



Mid-Term Evaluation

Reducing Recidivism: A Process for Effective Disengagement of High-Risk Prisoners in Indonesia

December 2013

Acronyms

	English	Bahasa Indonesia
BNPT	National Anti-Terrorism Agency	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme
CMT	Conflict Management Training	Pelatihan Pengelolaan Konflik
CSO	Civil Society Organization	
Densus 88	Special Detachment 88 (Special Forces Indonesian counter-terrorism squad)	Detasemen Khusus 88
DGC	Directorate General of Corrections	Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan
KII	Key Informant Interview	
LAPAS	Correctional Institution (Lapas is the Technical Implementation Unit (UPT) under Directorate General of Corrections Department of Law and Human Rights of Indonesia)	Lembaga Pemasyarakatan
LFA	Logical Framework Approach	
LST	Life Skills Training	
NZAID	New Zealand Agency for International Development	
SoW	Scope of Work	
SFCG	Search for Common Ground	
SSI	Semi-structured Interview	
ToT	Training of Trainers	
UPT	Technical Implementation Unit	Unit Pelaksana Teknis
VERA	Violent Extremist Risk Assessment	

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Figure 1: Disengagement Program Location



Executive Summary

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to review a project entitled “Reducing Recidivism: A Process for Effective Disengagement of High-Risk Prisoners in Indonesia.” It aims to help the program leadership and partner to decide how to effectively engage each objective as well as to understand the project’s strengths and weaknesses and, thus, improve the next phase of the project. The evaluation is also part of SFCG’s commitment to conducting programmatic evaluations on a two-year basis to maximize program effectiveness and engage in continuous improvement and learning within programs and across the organization. SFCG also conducts additional evaluations on specific projects, such as this program.

The primary audience of this evaluation includes SFCG Indonesia program officers and staff of project partners such as NZAID, DGC and its technical implementation unit (Unit Pelaksana Teknis or UPT), as well as other stakeholders, i.e., Indonesian government, SFCG headquarters and other country programs, and other partner organizations that may be interested in the results and lessons learned from this evaluation.

Methods employed to collect and analyze the necessary information and data for this project midterm evaluation are desktop and document reviews, in which all project documents were reviewed, Key Informant Interviews (KII), which involved in-depth interviews with project stakeholders, and Semi Structured Interviews (SSIs), involving interviews with the project’s stakeholders and individuals. The total stakeholders engaged in this MTR is 45, consisting of four cohorts, i.e., SFCG officers, DGC officers, Correctional Officers, and prisoners. The following are highlights of findings and conclusions, which are categorized based on the evaluation questions’ themes set forth by SFCG:

Relevance

The growth of high-risk prisoners is not accompanied by a corresponding increase in the capacity of DGC personnel and Correctional officers. The SFCG Disengagement Program has improved the capacity of DGC staff and Correctional officers to aid in the education and social and behavioral transformation of high-risk prisoners. The program is highly relevant in dealing with current issues of religious extremist groups that continue to grow and pose threats. As yet, the government of Indonesia has not had any human development program prepared for high-risk prisoners, especially convicted terrorists. Nor does the DGC have specific terms and procedures to disengage high-risk prisoners.

Effectiveness

Though a long-term impact has not yet been seen, most of the target populations in the three penitentiaries reported that an immediate outcome is observable. The DGC officers have the skills to facilitate CMT and LST. Some of them already applied these skills by facilitating CMT and LST in the targeted Correctional Facilities. Similarly, the Correctional officers have seen noticeable behavior changes in the prisoners under their purview. The participating prisoners are now willing to interact and communicate with others.

On the DGC side, the program significantly helped the office to increase its capacity in its effort to transform social behavior of the prisoners. Of the three objectives, it can be concluded this one has had the strongest outcome.

Coherence and Coordination

The SFCG disengagement program fits very well with DGC’s strategic vision to become an office that has the professional capacity to carry out corrections functions for the prisoners through cooperation with stakeholders. This program was developed with intensive coordination with the DGC office.

Conclusion and Recommendations:

- Better Training Approach
- Training Content/Materials
- Training Applicability
- Optimization of Training Participation
- Strategy for Program Sustainability
- Optimization of SFCG's Role.

Introduction

Background

After the vicious Bali bombing in 2002, terrorism in Indonesia continues to threaten the country and pose security challenges. The terrorism's threats have developed from standard suicide bombings into more various ways, robbery of gold shops, bank, ATM, or the shooting of police stations. As seen recently, the targets of terrorism act are now also changing, from civilians to state actors, i.e., police. Consequently, the Indonesian's Densus 88 continues to make significant arrest to terrorism activists over the years since the Bali bombing in 2001. As a result, the number of high risks prisoners vis a vis terrorists under the management of Indonesia's Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) keeps increasing. Between 2003 and 2013, the prisons throughout the country has been home to more than 800 convicted terrorists, many of whom have been re-incarcerated after their initial release.

While Indonesian law enforcement has made remarkable strides in capturing, detaining and convicting terrorists over the past decade, violent extremism within Indonesian prisons and its troubling link to recidivism continue to be issues of serious concern. Indonesian prisons have been described as "schools of crime" for convicted terrorists, i.e. places where they can both strengthen their radical ideology and gain new tactical knowledge that may allow them to commit further acts of violence after their release from prison.

Despite evidence that some high-risk prisoners use their time in prison to strengthen their commitments to extremist movements and recruit others to their causes, leading to increased cases of recidivism; the DGC, which oversees the Indonesian prisons, severely lack the capacity to handle such high-risk prisoners. In particular, DGC lacks programming that equips high-risk prisoners with skills to facilitate their reintegration into Indonesian communities post-release, including strategies for making positive decisions and disengaging from terrorism acts. Yet a total of 39 convicted terrorists are due to be released on parole from the correction system in 2013 and 2014. Thus, in order to reduce recidivism, the need for comprehensive programming that addresses disengagement among high-risk prisoners is extremely pressing at this time.¹

The disengagement programs in Indonesian prisons for the high-risk prisoners are not too sophisticated. They are not too different from any other program in prisons, such as the Indonesian weekly flag raising ceremony, sports, handicraft making, and religious activity (Quran recital). For terrorist prisoners, besides those regular activities, there are other programs that are conducted occasionally, such as presenting to them well-known moderate Islamic clerics with the hope to rectify the religious belief of the prisoners² that their terrorism activities are not the right interpretation of the Quran. Also, the DGC often presents a psychologist, whom the prisoners can personally talk from heart to heart about their motives of involving in terrorist activity, with the hope that the source of the problem that the prisoners faced can be resolved.

Nevertheless, the DGC programs have limitation, in terms of resources and organizations. They are lack of focus. The overall DGC program for the high-risk prisoners do not meet what are needed and is not comprehensively done. The programs are not based on assessment, let alone evaluations of program's effectiveness towards reincarceration rate of the high-risk prisoners.

¹Disengagement suggests that the high risk prisoners would disengage their behavior from terrorist activity, but not necessarily change their ideological belief.

²The resource person invited, not only from the country but also from abroad, usually from the Middle East, i.e., Palestine and Egypt, as quoted by Cirebon Prisoner's officer.

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Project Overview

Search for Common Ground (SFCG), is currently implementing a one-year project entitled, “Reducing Recidivism: A Process for Effective Disengagement of High-Risk Prisoners in Indonesia” project, funded by New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID).

The following hypotheses constitute the basis of the project to help achieve the goal and to provide opportunity to stakeholders to assess the impact, hence SFCG can focus the project’s resources more clearly:

- If we build the capacity of the DGC’s staff on CMT and LST, they can deliver the training to the prisoners.
- If the DGC’s staff builds the capacity of high-risk prisoners through CMT and LST, they will be better prepared (skills and self-confidence) to reintegrate into society upon release from prison.
- If we build dialogue with the DGC’s stakeholders, policies that integrate CMT and LST into DGC’s social reintegration program will be catalyzed.

These development hypotheses have been translated into the project goal to reduce the rate of recidivism among high-risk prisoners in Indonesia. The project focuses efforts and resources on capacity building and dialogue with key actors on the process of disengaging and reintegrating the convicts into society.

There are three specific objectives to reach this project’s goal:

Objective 1: To increase the capacity of Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) staff to facilitate Conflict Management Trainings (CMT) and Life Skills Trainings (LST) with high-risk prisoners as part of DGC’s overall programming.

DGC officers have a primary role in managing and rebuilding high-risk prisoners. Therefore, they were trained as “Master Trainers.” It is expected that through the SFCG facilitated trainings, the DGC officers will have the capacity to facilitate CMT and LST not only for prisoners, but also to other DGC officers so that CMT and LST can be sustained and institutionalized by DGC.

Objective 2: To prepare high-risk prisoners for better reintegration into society upon release from prisons.

Equally critical stakeholders are the high-risk prisoners. They also participated in CMT and LST to prepare them with key skills and knowledge, specifically in conflict management including anger management, making positive choices, and life skills, in developing small business and other related plans upon their release.

Objective 3: To catalyse dialogue on policies which integrate CMT and LST training into DGC’s social reintegration program.

This objective is an important preliminary step towards sustainability and institutionalization. It is expected that intensive interface, constructive dialogue, and coordination with the DGC on building a reintegration program for high-risk prisoners can yield the sustainability and institutionalization of CMT and LST into DGC’s social reintegration programming and policy.

To better understand the relationship between objective, outcomes, and results, the results framework of the project is provided below:

Target Stakeholders for MTR

The main project activities are comprised of Training of Trainers (ToT), which is referred to as cascade training. The training is intended to build the capacity of SFCG’s partners, including DGC and its UPT staff as well as others, to form a critical mass that will conduct future trainings for the prisoners.

Both internal and external project's stakeholders will be engaged this MTR, as follows:

- Program owners, i.e., NZAID, SFCG program staff,
- Beneficiaries: direct/indirect
- Government officials, i.e., DGC, and
- Others as relevant.

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Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to review the project titled, “Reducing Recidivism: A Process for Effective Disengagement of High-Risk Prisoners in Indonesia,” hereinafter referred to as Disengagement Program. Specifically, this evaluation aimed to assess the effectiveness of the programming and engage in continuous improvement and learning within programs and across the organization. Furthermore, this evaluation will help the program leadership and partner to make decisions on how to effectively engage each objective. Further, the evaluation will enable program managers to understand the project’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as to identify emerging issues, so that the next phase of project activities can be improved.

The primary audience of this evaluation includes SFCG Indonesia program officers, staff from project partners such as NZAID, DGC and its technical implementation unit (Unit Pelaksana Teknis or UPT), as well as other stakeholders, i.e., Indonesian government, SFCG headquarters and other country programs; and other partner organizations that may be interested in the results and lessons learned from this evaluation.

This evaluation covers the first of two phases of this one-year project, from June to November 2013. The evaluation was conducted December 9 -18, 2013.

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Methodology and Limitations

An independent consultant was contracted to undertake the evaluation, with full support from SFCG management and DM&E officer. Intensive consultation and discussion took place between the consultant and relevant SFCG officers to ensure that the MTR design was conducted in accordance with SFCG’s standard procedures.

This report is limited to programmatic evaluation in that the impact was not measured quantitatively. Three Correctional Facility sites were visited: Tangerang in Banten, Cirebon in West Java, and Cipinang in East Jakarta.

The evaluation methodology was proposed to and approved by SFCG in October 2013. Essentially, the methodology consisted of two parts: desktop review and fieldwork, as detailed below. The fieldwork involved predominantly individual and group interviews exploring themes described in a non-exhaustive list of questions as attached in Annex A.

1. Desktop and document reviews

The first step of the evaluation was reviewing the project documents. Project documents provided by SFCG include: Activity/progress report, Program Workplan, Project’s Logframe (LFA), Baseline and

Need Assessment Reports, internal reflection, newspaper clippings, success stories, and others as relevant. One-on-one consultations with relevant SFCG project officers were also conducted to clarify information from the documents. The information gathered was then synthesized into points of discussion and interviews with the evaluation stakeholders.

2. Fieldwork

The fieldwork for the evaluation took place in the SFCG disengagement program target locations. The evaluator provided initial categories of respondents to be interviewed. SFCG then arranged the interview sessions with the list of respondents; other meetings were organized through snowballing.

The interviews were conducted with most of the recipients of the CMT and LST activities. The interviews entailed the following:

i. Key Informant Interviews (KII)

In-depth interviews were conducted with project stakeholders, such as the Correctional officers who were linked with the program. The key informants were selected on the basis that s/he is knowledgeable, hence understands about the project, therefore, could provide his/her perspective on the issues and share that knowledge. From there, the selected informants/interviewees often referred names of others to be interviewed. No less than two interviews of KI were conducted per prison.

KII is useful as the KI provides in-depth first-hand information on sensitive issue more than other interviewees, such as this high risk prisoners vis a vis terrorists. The questions in the KII are usually based on the flow of the interview and the follow-up questions are developed from the conversation.

ii. Semi Structured Interviews (SSIs)

Different from the KII, the SSI is more exploratory. The interview is usually guided with pre-defined set of questions, which are presented in a flexible format. SSI typically focuses with project stakeholders and individuals associated with the project were conducted to obtain information in regards to project implementation, progress, and challenges. It enabled project managers to identify any gaps between intended and actual results as well as impacts of the project. SSI also allowed both interviewer and interviewees the flexibility to inquire about details as well as to explore different insights about the project in a more or less informal setting. As a result, the responses from interviewees were open and honest.

Some of the respondents were aware of the evaluation plan, while others were simply aware of an activity related to CMT and LST. Subsequently, meetings were arranged. The interviews, for both KII and SSI were conducted individually, as opposed to group interviews. Interviews involved only 1 to 3 people at a time to allow all interviewees to speak out and share their opinions regarding the program.

Limitations in this evaluation were fairly minimal. Although all meetings were arranged by SFCG, none of the SFCG officers interfered in the evaluation process. During each interview, the evaluator explained the purpose of the evaluation and the usefulness of the evaluations for the disengagement program. Furthermore, to obtain frank and honest responses, the evaluator made sure to explain that an independent consultant was conducting this evaluation.

Evaluation Questions

The terms of reference for this evaluation set forth questions that fall into three key areas: Relevance, Effectiveness, Coherence and Coordination, which are taken from OECD DAC's Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding activities³:

1. Relevance:

³ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Assistance, 2008.

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- a. To what extent was the project's approach relevant to preparing high-risk prisoners for better reintegration into society? To what extent was the knowledge and skills of DGC's staff improved in delivering material to the high-risk prisoners? Was the set of activities sufficient? To what extent did the different categories of activities complement each other?
 - b. Did the project target the right group of beneficiaries?
 - c. What unexpected results did the project lead to?
2. Effectiveness:
 - a. Did the participant's knowledge and skills in conflict management and life skills improve, and to what extent did the participants use the learned skills to prepare them for better reintegration into society?
 - b. To what extent did the project empower the high-risk prisoners?
3. Coherence and coordination
 - a. How well was the program implementation process managed?
 - b. How was the coordination between SFCG's program leadership and DGC staff in implementing the program?

As attached in Annex B, the questions were further modified and organized by cohort. Then, the information from the documents and fieldwork was gathered and transcribed. This report is the result from the process of synthesis and analysis, conducted as the last stage of the evaluation.

Findings

Overall, the Disengagement Program has been implemented successfully and is well on its way to achieving the expected outcomes during the remainder of the project. The target population, DGC and the high-risk prisoners were satisfied with the progress of the program.

From the DGC side, the program is in line with DGC's missions to professionally build institutional capacity, to continuously develop the competencies of human resources as well as to optimize cooperation with stakeholders. As detailed below, immediate outcomes are noticeable.

From the prisoners side, the prisons' staff in Cipinang claimed that there have been a number of various training from different organizations delivered to the detainees, but they are not the same with the SFCG approach. The prisons' staff claimed that the training content was focused on patriotism, which was not at all fancied by the religious extremists. He further concluded that the prisoners see SFCG as a trusted partner, otherwise none of them would participate in any meeting or training facilitated by SFCG. SFCG should take advantage of the trust given. Further efforts or activities can be implemented to facilitate the disengagement process by SFCG with no major challenges from the target audience.

Some training participants suggested that it would be better if CMT were conducted three times during the length of one's sentence, i.e., the beginning, middle, and at the end of the sentence, as opposed to just one time training only. They suggested that conducting only one time training is ineffective. If the training is conducted in the beginning of a prisoners' term, the application of their acquired skills is limited only during their detention in the prison, some lessons would likely be forgotten once they are released and reintegrate in the society; if it is conducted in the middle of their term, they may also forget or it may be too far off from their release, because most of them serve long term sentence; if it is conducted in the end of the term, they have no time to fully apply skills such as conflict management when conflicts occur in the prison. Similarly, LST would best be conducted towards the end of their sentence so that the prisoners not only get the new spirit to move on but also the enthusiasm to apply newly acquired skills.

Further on the high-risk prisoners side, however, it was not expected to see the immediate impact of the Disengagement Program, mainly because it relates to ideological views, which was very sensitive to ask the interviewees directly. Nevertheless, the program was perceived positively. The convicted terrorists are unique prisoners. For many reasons, it is difficult for outsiders to gain trust from high-risks prisoners, particularly the convicted terrorists. BNPT (National Anti-Terrorism Agency), Densus 88 (Special Detachment 88) or police, media, and government all tend to be groups that convicted terrorists distrust the most. The high-risks prisoners see SFCG as a trusted partner. For this reason, they were willing to participate in CMT and LST. In their opinion, SFCG is persistent and has been very patient in facing resistance from the high-risk prisoners. SFCG is seen as a neutral organization and therefore could serve as a liaison between the prison and DGC. More importantly, SFCG can expand its role to more than just facilitating the CMT and LST, but more than that, which is to follow-up the disengagement process of the terrorist convict.



Morning briefing at Cirebon Class I Correctional Facility

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Actually, DGC as well as the three Correctional Facilities reported that there were two similar programs conducted for the high-risk prisoners by other organizations, but the SFCG disengagement program was considered to be better than these previous programs.

Based on the methodology detailed above involving around 45 interviewees, below are the findings of the evaluation.

Relevance

The growth of high-risk prisoners is not accompanied by an increase in capacity as well as quantity of the DGC or Correctional officers in managing. The SFCG Disengagement Program is found to have improved the capacity of DGC staff and Correctional officers in the aspect of education and social and behavioral transformation of high-risk prisoners. In particular, the program is highly relevant with the current issues of religious extremist groups that continue to grow and pose threats, not only to the country but globally as well. As yet, the government of Indonesia is lacking the capacity to manage this issue and has not implemented a development program for high-risk prisoners. Furthermore, the DGC has not yet developed specific terms and procedures or disengagement program for high-risk prisoners.

In the absence of some type of comprehensive disengagement program in the Indonesians' correctional facilities, the SFCG disengagement program has provided a positive contribution to DGC and its targeted UPTs. The CMT and LST have good potential for sustainability, as stated by the DGC official. It not only falls within the DGC framework, but overall it also gives the high-risk prisoners a positive attitude towards the future.

The SFCG program's goal is intended to eventually reduce the rate of recidivism among high-risk prisoners in Indonesia, in this case is the terrorists convicts prisoners. Consequently, the program focuses on efforts and resources on capacity building and dialogue with key actors in the process disengagement and reintegration of the convicts to society. At the DGC level, capacity building is highly relevant to actually prepare the high-risk prisoners for better integration into society after release. In fact, CMT and LST were already incorporated into DGC's counseling guidelines, however, at the time of the evaluation, it has not yet translated the program into more concrete action, i.e., a definite policy or regulation to sustain the CMT and LST in the Indonesian prison system. There are reasons for this, challenge the Indonesian's civil servant is often subject to transfer from one office to another. If an official from particular department makes commitment with external party but gets transferred to other office later on, the new official does not immediately continue the commitment from his/her predecessor. It usually takes times, or else the partnership discontinues. This challenge is very common in the Indonesian's government bureaucratic system and becomes an issue faced by all partners.

Nevertheless, for the CMT and LST program, SFCG targeted the Personality Development & Counseling Division of DGC, which is the right target group for the training to be conducted. All interviewees of the DGC's counseling division found that the training is very useful and had improved their capacity. But there is criticism to this. It would have more impacts if more ToT were conducted to generate more capable trainers, so that they could keep up with the number of high risk prisoners that are increasing overtime. The SFCG program is limited to target certain number of prisons, which is not sufficient to accommodate all high-risk prisoners throughout the country. Some of the respondents stated that it would be ideal if every province in the country has CMT and LST experts.

Effectiveness

Though a long-term impact has not yet been seen, most of the target population in the three penitentiaries reported that an immediate outcome is noticeable. The relevant DGC officers have improved skills to deliver CMT and LST. Some of them already applied the skills by facilitating CMT

and LST sessions in the Correctional Facilities in Lapas Tangerang and Cipinang.⁴ Similarly, the Correctional officers in Cirebon and Tangerang have observed clear behavior changes in the prisoners under their purview. The participating prisoners are now willing to interact and communicate with the prison staff and other inmates. The prisoners were enlightened about the concept of conflict management and communication. More importantly, the training is an eye-opener about diversity and differences. Some of them have started praying together at the mosque, which never occurred before. Only a few prisoners still stay in their cell to pray.

The DGC is the oversight government body that provides counseling to the prisoners, hence, any program that can improve the counseling capacity to the office is considered advantageous. As indicated above, the number DGC staff that has good capacity is limited and does not commensurate with the number of prisoners. The program from SFCG had significantly helped the DGC office to increase capacity to help transforming social behavior of the prisoners.

The number of terrorism-related activity arrest in Indonesia has been increasing. They are becoming common sight in the country. When they are already in the detention, they never interact with others, particularly the outside of their group, they often go on solitude, or form an exclusive group. This exclusivity is the reflection of their daily life in society. The extremists group never interacts with their surroundings. So, when the arrest is made to terrorism activity, almost none of the neighbors is aware of their background and activity. Therefore, any slight change would be easily noticeable by the prison staff who oversees them on a daily basis. One of the immediate results that the prison staff noticed in the three prisons is most of the high-risk prisoners participants changed after attending the CMT and LST. They become more willing to talk and interact with others, doing exercise or praying in the mosque together, which never happened before.⁵ Of the three objectives, it can be concluded this objective has the strongest outcome, which could lead to the achievement of prisoners' better reintegration into society upon release from prisons. The behaviour change is the result of the CMT and LST trainings given to them. They were prepared with key skills and knowledge specifically in conflict management that includes anger management, making positive choices, and life skills in developing small business and other related plans upon their release. More importantly, the trainings provided a different perspective conducive to behavioral reform.

Despite of the successful implementation of CMT and LST, there were issues with full attendance and participation in CMT and LST sessions. There were about 55 high-risk prisoners trained in this program. Initially, all of the targeted convicted terrorists agreed to participate. However, after consulting with their leaders, some of them decided not to participate. As indicated above, their leaders said that such trainings are *mubah* in nature, or categorized as 'permitted,' meaning that they are permitted to participate but when one participates in CMT/LST, they would have to leave their religious obligations, such as Quran recitals, which is much more important than *mubah* activity. Therefore, some prisoners opted not to participate in CMT and LST. As a result, SFCG transferred the training participants' allocation to other high-risk prisoners, i.e., regular crime-related (drugs or robbery). This happened in Tangerang penitentiary, where approximately 11 participants were non-terrorist convicts. However, most of the convicted terrorists in Cirebon and Cipinang Correctional facilities were willing to participate, only 2 and 3 from each respective prison declined, and hence transferred to non-terrorists convicts prisoners.

Further, some of the interviewees were confused when asked the objectives of CMT and LST. There were some who felt privileged, particularly the non-terrorists convicts, to be included in the trainings, but others, including many convicted terrorists, questioned why only specific type of prisoners, such as themselves the terrorist convicts, were asked to participate in the trainings. There were some prisoners participated to simply kill the time and boredom and expected that their participation would make it easier for them to gain parole, or to get better meals/snacks than food from prison.

⁴ As cited from Idang, Johny Praptomo, and Tri Anna of DGC.

⁵The extremists think that their interpretation of Islam is the right one, therefor they never want to pray together in the mosque with others, as they fear that their belief would be contaminated by those who are not in line with them.

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Most of training participants (DGC staff as well as prisoners) felt that the duration of the trainings was too short for such comprehensive training content. Many participants suggested that more time should have been devoted to LST in particular because the objective of preparing the socio-economic of high-risk prisoners for better reintegration upon release is the most relevant and important in to their futures.

Other feedback related to game used in the trainings. Some interviewees, particularly the older ones, expressed concerns over the game, though the games is good for ice breaking or for other purpose to convey messages, they felt that not all of the games in the training were suitable for senior participants and they felt uneasy participating in games that, particularly when the trainings were conducted in an open space, and other non-participant inmates were watching.⁶

As explained above in the Tangerang correctional facility, after consulting with their Imam (leader) some convicted terrorists withdrew their participation in CMT/LST. So SFCG had to find other types of prisoners to participate. On one hand, this switch was certainly appreciated by the beneficiaries, but it did not serve the purpose of the disengagement program to target terrorist convicts.

Another issue that arose during the training sessions was that some senior participants did not feel comfortable being facilitated by a much younger facilitator. It should be well noted that the Indonesian society, to some extent, is still paternalistic, culturally. Furthermore, without specifying the terms, the interviewees said that some terminologies used in the trainings were difficult to understand, in their words it is 'too academics,' as some of them do not have good educational background.

"... my family was surprised to see change in me when they came to visit me, that I actually gave good advice to the family dispute at home, something I learnt from the training. I like the training facilitated by SFCG..."

A detainee in LP Tangerang

This in-depth assessment would be necessary to determine with whom the high-risk prisoners, particularly the terrorism convicts, consult when making decisions such as participating in activities. The assessment would also be necessary to identify terrorist prisoners' leaders so that SFCG can approach these individuals to get their full support on their followers' participation in the training, despite the *mubah* nature of this activity, as the convicted terrorists claimed. It also would have been good to consider engaging the leader of the convicted terrorists (*Imam*) in the training as a guest speaker or resource person. The Imams' engagement would have been helpful in potentially changing participants' behaviour in the disengagement process because they tend to be respected and revered by the terrorists.

Some prisoners training participants reported that some of the LST materials are too vague, in the sense that it would not be applicable in their situations. It was suggested that the training approach should be more hands-on learning, where participants learn through case studies on entrepreneurship, business tips, and so forth. It would also be good if some basic financial planning were included. Nevertheless, it is good to note that some of the CMT participants reported that they already applied what they learned in conflict management in relations with their family issues.⁷ This shows that family can be a cognitive opening for individuals to disengage themselves from radical organizations.

Other aspect to understand the effectiveness of the SFCG program in relation to its goal, which is to reduce the rate of recidivism, is through measurement. However, the program is not furnished with the measurement tool of terrorists convicts' post release. Since recidivism vis a vis disengagement of ex prisoners is difficult to detect, therefore a mechanism should be established within DGC to observe the behavior of the ex prisoners after release. The intelligence office or the police might have the

⁶ Couple participants detailed the game, where one side of participants' ankles are hooked to each other and they should hop with one foot.

⁷ When family members visit them in jail, usually all kind of family issues and updates are reported, this the time when the CMT alumni applied their skills.

database of the ex high-risk prisoners but it does not serve to provide further information that allow to measure the effectiveness of disengagement program to reduce the rate of recidivism.

Coherence and Coordination

This disengagement program is a continuation of a previous project that was also funded by the New Zealand Asia Security Fund (ASF). It is in line with the DGC strategic vision to gain the professional capacity to carry corrections functions for prisoners through cooperation with stakeholders. SFCG's relationship with DGC was established in 2009 and has been maintained ever since. This program was developed with intensive coordination with the DGC office. In this context, DGC has no definite plan yet to sustain CMT and LST into regular DGC programming in the near future. However, CMT and LST program activities have provided awareness of the need of a correction program for high-risk prisoners, for which a decree ordering the implementation of social reintegration program might be issued by DGC.⁸

The good relationship between SFCG and DGC has yielded intensive dialogue and coordination. Though this is not SCFG issue, the good communication is not reflected in the internal DGC as revealed by DGC officer during interviews that they are not always informed about the progress of the program. DGC staff that was involved in SFCG program do not necessarily inform or update what they know to their colleagues.

In their opinion the CMT and LST program is good and highly relevant not only to terrorists convict but also to be given to other types of prisoners, such as crime or drug-related prisoners. Apparently, this official was not aware that prisoners on crime/drug-related charges already participated in the trainings in Tangerang and Cirebon Correctional Facilities.

"...the disengagement program brought by SFCG had actually encouraged the DGC office to work further on handling high-risks prisoners, particularly the terrorists convicts. Also, because of this program, DGC has expertise on VERA, which can further be sustained..."

*Dr. Nugroho,
Director of Detainees Correction and
Service, DGC*

Conclusion and Recommendation

In general, the Disengagement Program has been well implemented and well received by the DGC officers, Correctional Facilities officers, and the high-risks prisoners. There have been positive changes in the three objectives, including increased capacity of DGC staff in delivering CMT and LST to the prisoners, the high-risks prisoners have a higher level of self-confidence and are better prepared to reintegrate into society upon release from prison, and dialogue has been catalyzed with the DGC's stakeholders on the creation policies to integrate CMT and LST into DGC's social reintegration program.

However, challenges still remain in reaching the objectives of this project. For one, the rate of recidivism is difficult to measure. A DGC official explained that this partly due to the fact that the DGC does not have complete profile information for each of the high-risks prisoners, such as Densus has, making it difficult for them to provide the necessary counseling or correctional program to the prisoners. To solve this problem, a holistic evaluation should be prepared for each prisoner, starting from the beginning of custody to the prisoner's release. This evaluation should involve psychological assessments, participation in activities both inside and outside the prison, comments from friends and family, and so forth.

⁸ Interview with Drs. Nugroho, Director of Detainees Correction and Service, DGC.

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Below are the recommendations extracted from the evaluation interviews and observation:

1. Effectiveness: Better Training Needs Assessment

SFCG conducted a training needs assessment prior to CMT and LST. However, a more in-depth assessment of training needs prior to CMT and LST would have been better to ensure that the high-risk prisoners in targeted correctional facilities would all participate in the trainings as planned. It was due to the fact that some of prisoners changed their mind not to participate in the trainings after conferring with their Imam. Islam, as in many other religions, regards highly of their Imam or leaders, they only heed to what their Imam says. The more in-depth assessment would hence, be needed in order to determine with whom the high-risk prisoners, particularly the terrorism convicts, consult when making decisions such as participating in activities outside religious domain. The assessment would also be necessary to identify terrorist prisoners' leaders so that SFCG can approach these individuals to get their full support on their followers' participation in the training, despite the *mubah* nature of this activity, as the convicted terrorists claimed. It also would have been good to consider engaging the leader of the convicted terrorists (*Imam*) in the training as a guest speaker or resource person. The Imams' engagement would have been helpful in potentially changing participants' behaviour in the disengagement process because they tend to be respected and revered by the terrorists.

As described above, some interviewees felt that not all games in the training were suitable for senior participants. Therefore, better training needs analyses should have been conducted to map out the audience of the training as well as to design better and suitable games for the training.

To respond to cultural issues, it is good to deploy SFCG young trainers/facilitators for the training, but it should be noted carefully that some high-risks prisoners are senior, some of them are above forty years old and come from decent family background (with no criminal record). Therefore, more senior facilitators should be considered for future training so that participants respect the whole learning process without objections and, thus, the learning objectives can be achieved.

2. Training Content/Materials

Some prisoners indicated that the CMT and LST training materials were too difficult to comprehend. A more hands-on approach with factual examples would have been better. The high-risk prisoners also expressed their confusion over terminology used in the trainings that was not that clear. Explanations should be made simpler so that training participants are able to fully understand the materials. The training participants have varied educational backgrounds; some of them attended high schools, while others only completed elementary school.⁹

In order to better prepare trainers during the Tot, it would be good if the course also covered training needs analyses, course design and strategies, activities, as well as technical and necessary administrative aspects of the training, background information, participants requirements/criteria, technique in delivering the training and training material.

3. Training Applicability

Some prisoners reported that some of the LST materials are too intangible. It was suggested that the training approach should involve more hands-on learning, where participants learn through case studies on entrepreneurship, business tips, and so forth. It would also be good if some basic financial planning were included. Hence, the prisoners have some ideas in regards to access to financial services and engage in entrepreneurship upon release. Some suggested that the LST engage successful

⁹ Baseline and assessment result also reported that about 80 per cent of the convicted terrorist prisoners completed elementary school or high school.

resource persons who were once detainees themselves, so that prisoners learn how to move on economically upon their release.

4. Optimization of Training Participation

To prevent participants' withdrawal from trainings, SFCG should explore other strategies or alternative avenues and methods of communication, such as seeking support from prisoners' leaders, so that high-risk prisoners participate in CMT and LST.

As discussed in the findings, compared to other organizations conducting program in Cipinang Correctional Facility, SFCG is seen as a trusted partner.¹⁰ For this reason, many were willing to participate in CMT and LST in this particular detention.¹¹ SFCG should take advantage of the trust given. Further efforts or activities might be implemented to facilitate the disengagement process. Some training participants suggested that it would be better if CMT were conducted three times during the length of one's sentence, i.e., the beginning, middle, and at the end of the sentence, as opposed to just one time training. They suggested that conducting only one time training is ineffective. If the training is conducted in the beginning of one's term, they can only apply some skills in the prison, and they would likely forget some lessons when they reintegrate in the society; if it is conducted in the middle of their term, they may forget or it may be too far off from their release; if it is conducted in the end of the term, they have no time to fully apply skills such as conflict management when conflicts occur in the prison. LST would best be conducted towards the end of their sentence so that the prisoners not only get the spirit to move on but also the enthusiasm to apply newly acquired skills.

To prevent misperception as to why only certain types of high-risk prisoners, particularly convicted terrorists, were targeted in the training, SFCG should mix the participants with other prisoners for future trainings.¹² It might allocate 50/50, convicted terrorists versus non-terrorists convicts, such as in the case in Tangerang Prison, where about 11 participants were from non-terrorists convict. The reason for this is during the interview this question was kept appearing.

5. Strategy for Program Sustainability

Based on interviews with DGC officials, CMT and LST do have value, but it will be left up to DGC to decide whether or not to sustain and adopt the program. There are several ways for the CMT and LST program to be continued and sustained. One is through an advocacy effort by which SFCG must approach and persuade like-minded individuals in DGC to pursue the integration of the CMT and LST program into their regular program. Secondly, SFCG should continue to try to strengthen the 'Satgas' (Task Force) that was already established in DGC, through which the CMT and LST program can be encouraged to be continued. The Task Force is also good for better communication, both internally and externally. Therefore, the DGC office staff is well informed.

Further, one DGC official pointed out the need to further implement CMT and LST in all UPTs or Correction Facilities and that each UPT should have 1 to 2 trainers. With that, it is possible for DGC to establish a training center, which serves as a pool of trainers capable of delivering CMT, LST, and other trainings as relevant. The training center will not only cater to high-risk prisoners, but also other type of prisoners.

¹⁰As stated by Mr. Andi Herry Irawan, Head of Counseling in Cipinang Correctional Facility, based on interview conducted on 18 December 2013.

¹¹ Only 2 terrorist convict did not participate in CMT and LST in this prison.

¹²In the case of LP Tangerang, none of the CMT participants were convicted terrorist, because of the withdrawal of convicted terrorist from CMT participation. In LP Cirebon, only three non-convicted terrorist prisoners included in the training, the same case for LP Cipinang.

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Alternatively, before being integrated into the regular DGC program, the CMT and LST modules can be incorporated in the existing *Kejar Paket*¹³ school program in the Correctional Facilities.

6. Optimization of SFCG's Role

SFCG should take full advantage of the trust given by the high-risk prisoners. SFCG's should further optimize its role through further dialogue with the *Imam* or the leader with whom prisoners normally consult. The *Imam* can be further empowered as a driver for collective disengagement, possibly through CMT.

Some of the training participants greatly appreciated SFCG's mentoring and facilitation, which yielded the establishment of a relationship between SFCG program officers and prisoners on a personal basis. This can be a good start for further disengagement programming because prisoners tend to not trust programs implemented by BNPT or Densus 88. It is also a good departing point to reconsider and restore their opinion towards government institutions to which they are against, i.e., Densus 88, Police, and others incrementally.

It is critical for SFCG to maintain this high level of trust. It is also equally critical for SCFG to be very careful in disclosing detailed information about SFCG, such as who supports the disengagement program. The high-risks prisoners are special detainees; they are reluctant to have any links with the outside, particularly with the United States and its allies.

¹³*Kejar Paket* is a program facilitated to those who have not yet completed regular schooling. The program consists of three levels, i.e., A, B, C, which are equivalent to elementary, junior, and senior high schools.

Annex A

Table 1 Results Framework

Activities	Outputs	Outcomes
Objective 1: To increase the capacity of Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) staff to facilitate Conflict Management Trainings (CMT) and Life Skills Trainings (LST) with high-risk prisoners as part of DGC's overall programming		
1. Baseline assessment, which identified participants within the high-risk prisoner population and the capacity of DGC staff participating in the Training of Trainers (ToT)	1. Baseline report identifying high-risk prisoner population and the capacity level of DGC staff.	Increased capacity of DGC staff to facilitate CMT and LST with prisoners.
Objective 2: To prepare high-risk prisoners for better reintegration into society upon release from prisons		
1. Training of high-risk prisoners in conflict management (CMT) and life skills (LST) 2. Follow-up reflection sessions with participating high-risk prisoners, including discussion and planning sessions in preparation for their release.	2. Trained high-risk prisoners in CMT and LST 3. Reflection sessions with participating high-risk prisoners in preparation for their release.	High-risk prisoners are better prepared for reintegration into society upon release from prison.
Objective 3: To catalyse dialogue on policies which integrate CMT and LST into DGC's social reintegration program.		
1. Stakeholder meeting to share findings of baseline assessment and to solicit feedback in order to improve the quality of the project implementation 2. ToT in CMT and LST 3. Follow-up reflection and planning sessions with DGC staff to discuss lessons learned and future institutionalization of disengagement programming.	1. CMT and LST facilitators generated 2. Skilled DGC officers to conduct CMT and LST 3. Informed DGC stakeholders on DGC capacity level 4. Lessons learned.	Dialogues around policies that integrate CMT and LST into DGC's social reintegration program are catalysed.

This disengagement program was developed based on the previous successes and lessons learned from the 2012 project, funded by the New Zealand Asia Security Fund (ASF). The project was implemented in three prisons: Palembang in South Sumatera, Palu in Central Sulawesi, and Porong in East Java. The program targeted 76 prisoners, including 20 convicted terrorists.

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Scheduling

No.	Task	Week			
		1	2	3	4
1.	Desk Review	X	X		
2.	Field work: Jakarta, Tangerang, and Cirebon		X		
3.	Data Analysis			X	
4.	Report drafting			X	
5.	Presentation of findings/Debrief				X
6.	Final Report				X

Annex B Non-exhaustive Questions Disaggregated by Cohort

SFCG

- To what extent was the project's approach relevant to prepare high-risk prisoners for better reintegration into society?
- To what extent was the knowledge and skills of DGC's staff improved in delivering materials to the high-risk prisoners?
- Was the set of activities sufficient?
- To what extent did the different categories of activities complement each other?
- Did the project target the right group of beneficiaries?
- What unexpected results did the project lead to?
- Did the participant's knowledge and skills in Conflict Management and Life Skills improve, and to what extent did the participants use the learned skills to prepare them for better reintegration into society?
- To what extent did the project empower high-risk prisoners?
- How was the coordination between SFCG's program leadership and DGC staff for implementing the program?

DGC Officers

- To what extent was the project's approach relevant to preparing high-risk prisoners for better reintegration into society?
- Do you understand the objective of the project?
- Was the set of activities for the disengagement program sufficient?
- To what extent will the project be sustained?
- What is the best part of this SFCG program?
- What needs to be improved?
- How well was the program implementation process managed?
- How was the coordination between SFCG's program leadership and DGC staff in implementing the program?

Correctional Officers

- To what extent was the project's approach relevant to preparing high-risk prisoners for better reintegration into society?
- Do you understand the objective of the project?
- Was the set of activities for the disengagement program sufficient?
- To what extent will the project be sustained?
- What is the best part of this SFCG program?
- What needs to be improved?
- How well was the program implementation process managed?
- How was the coordination between SFCG's program leadership and DGC staff in implementing the program?

Prisoners Participants

- To what extent was the project's approach relevant to preparing high-risk prisoners for better reintegration into society?
- To what extent was the knowledge and skills of DGC's staff improved in delivering material to the high-risk prisoners?
- Was the set of activities sufficient?
- To what extent did the different categories of activities complement each other?
- Did the project target the right group of beneficiaries?
- What unexpected results did the project lead to?

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- Did the participant's knowledge and skills in Conflict Management and Life Skills improve, and to what extent did the participants use the learned skills to prepare them for better reintegration into society?
- To what extent did the project empower the high-risk prisoners?
- How well was the program implementation process managed?
- How was the coordination between SFCG's program leadership and DGC staff in implementing the program?

Annex C List of Interviewees

No.	Name	Organization	Notes
1.	Elviera Agustin	DGC	Cooperation Section
2.	Sigit Budiyanto	DGC	Cooperation Section
3.	Drs. Nugroho	DGC	Director of Prisoners Rehabilitation and Service
4.	Tri Anna	DGC	Instructor of Prisoners Rehabilitation
5.	Ika Yusanti	DGC	Communication
6.	Johny Praptomo	DGC	Personality Development & Counseling
7.	Idang	DGC	Cooperation Section
8.	Iwan Pramono	DGC	Personality Development & Counseling
9.	Lina Herlina Widi Lestari	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Officer
10.	Suratmi	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Officer
11.	Firdaus	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Officer
12.	Agus Soekono	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Head
13.	Djoko Sunarno	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Officer
14.	Roro	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Officer
15.	Jauhari	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Officer
16.	Andi Herry	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Officer
17.	Samsun	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Head of the community learning center (PKBM)
18.	Nasrullah	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
19.	Kurniawan	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
20.	Albertus	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
21.	Tri	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
22.	Zarkasih	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
23.	Imam	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
24.	Afrizal	Tangerang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
25.	Wartoyo	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
26.	Agus Sumantri	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
27.	Darwoto	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Beneficiary

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		Facility	
28.	Syarif	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
29.	Maulana	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
30.	Fajar	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
31.	Ibnu	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
32.	Satimin	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
33.	Teuku Marshall	Cirebon Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
34.	Kamad	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
35.	Anwar	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
36.	Jali	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
37.	Kurnia	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
38.	Sofyan	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
39.	Opik	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
40.	Nur	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
41.	Abdul Ghofur	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
42.	Abdi	Cipinang Correctional Facility	Beneficiary
43.	Hardya Pranadipa	SFCG	Implementer
44.	Maghfiroh Hijroatul	SFCG	Implementer
45.	Laode Arham	SFCG	Implementer