CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION FORUM

Isolation vs. Engagement
Part One: The Changing Role of the Military
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Forum Description:

As foreign policy around the world is challenged to address perceived threats from state and non-state actors alike, traditional military strategy has undergone a series of self-correcting revisions. Part one in a series of fora on *Isolation Vs. Engagement* will focus on emerging military and police approaches to preventing and managing conflict—strategies that employ anthropologists in the case of the US military in Afghanistan, or dialogue between Pakistani military and tribal leaders. How have these strategies helped in the case of Iraq, and how are they being applied by AFRICOM? What is the new role of the Military?

Summary:

In 2004, the Defense Science Board issued its summer report, which laid out a scenario for what the military had to do for the "Long War." In 2005, the Secretary of Defense made conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction the equivalent of combat operations. So the military is ahead of NGOs in terms of conceiving what their job is.

In Sarajevo, a peace operation was redefined to include a multi-functional, multi-disciplinary intervention. In a successful peace-operation, you have the confluence of civil order and social justice, which is a positive peace, and, almost by definition, more stable.

The things that contribute to civil order are peacekeeping, as defined by the UN, and security operations. The things that contribute to social justice are found in peace-building (and in Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*). In a peace operation, the military is there to provide security. But for long-term stability, you need a civil component to work on nation-building and social justice.

The military is trying to learn how to deal with civilians. "Civil-military relations" is not just one thing. Now there are international civilians dealing with international military; international military dealing with local civilians; local military dealing with international civilians; and international military dealing with their home countries. Yet the military always has to deal with the local populous, and one of the problems there is a lack of cultural knowledge. One response to this problem was the Human Terrain Teams (HTT), which employ cultural anthropologists to provide commanders with cultural intelligence. This can be a good thing, but Project Camelot in Latin America was used as a front for the CIA, so there is a strong anti-HTT movement among anthropologists.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), were established in Iraq to help build state government. They were trying to develop the capabilities of existing institutions and how they dealt with problems. PRTs provided a space for different US government agencies to talk about what they're doing, how to coordinate their work, and how to coordinate US investments with the Iraqi government. The PRTs were composed of 80-120 people located at a military base or embassy, and their clients were provincial institutions.

Embedded PRTs (EPRTs) are smaller, work directly with brigade commanders, focus on governance, infrastructure, and economic development. EPRTs focus on civil-military cooperation not at the provincial level, but at the neighborhood level.

USAID designs programs for different sectors, and manages projects and constraints with local partners. The local partners decide what the problems are. The military sees the problems and works to fix them—little dialogue is had with locals. The State Department responds to problems in a country that affect foreign policy; Political Officers are not there to develop political systems. So each department comes with a different set of baggage. The US government doesn't have the kind of staff to do this work on the ground. They have to train and recruit more Foreign Service officers with experience in unstable areas.

Local investors start by focusing on spending money, rather than surveying what the problems are and addressing them. The US government has to be given time to do those assessments. The military can play a big role in that, and they're being trained to listen, to go in and assess the problems they encounter.

In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), militants were trained and sent to fight Soviets in Afghanistan. This relationship led Pakistan to accept the Taliban, which is how the FATA was allowed to radicalize. People in the FATA have an allegiance to tradition and custom. They have never accepted foreign subjugation, and they maintain an egalitarian society and ethos.

Pakistan is working to eliminate terrorism, and to deny the use of its territory as a base for operations within Pakistan or across the Pak-Afghan border. The military framework works to wean local support away from militants; squeeze the physical and moral space of militants; create a favorable military environment for other elements to take lead; create fission between various groups; and help locals expel Al Qaeda. Pakistan's strategic framework is 3-tiered: Military, Development, and Political. The military component has taken the lead, while the political and developmental components have not been able to move in parallel with the military. The military can only be as effective as foreign policy lets it.

A peace agreement in Pakistan is essential because it will show tribal people that it is in their interest to prevent terrorism. To reach an agreement, local dynamics need to be understood before going in to the region, and soft power will be most effective. The roots of ideology need to be examined. Why are people engaged in terrorism?