE on the island. However, as previously noted the household survey aspect of the data collection could not take place in Zanzibar. As a result, only qualitative focus groups and key informant interviews (KII) were conducted. KIIs were conducted by picking informants who would provide not only information on VE and CVE, but also information about the current social and political issues in Zanzibar. We were able to interview a director from a popular radio station in Zanzibar representing different opinions, representatives from women and youth activist institutions, representatives from religious institutions, representatives of an institution addressing VE/CVE for Zanzibari youth, and a researcher on Zanzibar social, religious and political issues. Equally important, we had an opportunity to conduct a focus group with ex-members of Ubaya Ubaya and Mbwa Mwitw gangs from Bububu. The opinions and contributions provided by these key informants and focus groups, as well as our data set from previous studies on this issue in Tanzania and Zanzibar, provided us with sufficient information to conduct analysis on the structure around the project indicators.

5.3.1 The Intermingling of Political and Religious Tensions

Although historically Zanzibaris have been living together peacefully regardless of their beliefs, the current political polarization in Zanzibar has served to catalyze the growth of fissures between Christians and Muslims with the UAMSHO riots and the violence during constitutional review process. According to the Round 21 Wasemavyo Wazanzibari⁴⁷ (WWz) mobile phone based panel survey in May 2015 conducted by International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) and The State University of Zanzibar (SUZA), when respondents were asked if politicization of religion creates tension between faiths, just over 76% of all respondents either agreed completely or agreed somewhat (see Figure 34).

The current the situation is the same, if not worse. In February 2017, nearly two years after the Round 21 WWz, our respondents from interviews and focus groups with different explanations, are still of the opinion that religious intolerance is growing in the Isles and the number of people who are radicalized by *both religions* is growing faster. During communication with one respondent, he traced back the coexistence of the two faiths in Zanzibar to before the 1980s and 1990s. According to this respondent, the emergence of Wahabi teaching and the fact that Christians, particularly evangelical churches that began evangelizing towards local Muslim populations, were the main reasons for these interfaith tensions.⁴⁸

Likewise, from a political perspective, the same respondent argued that the roughly 5% of the population that is non-Muslim is an obstacle for certain political parties during the general elections. This 5%, which is mostly Christian, vote mainly for CCM and have been the base for CCM to claim victory over CUF in every general election in Zanzibar since 1995. His assumption is that without non-Muslims, CCM and CUF have almost equal support in Zanzibar.⁴⁹ For him,

⁴⁷ Wasemavyo Wazanzibari or What do Zanzibari's say? Mobile panel survey was a joint collaboration between ILPI and SUZA. The survey was conducted from August 2013-April 2016 on a monthly basis.

⁴⁸ Personal Communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar, March 9, 2017.

⁴⁹ The 2010 official election figures bear this out with CCM officially winning the Presidency 50.1 to 49.2. Although this was according to CCM and CUF officials at the time a negotiated outcome because for the GNU to succeed CCM would have to be the senior partner.

this also is a reason for the decline in religious tolerance and the ongoing extremist activities in Zanzibar.⁵⁰

Another respondent highlighted the “other side” of extremism, to which attention is now needed. Some Christians have recently developed a tendency, according to him, that might result in extremism. Some leaders now openly preach to their followers about retaliating towards Muslims or not cooperating with the Muslim society. He gave an example of this, saying “I went to one workshop a year ago and this is what the facilitator, who was a Christian religious leader said... ‘God has commanded me not to save life only, but also save a life by killing those who want to take it’ ...these Christian types of teaching might end up radicalizing our youth.”⁵¹

The 2015 data on politicization of religion from the WWz survey shown in Figure 35, along with the recent opinions of respondents from key informants and focus group participants, reveal that the traditional culture of Zanzibar religious tolerance is rapidly declining.




Figure 35: Citizen perceptions of the politicization of religion in Zanzibar in 2015

As we have shown the political culture of Zanzibar is one that is much more characterized by conflict than on Tanzania mainland. The two main political parties in Zanzibar (CCM and CUF) have almost equal power with two very different versions of history and visions for Zanzibar’s place in the United Republic of Tanzania. Politics in Zanzibar tends to be hostile rather than a space where people can air their opinions, get a chance to choose or be chosen to serve their communities, or exchange ideas about how to better society. It is common to find that neighbors or relatives do not speak just because of their political opinions. Since the re-introduction of political parties in Tanzania 1992, and now the end of the GNU after only five years in 2015, politics in Zanzibar have contributed to hostile relationships. Mohammed Bakari in his essay, *The Democratization Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition*, says:

⁵⁰ Personal communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar. March 9, 2017.

⁵¹ Personal Communication (KII) with authors, Zanziba. March 9, 2017.

The main feature of multiparty politics in Zanzibar, since its inception in July 1992, has been hostility, which at times involves sporadic acts of violence contrary to the expected outcome of competition based on the principles of fairness and tolerance. Instead of opening up channels of political representation, participation and expression of grievances through legal registered political associations.... multiparty politics instead characterized by increasing political hostility...⁵²

Multiparty politics in Zanzibar has created or allowed for the public airing of divisions along religious lines in contrast to the old tradition of Zanzibaris getting along, helping one another, and interacting without considering faith, tribe, or other affiliations. During an interview in Zanzibar, one of the respondents, after being asked if there is sufficient representation on decisions regarding matters such as development or politics, said “if it happens that you are a member of a different party in Zanzibar and you are in a place where such party is not acceptable by many of the population, your voice will never be heard.”⁵³ He was distressed and without hesitation showed that the opinions of political parties are what determines right from wrong, and that even if a member of the CUF party has a valid point, among CCM members, he/she will be viewed as wrong simply because of the affiliation with CUF, and the reverse is true. Generally, every respondent and focus group member responded to this question similarly, agreeing with the previous findings that there are unequal opportunities for group members to interact in a positive way with other groups, including youth, in their community.

5.3.2 Youth Struggles in a Hyper Partisan Zanzibar

Emerging from the same complications surrounding politics, opportunities for youth, particularly those from opposition families or Pemba have narrowed. These youths are automatically, in most cases, considered opposition, and thus discriminated against. Reports show that a number of people, particularly youth, have been denied their rights just because they are from the opposition. Although the current situation is not as dire as immediately after the re-introduction and 1995 general election, the current political crisis has repolarized the civil service and other governmental bodies such as universities. For instance, following the 1995 elections, some students with scholarships saw their scholarships cancelled because they were classified as opposition.⁵⁴

The situation in 1997-1998 has now returned following the 2015 elections; opportunities go hand in hand with political affiliation. One informant, answering the question addressing the issue of opportunities, said “In my opinion, there are a number of opportunities in Zanzibar, but only those who are in the ruling party benefit from them...the opposition youth are always left out.”⁵⁵ Other youth from focus groups completely agreed with these opinions. They said that if you are from the opposition, to have opportunities is a “dream.”

⁵² Mohammed, B. *The Democratization Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition*. Humburg-Africa Studies. Umburg University. pg. 154-15. 2000.

⁵³ Personal communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar. March 9, 2017.

⁵⁴ Mohammed, B. *The Democratization Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition*. Humburg-Africa Studies. Umburg University. 2000.

⁵⁵ Personal communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar. March 9, 2017.

These findings are supported by the responses to the question asking about the most left out group in communities. Different from Tanzania mainland, the response to this question in Zanzibar was generic, in that every respondent simply said, “youth from the opposition are the most left out.” During focus groups, after one participant responded to this question with that answer, every member afterward without hesitation said “kama alivyosema mwenzangu,” or “as my fellow member said.” One respondent gave an example of the lack of opportunity to engage with local decision makers, saying:

...we the youth are not given the work as part of a project to clean in my area of Shaurimoyo only because we are not party stalwarts. These opportunities are instead given to elders who are and it is even difficult for them to do the job. We youth are told to stay quiet and relax.⁵⁶

Despite the need, the youth were unable to voice their frustration with the situation, as they were told to stay quiet. These opinions are not only from those in the opposition, but also the ruling party. The same sentiments were echoed by Zanzibaris who wish the best for their country regardless of political affiliation (CCM or CUF). One youth respondent, answering the question about organizations trying to address equal representation, said:

... here in Zanzibar, we have Youth Councils in every constituency. The council is supposed to be dealing with youth issues regardless of their political affiliation and so forth... However, these councils have been politicized in such a way the beneficiaries are the youth from ruling party, while youth from opposition are not well represented... I am the chairman of the Youth Council in my constituency and I am about to resign, which I know they will not want to accept because I have potential within the party. The reasons I want to do so is because I am not satisfied with how they want me to run my council...I disagree with the way we are handling the issue here.⁵⁷

Some youth have also experienced backlash after trying to express their needs and opinions towards authorities. There are instances of youth being questioned and detained by authorities after expressing their opinions. During one of the focus group, a young male told us of an experience he had when a Member of Parliament came to the local branch to speak with youth. Youth had an opportunity to ask questions, and after the Member of Parliament left, the police came and arrested youth who asked difficult questions.⁵⁸ This discourages youth from feeling comfortable speaking with peers and decision makers, as they fear that the consequences of disagreeing with others will put them in a similar situation.

5.3.3 How to operate in Zanzibar’s Current Context

Understanding the political economy and the space available to Zanzibaris civil and political actors operate in and the push/pull factors is key. In a word, it is politics. Research shows that in Zanzibar the two main factors for violence are; 1) political grievances and 2) polarization of religion tied to politics. The Zanzibar situation is unique compared to Kenya or Tanzania

⁵⁶ Personal communication (FG) with authors, Zanzibar. March 9, 2017.

⁵⁷ Personal communication (KII) with authors. Zanzibar. March 9, 2017.

⁵⁸ Personal communication (FG) with authors. Zanzibar. March 9, 2017.

mainland where violent extremism is linked to international or regional extremist groups.⁵⁹ In a study conducted by ILPI in 2015 regarding the threat of violent extremism in Zanzibar, a majority of respondents stated they preferred non-violent means to counter violent extremism, seeing this as the best way to fight the appeal of violent extremism. The findings from the study showed that 66% of respondents preferred dialogue as the means to counter violent extremism, followed by the use of force by security entities a distant second with 11.68% (Figure 36).




Figure 36: Best way to counter the appeal of VE groups in Zanzibar (2015)

A number of politicians and Zanzibaris still have hope that their problems can be resolved through peaceful means. Maalim Seif, the CUF candidate for the presidential election in Zanzibar, claimed to have won the October 25th election. Nevertheless, Maalim Seif was willing to participate in nine rounds of negotiation with his counterpart, President Shein, without reaching a satisfactory agreement over the annulment and how to resolve the issue. Showing his distress after the failure of this negotiation, Maalim Saif called for a press conference on January 11, 2016. Before he spoke, there was speculation that he could cause chaos aimed at the Revolutionary Day Celebrations. Instead, during the press conference he calmed his supporters and requested the President of the United Republic of Tanzania to intervene. Likewise, despite boycotting the re-election in March 2016, the opposition leader and supporters maintained the sense of peace.

In Zanzibar, politics and religion are very closely associated. A conflict in politics can easily result in religious fighting. Any approach trying to address conflict in the Isles must build itself upon or create a platform for dialogue between political actors to have a meaningful impact. There is also a new urgency with the splintering of CUF and the waning influence of Maalim Seif who is likely to step down from the Secretary General position of CUF in the next year or two. This could lead to a continuation of the peaceful and non-violent posture from CUF or, if more

⁵⁹ Bofin, Peter. “The Threat of Violent Extremism in Zanzibar” BRICS January 2017.

hardline factions gain control of the party, new levels of violent resistance that could catalyze violence and extreme views.

Media is an important source of information in any society often called the 4th pillar of government. Media is crucial in providing the population with information about what is going with political, security and social issues in their community. Media in Zanzibar has a role to play in providing important information to the population, but it is strictly controlled by the government and extremely biased. Media in Tanzania and Zanzibar have both become significantly more independent in the last decade, but Tanzania mainland media is significantly ahead of Zanzibari media in this regard.

An independent media is a vital feature of any democratic country. The major role of media in the free world is to scrutinize the government and inform people without bias on what is going on in their community or country in general. Speaking with the Director of one of the radio stations in Zanzibar about this, she pointed out that back then when private media were not present, reporting was totally biased in that no media spoke about any failures or wrongdoing of the government. However, after the emergence of private media, things changed. Not only can media now report about wrongdoing, but also people now freely speak and scrutinize the government.⁶⁰

The respondent went further by discussing the role of traditional and new media in reporting issues related to peace, security and religion in Zanzibar. Through the course of their weekly programs, they address these issues. Sometimes during their programs, they invite government officers, practitioners in their fields and religious leaders to talk to the community through the radio. The idea behind these programs is to create awareness in communities on the issues and to promote peace and tolerance.

She also recognized the role of social media in this, and the way people are active in reporting these issues to the media through their phones. She showed an example of a video that was taken a few days before by an unknown person while locals from Nungwi were attacking and trying to bury a person who was in a hole he was digging. While committing this act, locals were shouting that they are tired of investors who came and took their land. Interested in this information from social media, she sent a team of reporters to Nungwi to gain a more holistic picture of the issue and to broadcast it. She was concerned and referred to this act as violent extremism, and showed how the media plays a role in reporting incidents such as this.

When respondents were asked about where they learn about violent extremism, development and related issues the most common answer was the media. While some said, they get information from traditional media such as radio (Chuchu FM, Coconut FM), newspapers (Zanzibar Daima, Zanzibar Leo, AL-noor), and TV (TVZ, ITV, Star TV and Cloud TV), others said to get information from social media such as jamii forums⁶¹, WhatsApp and Facebook.⁶²

⁶⁰ Personal communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar. March 10, 2017.

⁶¹ Jamii forums is a Tanzanian online platform for discussions and posting of data, investigative journalism, and sometimes leaks from government sources. One example being the leaked Production Sharing Agreement between the Tanzanian government and Statoil in 2014.

⁶² Personal communication (Refer to question number 1 in both interview and FG guideline).

Predicting the challenges in speaking with religious leaders the researchers would face during the data collection in both Tanzania Mainland and Tanzania Zanzibar, we developed questions for our questionnaires, focus group discussions and interviews to get the opinion of respondents about religious leaders on these issues, particularly that of being moderate and willing to participate in interfaith dialogue. More importantly, we asked the respondents to suggest the names of religious leaders they know of who participate in such dialogues. In the questionnaire, there was a question asking if there are any religious leaders who involve themselves in solving local conflicts (refer to question 41 a and b). Likewise, we went deeper in our interviews and focus groups to gain this insight. We tried to explore interfaith dialogue issues on radicalization and VE in communities, one of the probing questions asked if there are specific leaders who respondents know are more open to such work. In this question, the desire was to know the name of such leaders and also why these leaders are considered more open than others.

In our communication with a respondent, who is a preacher and a researcher on Zanzibar politics and religion, when asked such questions, he mentioned a few Christian and Muslim leaders who are open to talk about these issues. These same leaders have, both in the past and recently, participated in interfaith dialogues with respondents.⁶³ In the interview with representatives from a youth organization dealing with VE in Zanzibar and women's organization a few additional leaders were also mentioned.⁶⁴ This suggests that there are entry points in the religious community in Zanzibar both religious leaders that are affiliated with SMZ and others operating without this political tint. As such, there are ways in which to engage, but to have a significant impact both those which are government affiliated (such as the Mufti's office) and those outside of these official stations must be included.

Knowing the importance of religious leaders for these projects, leaders who and could contribute to the project through interfaith dialogues were also considered. Several documents were reviewed including from the Inter-Religious Council for Peace Tanzania to gain insight into the key religious leaders to engage with based on the indicators, and who have collaborated with another religious group last year.

6 Challenges, Opportunities, Risks and Mitigation

Tanzania as a country is facing a number of challenges which are hindering, to an extent, its effort not only in countering violent extremism, but also other security issues, including fighting drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, and illicit weapons trafficking, to mention a few. Some social and political efforts have been taken by the country to try to counter violent extremism. There are some challenges to these efforts, but there are also opportunities for stakeholders to effectively support the government in its fight against extremism.

6.1 Challenges

Existing Distrust between Law Enforcement Agencies and other Stakeholders

⁶³ Personal Communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar. March 9, 2017.

⁶⁴ Personal Communication (KII) with authors, Zanzibar. March 10, 2017.

National security is one of the most important things for any country aiming to protect their citizens. The Government of Tanzania is the primary provider of the country's security through its law enforcement agencies (Police, Immigration and other intelligence agencies). However, to work effectively, the Government needs to work with other partners from the public and private sector including:

- Civil Society organizations including religious institutions
- Political Parties
- International NGOs
- Employers such as Tourism businesses, mining and oil/gas companies
- Labor Unions and Professional Organizations
- Youth and Women's organizations

The current relationship between government and these other stakeholders is characterized by distrust. Some actions by law enforcement agencies have been regarded as unprofessional, corrupt, and unfair by other stakeholders. The agencies have sometimes been accused of using unnecessary and excessive force. These practices by law enforcement agencies in Tanzania have been an obstacle in the effort to counter violent extremism. During a study on national and homeland security in Tanzania in 2015, a prominent reporter voiced his concerns, saying:

...the government addressing terrorism in Tanzania is still controversial. Sometimes I tend to believe some of the incidents are staged by the government itself. I don't have any proof of that, but my gut tells me that. For example, the issue of the explosion at the Chadema rally. What we know was this, the person who was believed to have thrown that bomb was protected by police while the Chadema supporters who saw him doing this tried to arrest him. You can find this reported in many newspapers....⁶⁵

In recent years, Tanzanian police have focused on community policing as a way to establish trust and better tap into information from citizens and communities. Despite these efforts, too much focus has been on establishing community police groups or reviving the Sungusungu⁶⁶, rather than building trust between formal police and communities. This has led in some cases to extrajudicial conduct by community police groups against the locals. Many locals therefore, instead of providing information to police, have been hiding information from them.

Increasing Poverty and Unemployment among Youth

Despite growing economically as per IMF and World Bank indicators, Tanzanian perceptions about economic issues is very different. Several respondents from the survey agreed that living standards in the country continue to deteriorate and these economic difficulties experienced by many is likely a source of VE as extremist groups often incentivize joining by promising money.

This has been noted as a major factor by many of our respondents during the interviews.⁶⁷ Although the relationship between poverty and extremism and radicalization is debatable, what is

⁶⁵ Anonymous, personal communication, September 17, 2015.

⁶⁶ Sungusungu are the Swahili name for local or community police during the single party era and this term continues to be used for local safety committees or community policing activities in Tanzania.

⁶⁷ Botha, Anneli. "Radicalisation in Kenya. Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council." *Institute for Security Studies Papers* 2014, no. 265 (2014): 28.

not debatable is that individuals of little income and with few options are more vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment to extremist groups. This is true in many parts of the world, including Tanzania, and can be seen by observing extremist and terrorist groups recruiting members in other nations such as Nigeria, Yemen and Somalia. Poor families are a pool for their recruitment.

The unemployment rate in Tanzania is rising. Unemployed youth not only threaten the economy, but also national security. Most violent extremist activities since the 1990s have been committed by unemployed youth. The National Statistics Bureau of Tanzania (NBS) shows that the unemployment level among youth is about 11.7%. On top of that, 15.5% of youth are economically inactive. Other important statistics provided by NBS include the unemployment rate by length. The statistics show that of all unemployed youth, 41.2% of them are victims of long-term unemployment.⁶⁸ Youth suffering from long term unemployment and other inactive youth need special attention from both government and stakeholders during the course of any strategy to counter violent extremism.

Permeable Borders

Tanzania shares its borders with numerous countries, but its border with Kenya in the north is currently the most concerning because of terrorist activities in Kenya. Although there are established entry points between Tanzania and Kenya to facilitate movement, and a presence of law enforcement at every border entry, there are also many unofficial entry points representing security challenges. These unofficial entry points have been regarded as main routes for criminal groups, smugglers, and extremists. Moreover, proximity between Tanzania and Kenya and cultural similarities among people in the border region increases the complication of border issues and violent extremism in Tanzania.

The current hunt for terrorists on Kenya's coast in Lamu and Mombasa by the Kenyan government has pushed many extremists south, who are looking for a safe haven and area to plan and advance their attacks. They have ended up in Tanzania around border or high traffic areas such as Tanga, Pemba and Morogoro. Likewise, the transfer of ideology from one place is difficult to control. The extremist group from Kenya, Al-Muhajiroum, for instance, was very active in protesting during the Sheikh Ponda case before it was dismissed recently.⁶⁹

Limited capability due to economic problems

The Tanzanian GDP is approximately \$138.5 billion, with economic growth of about 7%. Per capita income is \$2,904, inflation is 5.6%, and unemployment levels are around 3.2%.⁷⁰ Like many other Sub-Saharan African countries, Tanzania faces challenges such as urbanization, an unstable rural economy, unemployment, corruption, poor social services and crime. With a tax burden of 13.2% of the GDP, public spending around 18.7% of its domestic income, and a debt of

⁶⁸ Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics. 2014. www.nbs.go.tz.

⁷⁰ Index of Economic Freedom-Tanzania. 2017. <http://www.heritage.org/index/country/tanzania#government-size>

about 40.5% of its GDP⁷¹, the government's ability to fight challenges such as violent extremism, terrorism, and other international crimes remains limited.

Current Political Tension

Before the general election, the country was about to undergo one of the largest steps toward democracy since the reintroduction of a multiparty system in 1992. This was after the country decided to write its new constitution. However, the exercise stopped before the referendum stage to allow for another exercise, voter registration. Since then, citizens have been asking when the referendum will take place and the current administration has showed no interest in moving on with the exercise. The elected president once commented about the new constitution, indicating that it was not in his agenda during the campaign.⁷²

This issue is likely to increase tension. After the 2015 election, the government has implemented certain policies which are viewed by many as an effort of undermine the opposition. Actions such as the prohibition of political party rallies until 2020, some controversial section of the the Cybercrime Act of 2015 and new Media and Statistics Act have been boycotted by many political parties and stakeholders, such as human rights activists and the private media sector. Since these new policies and laws have been put into place, a number politicians and social media founders have been taken into custody. Recently the founder of a famous Tanzanian social media forum called Jamii forum, Maxence Melo, was arrested and taken to court for the charges related to the Cybercrime Act of 2015⁷³. Tundu Lissu⁷⁴ and Godbless Lema⁷⁵ from Chadema were also charged under similar vague charges.

6.2 Opportunities

Coordinating CVE issues through the National Counter Terrorism Center

Tanzania's National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is respected by many westerners, particularly the US, after its role during the investigation and prosecution of Tanzanians who participated in the terrorist attack on the US embassy in 1998. Nevertheless, the NCTC has not been effectively utilized in the past years. Recently the government has begun to use the NCTC to coordinate programs relating to CVE and terrorism in the country. Before this, it was difficult to identify the coordinator from the government. The NCTC has been in the process of conducting

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Magufuli faulted with Katiba, growth plans. The Citizen, 6/11/2016. <http://mobile.thecitizen.co.tz/news/Magufuli-faulted-on-katiba--growth-plans/2304482-3442516-format-xhtml-leb4wxz/index.html>

⁷³ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38341151>. The co-founder of a Tanzanian whistle-blowing website has been charged with obstructing an investigation after not handing over the details of people who post on the site to the police.

⁷⁴ <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Tundu-Lissu-arrested/1840340-3802454-j6hh4jz/index.html>. The chief whip of the official opposition camp Tundu Lissu (Chadema) was on Monday arrested outside the National Assembly grounds and has taken to Dar es Salaam allegedly to answer unspecified charges.

⁷⁵ <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Police-arrest-2-Chadema-key-leaders/1840406-3359742-652m9kz/index.html>. Police Arrests two Chadema Key Leaders. Those who arrested include outspoken Arusha Urban MP Godbless Lema, who was arrested at his home yesterday morning and Chadema Deputy General Secretary (Zanzibar) Salum Mwalimu who was apprehended by law enforcement in Simuyi.

programs aiming to counter violent extremism and radicalization from different angles. According to research conducted by the Global Center on Cooperative Security (GCCS), an informant from the NCTC reported that the NCTC was developing programs to address the issue of radicalization in prisons, aiming to prevent extremist and terrorist groups from using prisons as a recruitment pool.⁷⁶ Having the NCTC as the coordinator, puts stakeholders in a better position to join hands with the government because they now know which institution to approach when trying to reach the government.

National Counter Terrorism Strategies

There are signs showing that Tanzania is likely to change its counterterrorism strategy. This presents stakeholders with another opportunity to get involved in countering violent extremism. Information from an interview with a government official conducted by GCCS⁷⁷, as well as the fact that a number of programs have been accepted by the government is a good sign.

Youth unemployment

The government of Tanzania is beginning to recognize the danger posed by youth unemployment to national security. Several times, different politicians in different tones have addressed this as a problem. While addressing Tanzanian ambassadors in 2004, the then Chief Minister of the Government of Zanzibar showed concern regarding the arrests during a demonstration in early March 2004 followed by the terrorist activities between March 5-20, 2004 which were believed to be conducted by extremist youth. He was quoted saying that what was going on in Zanzibar at the time was because of poverty and unemployment of youth. Recently, politicians have been addressing the issue of youth unemployment and have regarded it as a “time bomb.” Any program aiming to address youth unemployment will be well received by communities and local and national authorities.

⁷⁶ Kessel, E. Durner, T. Schwertz, M. Violent Extremism and Instabilities in Great Horn of Africa: An Examination of Drivers and Responses. Global Center on Cooperative Security, April 2010.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

7 Indicator table

	Baseline Surveyed Areas				
	TANGA (n=101)	ARUSHA (n=102)	D'SALAAM (n=108)	ZANZIBAR	TOTAL (n=311)
PAMOJA: Strengthening Community Resilience to Violent Extremism in Tanga, Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar					
Goal: To strengthen community resilience to key drivers of violent extremism in at-risk areas					
Indicator for Baseline					
% of young men and women who report they have opportunities to articulate their interests and needs with peers and local decision-makers, and to jointly explore solutions to address these needs.	49%	57%	37%		48%
% increase in target community members who report that they interact in a positive way with members of other groups, including youth, in their community.	71%	88%	52%		70%
% of community members who report they would use non-violent means to resolve a dispute with member(s) of other religions.	71%	88%	52%		70%
% of community members who report they trust members(s) of other religions.	67%	62%	63%		64%
% of population surveyed in the target locations who report that media play a constructive role in addressing issues related to peace, security and religion.	59%	64%	71%		65%
% of population surveyed in target locations who believe that people from different religions coexist peacefully in their					

community.	78%	65%	89%		78%
% of religious leaders in the target areas who report they have collaborated with leaders from another religious affiliation in the last year.	0% (To be verified only at the endline)	0% (To be verified only at the endline)	0% (To be verified only at the endline)		
KATIKA USALAMA TUNATEGENEANA: A Community-Owned approach to Promoting Moderate Voices and Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanga					
Goal: To empower communities to prevent Violent Extremism					
Indicators for baseline					
% of target community members in Tanga who feel comfortable discussing violent extremism	53%				53%
% of target community members in Tanga who believe that they have a role to play in preventing VE	79%				79%
% of target community members in Tanga who feel there are opportunities in Tanga to discuss violent extremism	52.5%				52.5%
% of surveyed community members who believe that youth voices and positive narratives are being amplified	0% (To be verified only at the endline)				

8 Recommendations and Implications for Programing

SFCG, local partners and international development partners should seek buy in from the central government for CVE programing. The current lack of transparency from development partners and implementing organizations towards the government may be sustainable in the short term, but will likely continue to result in shallower outcomes, a risk for implementers. Political economy analysis of the security space and CVE efforts would be a good first step towards helping implementers and funders to find entry points (perhaps anti-drug/organized crime), anchoring this work with the relevant authorities. Second, an outreach campaign aimed at governmental, political, media and civil society to deepen understanding of VE and CVE goals. Move them from denial to acceptance that this is an issue and can be useful for them to address. A starting point for this could be to reframe the discussion using new terminology that is less loaded to officials. This could help to build trust and relationships that can then be leveraged to address VE head on. Furthermore, such engagement will likely amplify the impact of CVE efforts locally and nationally.

CVE programming such as Pamoja! and Tunategemeana, should aim to build upon existing interventions and forums within the civil society sector. In communities, peace building and interfaith dialogue efforts leverage these networks to reach new groups (youth influencers) and focus on trust building between faiths, communities and governmental actors. As one key informant told our team, “The awareness of youth and kids about the danger of VE can be achieved only if every stakeholder works on his/her angle of specialization. Those which deal with policy should focus on that and those who are directly involved in implementation should do so. The problem I am seeing here is that organizations tend to jump in when they see money without even having the capacity to implement such programs.”

Engagement in the online space should be increased and done in a strategic manner to reach at risk groups. Social media is currently viewed a more of a driver of rather than tool to counter VE, and this is a space where innovation can happen and many younger Tanzanians get information. So, credible and targeted social media can have a significant impact not only in the target communities but nationally. Entry points could be with police or religious groups to engage in the social media space. A good example of this is the Polisi Zanzibar Facebook page that was a product of a 2013-2014 CVE program that has continued long after the program ended. Furthermore, our data shows that trust in religious leaders exists, so this could be leveraged to produce positive interfaith narratives on social media.

Most Tanzanians see interfaith dialogue, youth empowerment and improved relations with government as the best strategies to counter VE. According to our qualitative and quantitative data, people feel that they personally can solve interfaith conflicts as they arise, but also suggest that the greatest needs to counter VE are 1) interfaith dialogue 2) opportunity for youth 3) increased engagement with government. This last point seems to indicate that it is incumbent

upon civil society to engage government more and government to change how it relates, if at all, to communities. Interfaith dialogue should be done in a broad and sustainable manner.

Political tensions are viewed as the main driver of tension in Tanzania, particularly in Zanzibar. While engaging with politicians is higher risk, it will also bring the highest rewards in terms of impact. This is an area that can help ease tensions and pull factors for VE as well as reaching new influencers and leaders. However, there is a need to proceed carefully and significant effort is required to engage the government and local political actors to gain their blessing. As one youth told our team in Zanzibar “...there are a number of opportunities in Zanzibar, but only those who are in the ruling party benefit from them...the opposition youth are always left out.” This same sentiment was also expressed to an extent in Tanzania mainland. Opposition youth supporters are specifically marginalized and this is a population that is also at risk of radical messaging because of the lack of representation and engagement with legitimate political actors. Programs should engage with both ruling party and opposition party MPs, local leaders and youth wings. Ensuring that interventions are seen as non-partisan and also inclusive will help to build these important relationships and to bridge political divides, and reach at risk groups.

9 Appendices

9.1 Appendix 1 Research tools

Survey Questionnaire

Part I: Information about the household

Enumerator Instructions:

Prior to knocking and entering the household, from in front of the door, are you able to see any of the following? [1=Yes, 2=No]

- Health clinic _____
- Police branch or station _____
- Political party branch _____
- Public well/borehole _____
- Government office _____
- Tarmac road _____
- Dirt road _____
- Court authority (e.g. local court) _____
- Religious facility _____
- House of local government leader _____
- Health Clinic _____

Building type: _____

[1=Single family house; 2=multi-family house; 3=multi-family, multi-unit structure; 4=servants

quarters; 5=Garage; 6=Hut; 7=Other]

Please record what material the dwelling is primarily made of: _____

[1=cement or rocks/coral; 2=Timber and dirt; 3=cured bricks; 4=uncured bricks; 5= cement; 6=Other]

Please record what material the roof of the dwelling is primarily made of: _____

[1=tin sheets; 2= roof tiles; 3=leaves; 4=Dirt and leaves; 5=Cement; 6=Other]

Enumerator Instructions:

Knock to enter the dwelling and please indicate whether or not someone was present in the home: _____

[1=a person was present; 2= no person was present]

Part II – Introduction

Good morning/Good afternoon, my name is _____. I am working as an enumerator for a study for SFCG to gather data on communities in Tanzania as part of the **“Baseline Evaluation of two programs to strengthen communities’ ability enable development and strengthen peacebuilding called Pamoja and Katika Usalama Tunategemeana.”**

SFCG is an international conflict transformation NGO that aims to transform the way individuals, groups, governments and companies deal with conflict, away from adversarial approaches and towards collaborative solutions. From this approach, SFCG intends to address the issue of conflict in different parts of Tanzania by implementing these two projects.

I would like to interview you as a community member in order to gain a more holistic picture of the issue of peace, development and conflict resolution in Tanzania, and also on relevance of the project objectives in your community/ country.

This questionnaire is being conducted in---- **city name**---as part of the baseline data collection for Pamoja and Katika Usalama Tunategemeana. I will be asking you general and specific questions regarding various issues regarding your household, your community and governance issues in Tanzania and therefore I kindly request your active engagement and participation.

Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential, and will not be shared with anyone other than members of our survey team. We therefore request that you feel free to provide frank and honest answers. Participation in this survey is voluntary, and you can stop the interview at any time.

However, we hope you will participate in the survey since your views are important to this research in Tanzania.

At this time, do you want to ask me anything about the survey? May I begin now?

Does the person agree to participate? Yes/No

Demographic Questions

1. How many members are there in your household who are above the age of 18? That is when you close the door at night how many people over 18 years old sleep in the house? ____

2. Is this person male or female? ____ [1=Female; 2=Male]

3. I'd like for you to tell me what their relationship is to the head of the household is. ____

[1=Household head; 2=Spouse of household head; 3=Child of household head; 4=Child of spouse of household head; 5=Grandchild of household head; 6=Parent of household head or spouse; 7=Another family relationship; 8=Worker; 9=Other non-family].

4. What is [his/her] tribe? _____

5. What is [his/her] her age?

1. 15-19 Adolescence
2. 20-24 Early Youth
3. 25-29 Middle Youth
4. 30-35 Late Youth
5. 36-40 Early Adulthood
6. 41-49 Middle Adulthood
7. 50-59 Late Adulthood
8. 60+ years Elderly

6. Is he or she married? ____

[1=Single; 2=Married, one spouse; 3=Married, multiple spouses; 4=divorced; 5=Separated from partner; 6=Widow; 7=Unmarried with live-in partner]

7. What is his/her highest educational qualification?

[1=No education; 2=Partial primary; 3=Completed primary; 4=Partial secondary; 5=Completed secondary; 6=Post-Secondary Certificate; 7=Bachelor's degree, 8=Master's degree; 9=Doctoral

degree]

8. What is his or her current occupation?

[1=Farmer or livestock; 2=Fisherman; 3=Miner; 4=Tourism; 5=Public servant; 6=Private company; 7=NGO 8=Religious organization; 9=Self-employed; 10= Domestic worker; 11=Student; 12=Disabled; 13=Not employed; 14=Retired; 15=Other] _____

9. Who is the owner of this dwelling? _____

[1=It is owned by the household members; 2=It is rented by the household members; 3=Employer provides housing without fee; 4=Employer provides housing with fee; 5=Another owner]

10. Is this home connected to the national power grid? _____

[1=Yes; 2=No]

11. What is the primary source of drinking water in your household? _____

[1=Piped water in house; 2=Piped water in compound; 3=Community borehole; 4=Uncovered well; 5=Bog; 6=River; 7=Water truck; 8=Water cart; 9=Bottled water; 10=Other]

12. Now I'd like to ask you how often in the last month you did each of the following? [1=Not even once; 2=Once or twice; 3=A few times; 4=A lot; 5=All the time]

- Leave your ward _____
- Have informal discussions in your community _____
- Attend community meetings _____
- Contribute during a community meeting _____
- Participate in a political party meeting _____
- Contact your MP over an issue _____
- Talk to a leader from your religion to voice an issue _____
- Share your thoughts with a media outlet _____
- Participate in a rally to voice an issue _____

13. Now I'd like to ask you about you yourself. What is your current religion?

1 Muslim

2 Catholic

3 Protestant

4 Other

14. About how much would you say that you trust other people of your religion in Tanzania in general?
And what about Tanzanians who are from other religions?

a) From your religion: _____

[1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Somewhat, 4=A lot, 5=Completely]

b) Not from your religion: _____

[1=Not at all, 2=A little, 3=Somewhat, 4=A lot, 5=Completely]

15. Now I would like to ask you a few questions about the economy. How do you view the current state of the following? [1=Very bad, 2=Bad, 3=Average, 4=Good, 5=Very good]

• National Economy _____

• Personal economic state _____

16. Overall, how do you see your own personal economic state compared to other Tanzanians? _____

[1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better]

17. Overall, how do you see your own personal economic state compared how it was 12 months ago?

[1=Much worse today, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 6=Don't Know]

18. How do you think your personal economic state will be 12 months from today? _____

[1=Much worse that today, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 6=Don't Know]

19. Do youth in your community have the opportunity to engage with political leaders (diwani, MPs etc) or religious leaders and other youth to voice their interests and needs or concerns and to jointly explore solutions to address these needs?

_1 Yes

_2 No

If yes with who?

_1 Other youth

- _2 Local political leaders
- _3 Local religious leaders
- _4 other _____

20. Do you interact with other groups in your community outside of your ethnic group and religion to solve local problems or discuss important issues?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

21. If you or a friend/family member have a problem or dispute with another religious group or people from another do you use peaceful means to resolve it such as discussions, mediation or engaging religious leaders?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

22. In recent years there has been an increase in attacks perpetrated or planned by radicals/terror groups in Kenya and – allegedly – in Tanzania. Are you aware of these attacks? _____

- _1 Yes
- _2 No (skip Q2)

23. If yes, can you please name the incidents that you have heard of?

- _1 Garissa University attack in Kenya
- _2 Arrest of Zanzibari woman in Kenya wanting to join al-Shabaab/ISIS
- _3 Arrest of 10 men and killing of another in Morogoro region of Tanzania allegedly connected with some terrorist or extremist group such as al-Shabaab
- _4 Attacks of the police and shoot out at the Amboni caves near Tanga

- _5 Mpeketoni attacks in Kenya
- _6 Mandera attacks in Northern Kenya
- _7 Arrest of suspected Al-Shabaab members involved in a child indoctrination camp near Tanga
- _8 Other, please specify _____

24. Do you feel at all worried that such groups or people have threatened to attack in Tanzania in the near future?

- _1 Very worried
- _2 Somewhat worried
- _3 Neither worried or not worried
- _4 Not worried
- _5 Not worried at all

25. Young men are usually the main target group of radicals and extremist groups. What do you see as the main reason why they would join or try and join these groups?

- _1 Lack of employment
- _2 Religious motivations
- _3 Influenced by social media or internet
- _4 Influenced by religious leader who has radical views
- _5 Opportunity for adventure/create their own life on their own terms
- _6 Frustration with government and political system
- _7 Frustration with the evolution of society and the loss of traditional values
- _8 Lack of Marriage prospects

- _9 Frustration with poverty and ability to earn money or find a job
- _9 Lack of knowledge about life and ability to be financially independent

26. Generally radicalism or extremism is viewed as a problem primarily for young men. As we have seen recently, young women can also be enrolled by extremist or radical groups. What do you think is the main reason for young women to try and join extremist or radical groups?

- _1 Rebellion against parents
- _2 Influenced by social media or internet
- _3 Marriage prospects or love
- _4 Opportunity for adventure/create their own life on their own terms
- _5 Religious beliefs
- _6 Frustration with government and political system
- _7 Frustration with the evolution of society and the loss of traditional values
- _8 Lack of knowledge about life and ability to be financially independent

27. What other ways do young men and women have to express their desires or frustrations?

- _1 Participate in normal political activities
- _2 Get more involved with the life of their community
- _3 Express their views on social media and internet
- _4 Engage in economic and professional activities
- _5 They do not have other means of expression
- 6 *Other* _____

28. In many instances of youth joining radical or extremist groups, family or lack of has played a significant role. Please tell us how much you agree with the following statement: Youth with only one parent in the home are more likely to be influenced by radical or extremist groups.

_1 Agree completely

_2 Agree somewhat

_3 Neither agree/disagree

_4 Disagree somewhat

_5 Completely disagree

29. In recent years there has been a growing influence of foreign religious groups/actors including scholarships and foreign religious groups setting up in East Africa. Please tell us how much you agree with the following statement: Foreign preachers/imams and preachers/imams who have studied abroad are more likely to promote more divisive and non-traditional views of religion and religious tolerance.

_1 Agree completely

_2 Agree somewhat

_3 Neither agree/disagree

_4 Disagree somewhat

_5 Completely disagree

30. If yes what are the two most important governance issues in your opinion to address to fight terrorist or radical groups in Tanzania?

_1 Strong courts and judicial system

_2 Free and fair elections where all citizens can participate

- _3 Tackling corruption
- _4 Security/Police that works with and for the community
- _5 Protection of human rights
- _6 Youth more involved in governance and politics
- _7 Women more involved in governance and politics
- _8 Governmental leaders and workers following ethical codes and being held accountable for any wrongdoings
- _9 Interfaith dialogue and cooperation to combat the appeal of these groups
- 10 *Other, please specify* _____

31. Are there interfaith tensions that exist in your community?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

32. Do you feel comfortable to discuss extremism with others in your community?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

33. Do you think that your community and people living in the community have the skills required to counter the pull of radical groups?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

34. Do youth discuss violent extremism in your community?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

35. Do you believe that you have a role to play in countering extremism in your community?

_1 Yes

_2 No

36. What skills is it that your community members have to counter radical activities? (choose all that apply)

_1 Interfaith dialogue

_2 Locally anchored conflict resolution mechanisms

_3 More opportunities for youth engagement after school

_4 Vocational training for unemployed people and youth

_5 Understanding and cooperation with the police and local government

_6 Sharing of experiences with other communities on what works to empower youth and communities

_7 Other _____

37. What skills does your community need help to build or strengthen to counter radical messages?

_1 Interfaith dialogue

_2 Locally anchored conflict resolution mechanisms

_3 More opportunities for youth engagement after school

_4 Vocational training for unemployed people and youth

_5 Understanding and cooperation with the police and local government

_6 Sharing of experiences with other communities on what works to empower youth and communities

_7 Other _____

38. What are the two biggest areas of tension in your community and that could lead people towards radical groups or violent extremists? (choose two)

- _1 political tensions
- _2 unemployment or lack of opportunity
- _3 interfaith tensions
- _4 poor government services
- _5 lack of engagement or dialogue between groups in the community
- _6 Extremist returnees from abroad
- _7 *Other* _____

39. Do you speak about issues of radicalism, inter faith tensions, or threats to the community with your friends and family?

- _1 Yes (go to b)
- _2 No (go to a)

a. If no, why not?

- _1 Not important to me
- _2 No opportunities to do so
- _3 Afraid to discuss with others
- _4 Don't think such discussions would be useful
- _5 It is the job of leaders (gov, religious etc...) not communities
- _6 I have other issues that are more pressing to me and my family
- _7 *Other* _____

b. If yes, why?

- _1 Important to me and my friends/family

- _2 The government is not doing enough and so we citizen should
- _3 These discussions would be useful to help stop these things
- _4 Communities who address these issues head on are less likely to be affected
- _5 Other _____

40. Have you ever attended a meeting of interfaith groups or community leaders to discuss how your community can stop radicalization or violent extremism?

- _1 Yes (go to a)
- _2 No (go to b)

If yes, do you think that the discussion was valuable or useful?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

If no, would you like to attend such a meeting if it were held in your community?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

41. Are local leaders (religious, governmental and non-governmental) doing enough to combat violent extremism and the threat it poses to your community?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

a. If yes, which leaders are in your opinion doing the most on this issue? (select top two)

- 1. Local religious leaders
- 2. Local government officials

- 3. Local non-governmental leaders
- 4. Local political leaders (both ruling party and opposition parties)
- 5. National religious leaders
- 6. National governmental leaders
- 7. National non-governmental leaders
- 8. National political leaders (both ruling party and opposition parties)
- 9. Other _____

b. In your opinion what are the best ways in which your community can lead the way on the pull of extremist groups?

- _1 Interfaith dialogue
- _2 Locally anchored conflict resolution mechanisms
- _3 More opportunities for youth engagement after school
- _4 Vocational training for unemployed people and youth
- _5 Understanding and cooperation with the police and local government
- _6 Sharing of experiences with other communities on what works to empower youth and communities
- _7 Other _____

42. Please tell us if you agree with the following statement: The increasing politicization of religion is creating tensions between different faiths and religious groups in Tanzania?

- _1 Agree completely
- _2 Agree somewhat
- _3 Neither agree/disagree
- _4 Disagree somewhat
- _5 Completely disagree

43. Do you feel at all worried that such groups or people might try recruiting a member of your family in the near future?

- _1 Very worried
- _2 Somewhat worried
- _3 Neither worried nor not worried
- _4 Not worried
- _5 Not worried at all

44. Do you know of anyone having been recruited or attempted to be recruited to a violent extremist group?

- _1 Yes
- _2 No

45. The media is an important actor in civil society and building a peaceful and inclusive nation. How would you rate the media's coverage of radicalism in the region?

- _1 The media covers the issue in a fair and balanced manner
- _2 The media works to cover the motivations and drivers behind extremism
- _3 The media has only covered one side of the discourse and added to tensions
- _4 The media has not adequately covered the issue of radicalism sufficiently

46. Social media (Facebook, Twitter etc...) and the Internet have been important tools of extremist or radical groups in recruiting members. How much do you think the internet and social media have been used to build support and recruit youth in Tanzania?

- _1 Somewhat
- _2 A little
- _3 Very little
- _4 Not at all

47. Should the governments in East Africa more tightly control internet access and usage even if this means that legitimate freedom of speech and the right to assemble might be restricted?

- _1 Agree completely
- _2 Agree somewhat
- _3 Neither agree/disagree
- _4 Disagree somewhat
- _5 Completely disagree

48. Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you:

- _1 Felt unsafe walking in your neighborhood _____
- _2 Feared crime in your own home _____
- _3 Stayed home because of potential violence outside _____

Please choose how often:

- _1 Never
- _2 Just once or twice
- _3 Several times

_4 Many times

_5 Always

49. How would you describe the current general security situation in...

_1 Tanzania _____

_2 Your community _____

Please choose from:

_1 Very secure

_2 Secure

_3 Slightly secure

_4 Slightly insecure

_5 Insecure

_6 Very insecure

KII AND FOCUS GROUP NOTE-TAKING TOOLS

Date of Interview	
Location	
Professional/Position	
Organization	
Interviewer	

1: Tell us what you know about VE/CVE in general in Tanzania both in your community and nationally.

- Where did you learn about it?
- Do you think there is enough information about the CVE in general?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

2. Do you have any concerns about recent VE activities in your area?

- In your opinion what are the causes of these VE activities? Or
 - why are people pulled to VE?
 - What pushes people to participate in VE?
- Who do you think is behind these activities?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

3. Who do you think is the most vulnerable group/s to be recruited to join VE activities?

- Why do you think that?
- In your opinion what are the most likely techniques and messages are used by the VE groups to radicalize and recruit those group/s?
- What is the best way to counter these messages?
- Do you think stakeholders should employ the similar techniques in countering violent extremism, recruitment and radicalization? If yes, Why? If no, why?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

4. Do people feel comfortable and free talking about VE/CVE issues in your area? How about the national level?

- Do discussions cut across all sections of the community, such as between authorities and communities or one religion and another?
- Have you ever been involved in such dialogues and in what capacity?
- What should be done to improve such dialogues?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

5. Do religious leaders have the skills and ability to address VE these issues with their followers? How about amongst different faiths?

- What should be done to improve their skills?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

6. Do you know any programs dealing with CVE in your community?

- If yes, what activities do they do to address CVE you aware of?
 - aa. What are your perceptions of the success of these programs?
 - bb. Where did they fail or could have been improved?
- If no, why do you think there is no such program while the concern of VE continues to grow in your area?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

7. Is there interfaith dialogue and intra-faith dialogue on the issues of radicalization and VE in your community?

- How should such discussions be centered or where are the entry points to starting or improving these types of interactions?
- Are there specific leaders who you know of who are more open to such work?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

8. If you have an opportunity to design a program that addresses VE in your community what would you include in your program in terms of objectives and goals?

- Do you think the relationship between stakeholders on CVE in your area is good or fair or bad?
- What should these projects, Pamoja and Katika Ulinzi tunategemeana look like or focus on?
- How should interventions for men be focused? How should interventions for women be focused?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

KISWAHILI VERSIONS

HOJAJI

SEHEMU I: TAARIFA ZA MUHOJIWA

Maelekezo kwa Muhojaji:

Jaza 1 kwa jibu ndiyo na 2 kwa jibu hapana.

Kabla ya kugonga kwenye mlango wa kuingia kwenye kaya, angalia kama unaweza kuona vitu vifuatavyo na kisha jaza;

- Shule ya msingi/sekondari _____
- Kituo cha afya _____
- Kituo cha polisi _____
- Tawi ya chama cha siasa _____
- kisima cha maji ya umma _____
- Ofisi ya serikali _____
- Barabara ya lami _____
- Barabara ya udongo _____
- Mahakama (mf. Mahakama ya mwanzo, n.k) _____
- Msikiti au Kanisa _____
- Kaya ya Mtendaji au Sheha _____

Muhojaji: Tafadahli jibu maswali haya kabla ya kupiga hodi.

Aina ya jengo: _____

[1=Nyumba ya familia moja; 2=Chumba/nyumba ya familia nyingi; 3=Nyumba ya mtumishi; 4=Garage; 5=kibanda; 6=nyingine]

Nyenzo/vifaa vya kuta: _____

[1=cement or rocks/coral; 2= Miti/Nyasi/Udongo; 3= Tofali za udongo za kuchoma; 4= Tofali zisozochomwa; 5=Saruji; 6= Bati 7= Vitu vingine]

Paa la nyumba limetengenezwa kwa kitu kipi?: _____

[1= Mabati; 2= Vigae; 3= Nyasi/Majani/Myanzi; 4= Udongo/Nyasi; 5= Zege/sementi; 6= Vifaa nyingine]

Maelekezo kwa Mhoji yanaendele:

Gonga mlango/geti ili kuingia ndani ya kaya. Andika kama kuna mtu au watu katika kaya hii: _____

[1= Kuna mtu ; 2= hakuna mtu ambaye yupo]

Sehemu ya Pili: Utangulizi

Habari za (asubuhi/mchana/jioni). Jina langu ni _____. Ninafanya kazi kama muhojaji wa dodoso kukusanya maoni kwa ajili ya maandalizi ya mpango wa kuendeleza amani na kuongeza maendeleo kwenye jamii yako kupitia miradi ya **Pamoja na Katika Usalama Tunategemeana**. Miradi hii itasimamiwa na taasisi isiyo ya kiserikali inayoitwa Search for Common Ground. Kwa hiyo, mahojiano kati yangu na wewe ni katika kutafuta maoni ili kuimarisha mipango ya utekelezaji wa mradi ambao umelenga kuboresha na kudumisha amani na utulivu na kuwezesha watu, hasa vijana kupata nafasi ya kujishughulisha ili kujipatia maendeleo.

SFCG ni taasisi ya kimataifa inayojishughulisha na masuala ya **kuimarisha amani na maendeleo** huku ikilenga kubadilisha mtazamo wa mtu, vikundi, serikali na makampuni jinsi ya kukabiliana na **vitendo vya vurugu na uvunjifu wa amani**, kwa kusisitiza **ushirikiano** kama njia muhimu ya kutatua matatizo

hayo. Kupitia mkakati huu wa kuhamasisha ushirikiano ili kulinda amani na kuchochea maendeleo, taasisi yetu itatekeleza miradi hii miwili sehemu mbalimbali hapa Tanzania, ikiwemo _____ ili kuunga mkono juhudi za serikali ya awamu ya tano za kujaribu kutatua tatizo la ajira kwa wananchi hasa vijana.

Tungependa kuzungumza na wewe mambo machache kama mdau wa jamii hii ili tuweze kupata picha halisi ya masuala haya katika eneo lako, hivyo tujue ni nini vijumuishwe kwenye miradi hii.

Taarifa za mahojiano haya ni kwa ajili ya mpango wa kuandaa utekelezaji wa miradi ya **Pamoja** na Katika **Usalama Tunategemeana**, hivyo tutapenda kujua mtizamo wako juu ya mambo haya. Mtizamo wako utabaki kuwa siri na hautatumika kama taarifa nyingine. Tungependa uwe huru na kushiriki kikamilifu mahojiano haya. Kushiriki mahojiano haya ni hiari.

Kwa muda huu, una swali lolote ungependa kuniuliza kabla hatujaanza? Naweza kuanza?

Je mtu huyu amekubali kuhojiwa? Ndiyo/Hapana

Maswali ya demografia

1. Watu wangapi wanaishi kwenye kaya yako? Kwa maana nyingine, Je, unapofunga mlango wa nyumba usiku, kuna watu wangapi wanaolala ndani? _____

[Maelekezo kwa Mhesabuji] Onyesha idadi ya watu wenye miaka 18 au zaidi katika nyumba ambayo ni wa jinsia yako. Baada ya kuonyesha hiyo, utachagua nambari ya muhojiwa kutokana na ranking yao ya umri. Kwenye ranking hii, ya umri zaidi ya ye yote mwengine itakuwa nambari ya kwanza ("1") yule mdogo atakuwa nambari ya mwisho. Kama nyumba ni ya mwanzo chagua namba moja. Kama ni ya pili chagua namba ambayo iko kati kati, kama ni ya tatu chagua namba ya mwisho. Kama ya nne, chagua 1, endelea kama imeelezewa hapa kwa kaya zote.

2. Huyu mtu ni mwanaume au wanawake? _____
[1= wanawake; 2= wanaume]

3. Naomba unieleze uhusiano wako na mkuu wa kaya. _____
[1= Mkuu wa kaya; 2= Mwenzi wa mkuu wa kaya; 3= Mtoto wa mkuu wa kaya; 4= Mtoto wa mwenzi; 5= Mjukuu; 6= Mzazi wa mkuu wa kaya/mwenzi wake; 7= Ndugu mwengine; 8= Mfanyakazi wa nyumbani; 9= Mwingine, asiyehusiana naye].

4. Je, yeye ni kabila gani? _____

5. Je, ana umri gani?

9. 15-19
10. 20-24
11. 25-29
12. 30-35
13. 36-40
14. 41-49
15. 50-59
16. 60+

6. Je, umeoa au umeolewa? _____
[1= Sijaoa/olewa; 2= Nimeoa/olewa mara moja; 3= Ameoa/olewa mara nyingi; 4= Ameachika; 5= Ametengana na mwezi wake; 6= Mjane; 7= Anakaa Kinyumba]

7. Je, ana kiwango gani cha elimu?
[1= Hukuwahi kupata elimu ya darasani; 2= Hukuhitimu elimu ya msingi; 3= Alihitimu elimu ya msingi; 4= Hukuhitimu elimu ya sekondari; 5= Alihitimu elimu ya sekondari; 6= Stashahada; 7= Shahada ya kwanza, 8= Shahada ya uzamili; 9= Shahada ya uzamivu]

8. Je, anafanya kazi gani?
[1= Kilimo/ufugaji; 2= Uvuvi; 3= Uchimbaji madini; 4=Utalii; 5= Mwajiriwa wa shirika la umma; 6= Kampuni binafsi; 7= Shirika lisilo la kiserikali 8= Shirika lisilo la dini; 9= Anafanya kazi peke yake; 10= Mfanyakasi wa nyumbani; 11= Mwanafunzi; 12= Mlemavu; 13= Anatafuta kazi; 14= Amestaafu; 15=Nyingine] _____

9. Nani anamiliki jengo hili? _____
[1= Wanafamilia ndiyo wamiliki; 2= Wanafamilia ni wapangaji; 3= Mwajiri alitoa bila malipo; 4= Mwajiri anatoza kodi; 5= Umiliki mwingine]

10. Je, jengo limeunganishwa na umeme wa gridi ya Taifa? _____
[1=Ndiyo; 2=Hapana]

11. Katika nyumba hii chanzo kikubwa cha maji ya kunywa ni kipi? _____
[1= Kuna mfereji (bomba) wa maji ndani ya jengo; 2= Kuna mfereji (bomba) katika eneo la ndani; 3= Mfereji (bomba) wa jamii; 4= Kisima cha maji bila mfuniko; 5= Bwawa; 6= Mto/Ziwa; 7= Maji ya mvua; 8= Gari la maji; 9= Maji ya chupa; 10= Vingine]

12. Sasa ningependa kukuuliza mara ngapi katika mwezi uliopita umefanya mambo yafuatayo? [1= Sifanyi kabisa; 2=Mara moja au mbili; 3= Mara kadhaa; 4=Mara nyingi; 5=kila siku]
 - Kusafiri nje wadi/shehia yako _____
 - Kufanya mawasiliano yasiyo rasmi katika jamii yako _____
 - Kuhudhuria mikutano ya jumuiya _____
 - Kutoa maoni kwenye mkutano wa jumuiya _____

- Kuhudhuria mkutano wa chama cha siasa _____
- Kumshirikisha suala fulani mbunge wako _____
- Kumweleza suala fulani kiongozi wako wa imani _____
- Kuwasilisha maoni yako kupitia vyombo vya habari _____
- Kushiriki maandamano kueleza suala fulani _____

13. Ningependa kukuuliza wewe ni imani gani?

1 Mwislamu

2 Catholiki

3 Mprotestanti

4 Nyingine _____

14. a) Kwa ujumla unaweza kusema ni kiasi gani unawaamini watu kutoka katika imani yako hapa Tanzania?

[1= Hata kidogo, 2= Kidogo, 3= Kwa kiasi fulani, 4= Sana, 5=Kabisa]

b) Je unaweza kusema ni kiasi gani unaamini watu kutoka imani nyingine hapa Tanzania? _____

[1= Hata kidogo, 2= Kidogo, 3= Kwa kiasi fulani, 4= Sana, 5=Kabisa]

15. Sasa ningependa kukuuliza maswali machache kuhusu maoni yako juu ya uchumi. Je, unaionaje hali ya sasa ya uchumi katika viwango hivi?

[1=mbaya sana, 2=Mbaya, 3=Wastani, 4=Nzuri, 5=Nzuri sana]

- Hali ya uchumi wa nchini _____
- Hali ya uchumi yako binafsi _____

16. Kwa ujumla, unaionaje hali yako ya kiuchumi ya sasa ukilinganisha na Watanzania wenzako? _____

[1= Mbaya zaidi ya wengine, 2=Mbaya, 3=Iko sawa, 4=Bora, 5= Bora sana]

17. Vipi hali yako ya kiuchumi kwa sasa ukilinganisha na miezi 12 iliyopita? _____

[1= Sasa Mbaya zaidi, 2= Mbaya, 3=Iko sawa, 4= Nzuri, 5= Nzuri zaidi, 6=Sijui (mhoji usisome hii!)]

18. Unafikiri hali yako ya kiuchumi itakuwaje miezi 12 ijayo ukilinganisha na sasa? _____

[1= Mbaya zaidi ya sasa, 2= Mbaya, 3= Iko sawa, 4= Nzuri, 5= Nzuri zaidi, 6= Sijui (mhoji

usisome hii!)]

19. Je, vijana katika jamii yako wanazo fursa kuwasiliana na viongozi wa kisiasa (diwani, Mbunge, sheha nk) au viongozi ya kiimani na kutoa maoni yao, mahitaji yao, na kujaribu kutafuta masuluhisho ya mahitaji haya?

_1 Ndiyo

_2 Hapana

Kama ndiyo na nani?

_1 Vijana wenzao

_2 Viongozi wa kisiasa

_3 Viongozi wa kiimani

_4 Wengine _____

20. Kama ukiwa kwenye mgogoro wa kawaida na mtu au baadhi ya watu kutoka jamii, kundi au imani tofauti, je, unajaribu kutatua mgogoro huo kwa amani au kutumia kiongozi/viongozi wa imani kukusaidia na hayo?

_1 Ndiyo

_2 Hapana

21. Je unajua hivi karibuni kumekuwa na matukio ya uvunjifu wa amani katika sehemu mbalimbali duniani kwa mfano Kenya, nchi za jirani na hata nchini Tanzania. Je, wewe unafahamu kuhusu matukio hayo?

1_ Ndiyo

2_ Hapana (ruka 23)

22. Ikiwa Ndiyo, je unawaeza kututajia matukio ambayo umewahi kusikia kati ya yafuatayo?:-

1. Shambulio la Chuo cha Kikuu cha Garissa, Kenya
2. Majambazi yaliyovamia nyumba za ibada na kuua watu wanne Mwanza
3. Kuuawa na majambazi kwa wanakijiji katika kijiji cha kibatini Tanga
4. Polisi kugundua na kuvamia Majambazi yaliyojificha mapango ya Amboni Tanga.
5. Mashambulio ya Mpeketoni nchini Kenya.
6. Mashambulizi ya Kaskazini ya Kenya
7. Mengine (tafadhali yataje) _____

23. Je una wasiwasi kwamba vitendo hivi vya uvunjifu wa amani vinavyofanywa na waalifu au makundi kama hayo vinaweza kutokea au kukua zaidi katika jamii yako hapo mbele hivyo kukwamisha juhudi za kuleta maendeleo?

_1 Nina wasi wasi sana

_2 Nina wasi wasi kidogo

_3 Sina wasi wasi ila pia sihisi amani

_4 Sina wasiwasi

_5 Sina wasi wasi hata kabisa

24. Mara nyingi vijana, hasa wakiume, wamekuwa wakihusishwa na kujiunga na vikundi hivi vya uhalifu na vurugu ambavyo havizingatii sheria. Je, unafikiri ni sababu gani kuu zinapelekea vijana kujiunga au kujaribu kujiunga na makundi haya?

1. Ukosefu wa ajira
2. Sababu za kiimani
3. Ushawishi wa au athari ya mitandao jamii
4. Ushawishi wa au athari ya viongozi wa imani ambao wana mawazo ya msimamo mkali
5. Fursa ya kutengeneza maisha yao wenyewe kwa namna ambayo wenyewe wanaiona.
6. Kukereka na serikali ama mfumo wa siasa
7. Kukereka na namna jamii inavyokuwa na kubadilika na kupotea kwa maadili ya asili na tamaduni
8. Kutarajia ndoa au mapenzi
9. Kutokuwa na elimu ya maisha, na upeo wa maisha (mwelekeo)

25. Kwa ujumla vijana wa kiume ndiyo wamekuwa wakihusishwa na vikundi hivi vya uhalifu, lakini hivi karibuni vijana wa kike nao wameanza kujiunga na makundi haya yanayovuruga amani na kuzuia kasi ya maendeleo. Je wewe, unafikiri ni sababu gani kuu ya wasichana ya kujaribu kujiunga na makundi haya ya watu wenye msimamo mkali?

1. Uasi kwa wazee wao
2. Ushawishi au athari ya mitandao jamii
3. Kutarajia ndoa au mapenzi
4. Fursa ya kutengeneza maisha yao wenyewe kwa namna ambayo wenyewe wanaiona.
5. Sababu za kiimani
6. Kukereka na serikali ama mfumo wa siasa
7. Kukereka na namna jamii inavyokuwa na kubadilika na kupotea kwa maadili ya asili na tamaduni
8. Kutokuwa na elimu ya maisha, na upeo wa maisha (mwelekeo)

26. Njia gani ambazo vijana wa kiume na wa kike wanaweza kutumia kuonyesha hisia zao au kama wamekerwa na jambo?

1. Kushiriki katika shughuli za kawaida za siasa
2. Kushiriki zaidi katika maisha ya jamii yao
3. Kutoa mitazamo yao kupitia mitandao ya kijamii
4. Kujishirikisha na shughuli za kiuchumi na kitaalamu
5. Hawana njia nyengine ya kutoa mitazamo au mawazo yao
6. Nyingine (andika)_____

27. Tafadhali tueleze unakubaliana au hukubaliani na kwa kiasi gani na kauli ifuatayo: Kujichukulia hatua mkononi na kusababisha vurugu na uvunjifu wa amani (mfano, kujichukulia hatua na kuwachoma moto vibaka kabla ya kufikishwa polisi, n.k) ni njia isiyo sahihi ya kudai haki?

- a. Ninakubali kabisa kabisa
- b. Ninakubali kidogo
- c. Sio ninakubali/ Wala sikatai
- d. Ninakataa kidogo
- e. Ninakataa kabisa kabisa

28. Katika matokeo mengi, vijana wanaojiunga na makundi ya uhalifu na uvunjifu wa amani kwa sababu za kifamilia. Tunaomba utueleze kwa kiasi gani unakubaliana au hukubaliani na kauli ifuatayo: Vijana wenye mzazi mmoja nyumbani wako hatarini zaidi kushawishiwa na makundi ya uhalifu na uvunjifu wa amani?

1. Ninakubali kabisa kabisa
2. Ninakubali kidogo
3. Sio ninakubali/ Wala sikatai
4. Ninakataa kidogo
5. Ninakataa kabisa kabisa

29. Je, unakubaliana kuwa miaka ya karibuni, kumekuwa na uvunjifu wa amani, matukio ya uhalifu yanayosababishwa na vikundi, wahamiaji haramu au mafundisho ya kiimani kutoka nje ya Tanzania?

1. Ninakubali kabisa kabisa
2. Ninakubali kidogo
3. Sio ninakubali/ Wala sikatai
4. Ninakataa kidogo
5. Ninakataa kabisa kabisa

30. Ikiwa ndiyo, kwa maoni yako, ni mambo gani mawaili muhimu zaidi ya kijamii na kiuchumi ya kuyashughulikia ili kupambana vitendo vya uvunjifu wa amani na kupuguza uhalifu katika jamii yako na Tanzania kwa ujumla?

_1 Ajira kwa vijana

_2 Kukuza elimu

_3 Kuimarisha utoaji wa huduma za afya

_4 Kuwapa wanajamii wazalendo kipaumbele kwenye ajira kuliko wanaotoka nje ya jamii au nchi

_5 Kuongeza mishahara na maslahi ya wafanyakazi wa umma

_6 Kutoa fursa za kazi nyingi zaid/ na za elimu zaidi kwa wanawake

_7 Kukuza elimu ya imani na ufahamu wa jamii

8 Mengine tafadhali yataje (andika maneno)_____

31. Je, kuna mivutano au matatizo kati ya imani tofauti katika jamii yako?

_1 Ndiyo

_2 Hapana

32. Je, unajisikia huru kuzumgumza watu wengine katika jamii yako juu ya mada ya uhalifu na vitendo vya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia za kiimani na uhalifu?

_1 Ndiyo

_2 Hapana

33. Je, unadhani jamii yako na watu wanoishi hapa wana uwezo na uelewa wa kutosha kupambana na vitendo vya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia za kiimani na uhalifu?

_1 Ndiyo

_2 Hapana

34. Je, vijana wanajadili ghasia zanzosababishwa na mihemko (mfano, kujichukulia hatua mkononi) na uhalifu ndani ya eneo/jamii yako?

_1 ndiyo

_2 Hapana

35. Je, unahisi wewe unao wajibu wa kusaidia kupambana na vitendo vya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia zinazosababishwa na mihemko na uhalifu katika eneo lako?

_1 Ndiyo

_2 Hapana

36. Ni katika mambo yapi kati ya haya unahisi yapo katika jamii yako na yanaweza kutumika kupambana na vitendo vya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia za mihemko na uhalifu? (chagua yote yanayohusika)

_1 Mjadala utakaoshirikisha imani zote

_2 Taratibu za kimila za jamii husika

_3 Nafasi zaidi za kimaendeleo kwa vijana mara baada ya kumaliza shule

_4 Mafunzo kwa vitendo (VETA) kwa watu na vijana wasiokuwa na ajira

_5 Uelewa na ushirikiano wa polisi na serikali za mitaa

_6 Kubadilishana ujuzi na jamii nyingine jinsi ya kufanikisha kuwawezesha vijana na jamii kwa ujumla wake

_7 Maoni mengine (andika) _____

37. Ni mambo gani kati ya haya unahisi jamii yako inahitaji ili kukabiliana na vitendo vya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia za kiimani na uhalifu na ushawishi wa kujiunga na vikundi hivi?

_1 Mjadala utakaoshirikisha imani zote

_2 Taratibu za kimila za jamii husika

_3 Nafasi zaidi za kimaendeleo kwa vijana mara baada ya kumaliza shule

_4 Mafunzo kwa vitendo (VETA) kwa watu na vijana wasiokuwa na ajira

_5 Uelewa na ushirikiano wa polisi na serikali za mitaa

_6 Kubadilishana ujuzi na jamii nyingine jinsi ya kufanikisha kuwawezesha vijana na jamii kwa ujumla

wake

_7 Mengineyo _____

38. Vitu gani vinavyochangia kwa kiasi kikubwa matukio ya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia za kiimani na uhalifu pia vinaweza kusababisha vijana kujiunga na vikundi hivyo katika eneo lako? (Chagua mawili)

_1 siasa

_2 kutokuwa na ajira na ufinyu wa fursa

_3 ugomvi wa kiimani

_4 upungufu wa miundombinu ya kimaendeleo katika jamii

_5 Kutokuwepo na njia za kujadili matatozo katika jamiii

_6 Wahalifu wenye mtizamo wa kiitikadi kali wa kiTanzania wanaorejea kutoka maeneo mbalimbali

duniani

_7 Mengineyo_____

39. Umeishawai kushiriki vikao vinavyojumuisha imani zote au viongozi wote wa imani wa eneo lako kujadili ni jinsi gani jamii yako itakabiliana na vitendo hivi vya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia za kiimani na uhalifu?

_1 Ndiyo (Nenda a)

_2 Hapana (Nenda b)

Kama ndiyo, je, unadhani majadiliano hayo yalikuwa na matokeo mazuri?

_1 Ndiyo

_2 Hapana

Kama hapana, je, ungependa kushiriki vikao hivyo kama vikiitishwa katika jamii yako?

_1 Ndiyo

_2 Hapana

40. Je unadhani viongozi wa ngazi za chini (serikali za mitaa, imani, na mashirikia yasiyo ya kiserikali) yanafanya kazi ipasavyo kutatua vitendo hivi na kuleta maendeleo katika jamii yako?

_1 Ndiyo

_2 Hapana

c. Kama ndiyo, kiongozi gani kwa mtizamo wako anafanya kazi ipasavyo zaidi kutatua mambo haya? (chagua wawili)

1. Viongozi wa imani katika jamii yako
2. Viongozi wa serikali za mtaa
3. Viongozi wa mashirika yasiyokuwa ya kiserikali
4. Viongozi wa kisiasa (Kwa pamoja kutoka chama tawala na upinzani)
5. Viongozi wa imani ngazi ya taifa
6. Viongozi wa serikali ngazi ya taifa
7. Viongozi wa mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali ngazi ya taifa
8. Viongozi wa siasa ngazi ya taifa (Kwa pamoja chama tawala na upinzani)
9. Wengine _____

41. Kwa mtizamo wako, ni njia ipi/zipi zikitumika zitasaidia jamii yako kukabiliana na vitendo hivi vya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia za kiimani, uhalifu na vijana kujiunga na makundi haya?

- _1 Mjadala utakaoshirikisha imani zote
- _2 Taratibu za kimila za jamii husika
- _3 Nafasi zaidi za kimaendeleo kwa vijana mara baada ya kumaliza shule
- _4 Mafuzo kwa vitendo (VETA) kwa watu na vijana wasiokuwa na ajira
- _5 Uelewa na ushirikiano wa polisi na serikali za mitaa
- _6 Kubadilishana ujuzi na jamii nyingine jinsi ya kufanikisha kuwawezesha vijana na jamii kwa ujumla wake
- _7 Mengineyo (taja) _____

42. Tafadhali tueleze ikiwa unakubaliana na kauli ifuatayo: Kuongezeka kwa kuchanganywa imani na siasa kunaibua mizozano baina ya imani tofauti na makundi ya imani tofauti katika eneo lako?

1. Ninakubali kabisa kabisa
2. Ninakubali kidogo
3. Sikubali/ Wala sikatai
4. Ninakataa kidogo
5. Ninakataa kabisa kabisa

43. Je, unajisikia wasiwasi kuwa vikundi hivi vinavyofanya matendo ya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia za kiimani na uhalifu vinaweza kuwaajiri/kuwahadaa watu/mtu kutoka kwenye familia yako hapo baadaye(mbeleni)?

- _1 Nina wasi wasi sana
- _2 Nina wasi wasi Kidogo
- _3 Sikubali /Wala sikatai
- _4 Sina wasi wasi
- _5 Sina wasi wasi kabisa

44. Je unamjua yeyote yule ambaye ameingizwa/kuajiriwa au kujaribu kuingizwa/kuajiriwa na makundi ya aina hii?
1. Ndiyo
 2. Hapana
45. Vyombo vya habari ni mdau muhimu katika jamii na katika kujenga taifa imara, lenye amani na maendeleo yanayoshirikisha watu wote. Nini tathmini yako juu ya vyombo vya habari kwenye kuripoti habari hizi?
1. Vyomba vya habari vinazungumzia jambo hilo bila upendeleo, haki na kwa uadilifu kabisa
 2. Vyombo vya habari vinapojadili vitendo hivi uonyesha sababu zinazochoccha kutokea kwake
 3. Vyombo vya habari vimeegemea upande mmoja kuelezea habari hizi hivyo kuongeza wasiwasi zaidi
 - _4 Vyombo vya habari havijafanya kazi yake ipasavyo kuzungumzia mambo haya
46. Mitandao jamii (facebook, twitter n.k...) na intaneti zimekuwa ni nyenzo muhimu za makunndi haya ya uvunjifu wa amani, ghasia za kiimani na uhalifu katika kushawishi wana jamii kujiunga navyo. Ni kwa kiasi gani unafikiri intaneti na mitandao ya kijamii vimekuwa vikatumika kutafuta uungwaji mkono na kushawishi vijana katika makundi haya hapa Tanzania?
1. Kwa kiasi
 2. Kidogo
 3. Kidogo sana
 4. Hata Kidogo
47. Je, unadhani kuna ulazima sasa serikali zijaribu kudhibiti matumizi haya mabaya ya mitandao ya kijamii na intaneti hili kukabiliana na makundi haya?
- a. Ninakubali kabisa
 - b. Ninakubali kiasi
 - c. Sikubali/Wala sikatai
 - d. Sikubali kidogo
 - e. Sikubali kabisa
48. Kwa kipindi cha mwaka mmoja uliopita, ni mara ngapi umewahi kuhisi hali ifuatayo:
- _1 Kuhisi sio salama kutembea kwa mguu katika mtaa wako _____
- _2 Kuhofia uhalifu ndani ya nyumba yako _____
- _3 Kukaa nyumbani kwa sababu ya kuhofia vurugu/ghasia nje _____

Muhojiwa achague kutoka hapa:

- _1 Haijawahi Kutokea
- _2 Kama mara moja au mbili tu hivi
- _3 Mara kwa mara
- _4 Mara nyingi sana
- _5 Muda wowote

49. Ni kwa vipi ungeielezea hali ya sasa ya usalama kwa jumla?

- _1 Nchi _____
- _2 jamii iliyokuzunguka _____

Muhojiwa achague kutoka hapa:

- _1 Salama sana
- _2 Salama
- _3 Salama kidogo
- _4 Si salama kidogo
- _5 Si salama
- _6 Si salama sana

MSHUKURU MUHOJIWA NA UFUNGE

KII NA FOCUS GROUOP NOTE-TAKING SUMMARY

Tarehe ya Mahojiano	
Sehemu Mahojiano yanapofanyika	
Nafasi/utaalamu wa mhojiwa	
Shirika/ofisi	
Jina la Mhojiwa (siri)	
Jina la Mohijaji	

1: Tuambie juu ya mtizamo wako kwenye hali ya maendeleo katika eneo lako na nchi kwa ujumla?

- Nini ni chanzo chako cha taarifa kwenye mambo haya?
- Vipi hali ya vurugu na uhalifu?
- Unadhani kuna uhusiano wa mambo ya maendeleo na vurugu na uhalifu?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

2 Je, una wasiwasi wowote juu ya virugu, uvunjifu wa amani na uhalifu unaonedelea kutokea katika

jamii yako?

- Nini maoni yako juu ya mambo haya?
- Nani unadhani yuko nyuma ya matukio haya?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

3. Unadhani ni kundi gani katika jamii lipo kwenye mazingira hatarishi ya kuingia kwenye mambo haya ya vurugu, uhalifu na uvunjifu wa amani?

- Kwanini unadhani hivyo?
- Kwa maoni yako, ni njia gani makundi ya vurugu utumia kuwashawishi watu kujiunga nao?
- Njia gani unadhani zitumike kupambana na Kuzuia tabaka hili kufikiwa na makundi haya ya uhalifu?
- Je unadhani serikali na wadau wengine watumie mbinu sawa kama zinazotumiwa na makundi haya kwa vijana? Kama ndiyo/Hapana, kwanini?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

4. Hivi uwa unajisikia huru kujadili na kuzungumzia masuala ya amani, vurugu, uhalifu na maendeleo katika eneo lako? Vipi kwa ngazi ya taifa?

- Majadiliano yenu/yako yanajumuisha washiriki mchanganyiko, mfano, kutoka kwenye utawala, imani tofauti, na rika mbalimbali?
- umeisha wai kushiriki majadiliano hayo?
- Nini kifanyike kuimalisha mijadala hiyo?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

5. Unadani matabaka yote yanapewa nafasi sawa kushiriki katika mambo ya maendeleo, kijamii na kisiasa katika eneo lako?

- Kama ndiyo, kivipi? Kama hapana, kivipi??
- Kwa maoni yako ni tabaka gani katika jamii uliyopo limesahaurika kabisa?
- Kuna taasisi yeyote katika eneo lako ambayo inajishughulisha na kutatua tatizo hili (maendeleo ya tabaka lililo sahurika),

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

6. Je unajua mradi wowote wa maendeleo na unaojaribu kuelimisha watu kuepukana na vurugu, uhalifu na uvunjifu wa amani katika eneo lako?

- Kama ndiyo, Shughuli gani wanazofanya kutekeleza adhama yao?
- Kama hapana, Kwa nini unadhani hakuna taasisi zinazoshughulikia mambo haya katika eneo lako wakati mahitaji yapo?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

7. Katika eneo lako kuna mijadala inayousisha imani tofauti kwenye kutafuta suluu ya mambo ya uvunjifu wa amani, vurugu na uhalifu?

- Majidiliano ya aina hii unadhani inabidi yaweje? Yaanzie wapi?
- Nini iwe mada ya msingi kujadili kama wadau?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

8. Ukiwa kama mdau, ukipata nafasi ya kutengeneza mradi wa kupamana na uvunjifu wa amani, uhalifu ili kuleta maendele, ni kitu/vitu gani ungevitilia mkazo na kuvijumuisha kwenye malengo yake?
- Unadhani taasisi zinazojishughulisha na shughuli za kimaendele, na kueleemisha jamii kuepuka vitendo vya uhalifu na uvunjifu amani zinashirikiana vya kutosha katika eneo lako?
 - Unadhani miradi hii ya **Pamoja** na Katika **Ulinzi Tunategemeana** izingatie nini ili isiharibu utamaduni na juhudi zilizokwisha fikiwa na jamii yako?
 - Ni mbinu ganizitumike kusaida vijan wa kiume? Ni mbinu gani zitumike kusaidia vijanawa kike?

Brief Summary/Key Points	Notable Quotes

9.2 Annex 3 Terms of Reference

Combined baseline evaluation: Katika Usalama Tunategemeana: A Community-Owned approach to Promoting Moderate Voices and Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanga (CTU) AND Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience to Violent Extremism (DRL)

1. Context

About Search for Common Ground

Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is an international conflict transformation NGO that aims to transform the way individuals, groups, governments and companies deal with conflict, away from adversarial approaches and towards collaborative solutions. Headquartered in Washington DC, USA, and Brussels, Belgium, with field offices in 35 countries, SFCG designs and implements multifaceted, culturally appropriate and conflict-sensitive programs using a diverse range of tools, including media and training, to promote dialogue, increase knowledge and determine a positive shift in behaviors.

The Projects

SFCG seeks an external consultant to conduct a combined baseline for the following two projects: 1) Katika Usalama Tunategemeana: A Community-Owned Approach to Promoting Moderate Voices and Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanga (CTU) and 2) Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience to Violent Extremism (DRL).

Project 1: Katika Usalama Tunategemeana: A Community-Owned Approach to Promoting Moderate Voices and Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanga (CTU)

While the issue of violent extremism (VE) is relatively nascent in Tanzania, over the past three years, Tanga has gradually become a hotbed for radicalism in the country. Due to this geographical proximity with Islamist logistical hubs of the Arab gulf, there has been a growing influence of conservative strands of Islam in the area. In addition, Kenyan Police and army's raids on radical mosques in Mombasa have forced some Islamists to settle in bordering Tanzania. In this context, Tanga is experiencing an increase in active recruitment, terrorist transit and violent activity. The government has responded to these risks through a counterterrorism approach articulated by the

National Counterterrorism Center, which has spearheaded initiatives such as community policing efforts to encourage community resilience to VE. However, these initiatives have been undertaken with mixed results, lacking inputs from civil society and affected communities.

To respond to this situation, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and the Tanga Youth Development Association (TAYODEA), with funding from U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Counterterrorism (CTU), will implement a 24 month project based on the **theory of change** that if space to constructively dialogue and engage on issues of VE is opened, if community stakeholders are better equipped to recognize and understand the risks of VE and have the opportunities to collaboratively address these risks, and if credible and constructive narratives are amplified, especially among youth, then marginalization of vulnerable populations will be reduced, inclusive participation and self-agency will be increased and alternatives to violent action and division will be promoted, reducing the risk of radicalization, recruitment and violent action and preventing the threat of VE in Tanga.[1]

The overall project goal is **to empower communities to prevent VE in Tanga**. This goal is supported by three specific objectives:

- **Obj. 1:** To increase the space for engagement of diverse community stakeholders in community-level dialogue around issues of VE.
- **Obj. 2:** To share strategies and skills for community residents to counter recruitment narratives and other pull factors.
- **Obj. 3:** To promote community-owned and –led initiatives to prevent VE.

Project 2: Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience to Violent Extremism (DRL)

Tanzania holds a reputation for peace and stability. However, the country has experienced an increase in violent Islamist-related activity and religious intolerance in the past few years, putting it at risk of becoming a new center for violent extremism in the region. Recognizing this risk, and also the opportunity to empower youth and local leaders to address key drivers of violent extremism, SFCG, with funding from the US Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), will implement a 21-month project with community empowerment and interfaith dialogue at its core.

The project is based on the **theory of change** that if populations vulnerable to extremism in at-risk areas, especially young men and women, have the skills and opportunities to participate and constructively engage within their communities, if local leaders, including religious leaders, are better equipped to recognize the risk of violent extremism and include marginalized groups, and if credible and constructive narratives are amplified, then marginalization of vulnerable populations will be reduced, inclusive participation and self-agency will be increased and alternatives to violent

action and division will be promoted, reducing the risk of radicalization, recruitment and violent action and preventing the threat of violent extremism.

The overall goal of the project is **to strengthen community resilience to key drivers of violent extremism in at-risk areas**. It pursues two objectives and four results.

- **O1:** To promote participation and inclusion of populations vulnerable to extremism, especially young men and women.
- **O2:** To foster interfaith collaboration and social cohesion.

2. Objectives of Study

SFCG seeks a consultant to conduct a baseline study for this project. The objectives of the study are as follows:

1. Further analyze the current context, especially with regards to drivers and risk factors of VE in the target areas;
2. Assess the project Objectives, Indicators and Theory of Change (TOC);
3. Conduct a risk assessment in order to ensure “Do No Harm” and conflict sensitivity are respected in the project.

4. Geographic Locations

Katika Usalama Tunategemeana: A Community-Owned Approach to Promoting Moderate Voices and Preventing Violent Extremism in Tanga (CTU): Tanga, Tanzania.

Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience to Violent Extremism (DRL): Zanzibar, Tanga, Arusha, and Dar es Salaam.

5. Baseline Questions

The external consultant will be asked to finalize study questions, specifically seeking to identify the following in target communities:

Contextual assessment

- What long-term and recent developments have affected conflict dynamics and VE?

- What is the state of CVE/PVE work regionally and nationally? What are the current approaches being taken? What are the gaps and opportunities? (This should build on the current literature review that SFCG has developed.)
- What are the key drivers and triggers of extremism and recruitment? What unifiers and dividers shape VE dynamics in communities?
- How do these existing dynamics and conflicts affect VE?

Processes Supporting and Protecting Against Radicalization

- How is VE/radicalization understood in the communities of intervention?
- Do people talk about VE? Who, and where do they talk about it?
- Who influences/plays a role in VE? Who influences/plays a role in CVE?
- Who is most vulnerable to VE?
- What are the key narratives driving VE/radicalization?
- What are the key positive narratives (CVE) that resonate with communities?

Community assessment

- What are the capacities of local leaders and organizations currently to work with communities to counter violent extremism and radicalization?

Theory of Change and program design

- Considering the current status of project indicators, objectives and theory of change, are there recommendations for adaptations to improve the potential impact of the projects?

Risk Assessment

- What are the contextual and project-related risks that require monitoring?
- What can the project do to assure it is conflict sensitive and respects “Do No Harm” principles?

6. Methodology

The baseline will apply a mixed methods approach consisting of a literature and document review, quantitative survey, as well as qualitative methods (Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)). The consultant will be responsible for conducting the literature review, designing the final methodology, developing tools, training of enumerators, data analysis, and drafting of the report. SFCG’s ILT will review methodology and all tools as well as provide feedback on the report. To ensure future understanding of the impact of the project on marginalized populations, data will be disaggregated.

Deliverables

SFCG expects the following deliverables from the external consultant:

- A baseline plan (inception report) detailing a proposed methodology, tools, calendar and written evaluation tools for a baseline study;
- Training of enumerators;
- Supervision and participation in data collection;
- Oversight of the data coding process;
- Submission of all databases to SFCG
- Analysis of the data collected and production of a draft evaluation report in English, for review by SFCG staff and partners;
- A Final Report in English (40 pages max in length, excluding appendices) consisting of:
 - Table of contents
 - Abbreviations
 - Executive summary of methodology, limitations, key findings and recommendations
 - Background information (project specifics)
 - Methodology: Objectives, data collection and analysis and limitations of the study
 - Research findings, analysis, with associated data presented (should be structured around the main objectives/evaluation criteria and should cover all indicators)
 - Indicator table showing all baseline indicators
 - Appendices, which include detailed research instruments, list of interviewees, terms of references and evaluator(s) brief biography

9.3 Annex 4 Map and Overview of Survey Areas

9.3.1 Tanga

Tanga is located on the East coast of Tanzania, with an estimated population of 270,000. The city is divided into eight districts: Kilindi, Korogwe, Handeni, Lushoto, Mheza, Tanga town, Pangani, and Mkinga. Tanga is known for sisal plantations and the Amboni Caves. The city is near the border with Mombasa, Kenya, an area with a number of active extremists who threaten Kenyan security, and recently also Tanzanian security.

Surveyed Areas:

Tanga town (Kwa Njeka, City Center, Kiyomoni), Mkinga-Mzizima, Horohoro, Lushoto

Overview of some known extremist Activities:

- Attack on police station - 2015
- Gun exchange between law enforcement agents and suspected Al-Shabaab militants -2015
- Police rescue 54 children and 32 women from training facility associated with Al-Shabaab - 2013
- Decapitation of 8 villagers at Kibatini Village, Tanga - 2016



9.3.2 Arusha

Arusha is located in the northern part of Tanzania, with estimated population of 350,000. The city is divided into six districts: Arusha Urban, Arusha Rural, Meru, Ngorongoro, Longido, and Monduli. It is the hub for many international institutions including the East African Community, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, the city is the center for tourism in Tanzania because of its proximity to the Serengeti National pPark, Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Lake Manyara, and Tarangire National Park.

Survey Areas:

Arusha town; Majengo, Soweto, Ngarenaro; Usa-river, and Tengeru

Overview of some known violent and religiously motivated Activities:

- Bomb explosion near church - 2015
- Bomb explosion at Night Park - 2014
- Bomb explosion at the home of a Muslim Cleric - 2014
- Bomb detonation at church - 2013
- Explosion at Chadema rally - 2013
- Acid attack on Muslim Cleric-2014



9.3.3 Dar es Salaam


Dar es Salaam is located on the East Coast of Tanzania, with an estimated population of about 2.7 million. It is the largest economic city in Tanzania serving almost every region and neighboring countries. Dar es Salaam is divided into five districts: Ilala, Kinondoni, Temeke, and recently added districts, Ubungo and Kigamboni.

Surveyed areas:

Tandale, Manzese-Mwembechai, Buguruni, and Ilala Boma

Overview of some known violent and religiously motivated Activities:

- Destruction of pork butchers around Dar es Salaam -1993
- Muslims from Mwembechai mosque riots which resulted in loss of life and destruction of public and private property in 1998 - Manzese Mwembechai
- Kidnapping and torture of media managing director - 2013
- Attack on the private guard at archbishop's home - 2013
- Kidnapping and torture of the Chairperson of the Medical Association of Tanzania-2013
- Burning of Churches and spread of word spread that a Christian desecrated the Quran-2012



9.3.4 Zanzibar

The archipelago of Zanzibar is made up of two islands, Unguja and Pemba. It is part of the United Republic of Tanzania with its own government under the President as the head of the government responsible for matters within the archipelago.

The archipelago is famous for its unique culture and white sand beaches all around the islands. The Island is divided into Urban, West, North and South districts. In Pemba, there are three districts, Chakechake, Wete, and Micheweni.

Surveyed Areas

All Zanzibar survey data is from the June 2015 Wasemavyo Wazanzibari survey. Wasemavyo Wazanzibari was a mobile phone based panel survey conducted by ILPI and SUZA from August 2013-March 2016 with 510 respondents from both Unguja and Pemba. All qualitative interviews for the report were conducted in Unguja in Urban/West districts.

Overview of some known violent events and activities:

- Acid attack on Muslim cleric and his son - 2014
- 2 bomb explosions near Anglican Church and tourist restaurant - 2014
- Bomb explosion outside an Anglican Church - 2014
- Acid attack on Catholic priest - 2013
- Acid attacks on two tourists - 2013
- Grenade thrown at the market place - 2013
- Attempt to bomb Mercury restaurant - 2004
- Bomb attack on the home of the Minister of Communication - 2004
- Bomb explosion at ZEC office - 2000
- Bomb at ZEC official's residence - 2000

